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ABSTRACT
This thesis comprises a critical review of the role of Local Government in the conservation of
biological diversity (or ‘biodiversity’). Whilst the vast majority of the text relates to NSW, much
of the broader commentary may extend to other Australian jurisdictions. The nub of the thesis is
that despite the rhetoric in key documents – including the National Strategy for the Conservation
of Australia’s Biological Diversity, the NSW Biodiversity Strategy, the National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy and various plans and policies made at the municipal level –
the outlook is grim without fundamental policy, legal and fiscal change.
The topic is huge but crucial to any person concerned about the mammoth decline of biodiversity
in Australia. Whilst being intrinsically transdisciplinary in nature, the thesis attempts to contribute
1
to the ‘new production of knowledge’. It raises issues, problems, ideas and recommendations.

The work is based on:
•

A literary search until 2001. The long gap between this date and thesis submission is due
to a severe illness suffered by the author, which arose in late Dec 2001.2

•

Empirical research into:
o

nine 1998/1999 ‘state of environment’ reports prepared for by councils located
roughly in or around the ‘NSW South-western Slopes’ bioregion that is
recognised for the extremely limited extent of remnant native vegetation;

o

conservation

related

clauses

in

all

gazetted

‘comprehensive’

Local

Environmental Plans - i.e. those applying to entire Local Government areas prepared by councils between 1995 and 2000 inclusively and which remain in
force;
•

Personal discussion with various officials and onlookers directly involved in, or
concerned about, biodiversity conservation at the municipal level.

Brief summaries of each chapter are provided herein. The introduction initiates discussion on (i)
the meaning of ‘biodiversity’, including its shift from a scientific concept to a populist
1

See ch 1 at 2.
On 31 Dec 2001, after hospitalisation for 9 days, the author was diagnosed as suffering from a malignant
brain tumour, known as astrocytoma. It was removed in 2002, followed by heavy radiotherapy and
chemotherapy, and a long period of torpor during which I lived the life a cat, sleeping for over twelve hours
per day. I returned to this thesis in July 2002, then spending about 30 minutes per day which expanded over
time, and recommenced part-time academic work in 2003. I am now convinced that I have left the cancer
behind, being one of the fortunate 20% of astrocytoma sufferers to survive, supported by a medical team of
professional excellence.

2

xiv
expression, (ii) the position of councils in Australian government and (iii) the significance of
biodiversity conservation at the local sphere. It also introduces two related concepts that are met
throughout the thesis, which arguably erode council conservation capability: Local Government’s
‘historical and cultural baggage’ and the ‘ratepayer ideology’.
The following three chapters provide the ‘historical and institutional’ context. Chapter Two
focuses on changing societal perspectives towards the biophysical environment, together with
resultant statutory and environmental trends that have paralleled the advancement of Local
Government. Chapter Three traces the history of NSW Local Government, demonstrating its
entrenchment in the political landscape. It examines major changes, especially functional
expansion and managerial reform. Chapter Four scrutinises a particular aspect of municipal
experience, namely top-down and bottom-up cooperation between neighbouring councils. This
chapter adds consideration of state appointed regional bodies that may arguably sideline Local
Government. The regional context is fundamental to environmental management due to the
inappropriateness of many council boundaries.
The next three chapters concentrate on legislative and financial detail. Chapter Five reviews the
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), which provides wide service powers, limited regulatory
opportunity and special requirements for council-owned land. Chapter Six explores the land-use
planning system under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), especially
the ongoing influence of its urban background. It raises the perennial influence of
‘developmentalism’ in the determination of applications for development, which directly benefits
property interests. Recent statutory change, especially in relation to ‘threatened species’ law, may
do little more than support informed habitat destruction. A closely related matter is funding, as
discussed throughout Chapter Seven. The issue goes beyond insufficiency. It is argued that Local
Government’s primary financial source - i.e. rating, a property tax - works against biodiversity
conservation. Not only is there no policy rationale to support rating in the conservation context
but the system can provide a ‘perverse incentive’ to rural landholders to clear their lands. This
problem is exacerbated by the type of valuation and differential rates. The system demands major
overhaul, including consideration of increased conditional Commonwealth funding.
The following two chapters relate to attitudes towards the biophysical environment that are
popular amongst the general community. Chapter Eight considers the provision of vegetated,
passive recreational open space whilst Chapter Nine deals with securing and enhancing local
amenity. These approaches, however, can be directly inconsistent with biodiversity conservation.

xv
Parochial ‘green’ desires of local constituents can lead to environmental damage.
Notwithstanding this, Chapter Ten provides some impressive examples of Local Government
supporting biodiversity conservation. But these are isolated and rely on committed individuals.
Whilst the pervasive prospect throughout this thesis is one of gloom, the concluding chapter
builds on previous discussion by presenting ideas and recommendations to improve the role of
Local Government in conserving biodiversity. It emphasises the need for regional approaches,
improved funding mechanisms and fresh visions. Councils with bigger areas, supported by
community structures to maintain ‘grass roots’ public participation, together with massive change
to Local Government funding, may provide a desirable path for municipal reform and retention of
Australia’s precious biodiversity.
The law discussed throughout this work stands at 1 Jan 2003. Major changes since then are noted
in the Postscript.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1

Prelude

This thesis concerns the role of NSW Local Government in managing the natural environment.
More precisely, it critically examines the position of Local Government in conserving
1

‘biodiversity’: i.e. the “variety of all life forms”. It considers opportunities for, and limits to, the
role of ‘general purpose’ councils in protecting biota and their ecosystems across Australia’s most
populous State. In view of current environmental expectations on Local Government arising from
legal, political, and community pressure, together with its sheer proximity to the environmental
2

coalface, it is a subject that deserves serious consideration. In 1995, Sproats observed that there is
3

an “absence of widespread debate” on the purpose of Local Government. Doyle and Kellow note
that, in particular, there has been “insufficient study of the role of local governments in the
4

development and implementation of environmental policy”. Hamilton et al are even more specific,
stating that “[t]oo little attention has been given to the role of local government in biodiversity
5

conservation”. Local Government itself does not help the situation with its low expenditure on
6

research and development. This thesis goes a small way to addressing this gap in the literature.
Councils have a crucial role in assessing, managing and carrying out actions that directly affect the
biophysical environment. Their ordinary day-to-day decisions add to an overwhelming, ongoing
impact on vegetated landscapes, creating what Bradsen calls ecological “death by a thousand cuts as
7

development nibbles away at habitat”. Council functions such as land-use zoning, determining
applications for development consent and providing basic infrastructural services, such as road and
1

Commonwealth of Australia, The National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity
(Canberra: Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (Cth), 1996), 1.
2
A Tarlock, “Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What is its Niche?” (1993) 60 University of
Chicago Law Review 555 at 556.
3
K Sproats, Australian Local Government Reform in the 1990s (Sydney: Centre for Local Government
Education and Research, UTS: 1998), 1; see also J Dore, “Revising Our Expectation of Local Government”
(1998) 57(3) Australian Journal of Public Administration 92 at 92; M Daly, “The Challenges for Local
Government in the 21st Century” in B Pritchard & P McManus (eds), Land of Discontent: The Dynamics of
Change in Rural and Regional Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000), 198; N Marshall & K Sproats, “Using
Strategic Management Practices to Promote Participatory Democracy in Australian Local Government”
(2000) 18 Urban Policy and Research 495 at 509.
4
T Doyle & A Kellow, Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia (Melbourne: Macmillan,
1995), 179.
5
C Hamilton, D Lunney & A Matthews, “An Economic Appraisal of Evaluation of Local Government
Approaches to Koala Conservation” (2000) 7 Australian Journal of Environmental Management 158 at 16768.
6
M Jones, Transforming Australian Local Governmen: Making it Work (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 221.
7
J Bradsen, “Biodiversity Legislation: Species, Vegetation, Habitat” (1992) 9 Environmental and Planning
Law Journal 175 at 179.
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drainage construction and maintenance, are all relevant. Councils are also responsible for managing
9

10

11

12

a great deal of public land, including bushy municipal reserves, cemeteries and roadside verges,

on which valuable remnants may be located. These and other functions put Local Government in a
pivotal position if achieving biodiversity conservation, rather than merely talking about it, is to be
taken seriously. As will be seen, councils enjoy extensive powers to pursue ecological objectives.
But despite considerable enthusiasm in some quarters, accomplishing effective conservation is far
from easy. Indeed, there are some locations where it is not even recognised as an issue. As a result,
there are major barriers, often derived from historical systems and traditional outlooks, which
demand attention. This forms the crux of the thesis.
1.2

Methodology, Objects and Limitations

1.2.1

Methodology

This study is multi-disciplinary, or perhaps more precisely, transdisciplinary, in nature. It brings
together aspects of environmental law, public policy, institutional history, town and country
planning, political science, and, to a lesser extent, conservation biology. This conglomeration of
subjects with their disparate perspectives is a direct result of putting law and legal institutions in a
broader policy context. The study essentially explores and analyses a great deal of information and
argument on a complicated topic in a structured manner for the first time, thereby contributing to
’

the “new production of knowledge” celebrated by Gibbons et al, which is ‘transdisciplinary and
13

‘heterogeneous’ in character.

8

C Binning, M Young & E Cripps, Beyond Roads, Rates and Rubbish: Opportunities for Local Government
to Conserve Native Vegetation (Environment Australia: Canberra, 1999), 22-26 & ch 3; E Cripps, C Binning
& M Young, Opportunity Denied: Review of the Legislative Ability of Local Government to Conserve Native
Vegetation (Canberra: Environment Australia, 1999), ch 1; N Goudberg, “Local Government” in Proceedings
of the Fenner Conference on Biological Diversity: Its Future Conservation in Australia (Canberra:
Department of Environment, Sport and Territories (Cth) & Ecological Society of Australia, 11-13 March
1992), passim; G Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (Sydney: Butterworths, 2002), 84-86.
9
Andrew Campbell, “Contrasting Perspectives: Young Countries in Old Landscapes and Old Countries in
Young Landscapes” in A Hamblin (ed), Visions of Future Landscapes. Proceedings of 1999 Australian
Academy of Science Fenner Conference on the Environment, 2-5 May 1999 (Canberra: Bureau of Rural
Sciences, 1999), 22.
10
A Kelly, “Biodiversity Conservation on Municipal Open Space in New South Wales” (1997) 4(1)
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 25, passim.
11
See, for example, S Prober & K Thiele, “Surviving in Cemeteries – The Grassy White Box Woodlands”
(1993) 37(1) National Parks Journal 13, passim.
12
See, for example, S Sandhu, M Toscan & B McAlister, “Roadside Vegetation: Preserving the Sample of
Australia Prior to European Settlement” in A Ray (ed), Bushcare: Proceedings of NSW Local Government
Workshops (Sydney: NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, 2000), 75.
13
M Gibbons et al, The New Production of Knowledge (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 4-6 & passim.

3

Whilst the edges of the overall topic might be blurry, relevant law and associated policy lie at its
core. Notwithstanding Dovers’ criticism of environmental lawyers “preferring too often, it seems, to
14

react to statutes”, legislation and its implementation are the hub of environmental law. It is the
failure of the common law to protect our surroundings that has led to statutes in areas such as public
land management and land-use planning.
This study goes far beyond a conventional, positivist approach to legal studies, which typically
identifies, scrutinises and analyses existing law on a certain matter. Positivism is restricted to what
15

the law comprises rather than how it could or should be improved or even abandoned. In contrast,
this thesis is about existing problems and the need for change, not only in respect to the law itself
but also how it is used and administered in policy and structural terms. The study might best be subcategorised as ‘socio-legal’ research, which concerns the societal impact of law and its “policy
16

relevance”. Its reach extends much further than traditional, Dixonian legal reasoning, with its
17

reliance on “strict logic” and almost scientific footings. Socio-legal research may stretch to vaguer
realms such as, inter alia, decision-making bias and politically-based policy formulation, all lying
within the law but not necessarily driven by it. It provides a suitable context for research into the
18

implementation of modern environmental law.

The author explored a wide range of literature, commencing with traditional legal texts but going
beyond to references from other disciplines, professional journal articles, parliamentary debates,
government reports (including agency Annual Reports), technical documents, unpublished
seminar/workshop papers and individual council plans and policies. Attendance at relevant
conferences and seminars, at which the author was sometimes privileged to speak, helped to provide
useful information and an understanding of current trends and thinking. Conversations were
conducted – often on an informal basis - with numerous people involved in Local Government
environmental management, including council and State Government officers, consultants, local
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S Dovers “Still Settling Australia: Environment, History and Policy” in S Dovers (ed), Environmental
History and Policy: Still Settling Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16-17.
15
T Hutchinson, Research and Writing in Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2002), 12 & 51.
16
B Hutter, “Socio-Legal Perspectives on Environmental Law: An Overview” in B Hutter (ed), A Reader in
Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.
17
O Dixon, the Right Hon, “Concerning Judicial Method” in Judge Woinarski (ed), Jesting Pilate (Sydney:
Law Book Co Ltd, 1965), 154.
18
Hutter, op cit n 16, passim.
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19

politicians and constituents concerned about biodiversity conservation.

Finally, analyses of

particular council documents took place, namely:
•

nine ‘state of environment’ reports (SoERs) held at the NSW Department of Local
Government’s (DLG’s) offices, prepared for 1998/1999 under the Local Government Act 1993
(LGA 1993) by councils located roughly in or around the ‘NSW South-western Slopes’ IBRA
(i.e. ‘Interim Biogeographic Regionalisation for Australia’) Bioregion, noted for its “small size
20

and fragmented nature” of remnant vegetation;
•

conservation related clauses in all gazetted ‘comprehensive’ Local Environmental Plans (LEPs)
- i.e. those applying to entire Local Government areas - prepared by councils under the
21

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA) between 1995 and 2000
22

inclusively and which remain in force, available via the ‘Austlii’ internet website.

The study of SoERs aims to provide an understanding of how some inland, rural councils not only
grapple with certain environmental obligations under the LGA 1993 but address the issue of
biodiversity itself. It formed a relatively small part of the research process. The review of 57
‘comprehensive’ LEPs involved more extensive research. LEPs provide a formal indicator of Local
Government’s regulatory response to biodiversity conservation imperatives. Good and bad
examples of local planning conservation provisions, together with specific matters, such as tree
preservation orders and environmental protection zones, will be dealt with in later chapters.

19

See references throughout the entire thesis. Some especially helpful people are mentioned in the
Acknowledgements at p *.
20
See R Thackway & I Creswell (eds), An Interim Biogeographic Regionalisation for Australia: A
Framework for Setting Priorities in the National Reserves System Cooperative Program (Version 4.0)
(Canberra: Australian Nature Conservation Agency, 1995), 58. See also ch 2. The councils comprise
Boorowa, Cootamundra, Gundagai, Gunning, Harden, Junee, Temora, Yass and Young Councils. The region
is characterised by the decimation of the grassy White Box woodlands community, noted by Prober & Thiele
as “one of the most poorly conserved ecosystems in Australia”: op cit n 11 at 13.
21
Whilst draft LEPs are prepared by councils, they are made by the relevant Minister prior to gazettal: see
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), ss 54-69 & 70.
22
Conveniently, this process was able to parallel, albeit to a limited extent, a consultancy study for the then
NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning undertaken by the author as the primary researcher: A Kelly,
D Farrier & C Larcos, Local Environmental Plans and Natural Resource Management (Wollongong: Centre
for Natural Resources Law and Policy, UoW, Oct 2000). The study assisted the Department’s review of Pt 3
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW): see Planfirst Review of Plan Making in NSW
White Paper (Sydney: the Department, 2001), 47. The LEPS were accessible via
www.austlii.au/form/search/?method=phrase&query=local+environmental+plan.
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1.2.2

Objects and Limitations

The thesis explores the extent to which Local Government’s historical and cultural baggage works
against effective biodiversity conservation. Much of the ‘baggage’ flows from decades of reliance
on rate moneys and the carrying out of narrow, property-enhancement functions. These have helped
foster a strong developmentalist municipal tradition. The general argument advanced is that whilst
key statutes – most notably the LGA 1993 and the EPAA - provide significant opportunity for
councils to introduce innovative local conservation policy frameworks, it is too easy for councils to
rely upon symbolic action only. They can remain in their stables of conservatism whilst boasting
conservation rhetoric. Even where a council has a strong interest in conserving its biophysical
environment, various problems remain such as limited finance, efficiency-driven managerial trends
and popular attitudes that are inconsistent with modern biodiversity imperatives. All this does not
mean that the situation is entirely bad for those who advocate a cardinal role for Local Government.
But further work needs to be done, including statutory amendment if not overhaul, advancement of
inter-council collaboration, strengthening regional planning and encouraging councils to lead their
own local communities in protecting neighbourhood environments.
The major sub-objectives of the thesis, in accordance with each individual chapter, are to:
i.

consider the meaning of the notions ‘biodiversity’ and ‘Local Government’ and the
relationship between them (see remainder of this chapter);

ii.

examine the history of societal attitudes towards the natural environment since European
settlement and the resultant statutory and environmental trends that have paralleled the
advancement of Local Government (ch 2);

iii.

scrutinise the development of Local Government since its inception in relation to functional
expansion, funding arrangements, boundary definition, electoral systems and managerial
reform (ch 3);

iv.

investigate previous and current attempts to require or encourage regional collaboration
between councils in view of the recognised importance of cross-border conservation
activity (ch 4);

v.

probe opportunities for, and constraints upon, conserving biodiversity under the LGA 1993
(ch 5);

vi.

critically explore the land-use planning system, including its background and the continuing
urban influence on contemporary plan-making, and the nature of the system under the
EPAA today, especially the preparation, interpretation and implementation of LEPs by
individual councils in respect to conservation demands (ch 6);
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vii.

assess the appropriateness of Local Government funding mechanisms for local biodiversity
conservation (ch 7);

viii.

analyse the situation where councils choose to pursue conservation in terms of:
a. providing vegetated, passive recreational open space (ch 8);
b. securing and enhancing neighourhood amenity (ch 9); and

ix.

appraise opportunities for, and examples of, councils that are serious about protecting
ecosystems (see ch 10).

The overall intention is to review the potential of Local Government to conserve biodiversity in the
contexts of:
•

its history and institutional structures, including regional mechanisms;

•

key legislative structures and the central fiscal regime; and

•

common attitudes concerning the benefits of keeping the natural environment intact but which
may work against biodiversity conservation.

Most of the information relates to NSW alone. Whilst many of the broader arguments may be
readily translated to other Australian jurisdictions, it is worth noting at this stage that the historical
development of NSW municipal government was unique in terms of the strength of early
community opposition and apathy.
Empirical research material in this thesis rarely goes beyond late 2000. This is due mostly to
personal reasons as explained in the abstract. The literature review extends to 2001/2002, although
worthwhile references discovered since then have not been ignored. The law, as described, stands at
1 Jan 2003. More recent administrative change is mentioned where appropriate, together with brief
reference to forthcoming change in the final chapter.
1.3

Introduction to Biodiversity

1.3.1

Notion of Biodiversity Conservation

The remainder of this chapter deals with key terms. At the outset, it is noteworthy that the terms
‘natural environment’ and ‘biodiversity’ are essentially different, even though they are often used
23

synonymously. The first, and older, term contains a conceptual difficulty: the boundary between

23

The remainder of this paragraph is based largely on J Wohlwill, “The Concept of Nature: A Psychologist’s
View” in I Altman & J Wohlwill (eds), Behaviour and the Human Environment (New York: Plenum Press,
1983), 7-10.
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natural and artificial is indistinct. Human intrusion into the native landscape is impossible to escape
except in the most inaccessible and inhospitable of places. This raises the question of the extent to
24

which we should tolerate human intervention before the landscape loses its ‘naturalness’. There is
also the related question of whether fragments of nature imported into the urban context, such as
street trees and blossom in window boxes, are part of the natural environment. Such issues illustrate
the sheer ambiguity of the concept. In contrast, the modern concept of biodiversity conservation, as
discussed further below, readily overrides such questions.
It may be argued that nature conservation, especially in the institutional context, should pay less
upfront attention to what the natural environment actually comprises and concentrate instead, in the
first instance, on why we want to conserve it. Answers to the second question should lead to the
first. Differing conservation objectives demand varying conceptions of what we desire to keep. In
other words, justification for conserving nature will indicate where limited conservation dollars
should be spent. For example, an undisturbed but visually dismal marshland is unlikely to be
maintained for amenity reasons yet may embody an invaluable reservoir of biological resources that
25

demand its preservation. In stark contrast, an avenue of non-native, common, flowering trees, such
as the Brazilian jacaranda, may be earmarked for protection solely due to its beauty. The first
example is a classic issue of biodiversity conservation, which concentrates on all species,
populations and their habitats, regardless of their appearance. The overriding concern is, in the
words of The National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity (‘National
Biodiversity Strategy’), the “sustainable use of biological resources and safeguarding the life
26

support systems on earth”.

The concept and term ‘biodiversity’ arose in the mid-1980s as a result of growing scientific interest
27

in “species extinction and ecosystem loss”. Jeffries refers to the term as a “snappy abbreviation”
formulated by Rosen, co-director of the 1986 American ‘National Forum for BioDiversity’, who

24

Interestingly, it appears that the community wants some level of human imprint, even in ‘wilderness’ areas.
The Wilderness Act 1987 (NSW), s 6(1)(c), defines ‘wilderness’ as, inter alia, areas that are, in the opinion of
the Director of the National Parks and Wildlife (see s 2),“capable of providing opportunities for solitude and
appropriate self-reliant recreation”, thereby encouraging limited human access. A 1995 survey of visitors to
NSW wilderness areas and national parks found that the majority of respondents regarded certain humanmade developments in such places as desirable: A Ramsay, “What is Wilderness: NSW Perceptions” (1995)
31(4) Australian Parks and Recreation 26 at 28.
25
J Bennett & M Morrison, “The Economic Analysis of Wetland Rehabilitation” (2000) 7 Australian Journal
of Environmental Management 48 at 48; D Mossop, “Coastal Wetland Protection Law in New South Wales”
(1992) 9 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 331 at 332-34.
26
Commonwealth of Australia (1996), op cit n 1 at 1.
27
M Jeffries, Biodiversity and Conservation (London: Routledge, 1997), 3.
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modified the longer title of ‘Biological Diversity’ that had arisen in scientific papers several years
28

earlier. These articles by US ecologists had used global perspectives to deal “with wider themes
29

than the purely biological”. EO Wilson, an internationally renowned Harvard biologist, argues
that:
“[b]iologists are inclined to agree that it is, in one sense, everything. Biodiversity is defined as
all hereditarily based variation at all levels of organization, from the genes within a single
local population or species, to the species composing all or part of a local community, and
finally to the communities themselves that compose the living parts of the multifarious
30
ecosystems of the world.”
The 23 definitions of ‘biodiversity’ quoted by Takacs from interviews with eminent biologists,
including Wilson, are mostly similar, reflecting the concepts of “biological totality” and “multiple
31

levels of biological hierarchy”. All this helps to underline the essentially scientific nature of the
concept in its original form.
This scientific emphasis is prominent in the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (‘Biodiversity
32

33

Convention’), signed by 155 states, including Australia, at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (UNCED).
The Convention defines biodiversity as:

“the variability among living organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial,
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part;
34
this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.”
The Biodiversity Convention sees biodiversity as a fundamental resource on which humankind
depends, both now and in the future. It recognises protection of genetic material for vital needs such
as food, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. Apart from brief passing reference in the first sentence
of its preamble to awareness of “economic”, “recreational” and “aesthetic” values of biodiversity,
the Convention is based essentially on conserving, managing and “fair and equitable sharing” of a
28

Ibid at 4-5.
Ibid.
30
EO Wilson, “Introduction” in M Reaka-Kudla, D Wilson & Edward Wilson (eds), Biodiversity II:
Understanding and Protecting our Biological Resources (Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1997), 1.
31
D Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 50-51.
32
Convention on Biological Diversity, entered into force 29 Dec 1993, ATS 1994 No 2. For general overviews
of the terms of the Convention, see M Grubb et al, The Earth Summit Agreements: A Guide and Assessment
(London, Earthscan Publications Ltd: 1993), ch 7; G Meyers, “An EIA for Rio: Assessing the Environmental
Impacts of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development” (1994) 1(2) Australasian
Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 1 at 49-60; see also S Blay & R Piotrowicz, “Biodiversity and
Conservation in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of the Earth Summit 1992” (1993) 10 Environmental
and Planning Law Journal 450, passim.
33
i.e. the ‘United Nations Conference on Environment and Development’, Brazil, June 1992.
34
Convention on Biological Diversity, article 2, ibid.
29
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35

global resource. As Farrier notes, the dominant phrase in the Convention is “the conservation and
36

sustainable use of biological diversity”. But the Biodiversity Convention is not a particularly
37

robust instrument. Hendricks describes to it as a “limited” and “fairly loose ‘framework’ treaty”.

Meyers is even more critical, arguing that its “vagueness, ambiguities, sometimes conflicting
provisions and unresolved issues” will continue to undermine its contribution to restricting
38

biodiversity loss.

More obviously, the thrust of the Biodiversity Convention introduced a very different
anthropocentric dimension to the nature conservation politics that had arisen over twenty years
earlier. The 1960s witnessed the advent of ‘modern environmentalism’, a global trend based on a
39

strong conservation ethic fuelled by the emerging science of ecology. This movement led to fierce
public interest in protecting native landscapes. But energy was directed at the cherished and
spectacular, such as mountain lakes and rainforests, rather than all aspects of nature. The powerful
emergence of the biodiversity conservation objective from the 1980s onwards has challenged such
environmental favouritism. As Kelly and Farrier observe, biodiversity conservation “extends
40

beyond pleasant forested landscapes to malodorous swamplands and monotonous saltbush plains”.

41

It encompasses not only visible, attractive species, such as the Australian koala, but also insects,
42

43

44

arthropoda, soil biota and microbes. It renders the philosophical questions raised earlier about

35

Ibid at article 1.
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37
B Hendricks, “Postmodern Possibility and the Convention on Biodiversity” (1995/96) New York University
Environmental Law Journal 1 at 9.
38
Meyers, op cit n 32 at 60.
39
See ch 2.
40
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41
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Royal Zoological Society of NSW, 1998), passim; S Little, “Implications for Threatened Invertebrates in the
New South Wales Planning System” in W Ponder & D Lunney (eds), The Other 99% (Sydney: Royal
Zoological Society of NSW, 1999), passim.
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Future” in R Gifford & M Barson (eds), Australia’s Renewable Resources: Sustainability and Global Change
(Canberra: Bureau of Rural Resources, Department of Primary Industries and Energy (Cth), 1992), pp. 189202.
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State of the Environment Advisory Council, Australia: State of the Environment 1996 (Canberra: CSIRO
Publishing, 1996), 4-6.
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(eds), Biodiversity II: Understanding and Protecting our Biological Resources (Washington DC: Joseph
Henry Press, 1997), 279-288.
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pinpointing what is sufficiently ‘natural’ almost redundant. A species or genetic population
earmarked for conservation might be found only in a dramatically modified remnant, such as a
partially mown council reserve or even the scientist’s laboratory. Biodiversity conservation
encompasses ‘sullied’ landscapes as well as the pristine. For these reasons, it is a far more
challenging concept than traditional approaches, which have emphasised protection of the
pleasurable.
Since the 1980s, the term ‘biodiversity’ has entered popular culture, utilised by environmental
activists and the wider community. In the opening sentence of his essay on the meaning of
‘biodiversity’, Gaston refers to “[b]andwagon, buzz-word, growth industry, global resource, issue
45

and phenomenon”. At a local seminar in 1996 on ‘the new construct of biodiversity’, England
called it a “buzz word” used in “arguments of conservationists, bureaucrats and politicians”
46

(including, presumably, those from Local Government). So at one end of the biodiversity spectrum
– i.e. the original end – it is a science-driven notion that sees conserving nature as essential for
humankind’s survival and enrichment. At the other end, it is a fashionable word that has injected
new vigour into nature conservation. The term is used far more commonly today than it was when
work on this study commenced. It can be seen in newspaper articles and tourist brochures. As will
be seen in later chapters, it is easy for council decision-makers to ‘dress up’ environmental action in
misconstrued biodiversity clothing. This can only add to biodiversity decline outside those special
places earmarked for recreational opportunity and aesthetic delight.
Issues such as this are made all the more poignant when considered against Australia’s extreme
richness in biodiversity. The 1996 Australia State of the Environment report recorded that 85 % of
the nation’s flowering species, 82% of its mammal species, 45% of bird species, 89% of reptile
47

species and an astonishingly high 93% of frog species are endemic to this continent. It is not
surprising, therefore, that Australia is recognised, in conservation biological terms, as one of the
48

twelve ‘megadiverse’ countries whose “native biodiversity is of global significance”. New notes

45

K Gaston, “What is Biodiversity” in K Gaston (ed), Biodiversity: A Biology of Numbers and Difference
(Oxford: Blackwell Science, 1996), 1.
46
P England, “Biodiversity: All Bark and No Bite?” in D Lunney, T Dawson & C Dickman (eds), Is the
Biodiversity Tail Wagging the Zoological Dog? (Sydney: Royal Zoological Society of NSW, 1998), 30;
Takacs, op cit n 31 at 39.
47
State of the Environment Advisory Council, op cit n 43 at 4.4; see also Commonwealth of Australia
(Biodiversity Unit, Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories), Australia’s Biodiversity: An
Overview of Selected Significant Components (Canberra: the Department, 1994), 15.
48
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW), NSW Biodiversity Strategy (Sydney: the Service, 1999), 5; see
also T New, Conservation Biology (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), 23.
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that it is “geographically more isolated” than the other eleven and the “only one … predominantly
in the temperate region”, leading to the observation that:
“Australia’s biota is sufficiently unusual, with many unique elements, to be of undoubted
global significance in scientific terms and as part of the attraction and character of the
49
continent …”
In 1994, the then Federal Minister for the Environment, Senator Faulkner, who oversaw much of
the Commonwealth’s lead in advancing national biodiversity conservation policy, remarked that
“Australia is privileged to be the only developed country in the world recognised as being
50

outstandingly rich in biodiversity”. But despite Australia’s advanced economy and educational
levels, a large proportion of our native species has disappeared forever. In late 1995, the then NSW
Minister for the Environment, Ms P Allen, when introducing the Threatened Species Conservation
Bill 1995 in an effort to reduce decimation of various endangered native species and their habitats
across NSW, lamented that “Australia has the worst record of mammal extinction rates”, adding
51

that “almost a quarter of the nation’s plant species are now classed as threatened”. Brown states
that “Australia has lost more mammal species in 200 years than the rest of the world in two million
52

years”.

Biodiversity loss extends beyond species annihilation. Where a species has been partially
exterminated, involving local rather than full extinction, its diversity will nevertheless be reduced,
which may affect “any of the five major evolutionary processes – mutation, selection, random
53

genetic drift, and mating and genetic recombination”. This issue relates to ‘genetic biodiversity’:
54

i.e. “diversity within species”.

At the other end of the scale is ‘ecosystem diversity’. The

Biodiversity Convention defines ‘ecosystem’ as a “dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro55

organism communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit”. Damage
to this level of biodiversity is far easier to observe. In 1996, the Commonwealth recorded that
“[n]early 70 per cent of all native vegetation ha[d] been removed or sufficiently modified by human

49

New, ibid.
Senator J Faulkner, “Biodiversity: It’s Time to Deliver” (1994) 1(1) Australian Environment News 2 at 2.
51
Ms P Allen, Parliamentary Debates, NSW Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 7 Dec 1995, 4482.
52
V Brown, “Our Core Business is the Future: Working Towards Local Agenda 21” in V Brown (ed),
Managing for Local Sustainability: Policy, Problem-Solving, Practice and Place (Richmond, NSW: UWS,
Hawkesbury: 1997c), 15.
53
New, op cit n 48 at 41 & 58.
54
Convention on Biological Diversity, op cit n 32, article 2, emphasis added.
55
Ibid, article 2.
50
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56

activity since 1778”. This included the estimated destruction of 43% of forests, 60% of coastal
wetlands, almost 90% of temperate woodlands and over 99% of temperate lowland grasslands of
57

south-eastern Australia. Glanznig refers to the disturbing example of the whitebox woodlands of
the NSW western slopes, encompassing the NSW south-western slopes IBRA bioregion, which
have been reduced in area from “several million hectares to probably 50 to 100 hectares with an
58

intact understorey, scattered widely”. He asserts further that in the central wheatbelt, “about 90%
of the native vegetation has been cleared … and remnant vegetation continues to be cleared at a
59

substantial rate”. Further examples will be provided in ch 2.
The bulk of this thesis relates to the challenge of stemming loss of ecosystem biodiversity. Takacs
reveals the widely held view amongst conservation biologists is that the “conservation focus”
60

should be “shift[ed] … to processes, ecosystems and habitat”. Lovejoy states that “[b]y far the
61

biggest problem in protecting the world’s biodiversity is habitat destruction”. This extends from
the step-by-step ‘nibbling away’ of biodiversity by individual developments to wide-scale land
62

clearance, mostly for agricultural purposes.
1.3.2

Key Instruments and Documents beyond the Biodiversity Convention

The Biodiversity Convention was not the only formal product of the UNCED. In addition to the UN
Framework on Climate Change, 170 countries, including Australia, endorsed two international
63

statements of intent: (i) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and (ii) Agenda

56

State of the Environment Advisory Council, op cit n 43 at 4-6.
Ibid at 4-26.
58
A Glanznig, Native Vegetation Clearance, Habitat Loss and Biodiversity Decline: An Overview of Recent
Native Vegetation Clearance in Australia and its Implications for Biodiversity (Canberra: Department of the
Environment, Sport and Territories (Cth)), 1995), 8; see also New, op cit n 48 at 31-32; Prober & Thiele, op
cit n 11, passim.
59
Glanznig, ibid at 23, emphasis added.
60
Takacs, op cit n 31 at 69.
61
T Lovejoy, “Biodiversity: What is it?” in M Reaka-Kudla, D Wilson & Edward Wilson (eds), Biodiversity
II: Understanding and Protecting our Biological Resources (Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1997), 11;
see also Glanznig, op cit n 58 at 6 ff; M Young et al, Reimbursing the Future: An Evaluation of Motivational,
Voluntary, Price-Based, Property-Right, and Regulatory Incentives for the Conservation of Biodiversity, Part
I (Canberra: Biodiversity Unit, Department of Environment, Sport and Territories (Cth), 1996), 130.
62
B Traill, “Environmental Impacts of Landclearing in Australia” in Proceedings of I Can See Clearly Now …
Land Clearing and Law Reform Conference, 4-5 July 2002 (Sydney: National Environmental Defenders
Office, 2002), 5.
63
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Annex I – Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/Conf.151/26 (Vol 1)), Rio de
Janiero, Brazil, June 1992. See also www.un.org.documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.html (accessed
18 May 2004).
57
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64

65

21, described by Bates respectively as a “statement of general principles’” and “an action plan”.

These two declarations enshrined the principle of ‘sustainable development’, a norm with “long
66

historical lineage”, kickstarted by the World Commission on Environment and Development in
1987 and awarded global celebration at the UNCED. Sustainable development was defined
concisely in the 1990 ‘Brundtland Report’ (i.e. ‘Our Common Future’) as “development that meets
the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
67

needs”.

The version of sustainability adopted in Australia is ‘ecologically sustainable development’ (ESD),
in which insertion of the term ‘ecological’, as Harding notes, reflects “more emphasis on ecological
68

concerns”.

ESD serves as an over-arching precept for environmental management, which
69

embraces biodiversity conservation as a key subset.

Several months after the UNCED, the

Commonwealth released the National ESD Strategy, which listed its “core objectives” as:
•

enhanc[ing] individual and community well-being and welfare by following a path of economic
development that safeguards the welfare of future generations;

•

provid[ing] for equity within and between generations; and

•

protect[ing] biological diversity and maintain[ing] essential ecological processes and life70

support systems.

In similar fashion, the common statutory definition of ESD in NSW includes reference to
71

“conservation of biodiversity conservation” within one of several underlying ‘principles’. Dovers
observes that the principles in the National ESD Strategy led to insertion of ESD objectives “in
72

dozens of Australian statutes”. But the language of ESD, in both legislation and official strategy, is
64

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1993, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for
Sustainable Development (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1993). See also
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.html (accessed 18 May 2004).
65
Bates (2002), op cit n 8 at 122.
66
T O’Riordan, “The Politics of Sustainability” in R K Turner (ed), Sustainable Environmental Economics
and Management: Principles and Practice (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), 44-53.
67
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 87.
68
R Harding, Environmental Decision-Making: the Roles of Scientists, Engineers and the Public (Sydney:
Federation Press, 1998), 21.
69
National Parks & Wildlife Service (NSW) (1999), op cit n 48 at 49.
70
Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992b), 8.
71
For more detail, see ch 2.
72
S Dovers, “The Rise & Fall of the NSESD, or Not?” (1999a) (4) Australian Environmental Law News 30 at
35. See also ch 2 at n 121.
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one of noble, vague aims. At least at a superficial level, they are difficult to reject. O’Riordan
observes that ESD has become a “persistent ... political concept similar to democracy, justice and
73

liberty: in other words, a movement without opposition”.

The statement in the National ESD Strategy that “implementation … [is] subject to budgetary
74

priorities and constraints in individual jurisdictions” is evidence of the document’s weakness. In
any event, the National ESD Strategy does not appear to have made a noticeable impact on onground environmental decisions. Of all the NSW councils surveyed by Fowke and Prasad in 1996,
with an impressive 85% response rate from 59 councils, only a miserable nine were able to mention
75

the then four year-old National ESD Strategy. This was despite the success of Local Government’s
peak national body, the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) – i.e. the ‘federation’ of
76

all State and NT Local Government associations and the ACT Government - in “gaining a place in
77

the negotiating process”. The figure makes mockery of Brown’s statement in 1997 that “[l]ocal
authorities [were] already ... a major influence ... in the national moves towards ecologically
78

sustainable development”.

An arguably far more significant Australian document, which preceded the UNCED by only several
79

weeks, was the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE). In May 1992, Prime
80

Minister (PM) Keating, all State Premiers, Territorial Chief Ministers and, importantly, the

73

O’Riordan, op cit n 66 at 65.
Commonwealth of Australia (1992b), op cit n 70 at 14.
75
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Planner 61 at 65. Furthermore, only 52% were aware of Commonwealth and State Government work on
ESD.
76
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Resource Assessment Commission, 1993), 29.
78
Brown (1997c), op cit n 52 at 16. ESD will be discussed again in ch 2. Notably, there has been an
“explosion” of Australian literature on ESD: D Mercer, A Question of Balance: Natural Resources Conflict
Issues in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 2000), 101. See also Moffatt who observes that after the
Brundtland Report, “academia ... generated a spin-off industry in defining the concept”: I Moffatt, “The
Evolution of the Sustainable Development Concept: A Perspective from Australia” (1992) 30 Australian
Geographic Studies 27 at 35.
79
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1 May 1992).
80
Notably, Western Australia has since withdrawn from the Agreement.
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81

President of the ALGA, signed off on the IGAE. It is best viewed as a ‘political compact’, aimed
to “guide the parties in defining the [environmental] roles, responsibilities and interests of all level
82

of Government.” It articulates numerous key principles, including recognition that “conservation
of biological diversity … should be a fundamental consideration” in developing and implementing
83

“environmental policy and programs by all levels of Government”. There is also Sch 6, entitled
‘Biological Diversity’, which opens with the clumsy aim that “parties acknowledge that biological
84

diversity is a valuable component of the environment and should be protected”. An odd feature is a
separate Schedule 9 entitled ‘Nature Conservation’, which overlaps with the biodiversity
provisions. Its first item reads that:
“[t]he parties agree that each level of Government has responsibilities for the protection of
flora and fauna and should use their best endeavours to ensure the survival of species and
ecological communities, both terrestrial and aquatic, that make up Australia’s biota. The
parties recognise that the protection and sound management of natural habitats is of
85
fundamental importance to this aim …”.
The separation of the two Schedules reflects, perhaps, the then freshness of the term ‘biodiversity’
and its limited usage outside scientific literature before its eruption at the UNCED. Perhaps the term
had then yet to be embedded in modern environmentalism.
86

The IGAE has been largely supplanted by later instruments,

including Commonwealth

87

legislation. Nevertheless, its importance cannot be overlooked. Brown observes that it “was the
88

first instrument ever to be signed by all three spheres of Australian Government”, which reflects
the then growing stature of Local Government in terms of not only inter-government relations but
also environmental management.
The second item of Sch 6 of the IGAE refers to the ongoing preparation of “a draft national strategy
89

for the conservation of biological diversity”. It took another four years for PM Keating and all
State Premiers and Territorial Chief Ministers – but, unfortunately, no Local Government
81

Bates (2002), op cit n 8 at 77.
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83
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84
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See ch 2.
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90

representative

91

– to sign the National Biodiversity Strategy.

Kennedy describes its long

preparation period as an “unfortunate” case of State Governments playing “political football”,
92

noting objections by NSW and Western Australia in particular.

Whilst the description of biodiversity in the National Biodiversity Strategy is consistent with the
Biodiversity Convention’s definition set down earlier, the explanation of the “numerous” benefits
93

flowing from its conservation is broader. The first articulated conservation imperative is that
biodiversity comprises “the primary source for fulfillment of humanity’s needs” with the added
comment that biodiversity richness “offers the broadest array of options for sustainable economic
94

activity”. The document goes on to observe that biodiversity conservation leads to advantages well
95

beyond “the continued harvest of resources”. It refers to the essential provision of ecological
services, such as, inter alia, groundwater recharge and soil production, as well as reduction of
96

“rising costs” from land degradation. There is even mention that conservation know-how is a
97

“marketable commodity”. The Strategy acknowledges an ethical dimension that “[w]e share the
98

earth with many other life forms that warrant our respect, whether or not they are of benefit to us”.

It also emphasises the direct human enjoyment that biodiversity provides, echoing the traditional
perspectives of modern environmentalism in stating that:
“[t]he aesthetic values of our natural ecosystems and landscapes contribute to the emotional
and spiritual wellbeing of a highly urbanised population. Both active and passive recreational
99
benefits of our ecosystems are highly valued by an increasing number of people.”
The assortment of reasons for conservation expressed by the National Biodiversity Strategy
suggests that it has a bet on all sides. Unlike the Biodiversity Convention, it fails to prioritise any
overriding objective. Its scattergun approach can only help boost the Strategy’s wider support. In
particular, the general community and its political representatives, including municipal councillors,
90

A Kelly, “Biodiversity, the Planning System and Local Government: A Happy Trio?” in D Lunney, T
Dawson & C Dickman (eds), Is the Biodiversity Tail Wagging the Zoological Dog? (Sydney: Royal
Zoological Society of NSW, 1998a), 35.
91
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92
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the Commonwealth’s Move?” in B Boer, R Fowler & N Gunningham (eds), Environmental Outlook No 2:
Law and Policy (Sydney: Federation Press, 1996), 187.
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can easily appreciate those benefits relating to human pleasure. These are far easier to appreciate
than, for instance, the unknown gains of resource conservation for future generations.
100

Biodiversity strategies have since emerged at the State level.

In 1999, the NSW National Parks
101

and Wildlife Service (NPWS) issued the NSW Biodiversity Strategy. In its first paragraph, it states
102

that “[b]iodiversity is vital in supporting all life on earth”,

adopting the same description of

biodiversity as does the National Biodiversity Strategy. In terms of benefits, it emphasises
‘ecosystem services’, such as soil formation and pollution absorption, whilst conveying the crucial
103

message that “biodiversity provides all the critical processes that make life possible”. It then refers
to direct human usage of nature. Reference to aesthetic, recreational and cultural values is brief.
More attention is paid to the “economic benefits” of conservation, such as the role of koalas and
104

whale-watching in the tourism industry”.

A trickle of individual biodiversity conservation plans and policies has emerged at Local
105

Government level, notably in urban and coastal areas.

In the meantime, the ALGA and the

Biological Diversity Advisory Council (BDAC; i.e. the body responsible for ongoing action under
106

the National Biodiversity Strategy),

has produced a more general document for all councils,

namely the National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy (‘National LG Biodiversity
107

Strategy’).

This received unanimous acceptance at the National General Assembly of Local
108

Government, an “annual policy-setting congress of councils”,

in Nov 1998.

109

In the Assembly’s

2002 National Agenda for Australian Local Government (‘LG National Agenda’), an annual policy
document endorsed by delegates at each National Assembly, members adopted the statement that

100

J Bradsen, “The ‘Green Issues’: Biodiversity Conservation in Australia” in B Boer, R Fowler & N
Gunningham (eds), Environmental Outlook: Law and Policy (Sydney: Federation Press, 1994), 199.
101
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW) (1999), op cit n 48.
102
Ibid at 3.
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104
Ibid at 4.
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See ch 10.
106
For information on the Biological Diversity Advisory Council (BDAC), see
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Australian Local Government Association & Biological Diversity Advisory Council, National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy (Canberra: the Association, 1999).
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Brown (1997a), op cit n 88 at 60.
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Australian Local Government Association, National Local Government Biodiversity Survey; National
Local Government Biodiversity Strategy Implementation Project Stage 1 (Canberra: the Association, 2000),
18.
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“Local government supports efforts to conserve biodiversity and will pursue the implementation of
110

the [National LG Biodiversity Strategy]”.

The National LG Biodiversity Strategy describes ‘biodiversity’ in similar terms to the other
documents mentioned above.

111

At the top of the list of conservation advantages is “high economic
112

returns through tourism and increased land values, due to scenic and amenity values”.

The

expression reflects Local Government’s traditional interest in serving local economies and property
interests, perhaps designed to attract strong municipal support rather than educate Local
Government personnel on global and inter-generational interests. The document also attempts to
lobby the other levels of government. Whilst recognising that “natural resource management is best
done at a local level”, it calls for improved legislation and policy frameworks, better intergovernmental partnerships and, most fiercely, superior funding arrangements.

113

The Strategy

immediately prompted an audit of councils across Australia, with a response rate of 65.2%,
published as the National Local Government Biodiversity Survey, to “determine what was
114

happening”.

Another document, published in 2001, is the Biodiversity Planning Guide for NSW Local
115

Government (‘Biodiversity Planning Guide for LG’), prompted by a proposed ‘action’ in the NSW
Biodiversity Strategy to assist individual councils prepare their own ‘local biodiversity action
116

plans’.

The Biodiversity Planning Guide for NSW Local Government describes ‘biodiversity’ in

line with the various strategies referred to earlier, adding that it provides the “basis of life support
systems that contribute towards the functioning and maintenance of ecosystems, landscapes, human
117

settlements and land use”. In explaining the reason for conserving biodiversity, it follows the NSW
Biodiversity Strategy in stressing “maintenance of essential ecological processes”, going on to
118

accentuate “the economic and social benefits”.
110

It refers, for example, to “tourism and recreation

Australian Local Government Association, National Agenda for Australian Local Government 2002, item
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111
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112
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Planning Ministers’ ‘National Award for Planning Excellence’ administered by the (then) Royal Australian
Planning Institute. The author of this thesis was a co-author.
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119

opportunities” and even ‘political advantages’ in terms of meeting community expectations. Such
text is clearly designed to attract municipal support. It demonstrates the distance the desire for
biodiversity conservation has travelled since its scientific origins.
1.4

Introduction to Local Government

1.4.1

Stature and Entrenchment
120

At the time of writing, there are 172 local councils in NSW, excluding ‘county councils’ (see ch
4) and Aboriginal Land Councils. They range from bustling Blacktown City with a rapidly growing
121

population of over 266,000, to sleepy Nundle Shire with a little over 1,300 people.

In area size,

they extend from tiny Hunters Hill overlooking Sydney Harbour, with only 6 sq km, to the vast,
122

outback Central Darling Shire with over 53,500 sq km. All this leads to wide variation in matters
123

such as fiscal capacity, staff expertise and their impact on local conservation policy. Nevertheless,
despite the huge diversity amongst individual councils, they all operate under the same major
statutes.
Local Government is Australia’s third sphere of government. It prefers the term ‘sphere’ to ‘level’
or ‘tier’ as it implies ‘equality’ with the Commonwealth and States rather than underling status. But
its subordinate position in the federal framework is impossible to ignore. First, it has no recognition
in the Australian Constitution. Second, it is established under State legislation, which is vulnerable
to Parliamentary amendment and repeal. Both points will be expanded upon below. Third,
Australian statutes that set up municipal systems always confer strong powers on the relevant State
124

Government on issues such as council dismissal and amalgamation.

This helps to explain why

Local Government is often called a ‘creature of the State Government’, although more accurately it
is a product of State Parliament.

119

125

Ibid at 7-8.
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121
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126

Amalgamations, unless voluntary, have always been controversial and unpopular. They probably
remain “the most contentious feature” of modern Local Government reform.
128

introduction of compulsory incorporation across NSW in 1906,

127

Since the

the number of councils has

approximately halved. But unlike other States, so far the amalgamation process has occurred
129

incrementally rather than by upheaval,
131

precipitated by the ‘Barnett Inquiry’.

130

with the most active period having been 1975-1985

During the 1990s, four separate voluntary amalgamations

occurred, prompted by State encouragement and publicly funded facilitation meetings. In contrast,
in Victoria in 1996, the Kennett Government replaced 210 elected councils with 68 authorities
managed by appointed commissioners, together with enforced efficiency-driven organisational
132

reforms. Tucker describes Victorian councils as having been reduced to “little more than a part of
133

state government administration”.

Chapman refers to the incident as “both despotic and totally
134

contrary to the community principles on which local government is founded”.

It reveals the

potency of State Government’s muscle over councils and supports the argument that Local

126

Sproats (1998), op cit n 3 at 3; A Vince, “Amalgamations” in B Dollery & N Marshall (eds), Australian
Local Government: Reform and Renewal (Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia, 1997), 152. For a
description of Local Government attitudes towards amalgamations penned in 1958, which is not out-of-date
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135

Government is little more than a “dependent appendage” of its parent.

Marshall observes that
136

NSW “sits at the other end of the [amalgamation] spectrum from Victoria”.

But there is no

guarantee that NSW will escape mass, enforced amalgamation in the future.
Local Government regards its omission from the Australian Constitution as a continuing thorn in its
137

side,

which fails to protect it against severe action by State Government such as the Victorian

experience under Premier Kennett. In the 2002 LG National Agenda, delegates supported the
statement that “[t]he rights of citizens to the democratic pursuit of community values through
elected local government must be protected in the Australian Constitution”, adding that “Local
138

Government seeks constitutional recognition in the Australian Constitution”.

Commentators’

views differ on the issue. Galligan argues that “there is no great point, nor much practical
139

likelihood, of local government being constitutionalised”. On the other hand, Longo states that the
Constitutional silence “makes it difficult for local government to strengthen its role in Australia’s
federal system”.

140

Justice Michael Kirby is also sympathetic, suggesting, extra-curially, that

“recognition and protection of the democratic character of local government could be an appropriate
141

[constitutional] reform which would have many supporters”. Such ‘supporters’, however, have not
been sufficiently forceful in the past.
142

Local Government played no role in establishing Federation.

It was not represented, let alone
143

discussed, at the official Constitutional Conventions of the 1890s.

135

Whilst municipal delegates
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Government Finance (Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, ANU, 1987), 1.
136
N Marshall, “Reforming Australian Local Government:S Efficiency, Consolidation – and the Question of
Governance” (1998) 64 International Review of Administrative Sciences 643 at 650. For current moves, see
ch 11.
137
Tucker (1999), op cit n 125 at 55.
138
Australian Local Government Association, National Agenda for Australian Local Government 2002, op cit
n 110, items 2 & 3 under ‘Principles of Local Democracy’, www.alga.asn.au.page.cfm?site_page_id+386
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143
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144

attended the unofficial Conventions at Corowra and Bathurst, Local Government was not an issue
of concern. Councils and their infrastructural services fell, without question, outside “matters of
145

national and international concern” into the realm of residual powers of the new States.

As a

result, the drafting of the Australian Constitution on the picturesque Hawkesbury, itself described
146

by artist McCubbin as a ‘national symbol’, was irrelevant to Local Government.
Nothing then happened until the early 1970s, when the Commonwealth Government under PM
Whitlam became more involved in Local Government, despite Local Government’s “loud and long”
lobbying since 1948 when the ALGA’s predecessor, the Australian Council of Australian Local
147

Government Associations (ACLAGA), was established. Local Government was represented at the
148

1973 Constitutional Convention,

which led to an unsuccessful referendum for Constitutional

amendment to allow direct funding by the Commonwealth to Local Government.

149

Establishment

of the Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations (ACIR) in 1976 by the Fraser Government
150

led to further interest. The ACIR, whose aim was to “improv[e] inter-government cooperation”,

paid considerable attention to Local Government, adding fuel to Local Government’s aspirations for
151

greater kudos and inter-governmental profile. Chapman notes that the ACIR’s efforts “indirectly
152

led to [Local Government’s] entrenchment in several State Constitution Acts”, including s 51 of
the NSW Constitution Act 1902. The ACIR’s support for strong recognition of Local Government
153

in the Commonwealth Constitution was less successful.

144

Although the ACIR was later abolished
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‘inter-government cooperation’ to include Local Government: s 2(1). For an overview of the establishment of
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154

due to controversy over some of its critical views of federal government, the Hawke Government
set up the Constitutional Commission in 1986, which recommended, inter alia, insertion of a
reference to Local Government in the Australian Constitution, albeit via a shorter and simpler
155

version than what the ACIR had canvassed. The Constitutional Commission believed that such an
amendment would:
“give local government the necessary status as a third sphere of government, and the
necessary standing to enable it to play its full and legitimate role in the structure of
government in Australia, and as an equal partner in consultations about the allocation of
156
responsibilities and resources within that structure.”
157

This led to crunch time for Local Government.

In 1988, the electorate faced a question on

inserting a new s 119A into the Constitution, which was to read:
“[e]ach state shall provide for the establishment and continuance of Local Government bodies
elected in accordance with its laws and empowered to administer, and to make by-laws for,
158
their respective areas in accordance with the laws of the state.”
159

As is well known, the attempt was unsuccessful.

The result, according to Marshall, led to a

“downturn in the status of Local Government in both federal and state arenas”.

160

The then ALGA

161

President, Cr P Kyle, had predicted a loss would be “unthinkable”. But momentum soon returned,
as illustrated by the Commonwealth’s agreement in late 1995 to “provide support” for
162

Whilst the Labor Government was supportive, the subsequent

Constitutional recognition.

Coalition Government has dampened Commonwealth interest. Local Government became a nonissue during the more recent republican debate, the related ‘People’s Convention’ and the 1999
163

referendum on Head of State.

154

Constitutional recognition now appears to be an issue of interest
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mainly to Local Government itself. It is still a sensitive issue, comprising one of ALGA’s chief
164

priority policy areas”.

The references in State constitution statutes do little to soothe Local Government. Whilst the
165

Constitution Act 1992 of NSW provides for the continuation of “a system of local government”, it
166

does not demand that councils be always elected; nor does it prevent rearrangement of the system.

Whilst Local Government cannot be entirely dismantled under the statute, there is no definition that
describes what ‘Local Government’ is. Furthermore, the provision has been drafted in a “non167

Ellis-Jones and Henningham note that the Constitution Act “could be

entrenched manner”.

amended, or even repealed, by another Act of Parliament – and by a simple majority.”

168

In 1920,

the UK Privy Council described its Queensland counterpart as “occup[ying] precisely the same
169

position as a Dog Act”.

All the above simply means that if Local Government is a genuine sphere of government, this is due
to reasons other than formal Constitutional recognition. It enjoys a firm position in the federal
system due to the progressive role of the ALGA in forging inter-governmental partnerships. Its
membership of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) since 1992, endorsement of key
documents such as the IGAE and National ESD Strategy, together with entry into the Accord
Between the Commonwealth of Australia and Local Government in 1995 (‘the Commonwealth/LG
170

Accord’),

provide ready examples. The IGAE makes it clear, however, that it does not bind
171

individual councils.

It is difficult for the ALGA, as Local Government’s national body, to
172

“properly reflect the diversity” across all of its members.

The other reasons for Local Government’s entrenchment, all interrelated, concern the nature of
173

Local Government itself and its relationship with local communities. First, there is the sheer age

164
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174

of Local Government. Second, there is the fundamental nature of many of its activities. Since the
nineteenth century, councils have provided basic, unglamorous facilities such as roads, bridges,
stormwater drains and waste depots. They have also facilitated less crucial but nevertheless prized
services, such as parklands, libraries and community meeting halls. Councils have also played a
significant role as regulators in promoting public health and safety since early times. All these
175

functions are relatively uncontroversial and rarely stir the heart. But they can be most effectively,
176

and efficiently, delivered at the local level.

As Hawker noted over twenty years ago, they are

177

essentially “housekeeping tasks”. As recently as 2000, Daly described councils as “frequently …
busy with ‘housekeeping’ matters” that comprise a “rag-bag of functions that State and Territory
178

governments generally find too local, or too detailed to bother with”. This is especially the case in
179

rural shires with limited populations.

But despite the ‘housekeeping’ nature of traditional

municipal activity, such functions are elemental to neighbourhood communities, their civic pride
180

and local economies. They directly affect each citizen’s quality of life. They serve to embed Local
Government in Australian society.
The third factor is Local Government’s ‘democratic legitimacy’: i.e. recognition that local
communities choose the members of their councils. This is despite the factor of ‘voter apathy’, as
evidenced by contrasting the extent of municipal voting with elections for other spheres of
181

government.

Mueller remarks that Local Government “sees itself as almost synonymous with

182

democracy”. Aulich suggests that NSW in one of three Australian states where Local Government

174

See ch 3.
See Bowman, who commented in 1983 that “[l]ike the old-fashioned housewife, local government helps to
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municipal history, Bland had argued for the State Government to shed the “wearisome cares of domestic
housekeeping” to councils: F Bland, Planning for the Modern State (Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1937), 203.
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Daly (2000), op cit n 3 at 197 & 200-201; see also Goudberg, op cit n 8 at 80.
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Daly, ibid, passim.
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maintains “a high commitment to local democracy”, unlike others where “fiscal and economic
183

issues override other social and political concerns”. Recent pressure on improving efficiency and
corporate management, however, according to Marshall et al, has helped weaken Local
184

Government’s “traditional democratic foundations” across Australia. These systems hark back to
185

the roots of municipalisation, albeit in a very different form to today. Local Government’s elected
nature does not mean, however, that communities enjoy true representativeness. Gray observes that
the average councillor in Australia is “predominantly male, middle aged or older, and of small
186

business, farm for professional occupation.”

Despite this, the general accessibility of council

representatives to their constituents – i.e. what Marshall and Sproats call “an immediacy and
187

directness about representative/constituent interaction” – is superior to the situation at the Federal
and State levels. It also contrasts with appointed regional bodies in NSW, such as Regional
188

Vegetation Committees, which will be mentioned in later chapters. As Skelcher and Davis remark,
the accountability of appointees, as opposed to elected members, tends to be inwards to the
189

organisation itself. No electors are involved.
The fourth related reason, as stated by Daly, is that Local Government is “the institutional face of
190

government that is closest to the grassroots of society”.

Self claims that Australia’s municipal
191

system is “genuinely local and grassroots”, in contrast with most systems elsewhere. This issue is
closely allied with the democratic factor but extends to council officers. As Bishop notes, most

183
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192

interaction with citizens occurs through administrative channels. Proximity to the coalface means
greater opportunity for citizen input into policy formulation and decision-making, thereby moving
away from reliance on political representation to active participation, aided by modern legislative
193

opportunity.

Notwithstanding this, the ‘grassroots’ factor reflects the ‘subsidiarity’ principle,

defined in the European Charter of Local Self Government in the following terms:
“[p]ublic responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities
which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of the task to another authority should weigh up
194
the extent and nature of the task and the requirements of efficiency and economy.”
The delegation of functions to Local Government during the last few decades exemplifies the
principle well. Land-use planning, the force and sophistication of which has expanded substantially
195

since the 1960s,

provides a ready example. Jones maintains that development control still serves
196

as Local Government’s sole “key power”. But in line with European Union’s definition, the State
197

Government still enjoys the ultimate hand under the EPAA. It can take planning and development
assessment powers away from Local Government. At the same time, it has poured new
198

responsibilities upon councils. During the 1990s, as will be discussed outlined in ch 6,

major

amendments to the EPAA injected consideration of protection threatened species, populations and
ecological communities into the planning system. This is one of numerous examples of an
avalanche of fresh responsibilities and expectations imposed upon Local Government, especially in
relation to environmental management.
1.4.2

Local Government and Environmental Management

The NSW Biodiversity Strategy refers to ‘planning and development’ by Local Government as a
“traditional” Local Government activity whilst describing ‘environmental management’ as a ‘new
199

role’.
192

But unlike ‘planning and development’, environmental management is not encompassed

P Bishop, “Customers, Citizens and Consultation: The Ethics of Representation” in P Bishop & N Preston
(eds), Local Government, Public Enterprise & Ethics (Sydney: Federation Press, 2000), 27.
193
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195
See ch 6.
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under one statutory regime. It extends across most council functions, including land-use planning. It
also flows from various non-statutory instruments and documents.
At the global level, the Biodiversity Convention makes no reference to Local Government. In
contrast, Agenda 21 conveys its appreciation of the importance of local authorities, with an entire
chapter devoted to Local Government. Its Ch 28 opens by stating that:
“[b]ecause so many of the problems and solutions being addressed by Agenda 21 have their
roots in local activities, the participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a
determining factor in fulfilling its objectives. ... As the level of governance closer to the
people, [local authorities] play a vital role in educating, mobilising and responding to the
200
public to promote sustainable development.”
It goes on to establish the concept of a ‘Local Agenda 21’ (LA21), an action plan to be devised by
each local authority through a process of “consultation and consensus building” with local
201

communities.

In Australia it has been described as “a long term strategic planning program for
202

achieving sustainability in the 21st century”.

The LA21 concept has attracted extraordinary

hyperbole. Skinner of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives claims that
203

action by councils provided “the pebbles in the pond that led to the wave of UNCED”.

Otto-

Zimmerman, on the other hand, observes that Local Government was a relative latecomer to the
204

UNCED process.

He draws attention to the scant attention paid to municipal institutions

elsewhere in Agenda 21, together with the UNCED’s failure to provide “a sophisticated assessment
of how the international community and local authorities would work together to achieve
205

[sustainability] objectives.”

206

Whilst Agenda 21 is not binding on Local Government,

it appears

that it has prodded numerous Australian councils to at least address sustainability issues. Adams
200

Agenda 21, op cit n 64, cl 28.1.
Agenda 21, ibid, cl 28.2.
202
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and Hine argue that it has provided the catalyst for Local Government to “occupy … centre
207

spotlight on the environmental policy stage”.

Of course, levels of activity amongst councils are

uneven. Yet in 1999/2000, a national survey revealed that 34% of all councils had been involved in
208

a ‘LA21 or ESD plan’. In view of limited funds and lack of interest in some quarters, LA21 has
209

not transformed Local Government overnight.

But there is no doubt that ESD has entered Local

Government language. Chapter 28 of Agenda 21, the most influential of international instruments
210

on municipal environmental management, has been a significant contributor.
211

At the domestic level, Brown refers to the 1992 ‘TASQUE Report’, commissioned by the national
Local Government Ministerial Council, as “the first national statement recognising [Local
212

Government’s] major environmental responsibilities”.

Its main recommendations concerned (i)

injecting “good environmental practice” into all council functions and (ii) improving the
213

interrelationship between spheres of government.

The first is feasible, although not necessarily

mandated, as a result of council-driven ‘management’ or ‘strategic’ plans required under modern
207
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214

Local Government legislation across Australia.

The second has been achieved, at least partially,

via instruments such as the IGAE and the Commonwealth/LG Accord. Mention of the TASQUE
Report is now uncommon. The major drivers towards ESD and biodiversity conservation at the
local level since then have been the various strategies referred to already, new and revised
legislation and statutory instruments, Commonwealth funding schemes, various conferences and
workshops, community pressure and, occasionally, local ‘champions’ who become fierce
conservation advocates.
Management of the natural environment has developed as a major area of Local Government
functional expansion during the 1990s. This is reflected in the emergence of environmental
215

scientists and/or conservation officers as the latest professional grouping to join council ranks. But
attention to biodiversity conservation is not universal. In particular, rural councils often suffer
“limited capabilities”, with insufficient funding and expertise, to address localities facing “severe
216

environmental challenges”.

This is despite the remarkable expectations placed on all Local

Governments as set down in the official strategies.
217

The National Biodiversity Strategy contains fourteen direct references to Local Government.

In

the ‘Implementation’ section, it states that within two years of its publication, local councils would
218

“have assumed a major role” in the conservation of Australia’s biodiversity.

Without major

change, such a scenario was impossible. The NSW Biodiversity Strategy has 25 direct references to
219

‘Local Government’ in its text, including that “Local Government will be a key player in efforts to
220

conserve biodiversity”.

Again, it will emerge from this study that such a viewpoint is over-

optimistic. The summit organisation of Local Government in NSW, the twin Local Government

214
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221

Association and Shires Association,

also support biodiversity conservation. The bodies have

adopted the policy statement that “Councils should develop policies that maximise biodiversity and
protect threatened and endangered species and their ecosystems”.

222

A significant problem for individual councils, however, is insufficient funding.

223

Furthermore,

Local Government’s strong reliance on a property tax since its beginnings has limited its cultural
224

outlook, which several commentators describe as the ‘ratepayer ideology’. Manning sums up the
principle by observing that whilst ever councils are dependent on rate revenue, they “limit
225

themselves to the provision of services likely to cause an increase in the value of land”. In similar
226

fashion, Parker refers to a “property mentality”,

whilst Parkin alludes to an “institutional
227

conservatism” underpinned by a “basically property-oriented self-perception”. Bowman also uses
228

the term ‘property mentality’, which she attributes directly to municipal history. As Halligan and
Paris observe, the ‘ratepayer ideology’ means that Local Government is “concerned with people
229

only as property owners”. In 1989, Jones remarked that “[r]emnants of ratepayer philosophy still
230

influence” councils and would continue to do so. Whilst most of these references are now old, the
argument still carries weight. The ‘ratepayer ideology’ is the direct product of the strong property
231

franchise upon which Local Government was built. As will be argued throughout this thesis, it can
still stifle innovation today. Notwithstanding the functional and legislative changes of the 1990s, it

221
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is a strong part of the ‘historical and cultural baggage’ that undermines Local Government’s
potential in being a major player in conserving biodiversity, especially in rural areas. And it is not
the only obstacle.
As noted earlier, much of Australia’s biodiversity has already been lost. As Cowra Shire Council
232

notes forlornly, “essentially no remnant vegetation remains” in its area apart from rugged hilltops.

But this should arouse a sense of urgency rather than despair. In his overview of national
environmental politics in 1994, Toyne described Local Government as the “forgotten level of
233

government”. This is no longer the case. Doyle and Kellow call Local Government “the sleeping
234

giant of environmental politics”. This study will help show that the giant may now be awakening.
But is it too late?

232
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CHAPTER TWO
AN ALTERED LANDSCAPE AND COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA
2.1

Prelude

The remarkable extent of biodiversity decline in Australia has already been highlighted. This
chapter extends the foundation laid down in ch 1 by presenting a concise, and more detailed,
historical overview of environmental attitudes and ‘management’ throughout post-European
Australia. In considering whether any cultural shortcomings of modern Local Government
undermine its potential to conserve biodiversity, it is critical to consider the environmental context
in which Local Government emerged and has since developed. The influence of historical attitudes
on law and policy comprises a major aspect of this study. As Dovers suggests, “[e]nvironmental
history provides clues and some cues at best … for positioning our analyses and responses.”1
The first part of the chapter concerns dominating environmental paradigms of the past. During
colonial times, as will be seen, a large portion of society viewed the natural environment as nothing
more than something to be transformed for economic gain. This overrode weaker voices that valued
nature more highly. By the time a more universal pride in Australia’s natural surroundings emerged,
pressure for resource exploitation continued but was harnessed under institutional guises. It was
during this later era that Local Government structures became developed embedded in the
Australian political system.
Whilst the study concentrates on environmental practices after European settlement, there is no
intention to deny the considerable import of environmental management over countless centuries by
indigenous Australians.2 Indeed, the sustainable techniques practised by Australian Aborigines may
provide lessons to modern-day land managers. But this thesis is not about the best ways to manage
the environment on-ground. It is about broader institutional frameworks and, in particular, a certain
institution introduced to Australia by British settlers.

1

S Dovers, “Still Settling Australia: Environment, History and Policy” in S Dovers (ed), Environmental
History and Policy: Still Settling Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.
2
The special relationship, or ‘oneness’, between traditional Aboriginal people and their lands should be
acknowledged. This topic will not be met again. This does not mean that it is trivial. But it is poles apart from
Western perspectives and their anthropocentric policy frameworks. It helps to drive home that the common
notion of conserving the natural environment, which surrounds humankind, is essentially a Western construct.
For locationally specific discussion on the ‘oneness’, see L Head, Second Nature: the History and
Implications of Australia as Aboriginal Landscape (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 5, 17-18,
138-144 & 147; see also J Wright, Born of the Conquerors (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1991), 47.
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The chapter then moves on to deal with modern environmentalism, a social movement arising in the
late 1960s that challenged developmental norms head-on. In scrutinising any aspect of how
biodiversity conservation might be achieved on-ground today, it is important to appreciate the
broader background of environmental concern and its eventual crystallisation into statute. Modern
environmentalism precipitated a raft of ‘protective’ environmental laws at the State level, including
the powerful Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA). The ‘second
wave’ of modern environmentalism, comprising the advent of ESD, will also be addressed. As will
be discussed, ESD is now enshrined in relevant statutes, including the EPAA and the Local
Government Act NSW 1993 (LGA 1993).
The third and final part addresses contemporary trends in environmental management, namely a
realignment of environmental powers within the Federal framework, escalating complexity of
environmental administration and a relatively new emphasis on community involvement. It is in
these latter sections of the chapter where direct reference to Local Government is more common.
This is because all these developments have paralleled growing recognition of the significant
position councils may play in environmental management.
The earlier sections of this chapter rely heavily on Heathcote’s captivating overview of Australian
environmental history in which he catalogues non-indigenous attitudes towards the natural
landscape by reference to five environmental “visions” (or, in Frawley’s words, five “culturally
constructed lenses”).3 It provides a helpful framework for the historical narrative. Whilst the
‘visions’ are intrinsically broad in nature, it should not be forgotten that each individual landscape –
be it local or regional – always has its own story to tell.
2.2

Early Paradigms

2.2.1

The ‘Scientific’ and ‘Romantic’ Visions

Heathcote’s “scientific” vision emerged at the beginning of British settlement when the newcomers
regarded native biota as “objects of novelty and curiosity to European eyes”.4 To visiting scientists,
such as Joseph Banks, Australia represented an open-air museum of the bizarre. But any desire for
preservation was overshadowed by an urge to remove specimens for study and display, with ships
3

R Heathcote, “The Visions of Australia 1770-1970” in A Rapoport (ed), Australia as a Human Setting
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), 77-98; K Frawley, “A ‘Green Vision’: The Evolution of Australian
Environmentalism” in K Anderson & F Gale (eds), Inventing Places: Studies in Cultural Geography
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992), 221.
4
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returning to England almost resembling Noah’s Arcs.5 Nowadays, in stark contrast, the focus is on
in-situ, rather than ex-situ, species conservation. The first principle enunciated in both the National
Biodiversity Strategy and the NSW Biodiversity Strategy is that biodiversity “is best conserved insitu”.6 Of course, as seen in ch 1, modern biodiversity conservation policy is expressed in terms of a
far broader range of objectives than those embraced by early botanists. Nevertheless, the notion of
keeping nature intact to feed scientific curiosity can still be apparent.7
Another early paradigm, the “romantic” vision, gained momentum throughout the nineteenth
century based on “delight in the uncivilised nature of the landscape”.8 In contrast to growing
popular opinion that viewed the natural environment as a mere obstacle to economic progress, this
vision adopted a sympathetic attitude towards the Australian bush. It encouraged enlightened
settlers to appreciate the beauty and mystery of unfamiliar landscapes. But the vision was piecemeal
and weak. It took a whole 100 years after white settlement until Australian impressionist painters,
such as Roberts and McCubbin, chose to glorify native bushland, with its floristic detail and
subtlety of colours, rather than reproduce pretty English scenes.9
Nolan cites the protection of the spectacular limestone caves at Jenolan in 1866 as a rare example of
government action inspired by the romantic movement.10 Keeping natural areas in public ownership
for conservation purposes was then almost unknown. Most attention was directed at offloading
Crown land for agricultural development. Any land retained by the Crown for public use tended to
cater for town purposes, especially official buildings and manicured parklands.11

5
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When a fierce and successful conservation movement arosed during the 1920s and 1930s
demanding reservation of wilderness lands, much momentum came from demands for bushwalking
and canoeing opportunities in scenic and remote locations.12 Conveniently, the ruggedness of these
lands made them unsuitable for agriculture. The movement comprised an extension of the
‘romantic’ vision but was now driven by recreationists rather than artists and idealists. It has
influenced conservation reservation policy ever since, although many visitors today may prefer not
to leave their vehicles. Reservation of natural areas by the State still tends to concentrate on
impressive features and beauty spots.13 The same feature applies to Local Government albeit in a
more haphazard manner, as will be discussed in ch 8.
Pressure to preserve the most majestic scenery and cutest of species, especially the koala, provides
powerful reminders that the ‘romantic’ vision still carries considerable force. Nolan suggests the
fact that the caverns at Jenolan “still evoke feelings of the sublime is testimony to the enduring
strength of the Romantic vision in our culture”.14 Turning to the urban environment, Proudfoot
notes how the romantic movement influenced twentieth century town planning with its enduring
emphasis on suburbs in landscaped settings that mimic popular aspects of the biophysical
environment.15 As the chief neighbourhood planning agency, Local Government has helped drive
this approach. As will be argued in ch 9, conserving nature for its aesthetic benefits alone, as
championed by both early and modern-day romanticists, can readily conflict with contemporary
biodiversity conservation imperatives.
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2.2.2

The ‘Colonial’ Vision

The ‘romantic’ vision soon became overwhelmed by the “colonial” vision, the dominant
environmental paradigm throughout the nineteenth century. This vision was imbued with a
contempt for, or even fear of, an alien landscape that seemed untamed and desolate.16 Society
applied its energy to improving the environment by direct transformation, aided by government land
agencies fixated with transferring Crown land into private hands.17 The direct result was headlong
ecological assault, as described in poignant fashion in 1839 by a female pioneer during her journey
from Sydney to the Blue Mountains:
“[t]he system of ‘clearing’ here, by the total destruction of every tree and shrub, gives a most
bare, raw and ugly appearance to a new place. In England we plant groves and woods ... but
here the exact contrary is the case, and unless a settler can see an expanse of bare, naked,
unvaried, shadeless, dry dusty land spread all around him, he fancies his dwelling ‘wild and
uncivilised’. About some of the older houses in the colony a growth of fruit-trees, and often
British forest-trees, has succeeded the despised Aboriginal productions.”18
The settlers manifested their hostility to the landscape by re-establishing the English countryside.
This led to the ecologically disastrous importation of exotic species during the 1860s and onwards,
promoted by Acclimatisation Societies.19
At the same time, economic imperatives and colonial policy demanded settlement of the vast
interior for farming enterprise. Wool was more appealing to the free settlers than cultivation
because the open forest country often did not need to be cleared.20 Sheep also seemed suitable to the
arid and unpredictable climate. Wool catered for a hungry British market and was able to be
transported long distances.21 But the ancient and generally infertile soils were not used to sharp
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ovine hooves.22 Due to their thin and exposed nature, they suffered compaction and became highly
vulnerable to wind and water erosion. As a result, much native vegetation, especially grasslands,
suffered or disappeared altogether, making way for hardier plants such as exotic weeds.23 The
situation is exemplified well by Rolls’ solemn description of the Hunter region, concerning how:
“[s]ettlers first took their stock to the lovely Hunter River in 1821. By 1826 they had eaten
the county bare. In 1859 botanists inspected it for the New South Wales Government. On
farm after farm they found no Australian plants. All that grew were imported weeds.”24
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, interest turned to cropping, such as wheat farming,
which displaced much pastoralist activity and increased pressure for native vegetation removal.
This agricultural drive arose from a burgeoning gold rush population, which provided not only a
growing market for agricultural goods but needed new sources of income as the gleam of the
goldfields dimmed.25 Davidson describes the result as “the largest changes in the Australian
landscape” then ever to have arisen.26 Governmental policy, grounded in aspirations for dense
populations of yeomanry, promoted intensive settlement by ‘selectors’. The intention was to create
both (i) a civilised rural community in contrast to the heady gold rush days, and (ii) colonial
wealth.27 All this occurred against the background of core ‘colonial’ vision imperatives to subdue
the land. A combination of compulsory land improvement policy, new land clearing methods,
demand for timber fencing and pressure for increased agricultural output from inadequately sized
allotments all contributed to large-scale destruction of the native landscape.28 By 1892, it was
estimated that some 9.2 million ha in NSW alone had been cleared.29 The impact on native species
was disastrous. Beattie et al note, for instance, that:
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“[u]ndoubtedly the conversion of forests, woodlands or shrublands to grass-dominated
agricultural ecosystems caused a massive simplification of the invertebrate fauna. In addition
to losing those invertebrates which were associated with the native vegetation, there were
corresponding losses in the soil fauna as a result of changed microclimatic regimes and soil
compaction ... [t]hese losses in turn resulted in the deterioration of soil structure and
fertility”.30
Overworking, of farms, including insufficient fallowing, soon led to land degradation and reduced
harvests.31 Soil erosion became a visible problem.32 The picture of environmental devastation at the
hands of small landholders is drawn well in Rudd’s popular On Our Selection:
“[n]o mistake, it was a real wilderness – nothing but trees, goanna, dead timber and bears …
We toiled and toiled clearing those four acres, where the haystacks are now standing, till
every tree and sapling that had grown there was down.”33
So where was Local Government at this stage? As will be seen in the following chapter, Australia’s
first Local Government structures were established under the ‘colonial’ vision. But in NSW, initial
municipalisation was restricted mostly to townships where the colonial government encouraged
provision of basic infrastructure and sanitary regulation by local communities, all subsidised by a
property tax. Despite the close social and economic relationship between towns and their
hinterlands,34 nineteenth century Local Government remained confined to urban areas if tolerated at
all. Put simply, rural communities did not want it. Any hint of taxing farming enterprise would have
been antipathetic to a society built upon unbridled agrarian development. Accordingly, Local
30
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Government played an extremely minor role in the development of colonial rural NSW. Standing
on the sidelines as local ecosystems vanished, it comprised a tentative urban and town institution of
narrow enterprise. Nature conservation was irrelevant.
It should be noted that transformation of the pre-1778 environment, including loss of native
grasslands, also served to augment, rather than decimate, some vegetation communities. Native
herbivores, such as the kangaroo rat (or bettong), lost their habitats due to land clearance, thereby
freeing the dispersal of forest seeds, a previous source of food, which otherwise would have failed
to germinate.35 New thickly wooded country soon developed. Previous land management regimes
practised by indigenous inhabitants through the use of fire came to an abrupt end.36 Agriculture and
pastoralism led to the disappearance of the open woodland landscape so admired by early
romanticists,37 supplanted by woody weeds and dense timberlands. As Cary and Barr stress,
“[w]hole new forests appeared”.38 This is why Rolls observes that:
“[p]resent Australia grows many more trees than at the time of European settlement.
Unfortunately the growth is disorganised. There are far too many trees where there ought to
be few, such as the wide strip of ruined grassland north of Cobar in New South Wales
[whilst] there are no trees where there ought to be many, such as the recharge areas of
Victoria’s mallee.”39
In A Million Wild Acres, Rolls describes the onslaught of the ‘Pilliga scrub’ after sad attempts to
clear the lands for agriculture, observing that the “forest had had a final say”.40 This phenomenon
raises difficult questions for modern-day conservation policy-makers, including Local Government,
as to where conservation energy should be directed. It highlights issues about whether the limited
conservation dollar should be spent on preserving existing ecosystems, which may be very different
to the pre-1778 situation, or attempting to recreate what has disappeared since then.
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Despite anti-environmental attitudes under the ‘colonial’ vision, strands of conservation laws
nevertheless emerged. Legislation to protect imported game, such as grouse and pheasants for
sporting pastimes and aesthetic enjoyment,41 was extended to native fauna with particular attention
paid to the koala, a “general favourite with the public” especially after publication of The Magic
Pudding.42 This reflected elements of both the romantic and the budding ‘national’ vision, discussed
directly below. These early statutes are the ancestors of current threatened species conservation
laws which, as will be discussed in chs 5 and 6,43 now appoint Local Government as a major player.
2.2.3

The ‘National’ Vision

The “national” vision gradually displaced the ‘colonial’ vision to become the dominating ethos
throughout the twentieth century until the late 1960s. It was fired by growing optimism in national
economic prosperity, spurred by Federation in 1901. Society no longer viewed the landscape as
something to be conquered but as a key source of wealth that demanded expert management.
Enmeshed with this was a revival of early romantic notions concerning the visual appeal of the
bush. In this context, Frawley refers to:
“some changing aesthetic appraisals of the Australian landscape [that] related to the
affirmation of Australian cultural identity, nationalist sentiment and the attempt to see the
landscape through Australian rather than European eyes.”44
By this stage, Australia’s first national park (and the world’s second), now known as the Royal
National Park, had already been established in 1879.45 Nolan points out that adoption of the term
‘national’ twenty years before Federation reveals “a sign of confidence of colonial nationalism”.46
The emphasis was on providing a pleasure ground on Sydney’s doorstep without any intention to
preserve nature in its raw state.47 Turner describes the result as a “Hyde Park in the Bush”.48 The
41
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dawning ‘national’ vision, with its fresh fondness for the Australian bush, provided an ideal milieu
for establishment of artificial playgrounds carved out of bushland.49 Clearly, the notion of nature
conservation at that time wore a very different hat to modern-day biodiversity imperatives.
Apart from setting aside special places, enhanced awareness of nature failed to dampen enthusiasm
for environmental change. A developmental paradigm continued, albeit infused with growing
national pride, which encouraged formulation of public policy frameworks to guide and promote
natural resource development, including agricultural enterprise. A fresh approach based on ‘wise
use’ principles arose,50 underpinned by a complex interplay of social ideals and science. The era
witnessed a succession of government policies on further land selection, closer settlement and
soldier repatriation that promoted land clearance and cultivation on even smaller holdings.51
Lessons from the ‘colonial’ era about ecosystem destruction went unheeded.
Whilst the myth of an intensively settled agrarian population continued to permeate government
policy,52 an expanding scientific expertise facilitated ‘progress’ by guiding natural resource
development along utilitarian lines. Under this climate, State Governments enacted separate statues
for the managed exploitation of specific resources. For example, the NSW Parliament introduced a
series of “sectoral and segmented” laws,53 such as the Mining Act 1906 (NSW) and Water Act 1908
(NSW).54 Fowler describes these statutes as environmentally “exploitative”, as opposed to more
recent “protective” laws.55 Grinlinton observes that the vast majority of such laws entered existence
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well before the mid-1960s, with the most recent being “basically re-enactments”.56 The NSW
Government established specialist departments and statutory authorities, such as mining and water
management agencies, to administer the new resource allocation regimes. It overlooked Local
Government which, despite having been forced onto most of rural NSW in 1906,57 stayed in its
functional straitjacket of providing the most basic of services.
In hindsight, the impact of the ‘national’ vision on many natural ecosystems was catastrophic. A
ready example is the advent of irrigation: the regulation of scarce river water and promise of its
plentiful supply at the landholder’s gate. The first major irrigation work in NSW was the Burrinjuck
Dam on the Murrumbidgee River, commenced in 1906 and delivering water by 1913. By that time,
the then newly created Water Resources and Irrigation Commission had acquired 120,000 ha for
subdivision into 1, 4 and 20 ha irrigated farms for returned servicemen.58 But farm sizes proved
uneconomic, leading to social, economic and environmental disaster.59 Loss of soil nutrients and
soil salinisation became rampant due to overworking the soil and excessive water application. All
this stemmed from flogging the land for short-term economic survival. Despite the problems,
publicly funded irrigation schemes continued. The Burrinjuck-based scheme became the forerunner
of a vast network of State-controlled irrigation districts throughout south-western NSW. Continued
blind faith in Government sanctioned policy is epitomised in Hill’s 1940 homage to the Murray
Valley, described as:
“a pageant of God’s handiwork and man’s. ... the magic of irrigation has changed the face of
nature... Fifty thousand acres cut out in jewel patches from the wilderness; fifty thousand
happy people where once was but melancholy mallee; 17 settlements in 500 miles, coining
the gold of the sun into fruits as golden...”60
Within a decade after the penning of these words, the Commonwealth initiated the mammoth
Snowy Mountains Scheme to bring yet more water to the Murray Valley - 922,500 megalitres per
year - by diverting, tunneling and damming swift-flowing alpine rivers.61 It was an engineering feat
of massive proportions, representing the zenith of the ‘national’ vision and embodying tremendous

56

D Grinlinton, “The ‘Environmental’ Era and the Emergence of ‘Environmental Law’ in Australia - A
Survey of Environmental Legislation and Litigation 1967-1987” (1990) 7 Environmental and Planning Law
Journal 74 at 79.
57
See ch 3 at n 120.
58
Water Resources Commission (NSW), The Role of Water in the Development of New South Wales (Sydney:
The Commission, 1984), 30.
59
H Dare, Water Conservation in Australia (Sydney: Simmons, 1939), 34; Water Resources Commission
(NSW), ibid at 30.
60
E Hill, Water into Gold (Melbourne: Robertson & Mullens, 1940), 317-319.
61
Lines, op cit n 19 at 200.

44

symbolic significance in an optimistic era of post-WWII economic expansion. In 1958, PM
Menzies extolled that:
“this scheme is teaching us ... to think in a big way, to be thankful for big things, to be proud
of big enterprises and ... to be thankful for big men.”62
Such efforts are viewed very differently today. The environmental legacy of irrigation in the
Murray-Darling Basin and elsewhere is now harshly apparent.63 Well over a decade ago, PM
Hawke warned that:
“[p]roduction worth more than $220 million is lost each year [in the Murray-Darling Basin]
because of land degradation in cropping and irrigation areas alone. The total cost to the
community from degraded lands, deteriorating water quality, rising groundwater and loss of
native habitat throughout the Basin is likely to be many times greater.”64
The problem is still expanding. In the Berraquin area, for instance, it has been estimated that the
extent of salinised land increased from 22,000 ha in 1985 to 91,300 ha in 1990.65 The farming
landscape that has replaced Hill’s “melancholy mallee” is now an ecological travesty. A ‘Salinity
Audit’ released in 1999 refers to estimates of up to 12.3 million ha in the Murray-Darling Basin
NSW sector “experiencing rising groundwater levels”, with associated impacts on farm productivity
and biodiversity.66 By the time Heathcote’s fifth paradigm arose in the 1960s – i.e. the “ecological”
vision as outlined below – much of the natural environment had been altered beyond repair. Modern
environmentalism was to arrive far too late to save countless ecosystems such as the Murray mallee.
By the time the ‘national’ vision began to wane, Local Government was rigidly entrenched across
most of the NSW countryside. Its legislative regime had been formulated when developmentalism
reigned supreme. Although the NSW Government kept management of natural resource allocation
to itself, it had handed to rural councils responsibility for constructing and maintaining fundamental
infrastructural services, such as roads and domestic water supply, to serve rural communities based
on primary industry. It was during this period that a strong pro-development municipal culture
gained momentum, rooted in the perceived and unchallenged benefits of land improvement and
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local economic growth. The main Local Government legislation, enacted in 1919 when the
‘national’ vision enjoyed full force, 67 was to remain intact for over seven decades.
2.3

Modern Environmentalism

2.3.1

The ‘Ecological’ Vision

Heathcote’s final vision, the “ecological”, is simply another name for modern environmentalism, a
global movement that challenged prevailing norms directed at headlong development for economic
gain. Its central concern was the adverse and noticeable impact of humankind on the natural
environment. The movement emerged in the USA and Britain and, as Bates notes, “quickly spread”
to Australia.68 Whilst its ignition had been assisted by publication of influential texts,69 disturbing
scientific predictions of worldwide ecological collapse, such as the Club of Rome’s ‘Limits to
Growth’,70 propelled concern for immediate action.
As a ‘movement’, early modern environmentalism was hardly uniform. It encompassed “numerous
conflicting and often ambiguous goals and practices”.71 But it soon attracted mainstream
acceptance. Improved media technology relayed images of industrial pollution to an electorate that,
whilst enjoying rising living standards, demanded cleaner environments.72 High-profile disputes
between conservationists and developmental interests over specific resource development proposals
attracted mass media attention. This helped to galvanise public awareness of environmental issues
well beyond visual pollution. Australian examples include the flooding of the enchanting Lake
Pedder in Tasmania for hydro-electric purposes in 197273 and the logging of ancient rainforest at
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Terania Creek in northern NSW in 1979.74 Powell observes that such well-publicised controversies
helped persuade “the urban majority to lift its sights from immediate local concerns”.75 But most of
the major disputes involved prized natural places.76 More widespread and insidious ecological
problems, such as land degradation and clearance of inland scrub, attracted minimal public
attention. As Powell notes in relation to soil erosion, the mass media were far more interested in
“eruptions” rather than matters involving “neither an event nor an episode”.77
The big confrontations of the time usually concerned State Government resource management
agencies. Because Local Government was preoccupied with improving local economies, councils
generally supported large-scale, employment generating projects. In the urban context, Roddewig
notes that major conflicts often concerned “state-sponsored projects over which Local Government
had no control”.78 Smaller scale disputes between residents and their local councils over
neighbourhood issues, such as redevelopment of parkland or introduction of residential flat
buildings, had already arisen during the late 1960s and 1970s. By that stage, Local Government had
extended its functions to land-use regulation, which was then almost solely related to the urban
environment.79 These disputes had precipitated the emergence of local action groups demanding
more input into planning decisions.80 Controversies typically involved inner-city middle-class
residents with sufficient time, resources and expertise to defend their property investments against
unresponsive developmentalist councils.81 At the rural fringe and beyond, such community action
was virtually non-existent.
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The pivotal ‘green ban’ movement, a process of environmental unionism that protected various
places from destruction commencing with a patch of Sydney Harbour foreshore bushland in 1971,
served to buoy citizen action.82 Popular support for increased public participation in environmental
decision-making pushed the NSW Government to consider more interactive processes.83 The landuse planning system attracted particular attention. The NSW Parliament had already amended its
outdated planning laws in 1970 to require councils to give public notice of proposals to erect
residential flat buildings.84 This would have appealed to urban residents intent on preserving lowdensity suburban amenity. But it was not enough. One commentator suggests that the conservative
NSW Government was “so harried by action groups that it finally had to admit that its planning and
environmental laws needed a major overhaul”.85 The ‘green bans’ and growing community concern
helped lead to a full-scale review of the system and eventual enactment of the EPAA.86 This
imposed fresh public consultation obligations on planning agencies, including councils, signalling
departure from ‘wise use’ models under which government had seen itself as the sole expert in
environmental management. Nowadays, consultation provisions are common across the full
spectrum of environmental laws, including updated resource management statutes.87 They comprise
a firm part of the Local Government decision-making landscape today.
The EPAA will be discussed further in ch 6. As will be seen there, the EPAA not only deals with
urban issues but provides substantial opportunity for Local Government to deal with the natural
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environment. It provides a good example of what Harding calls the “institutionalisation of
environmental concern”.88 Other first-generation ‘protective’ environmental statutes related to, inter
alia, pollution control,89 heritage conservation,90 and establishment of a specialist court, the Land
and Environment Court (LEC), to resolve environmental disputes.91 NSW also introduced
compulsory environmental impact assessment for various development projects, although this was
integrated into the EPAA rather than awarded its own legislation.92 The focus of environmental
legislation thus moved away from the confines of resource allocation to require decision-makers to
take into account both impact on the natural environment and community views.93 The new laws
reflected a totally fresh role for Government in environmental management. Instead of
administering systems to encourage resource exploitation, agencies could now at least consider the
environmental impact of proposals in deciding whether or not to grant appproval.94 The ‘protective’
statutes did not create a fundamentally new super-regime of environmentally sympathetic laws.
Instead, they were “simply imposed” on existing resource development statutes.95 The result was
development of a ‘system’ of considerable complexity.
The ‘ecological’ vision also inspired enactment of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1967
(NSW), which set up the state’s first expert conservation agency, the NSW National Parks and
Wildlife Service (NPWS).96 Whitehouse notes that its establishment reflected both a burgeoning
popular conservation movement and the growth of ecology as a recognised discipline.97 The NSW
Government also established a specialist committee to advise on future national parks and other
reservations, which recommended “that as much diversity as possible of Australian animals and
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plants be retained for human use.”98 It thereby foreshadowed contemporary biodiversity notions by
stressing representative conservation across the entire landscape rather than cherished places alone.
But the national park system today is still biased heavily towards those areas left over from the
‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions, especially the rocky plateaux and eastern sideslopes of the Great
Dividing Range that are “least productive and too difficult to log”.99 Pressey refers to the “worthless
lands thesis”.100 If the conservation role of councils is to be taken seriously, the ecological
imbalance of the NSW park system places increased pressure on Local Government in districts
where ecosystems are poorly represented in State reserves.
The ‘ecological’ vision also prompted action by the Commonwealth Government.101 Activity
increased upon the 1972 election of the Whitlam Government, which, inter alia, enacted
environmental impact legislation102 and investigated the issue of national heritage.103 Such
initiatives led to more fragmentation in environmental law and administration. Perceived narrow
Constitutional footholds and conservative politics, however, soon dampened Commonwealth
enthusiasm. Resurgence of Commonwealth interest arose upon the election of the Hawke
Government in 1983, with most attention then centred upon the introduction and implementation of
the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) (WHPCA).104 The Commonwealth’s
success in defeating Tasmania’s High Court challenge against the WHPCA, which halted
98

Scientific Committee on Parks and Reserves (NSW), Report No 2: Park and Reserve Proposals, The
Coastal Areas of NSW (Sydney: National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW), 1969), quoted in Whitehouse
(1990), ibid at 13.
99
R Pressey et al, “How Well are the Forests of North-Eastern New South Wales? - Analyses of Forest
Environments in Relation to Formal Protection Measures, Land Tenure, and Vulnerability to Clearing” (1996)
85 Forest Ecology and Management 310 at 320 & 318-322; see also Adam, op cit n 13 at 20; Pressey (1994),
op cit n 13, passim & (1995), op cit n 13 at 49; Steering Committee to the Minister for the Environment
(NSW), Visions for the Millennium: Report of the Steering Committee to the Minister for the Environment
(NSW) (Sydney: the Committee, 1998), 18 & 69.
100
Pressey (1994), ibid at 663.
101
This commenced with the establishment of a Senate Committee in the late 1960s to investigate pollution
issues: M Crommelin, “Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy” (1987) 4 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 101 at 103. Note also that in 1971, the McMahon Government had established a new
Department of Environment, Aborigines and the Arts.
102
See former Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth).
103
R Hope (chairperson), Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1974). Significantly, this study led to legislation for Commonwealth national
parks and heritage protection, administered by new federal agencies: the Australian National Parks and
Wildlife Service was set up to implement the former National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975
(Cth) and the Australian Heritage Commission was established to administer the Australian Heritage
Commission Act 1975 (Cth).
104
This Act represented the Commonwealth’s implementation of the Convention for the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) [1975] ATS No 47, entered into force on
17 December 1975. It has since been superseded by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).

50

construction of the controversial Gordon-below-Franklin dam,105 excited the environmental
movement, whose eyes were opened to potential centralisation of environmental powers in
Canberra.106 Many conservationists saw the Commonwealth as a “powerful ally”.107 But they were
to be disappointed as federal activism dissipated.108
By the end of the 1980s, environmentalism remained an enduring, if less fashionable, force on the
political agenda.109 Yet destruction of the natural environment continued apace. For example,
Gasteen notes that the advent of new and powerful technology brought extensive clearing to the
brigalow lands at an unprecedented velocity.110 In 1991, Nadolny described a “spurt of clearing in
[inland] Queensland and northern NSW” due to, inter alia, the arrival onto the market of an
economical herbicide which could be administered from the air.111 Sivertsen’s comparison of aerial
photographs reveals that between 1977 and the mid-1980s, farmers cleared about 70% of native
woody vegetation within a large sector of northern NSW.112 Such facts might suggest that the
conservation movement had paid too much attention to bringing spectacular forest and coastal
landscapes into national parks rather than management of private lands in the less exciting interior.
They also raise questions about the strength of the ‘protective’ environmental laws themselves. In
1986, Formby outlined a pessimistic future for environmental policy, stressing both the continuing
strength of the “development ethic” and the preference of governments to indulge in symbolic
action rather than tackle hard decisions.113 As will be seen below, there has been little since to
hearten him. All this suggests that Heathcote’s ‘ecological’ vision may be a misnomer.
The rise of early modern environmentalism effected no overnight transition for Local Government
apart from new efforts in urban land-use control. In 1978, in his overview of Australian
105

Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.
B Cohen, “The Franklin Saga” in V Martin & M Inglis (eds), Wilderness: The Way Ahead (London:
Findhorn Press & Lorian Press, 1984), 47-48; Crommelin, op cit n 101 at 106; cf G Evans, “The Federal
Government and Environmental Law” (1984) 1 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 5 at 7. See also P
Tighe, “Environmental Values, Legalism and Judicial Rationality: The Tasmanian Dam Case and its Broader
Political Significance” (1987) 4 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 134 at 139-141.
107
Roddewig, op cit n 78 at 83.
108
J Formby, “Environmental Policies in Australia” in C Park (ed), Environmental Policies: An International
Review (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), 197-8; Toyne, op cit n 73, chs 4-10.
109
See Endre, who notes that environmental concerns had moved well beyond left-wing politics, especially
when “[i]t was clear that certain types of environmental practices if continued could cause permanent
economic disadvantages”: H Endre, “Legal Regulation of Sustainable Development in Australia: Politics,
Economics or Ethics?” (1992) 32 Natural Resources Journal 487 at 492.
110
J Gasteen, “The Changing Face of the Brigalow Lands”. (1989) 26(1) Wildlife Australia 10 at 11; see also
D Sivertsen, “The Native Vegetation Crisis in the Wheatbelt of NSW” (1994) 25(1) Search 5 at 8.
111
C Nadolny, “The Dilemma of Rural Land Clearing” (1991) 22(2) Search 43 at 44.
112
Sivertsen (1994), op cit n 110 at 8.
113
Formby, op cit n 108 at 216-7.
106

51

environmental politics, Roddewig stressed that councils’ main preoccupation was still “servicing
and promotion of urban development”, strengthened by the property-based rating system and
supported by an elected membership dominated by “local real estate agents and small
developers”.114
The LGA 1919, enacted during a bygone developmentalist era, still remained on foot.
Commencement of the EPAA in 1980, however, was to herald brand new opportunities and
responsibilities. But as will be gleaned in later chapters, an entrenched development-oriented ethic
derived from municipal origins has always been difficult to shake off, resulting in these advantages
not being taken up. Although council functions were beginning to expand, Local Government’s
potential in managing the natural environment remained largely neglected, unaided by the
continuing emphasis of development interests amongst elected representatives.115
2.3.2

The Second Wave: Ecologically Sustainable Development

Modern environmentalism has undergone substantial transformation since publication of
Heathcote’s essay in 1970. The most significant feature, arguably, has been the widespread
embracement of ESD as a fundamental environmental management goal. Beder refers to its
emergence as the ‘second wave’ of modern environmentalism. 116 The central feature of the concept
is its attempt to integrate resource development with protection of the natural environment. This
reveals the considerable distance travelled by environmentalism since the early 1960s. In earlier
times, new attitudes had challenged developmental paradigms head-on, aroused by scientific and
popular concern that continued economic growth was unsustainable. The modern concept of
sustainability now invites conservationists and developmentalists to work alongside one another
towards mutually compatible outcomes.117 Whilst it acknowledges the potential environmental
harm of economic ‘progress’, it demands that growth be adapted so that biological processes upon
which humankind depends are not compromised.
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It appears that development interests have welcomed ESD as a convenient tool through which to
avoid costly conflict with conservationists. Frawley suggests that contemporary developmentalists
tend to view ESD as “a more sophisticated extension of the pragmatic, managerial ‘wise use’
principles” established long ago under the ‘national’ vision.118 Mercer observes that the concept
“provides a far more acceptable idea, especially to the business sector” than the ‘limits to growth’
bogey championed during early modern environmentalism.119 Embracement of ESD by business
interests reflects how it provides a popular conceptual framework for pro-development governments
and their agencies, including individual councils. An approach to environmental decision-making
that accommodates both development and conservation interests must be a godsend for
governments whilst the memory of bitter and expensive environmental disputes remains fresh.
Endre goes further in arguing that ESD is now enmeshed with economic rationalist ideology, which
helps to explain its reference in recent government support for market-based mechanisms to solve
environmental problems.120
ESD has found its way into statute,121 via second-generation environmental laws. In 1997, the NSW
Parliament amended the LGA 1993 to incorporate ESD into its statutory objects and other
provisions.122 In debating the amendments, one enthusiastic Parliamentarian alluded to widespread
acceptance of the concept by claiming, without challenge, that “[a]bout 70% of Australians now
hold the view that economic development and environmental protection can co-exist”.123
The key statutory location of ESD in NSW, which all relevant statutes, other than the EPAA (see
below), appear to adopt, is s 6(2) Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW)
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(PEAA).124 This Act contained the first legislative expression of ESD in NSW, lagging behind other
Australian jurisdictions.125 It was amended in 1997, with ESD now defined as:
“… achieved through the implementation of the following principles and programs:
(a) the precautionary principle - namely, that if there are threats of serious or irreversible
environmental damage, lack of full scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.
In the application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions should be
guided by:
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible damage to the
environment; and
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various options,
(b) inter-generational equity - namely, that the present generation should ensure that the
health, diversity and productivity of the environment is maintained or enhanced for the
benefit of future generations,
(c) conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity – namely, that conservation
of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a fundamental consideration,
(d) improved valuation and pricing of environmental resources – namely that environmental
factors should be included in the valuation of assets and services …”126
Notably, ESD is not defined per se but described by means of four interrelated principles, including
biodiversity conservation, in line with the IGAE.127. Clearly, biodiversity conservation is recognised
as a fundamental component of ESD, even though the origins of the two concepts are different.
ESD is acknowledged in the EPAA although reference is limited and, oddly, the meaning of the
term is not defined.128 Reference to ESD now abounds in council policy documents and plans. 129
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Influences on councils extend well beyond legislation. In the Accord entered into between the
Commonwealth and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) in late 1995, both
parties agreed to “promot[e]” ESD. 130 ESD is also a central feature of ALGA policy, although the
ALGA recognises that supporting ESD is a “major challenge” for “[m]any local and regional
communities”.131 The ‘Local Agenda 21’ (‘LA21’) phenomenon has also provided a major
stimulus.132 Brown asserts that “[n]o-one argues any longer about whether Local Government is a
key player in achieving a long-term balance between the needs of people, the economy and the
environment”.133
Whilst espousal of ESD principles can at least promote public awareness of environmental issues
and impacts, translation of ‘motherhood’ statements into action is problematic without effective
legal and policy frameworks.134 But methods to implement ESD attract negligible attention. As
Hundloe warns, “concrete applications are still few and far between.”135 This should not be
surprising. After all, ESD, as a broad goal, is extremely difficult to apply at the coalface.136 An
overriding difficulty is the slippery nature of the concept itself. Terms are open to differing

Act 1997 (NSW) altered the objects clause of the primary Act to include the encouragement of ESD: see
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 5(a)(vii); ch 6 at n 145.
129
See, generally, V Brown (ed), Managing for Local Sustainability: Policy, Problem-Solving, Practice and
Place (Richmond, NSW: UWS, Hawkesbury, 1997); S Robertson, “Local Government and Sustainable
Development: Its Recent Evolution in Australia and New Zealand” (1996) 4 Local Government Law Journal
227; I Wright, “Implementation of Sustainable Development by Australian Local Governments” (1995) 12
Environmental Planning Law Journal 54.
130
An Accord Between the Commonwealth of Australia and Local Government (14 Nov 1995), cl 11(f); see
also Sch 4.
131
See Australian Local Government Association, National Agenda for Australian Local Government 2002,
Preamble, item 2; & Pt 11, item 3, www.alga.asn.au.page.cfm?site_page_id+386 (accessed 19 Dec 2002).
Item 2 in the Preamble describes ESD as an “over-arching principle”. See also V Brown, “Resource List of
Local Sustainability Policies” in V Brown (ed), Managing for Local Sustainability: Policy, Problem-Solving,
Practice and Place (Richmond, NSW: UWS, Hawkesbury, 1997d), 78-79.
132
See ch 1; G Adams & M Hine, “Local Environmental Policy Making in Australia” in K Walker & K
Crowley (eds), Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and Devolution (Sydney: UNSW Press,
1999), passim.
133
V Brown, “Our Core Business is the Future: Working Towards Local Agenda 21” in V Brown (ed),
Managing for Local Sustainability: Policy, Problem-Solving, Practice and Place (Richmond, NSW: UWS,
Hawkesbury, 1997c), 1.
134
G Bates, “Editorial: Implementing ESD” (1994) 11 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 251; S
Dovers, “Information, Sustainability and Policy” (1995) 2 Australian Journal of Environmental Management
142.
135
T Hundloe, “The Environment: How to Solve Problems that Don’t Respect Borders” (1998) 57(3)
Australian Journal of Public Administration 87 at 89.
136
A Roughley, “With Head, Heart and Land: Integration of Community Workers and Environmental
Planners in Ecological Sustainable Local Area Planning” (1999) 16 Environmental and Planning Law Journal
339 at 347.

55

interpretations and injection of personal and political values.137 For example, when a council
assesses a development proposal, tangible factors such as economic benefits can readily override
considerations that are not well understood or carry insufficient information.138 ESD catchcries
might even be exploited to sanitise bad decisions. Accordingly, whilst attachment to ESD is easy at
the macro-level, on-ground implementation is another matter altogether.
As far as the law is concerned , the major limitation in NSW is that the statutes do not demand that
ESD be striven for. Instead, ESD tends to be presented as something that, at most, must be taken
into account in discretionary decision-making. ESD is restricted typically to objects clauses rather
than substantive provisions.139 Whitehouse argues that more attention is paid to process than
outcomes.140 It is far easier for decision-makers to tick the box claiming that ESD has been taken
account rather than grapple with the real demands of ESD. In the absence of stringent provisions,
biodiversity conservation can be treated similarly. The description of ESD in the PEAA quoted
earlier states bluntly that biodiversity conservation need only be a fundamental consideration in
implementing the relevant legislation.141 A far superior approach is for instruments made under the
law to provide tough and unambiguous requirements on conserving ecosystems and habitats.
Despite the growth of instruments venerating ESD during the ‘second wave’, biodiversity decline
continues. As highlighted in Australia State of the Environment 1996, “[t]he rate of clearance has
accelerated ... with as much cleared during the last 50 years as in the 150 years before 1945”.142
Andrew Campbell claims that the native landscape in agricultural regions “is still being cleared –
for agriculture, roads, residential subdivisions, road metal”143 – most of which come into Local
Government’s functional environment.
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Sivertsen argues that “clearing of native vegetation is still very much part of the agrarian culture in
the NSW wheat belt”.144 He alludes to the significant expansion of cotton farming in western NSW
during the 1990s, involving wide-scale clearing and heavy demands for scarce surface water.145
Lawrence and Vanclay predict a grimmer outlook in view of the gradual replacement of the family
farm by foreign corporations and agribusiness, arguing that “[f]oreign capital is notoriously
insensitive to the environment”.146 A survey undertaken by Brandesma et al indicates that between
1991 and 1994, approximately 11% (160,000 ha) of the entire Bogan Shire was cleared of native
vegetation.147 Sivertsen echoes concerns raised by Pressey about increased land clearance in the
NSW outback, suggesting a “trend of habitat loss due to clearing from east to west”.148 In 1996, the
NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation estimated a land clearance rate in NSW of
150,000 ha per year.149 Benson notes that the rate of clearing native woody vegetation decreased
during the 1990s.150 One of the reasons, however, is that most land capable of agriculture has
already been cleared. There are too few trees left to remove. This means Traill’s estimate in 2002,
based on further evidence by Benson, that approximately 60,000 ha is now being cleared annually,
with most attention directed at eucalypt forest and woodlands, is the more disturbing.151 It also
renders the NSW Nature Conservation Council’s description of 95,000 ha having been lawfully
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cleared in 2001 as chilling.152 All these figures raise questions about not only the outcomes of
clearance regulation but also the extent of unlawful activity.
This continuation of environmental devastation decades after the rise of modern environmentalism
is chilling. The ‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions have long disappeared. As noted already, the
modern concept of biodiversity conservation encompasses all landscapes and biota rather than the
favourites fought over during earlier heady days. In its set of overriding principles, the National
Biodiversity Strategy refers to “a comprehensive, adequate and representative [CAR] system of
ecologically viable protected areas” extending across all ecosystems, with integrated reserve and
off-reserve conservation.153 But it seems to be the unspectacular inland country, such as brigalow
and the plains of Bogan Shire, where pressure for environmental destruction is unrelenting.154 This
invites the suspicion that ESD receives most sympathy in populated urban and coastal areas. All but
one of the ten NSW councils identified by Whittaker as having initiated a LA21 process in 1995 fall
into this category.155 A follow-up analysis in 1998 confirmed that the most active councils are
“predominantly urban”.156
Whilst ESD may have helped to promote community appreciation and cement political
mainstreaming of environmental issues, awareness in itself will not arrest biodiversity decline. In
examining institutional frameworks in working towards ESD, and biodiversity conservation in
particular, Local Government must attract a sizeable share of the spotlight. But as Reynders warns,
to succeed in meeting global environmental mandates, Local Government must “loosen its pioneer
ethics” derived from earlier times.157
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2.3.3

Recent Directions

Environmentalism continues to be a prominent public issue, whose proponents compete against
other sector interests, such as education, community health and welfare, in seeking more of the
political funding pie. Throughout the 1990s and beyond, environmentalism has become
institutionalised even further into a complex web of law and policy, all within the ESD rhetoric. In
particular, the Commonwealth’s role has undergone significant change. Galligan and Fletcher point
out that PM Hawke “singled out” the environment as a main issue in his pursuit of ‘New
Federalism’.158 After huge and costly environmental battles with the States, Hawke desired a more
cooperative approach, which became enshrined in the IGAE.159 In delineating the respective
environmental responsibilities of the respective parties, the IGAE exhibits an unambiguous
withdrawal by the Commonwealth with the exception of limited national environmental issues.160
Under the theme of ‘Resource Assessment, Land Use Decisions and Approval Practices’, the IGAE
states that “development and administration of the policy and legislative framework will remain the
responsibility of the States and Local Government.”161 Chapman notes that Local Government’s
established role in land-use planning assisted the ALGA’s input in formulation of the IGAE.162 The
instrument articulates the Commonwealth’s intention not to involve itself in planning systems
outside matters of “Commonwealth interest”.163 The consequence for Local Government is reduced
emphasis on centralised environmental power in Canberra, placing more pressure on Local
Government itself.
In late 1997, the Commonwealth, State and Territorial Governments, in addition to the ALGA,
revisited the IGAE by giving “in-principle support” to a new agreement foreshadowing total
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revision of Commonwealth legislation.164 Whilst the parties acknowledged a need for “greater
recognition and clarification of the role of Local Government in environmental management”,
reference to the third sphere of government is otherwise scant.165 It is restricted to endorsing both
improved consultation with Local Government and greater consideration of implications for
councils in implementing the agreement, in addition to anticipating “subsidiary agreements”
between the States and Local Government.166 The direct outcome of the 1997 agreement is the
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBCA). This is a good
example of a recent second-generation ‘protective’ environmental statute that intends, according to
its own statutory objects, to “promote” ESD and biodiversity conservation.167
In short, in addition to providing for various optional strategic mechanisms for ongoing
management of the natural environment, the EPBCA establishes a regime for the referral of
proposals posing significant environmental impact on “matters of national environmental
significance”, known as ‘controlled actions’, to the Commonwealth for approval.168 The range of
categories for referral, however, is narrow. The notion of ‘national environmental significance’ does
not extend to broad issues such as soil degradation or land clearing.169 The overwhelming majority
of small actions that gnaw away at biodiversity will never trigger the EBBCA, with many falling
within the domain of Local or State Government’s regulatory responsibility. As will be seen, others
will escape scrutiny altogether.
Detailed consideration of the EPBCA is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, several points
may be made. First, the EPBCA adds to the bewildering complexity of environmental regulation.
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Second, it is feasible that responsibilities for assessing various proposals caught by the EPBCA may
be delegated to Local Government via the States. This may be done via a bilateral agreement
between the Commonwealth and NSW,170 or on a ‘case-by-case’ accreditation of evaluation
processes under State law, such as the EPAA.171 Third, there is no mention of Local Government in
the EPBCA, other than permitting municipal officers to act as wardens etc under the regime,172
thereby postponing any measure to “clarify” the role of Local Government as promised in 1997.
Fourth, despite the narrow ambit of the EPBCA, many actions that hitherto escaped Commonwealth
attention now fall into its net, even if only partially. A person who proposes to carry out an action
that he or she believes is, or may be, a ‘controlled action’, is under an obligation to forward details
to the Commonwealth.173 With the benefit of public consultation and initial environmental
assessment, the relevant Minister then makes a decision as to whether or not the referred action
demands approval.174 In particular, actions impacting upon listed endangered species, ecological
communities and/or certain migratory species on private land outside Commonwealth territory may
now trigger the assessment provisions.175 This means that many activities may require approval
under both the EPBCA and the EPAA, unless official delegation procedures are in place. It also
means that in some cases, actions carried out by councils themselves should be referred to the
Commonwealth.
Beyond statutory overhaul, other Commonwealth interest in environmental management has
involved a very different course of direction. In some cases, instead of enacting law, the
Commonwealth has developed non-binding ‘strategies’ in conjunction with State and Territorial
170
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Governments and, sometimes, the ALGA. Two prominent examples are the National ESD Strategy
and the National Biodiversity Strategy. These comprise a mere handful. In 1995, Osborn and Cutts
identified 29 environmental strategies impacting upon councils, containing over 400 direct
references to Local Government.176 The researchers cited a case study of the Wide Bay region in
Queensland where over 200 “frameworks, programs, plans and projects” were recorded.177 Dovers
refers to “hundreds of subsidiary policies and programs” across Australia on various environmental
matters, including biodiversity.178 The high figure reveals the overwhelming complexity of modernday environmental management. It suggests institutionalisation of environmental concern gone
mad. It is little wonder that at a national conference in 1994 on ESD, the (former) ALGA Chief
Executive complained about an “incredibly complex administrative environment” and the tendency
for central government “to heap layer upon layer of new programs” upon strategy-weary Local
Government.179 Councils must either struggle to keep abreast of new developments or simply
remain oblivious.
Associated with the rise of non-statutory strategies is Commonwealth influence through its fiscal
powers and funding programs.180 This does not equate to active intervention in environmental
decision-making but rather the allocation of funds to various bodies, including Local Government,
to be expended in accordance with priorities laid down in the various strategies and plans.
At the State level, a series of new statutes has led to a maze of overlapping regimes. In NSW, the
first statute to refer to sustainability was the Catchment Management Act 1989 (NSW) (CMA),
which set up new policy-making and administrative structures in the form of a State Catchment
Management Coordinating Committee (SCMCC) and an array of catchment management (CM)
committees and trusts.181 The CMA lays down a primary aim of CM bodies to co-ordinate
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“sustainable use and management” of natural resources.182 This is to be achieved across designated
surface water catchments for which CM bodies are to prepare “strategies”.183 Whilst the State
Government intended the system to encourage integrated environmental management between
agencies, including councils, the segmented approach to managing the natural environment has still
prevailed due to a lack of “strategic authority” suffered by the CM bodies,184 together with their
inability to enforce their plans.185 The State Government admits that the ‘strategies’ were “unable to
address the causes of major natural resource problems”.186 In late 1999, the NSW Government
moved to replace 48 CM committees with eighteen regional CM ‘boards’,187 which at the time of
writing are preparing, or have finalised, ‘Catchment Blueprints’ as their regional strategies.188 The
inland regions are huge in size and do not always reflect ecological boundaries.189
A more recent statute, the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) (NVCA), provides for
more structures, known as Regional Vegetation Committees (RVCs), to prepare and monitor
regional plans for native vegetation management.190 Unlike the Catchment Blueprints, these plans
are to have statutory force.191 The articulated objectives of the NVCA are expressed to be “in
accordance with” the principles of ESD.192
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To complicate matters further, during the late 1990s the NSW Government established a system of
committees under its ‘Water Reform Package’ to prepare strategies for regulated rivers, stressed
unregulated rivers and various groundwater systems.193 This has since been codified by the Water
Management Act 2000 (NSW) (WMA), under which the relevant Minister may appoint regional
“management committees”, commonly called ‘water management committees’ (WMCs), for
designated “water management areas”.194 An express object of the Act is to “apply the principles”
of ESD.195 The Minister may direct a committee to prepare a “management plan” for its region’s
water resources, which may contain, inter alia, environmental protection provisions designed to
control, and even prohibit, identified land uses.196
These NSW examples are a handful of the smorgasbord of contemporary environmental
management structures emerging across Australia. The State planning agency has acknowledged the
growing complexity, stressing the “potential for overlap and contradictory direction in the
management of our environment and resources” and calling for “better integration”.197 Local
Government views the current situation as not only confusing but counter-productive. The
Presidents of the then joint NSW Local Government and Shires Associations have complained of a
“complexity of regulation” that appears to parallel and even duplicate municipal environmental
processes and procedures.198 Munro argues that Local Government should no longer tolerate a
general “mish-mash of changeable and overlapping geographic, administrative and consultative
regional arrangements, for a multitude of purposes”.199
The emergence of these various regional bodies – i.e. boards and committees (or, as will be
described in the following chapter, ‘new magistracies’200) – are all headed by appointed officials
rather than elected persons, as outlined further below.201 There is concern that Local Government
units are often too small in size to deal with various aspects of environmental management, with
193

See, generally, Department of Land and Water Conservation (NSW), Support Package for River,
Groundwater and Water Management Committees (Sydney: the Department, 1998e).
194
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), ss 11 & 12(1). See Department of Land & Water Conservation
(NSW), op cit n 54 at 9.
195
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 3(a).
196
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), ss 15, 34(1) & 46(1)-(2).
197
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, Plan Making in New South Wales: Opportunities for the
Future - Discussion Paper (Sydney: the Department, 1999c), 3 & 9.
198
Crs P Woods & B Bott, ‘Foreword’ in K Sproats and A Kelly, The Role of Local Government in Natural
Resource Management (Sydney: Local Government and Shires Associations of NSW, 1998), 1.
199
A Munro “Local and Regional Governance: Back to Basics” (1997) 56(3) Australian Journal of Public
Administration 77 at 81.
200
See ch 3.
201
See infra; see also ch 1 at 189.

64

boundaries that do not reflect environmental factors such as catchments and vegetation. In
Australian parlance, the term ‘region’ generally means an area somewhere between the size of an
individual Local Government area and a State.202
The emphasis on regional environmental management has been given additional weight by calls for
bioregional planning.203 This is a noteworthy element of the National Biodiversity Strategy, which
states that “regional planning in which environmental characteristics are a principal determinant of
boundaries diversity conservation is to succeed”.204 It goes on to list “[u]ndertak[ing] bioregional
planning for the conservation of biological diversity” as a primary action, pushing the need for
intergovernmental co-ordination.205 The NSW Biodiversity Strategy embraces the concept with even
more vigour. Its second objective, entitled ‘bioregional planning’, refers to “manag[ing] biological
diversity on a regional basis, and using natural boundaries to facilitate the integration of
conservation and production-oriented management”.206 is considered to be of major importance if
biological
At a national conference on bioregional planning convened by the Commonwealth in 1995, Miller,
the keynote speaker, defined a bioregion as:
“a geographic space that one whole or several nested ecosystems, characterised by its
landforms, vegetative cover, human culture, and history, as identified by local communities,
government agencies and scientists.”207
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This supports the idea that regional boundaries for biodiversity management should go beyond
biophysical factors alone and embrace social and economic communities of interest.208 Whilst this is
appealing in theory, its practical application is daunting. Current administration of environmental
management is already segmented and fragmented. For those prepared to acknowledge current
political reality yet anxious to stem biodiversity decline, the focus should be on strengthening inter
and intra-governmental co-operation. This contrasts with the radical change called for by some
bioregionalists, probably inspired by American eco-anarchists who believe regional communities
based on ecological contours should shape their own destinies.209
The Commonwealth Government has already undertaken a process of delineating bioregions
throughout Australia under the ‘IBRA process’, which identifies 80 separate regional landscapes.210
Unlike Miller’s approach, it is based on biophysical factors only. Lambert et al suggest that because
it fails to account for “human needs” and “sense[s] of community”, it should be viewed only as a
“starting point”.211 But it has been crucial for considering regional representativeness of
biodiversity.
Bioregional planning has not become a common term. In contrast to the popularity of ESD and
‘biodiversity’, it is small beer. But this has not removed realisation of the importance of effective
regional environmental management, including liaison between councils, local and regional
authorities and the various, appointed regional environmental agencies themselves.212
2.4

Community Empowerment

The rise of inter-governmental strategies, fresh funding programs and new State-appointed
management structures are all related to a further trend to be addressed here: a push for direct
community involvement in environmental management. This may take two forms: (i)
encouragement of on-ground active participation by landholders and interested community
members in tackling environmental problems or (ii) representation by community ‘stakeholders’ (a
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term derided by Dovers as “appalling”213) on administrative and policy-making bodies. Both reflect
a fundamental shift away from the interventionist approach of central government in earlier days of
modern environmentalism.
The first reflects a largely passive stance on the part of government. Its focus is summed up well by
the SCMCC’s observation that:
“[w]e are moving away form the era where Governments exclusively played the role of
planners, experts and decision-makers. Government agencies are refocusing their roles away
from centralised planning and legislative controls towards coordination, facilitation and
support of community participation in natural resources management. ... Community
ownership, involvement and action are seen as essential elements in our future management
of our natural resources.”214
This trend involves the direct devolution of management responsibility to the community level,
where citizens are expected to develop bottom-up approaches to environmental problems affecting
their localities. It is a clear manifestation of the subsidiarity principle. The approach is sometimes
articulated in terms of community empowerment.215 The crowning of community involvement in the
National Biodiversity Strategy is a notable example. Its second major principle states that “the
cooperation of conservation groups, resource users, indigenous peoples, and the community in
general is critical to the conservation of biological diversity”.216 It contains an entire chapter entitled
‘Involving the Community’, which recommends:
“increasing community involvement in research and management activities relating to
protected areas and vegetation remnants and in biological diversity programs, particularly
those involving survey, revegetation and rehabilitation.”217
The NSW Biodiversity Strategy embodies a similar focus. It lists provision of “opportunities and
incentives to the community for biodiversity conservation” as a “priority action”, noting that the
community is already “leading the way in driving efforts in biodiversity conservation through
grassroots initiatives”.218 In their comprehensive review of conservation policy options, Young et
al, in their overview of conservation mechanisms, maintain these emphases, recommending that
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“governments devolve greater responsibility to local communities and industries”.219 Community
involvement is also implicit throughout the National LG Biodiversity Strategy, although Local
Government is seen as the vehicle for consultative community action rather than local groups. It
states at the outset that environmental “management is best done at a local level … in consultation
with local people”.220
Numerous Commonwealth funding programs provide moneys to community organisations for onground planning and projects such as tree planting and bushland regeneration. A good example is
‘Landcare’, which operates under the revised ‘Natural Heritage Trust’ (NHT) scheme.221 Another is
‘Bushcare’, the NHT’s “largest program” and a scheme of ready interest to Local Government.222
Dovers and Gullett describe such community-based projects as “startling in their growth and
popularity”.223 Whilst citizen involvement may be attractive in terms of encouraging ownership of
environmental problems, it may also be viewed as a result of current managerialist trends of fiscal
restraint, government downsizing and ‘user pays’ policy. Managers may welcome shedding costs to
willing community members. Some commentators argue that the success of the Landcare
movement has legitimised transfer of responsibility for massive problems from government to local
communities.224 Dovers and Gullet suggest that the programs reflect a mix of (i) “a genuine desire”
on the part of central government to “empower” the community and (ii) an “abrogation of political
responsibility”.225 But when the funding runs out, are community members expected to keep the
action going? How local communities can effectively address widespread and poorly understood
problems that extend far beyond the neighbourhood level, such as salinisation and biodiversity
decline, beggars belief. On the other hand, it may be argued that community involvement is
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essential because environmental problems are simply too big to be solved by limited public
resources.226
The relationship between community organisations, especially Landcare, and Local Government
raises interesting questions. Although Local Government prides itself as the sphere of government
closest to the community, its links with Landcare groups are uneven and, frequently, nonexistent.227 It is curious that in arguing for government to facilitate more grass-roots environmental
activity, Martin makes no reference to Local Government at all.228 So whilst Local Government
might expect to be the most successful beneficiary of the subsidiarity principle, this is not
necessarily happening.
The second form of community environmental management involves more formal structures. The
rise of new committees in NSW dominated by appointees began with the setting up of CM bodies
under the CMA. The majority of members, all chosen by the relevant Minister, must comprise
landholders or land users.229 Shortly after the setting up of these structures, the SCMCC lauded the
system as “the community and Government working together”.230 Yet as Martin et al argue, the
wider community has no real voice in the selection of members” and the CM bodies are “viewed
with suspicion” by many rural citizens.231
The NCVA adopts a similar approach for RVCs. Even though there is no ‘majority membership’
rule, the statute maintains the ‘stakeholder’ approach by requiring appointed members to represent
specified interests, including “rural” and “conservation” concerns.232 Only one of fifteen persons on
a RVC represents Local Government.233 The WMA adopts a similar pattern for its appointed
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WMCs, implementing the Department of Land and Water Conservation’s objective that the
committees comprise representative “stakeholders”.234 At least two of a total committee
membership of between twelve and twenty persons must represent the “interests of local
councils”.235 Whilst former guidelines on committee operation refer to an “obligation” that these
members “represent and communicate with all of the local government bodies in the catchment or
groundwater area”,236 there is no requirement to ensure this happens.
Composition of all these structures has crucial implications for Local Government, which is only
one of a number of ‘stakeholders’ at the committee table. The issue is complicated by the emphasis
on regional, as opposed to local, environmental management. The new State-appointed bodies
relate to geographical areas that may not only combine council areas but split individual areas apart.
This concentration on regional action may prompt councils to reconsider their roles and look
beyond their borders. Inward-looking attitudes, shaped by a long tradition of narrow enterprise,
must be replaced by broader perspectives such as bioregional planning. Significantly, the IGAE
recognised that local authorities should not only have “an interest in the environment of their
localities” but also “in the environments to which they are linked”.237 Otherwise, Local Government
might find itself increasingly sidelined as the new ‘community-based’ regional structures – or ‘new
magistracies’ - strengthen.
2.5

Conclusion

Until recent times, councils tended to regard environmental effects as incidental to their main
functions and decisions. Land management was once in the hands of landholders themselves, driven
by the ‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions with minimal governmental interference. Regulatory
intervention by government, such as municipal land-use planning, is far more recent. These general
observations tend to make Brown’s remark that “Local Government has always managed the
environment on behalf of the community” rather glib and unhelpful.238
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With the growth of the ‘ecological’ vision, new ‘protective’ environmental laws such as the EPAA
have enabled governments, including councils, to interfere in private development proposals and, in
the event of sufficient political will, protect the biophysical environment. But Local Government
has been a relative latecomer to the conservation party. As observed earlier, the bigger disputes that
arose prior to the ‘second wave’ of modern environmentalism tended to involve other levels of
government. Neighbourhood conflicts with councils usually concerned urban issues. And on those
occasions where development threatened the natural environment, Local Government has hardly
earned a reputation as an ecological saviour. Even though the EPAA provides scope for strong
conservation policy, its potential has largely gone untapped. 239 Under the ‘second wave’, insertion
of reference to ESD into the statutes, with its biodiversity conservation subset, appears to have
made little difference. A survey of Local Government officers conducted found that increase in
council interest in, and commitment to, biodiversity conservation was merely “gradual”.240
In terms of institutional arrangements, contemporary trends in environmental management,
including different emphases on community involvement and regional structures, raise grave
questions about the future role of Local Government. Can it assert a meaningful position in an
emerging and complex milieu wherein other structures are forging new conservation roles? The
concern is that Local Government environmental management will remain in the land of symbols
whilst other bodies, such as the new RVCs, take the lead. One side of the argument is that Local
Government’s reluctance to break the shackles of tradition, especially in the rural context, will pave
the way for its marginalisation. But this is inconsistent with the significant expectations now placed
on Local Government. The core issue is whether or not Local Government is up to the task. By
charting the history of Local Government’s development in NSW, including the roots of any
prevailing Local Government culture, the following chapter will provide a useful context for further
consideration.
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CHAPTER THREE
FROM ROAD BUILDER TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGER:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NSW
3.1

Prelude

This chapter follows the development of Local Government in NSW from its origins to today.
Emphasis is placed on the evolution of both municipal functions and financial mechanisms. Some
attention is also paid to franchise requirements and definition of boundaries. All this will provide an
essential background for detailed consideration of municipal biodiversity conservation issues in
later chapters. More specifically, it will provide a useful basis for examining a central theme of this
thesis concerning the effect of municipal history and culture on managing the biophysical
environment today.
The first part of the chapter addresses the development of nineteenth century Local Government.
The institution was then characterised by questionable democratic features, its narrow functional
enterprise, a predominantly urban focus, political domination by propertied interests and a State
Government that preferred to retain centralised power whilst seeing Local Government as little
more than a minor field-agent.1 It was in this environment, under the ‘colonial’ vision, where the
seeds of municipal culture germinated. As Hort and Mobbs observe, “councils were set up primarily
to serve development”.2
Discussion then moves to twentieth century Local Government, beginning with compulsory
incorporation across most of NSW in 1906. A brief history of the development of municipal voting
and membership privileges is presented, which helps to explain Local Government’s traditional
preoccupation with serving property improvement. Much of the remainder of the chapter is devoted
to Local Government functional change brought about by external action, especially State
legislative milestones. Some emphasis is given to historical municipal resistance to functional
expansion away from elementary property-related services. Because property services are closely
related to Local Government’s traditional revenue source – i.e. the rating tax – attention is also paid
to the development of council funding, including new directions since the early 1970s (Local
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Government’s financial environment will be scrutinised in more detail in ch 7). Finally, discussion
centres upon the emerging nature of Local Government as a far stronger institution in Australian
governance than the fragile structures from which it originated. This is vital in view of its
potentially critical role in biodiversity conservation.
3.2

Early Local Government

3.2.1

Origins of Local Government

Local Government is an ancient institution. In the Anglo-American context, its origins can be traced
back as far as the municipal corporations of medieval England. These bodies arose as legal entities
under Royal municipal charters or grants of special freedoms, emerging from the shackles of
feudalism to provide some measure of self-government over emerging cities.3 Their predominant
concern was regulation of local trade and commerce,4 a role which higher levels of government
have since usurped. As will be seen throughout this chapter, Local Government has lost various
powers to central government throughout its history.
By modern Australian standards, Local Government in this country is also very old. It predates
Federation by six decades. Our first local authority, the Perth Town Trust, was established in 1838.
At this stage, the fledgling colony of Western Australia, first settled by Europeans in 1829, was still
to receive its first shipload of convicts.5 Very soon afterwards, Adelaide Municipal Council was
constituted in 1840, only four years after the township had been founded. Unlike its Western
Australian counterpart, this body was elected rather than appointed. As Larcombe notes, the poll on
30 October 1840 “was not only the first form of local election but the first for any form of elective
authority ever held in Australia”.6 During the following year, rearrangements were made to the
Perth Town Trust to make it Australia’s second elected local institution. Subsequent municipal
structures set up in other Australian colonies similarly embodied some form of democracy, thereby
following the British model and establishing a tradition of elected Local Government. As will be
seen below, contemporary notions of democracy are very different from what was acceptable in
early times.
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Development of municipal government in the more populous and well-established eastern part of
Australia was slower. In NSW, it took more than fifty years after white settlement in 1788 for the
first municipal authority, an elected Sydney Corporation, to emerge in 1842.7 Whilst various
reasons may be put forward for the lack of interest in local control over Sydney’s civic affairs, two
stand out. First, most public attention would have been directed instead at gaining a representative
Parliament for the burgeoning colony itself.8 Although the NSW Legislative Council already
existed, its members were appointed. The Imperial Parliament did not grant representative
government to NSW until 1842 and even then, only two thirds of the membership was to be elected.
As a result, the Sydney Corporation was the first “democratically elected government in NSW”.9 A
key feature of the New South Wales Constitution Act (Imp) of 1842 often overlooked in history
books was authorisation of a general system of ‘district councils’ throughout the colony,10 as will be
discussed below.
The second retarding feature was the grim spectre of rates. Community experience with property
taxation had already been tainted by an unsuccessful road funding system set up under the Parish
Roads Act of 1840.11 This scheme, the forerunner to NSW Local Government, had enabled election
of road trusts empowered to levy rates on local property owners for the construction and
maintenance of “parish roads”. Larcombe attributes trenchant opposition to land taxation as a major
factor behind the system’s downfall.12 A Legislative Council committee established in 1835 to
investigate road financing would have been acutely aware of public hostility when it predicted that
a scheme based on rating would “operate very unequally, and be found in many instances
oppressive”.13 The ‘ratepayer ideology’ was born and the parish roads trust system soon withered
and died.14
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Antagonism to property taxation was a direct result of the community’s historical reliance on the
central government for all services. When initial moves had been made in 1835 to set up a local
authority in Sydney to provide basic infrastructural and health services, a public meeting
condemned the proposed Town Improvement Bill, with the chief opponent claiming “he would
rather walk through the streets up to his knees in mud than pay a penny in taxation”.15 Nevertheless,
the sheer visibility of deteriorating physical conditions catalysed sufficient support for eventual
enactment of the Sydney City Incorporation Act in 1842.16 This established an elected council to
oversee very basic services such as road repairs,17 provision of sewers and waterworks18 and
installation of street lamps.19 It also authorised the council to raise rate funds “for the payment of
such a number of constables and such other police establishments within the … City as may from
time to time … be required”.20 Accordingly, the statute foresaw that the council would provide not
only elementary infrastructural services but also a convenient revenue-raising source for vital
regulatory functions.
The legislation empowered the new body to levy a general rate of up to one shilling in the pound on
the “full, fair and average annual value” of all buildings,21 plus special lower rates on the same
valuation for specific services, including a “police rate” and a “lighting rate”.22 The basis of
valuation chosen, borrowed from the UK, involved calculation of the notional amount each property
would earn in a given year in rental returns less an agreed figure for expenses: i.e. the ‘assessed
annual value’. It was to provide the basis for municipal financing throughout NSW until 1906. It
was an attempt to match tax burdens with capacity to pay. A landholder’s ability to contribute was
supposed to mirror the income that her or his property could potentially generate.23 Yet any concept
of a wealth tax, however crude, would have been abhorrent to propertied interests in an era
15
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grounded in laissez-faire economics and a colony reliant on pioneering entrepreneurialism. Many
landholders who had amassed wealth through profitable land uses and/or escalating property values
owed much of their success to facilities provided by government, such as roads and bridges, without
having contributed to their cost. As a result, they were unwilling to embrace municipalisation.24
The Sydney City Incorporation Act of 1842 confined the franchise for the proposed Council to adult
male ratepayers occupying buildings above £25 per annum in value.25 Whilst later amendments
tinkered with this franchise,26 the groundwork was set for NSW councils to become, according to
Mayne, “mouthpieces of property” and irrelevant to working-class people.27 The legislation
reinforced the council’s unrepresentative nature by requiring that only ratepayers of land valued at
over £50 per annum (later increased to £100), or who held assets of at least £1000 in value, were
eligible for civic office.28 As a result, aldermanic positions became the “preserve of men of means
with the time to spare”, far removed from “the difficulties faced by the less fortunate” but willing to
turn the city council into a “social club of some exclusiveness”.29 All this fuelled contempt for
Local Government on the part of the wider populace. Mayne describes how suspicion was fed by
“ridicule and criticism … indulged in by the press … catering to the prejudices of the
unenfranchised majority”.30 As a consequence, the colony was reluctant to see municipalisation
extend beyond Sydney. It is possible that longstanding apathy towards Local Government might be
traced back to such early antagonism.
The nineteenth century domination by propertied interests also highlights traditional municipal
preoccupation with property-related functions at the expense of activities designed to serve the
broader public interest. The Sydney Corporation, for instance, placed little priority on improving the
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sanitary conditions in slum areas where the inhabitants had no voting power and the landlords were
assured of rental income without interference from the regulators.31
Local Government in central Sydney has suffered a turbulent history since then.32 In 1853, it was
replaced by an appointed Commission, leaving NSW “without a vestige of local government save a
few road trusts”.33 Its modern-day successor, the Sydney City Council – which, interestingly, was
dismissed by the NSW Government as recently as 1987 - enjoys a quite separate history from the
general system of Local Government throughout the State.34 The original Corporation nevertheless
provided a model for the development of Local Government throughout the rest of the colony and
laid the foundations for a property-dominated municipal culture.
3.2.2

Governor Gipps’ Phantom District Councils

The comprehensive system of district councils for settled and surveyed areas beyond Sydney was
introduced under the New South Wales Constitution Act (Imp) of 1842.35 This was the product of an
Imperial Government no longer willing to pay for building and upkeep of police stations and
gaols.36 According to the legislation, new councils were to provide the “means of defraying such
expenses of or connected with the administration of justice and police within the district[s]”.37 The
result was that maintenance of law and order, a primary preoccupation of colonial governments,
became a major justification for Local Government. The Imperial Government had already applied
pressure to Governor Gipps to introduce a network of councils modelled on English experience. But
earlier efforts had been thwarted by members of the Legislative Council who, as wealthy and
prominent landholders, stood to bear a significant share of the rate burden. Gipps was a fierce
proponent of Local Government, claiming that municipalisation “[had] never failed to produce good
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effects in countries peopled by descendants of Englishmen”.38 When Britain ultimately forced Local
Government on NSW in 1842, Gipps had a chance to test his conviction.39 The legislation
authorised him, as Governor, to “form Districts … for … local Government”.40
Twenty-eight district councils were proclaimed throughout the police districts established in 1840,
commencing with Maitland on 26 July 1843 upon gazettal of a ‘charter’ that was followed slavishly
in later incorporations.41 The provisions did not restrict councils to ‘law and order’ functions. They
also empowered authorities to establish and make by-laws for roads, bridges, public buildings and
schools.42 Although councils were to enjoy some autonomy in setting priorities for such services,
they also provided convenient administrative outposts and revenue raisers for the colonial
government.43 Police activities, for instance, were to remain under the control of the Governor but
supported partially by council rates.44
Eligibility to vote and stand for office followed the same rules applying to the Legislative Council.45
Owners of land worth at least £200, plus mere householders of dwellings of £20 or more value per
annum, enjoyed the franchise. But the requirements to serve as a municipal councillor were far
stricter. Only owners of property worth £2,000 or £100 per annum were entitled to seek office,
thereby ensuring that councils remained the preserve of a propertied elite. The first councillors for
each district were not elected but appointed by Gipps, with the benefit of advice from police
magistrates on the worthiness and stature of local citizens.46 Whilst many council members declared
themselves unqualified,47 attempts by Gipps to convince the legislature to relax eligibility
requirements were unsuccessful.48
The system was an utter failure. Opposition to Local Government and rating proved to be even
stronger away from Sydney, especially where landholders had benefited from soaring property
38
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values due to government-funded roads and bridges that brought their estates closer to town and
market. Within weeks of the establishment of the Maitland District Council, for example, the local
newspaper attacked both rate payments and lack of representativeness in warning against an
“oppressive direct taxation without the advantages of local government”.49 By 1847, one council
alone had imposed a rate,50 only to collapse later due to insolvency.51 Widespread financial
paralysis due to legislative problems and community antipathy guaranteed the inevitable demise of
district councils. The wealthy propertied members of the Legislative Council were unprepared to
remedy the situation, preferring instead to press the Imperial Government to reintroduce direct
police funding.
Members of the Legislative Council were not only uncomfortable about property taxation; they
were also concerned that popularly elected councils could provide the first step towards reforming
procedures for their own election.52 They feared introduction of a two-tiered voting system, with
municipal councillors themselves electing members of the colonial Parliament.53 This led to a
climate in which, according to Larcombe, central government representatives viewed district
councils as “rivals rather than partners”.54 The result was a push for centralisation, rather than
dispersion, of political power, and crystallisation of a poor relationship between State and Local
Governments.
Another problem was the lack of appeal of being a representative. Heavy penalties could be
imposed if an elected or appointed person refused office.55 Another severe provision related to
seizure and sale of councillors’ goods if their councils failed to raise sufficient funds for police
stations and prisons.56 Distraint upon possessions could extend to citizens,57 which fanned wider
concern.
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A further, very different factor was the sparseness of population, compounded by undeveloped
communication networks.58 This impeded any emergence of cohesive communities seeking to take
charge of their own civic destinies.59 Landholders’ energies would have been directed instead at
conquering a seemingly inhospitable environment, as symbolised by the ‘colonial’ vision.60 The
experience of Sydney’s own council as a club of propertied, wealthy men showed that Local
Government was of negligible interest to the broader community.
There is evidence of continuing community unwillingness to embrace Local Government in thinly
populated and remote unincorporated area of NSW. During the late 1990s, the NSW Department of
Local Government explored options for administrative mechanisms to provide improved services in
unincorporated outback villages.61 In response, echoing similar sentiments to the antagonist of 1835
who was prepared to navigate muddy roads in Sydney without the help of Local Government,62 a
prominent citizen of Tibooburra argued:
“[w]e don’t need for anything out here. We have the best dirt roads in NSW. We don’t need a
council and we don’t want to be dictated to. The town has been here for 120 years and we’ve
never needed a council.”63
In conclusion, Gipps’ ill-fated councils are more than just a fascinating chapter of Local
Government history. They laid the foundations for later systems and attitudes. And at least one
tangible legacy remains. The perimeters of the council areas were based largely on the then
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prevailing thirty police districts,64 which not only provided convenient lines on the map65 but also
reflected the original ‘law and order’ emphasis of councils.66 Whilst the ‘law and order’ focus was
to later disappear, the police districts continued to provide ready borders. In its 1984 discussion
paper on municipal boundary evaluation, the ACIR noted that early police district borders still
“frequently serve[d] as [contemporary] local government boundaries”.67 This reinforces the point
that many modern-day council areas are derived from purely arbitrary historic patterns.
Environmental considerations are almost irrelevant.
3.2.3

Permissive Incorporation

The next step was enactment of the Municipalities Act of 1858 (NSW),68 which allowed permissive,
rather than compulsory, incorporation. In answer to growing community demands for new and
improved local public works, particularly in rural townships, the NSW Government provided a “do
it yourself” package.69 Proclamation of a municipality was available upon presentation of a petition
signed by fifty or more householders in the absence of a sufficient counter-petition opposing
corporation.70 This scheme was set against a background of an expanding population outside
Sydney, tightening central funds and worsening road conditions throughout the colony.71 But as will
be seen below, the system failed to flourish again.
The 1858 legislation comprised a major policy shift. The NSW Parliament had already undergone
reform with the granting of responsible self-government in 1855, including establishment of a
bicameral legislature with a popularly elected Legislative Assembly. The iron grip of propertied
interests in Parliament had therefore been loosened. There was also the precedent of neighbouring
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Victoria’s Municipal Institutions Establishment Act of 1854,72 which permitted voluntary
incorporation in townships.73 But unlike NSW, Victoria had exhibited popular support for Local
Government from the start. Ongoing disenchantment with the Sydney Corporation and concern
about property taxation made enthusiasm in NSW far more uneven.74 After several unsuccessful
attempts to reintroduce Local Government, the NSW Parliament’s hand was eventually forced when
it found itself unable to deal with an increasing bombardment of requests from local communities –
often through its own members – for services as basic as street repairs. Not only was Parliament
unable to agree on any system for allocating funds but, as Larcombe notes, the government “had
neither the time, technical personnel, nor finance for such a multitude of small services”.75 As a
result, Parliament recognised optional incorporation as a ready solution, supported by a property tax
as a “necessary evil”.76
Minimum property value requirements for voting and election to office were abandoned. But the
legislation still restricted voting privileges to ratepaying landholders alone.77 This attracted strident
public criticism. One local newspaper warned against “the general interest being sacrificed by the
favoured few”.78 But the central government was unsympathetic. Indeed, under the replacement
Municipalities Act of 1867,79 it strengthened Local Government’s unrepresentative nature by
granting a huge concession to wealthy landholders in the form of cumulative voting. This entitled
landholders to enjoy up to four votes in municipal elections according to the value of their
properties.80 Comparable mechanisms were already in place in other Australian colonies. The
system attracted strong support from Premier Parkes who claimed that voting influence should
reflect rate contributions.81 The Sydney Morning Herald extolled the scheme, arguing that it would
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soften complaints about councils engaging in “organised plunder”.82 Several years earlier it had
contended that councils should not be regarded as political bodies but as “joint-stock associations of
… property holders”.83 Mowbray suggests that the scheme was a clear ploy to entice the wealthy to
support municipalisation.84
Municipal control by property interests provoked opposition. Cumulative voting became an
“obvious target” for the Labour Electoral Leagues who, as outlined by Markey, made “significant
organisational efforts” in fielding candidates for office during the early 1890s.85 This enthusiasm
later waned although substantial gains were made in electing Labour members to State Parliament
who pressed for democratic reform.86 The ultimate downfall of permissive incorporation reflected
continuing resistance to property taxation by landholders despite the cumulative voting carrot. This
was bolstered by the comfortable position of landholders outside incorporated townships who had
been used to relying on the central government for all infrastructural needs.87
Ownership of Local Government power by property interests helped to embed an early focus on
property-related services. Whilst the earlier district councils championed by Gipps, with their ‘law
and order’ emphasis, had been set up mainly to facilitate property protection, their successors
restricted their purview largely to property improvement.88 Councils were no longer required to
raise funds for police services. Instead, their role in providing basic infrastructural services became
entrenched. The 1858 statute conferred power on municipalities in relation to:
“care and management of roads public streets bridges ferries wharves jetties piers and public
thoroughfares ... the establishment and management of public cemeteries the securing of the
necessary supply of water for domestic sanitary or irrigation purposes...”89
Councils were expected to be regulators as well as service providers. Regulatory powers involved
control of public health, safety and decency, including management of carriers, markets, cattle
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slaughtering, “noisome and offensive trades”, extinguishment of fires and “suppression of ... houses
of ill fame”.90 It seems that councils were viewed by the State as convenient administrative agencies
to carry out low-key duties – i.e. activities derided by commentators as ‘housekeeping’.91
In contrast, powers to provide positive services offered scope for local creativity. These functions
went beyond traditional ‘housekeeping’ roles to matters such as “establishment of public libraries
museums botanical gardens or other public places of recreation”.92 This represented a fresh
emphasis on cultural and recreational development. The 1858 legislation also presented opportunity
for welfare services in the form of hospitals for “the care of the destitute poor and sick” and
asylums for “the protection support and moral and religious instruction of destitute or deserted
children”.93 The Municipalities Act of 1867 conferred even broader powers on councils, including
provision of “[F]ree Infant Schools for the instruction and industrial training” of “children who are
objects of charity”.94 Despite the enormous potential for dynamic bodies to provide such services in
response to community needs, the system failed to take root, especially in rural areas. Provision of
such services would have meant higher rate payments.
By the time of the eventual dismantling of the system in 1906, less than 1% of NSW land area was
incorporated.95 Because these lands related mostly to townships, about 25% of the State’s
population lived within municipalities.96 Those councils that survived until 1906 confined
themselves to urban ‘housekeeping’ tasks: i.e. providing limited infrastructural services directed at
property and town improvement, such as roads, sewage disposal and drainage.97 Larcombe notes,
for instance, that no evidence exists of municipal interest in setting up infants schools.98 Such a
function would have catered for the wider community rather than ratepayers alone. The result was
system, of 192 small units,99 exercising only the most rudimentary of functions.100
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The narrowness of activities was due not only to limited outlooks but also the paucity and nature of
funding. Although rates continued to provide the fiscal mainstay, the NSW Parliament resisted
pressure to raise the general rate beyond one shilling in the pound.101 For small populations, this
meant that very limited amounts could be collected. Moreover, it was inevitable that councils
dependent on restricted rate revenue would want to limit operations to ‘local’ services desired by
ratepayers. Indulgence in experiment was unlikely without external assistance. Local Government
thus became the stronghold of a begrudging propertied class in built-up areas who insisted their
contributions be expended on a limited range of urban facilities that would enhance land values,
boost businesses and help feed local prosperity.
A major factor contributing to scarcity of rate moneys was legal and administrative obstacles in rate
collection. Whilst the 1867 Act sought to address this, a successful action against the validity of a
rate levy imposed by Shoalhaven Council, which had left aldermen personally liable for certain
costs, sent shockwaves throughout fledgeling councils.102 Most municipalities were afraid to tackle
arrears;
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many ceased to levy rates whilst others disbanded altogether.104 The direct result,

according to Larcombe, was that “with so little revenue at their disposal, councils were barely able
to do little more than make minor street repairs”.105 Problems were particularly acute for those
municipalities dominated by unimproved lands. A rating system based on assessed annual values
(i.e. predicted nett annual rental income) led to these bodies receiving a far smaller slice of the
revenue pie. At the same time, owners of vacant land pressed for improved local infrastructure to
facilitate capital gain.
In 1858, the colonial government introduced a controversial system of statutory grants, known as
‘endowments’, to supplement rate revenue, influenced by the Sydney Corporation’s experience.106
But councils with tracts of undeveloped land still suffered because amounts forwarded were based
on corresponding levels of rate collections rather than individual needs.107 It may be argued that the
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endowment system served to encourage fiscal reliance on the central government, a tendency that,
as will be seen later, still prevails today but now involves the Commonwealth Government. From
the beginning, the municipalities had demanded grants that were unconditional to guard against
erosion of local autonomy.108 Under the 1867 legislation, payments were made over a fixed fifteenyear period on a diminishing sliding scale.109 When funds began to diminish from the mid 1870s
onwards, pressure for further assistance led to ad hoc payments, thereby cementing Local
Government’s economic dependence on central government. This reliance became particularly
acute during the economic depression of the 1890s.110 Grant moneys were forwarded but restricted
to public works, with central government retaining substantial control over activities carried out.111
Such conditions provided fertile ground for the emergence of a culture in which local authorities
were little more than provincial agents of the NSW Government.
Because the statutes permitted petitioners to decide upon their own perimeters, district council
boundaries never followed any particular policy. The fact is that there was no policy at all on where
the lines should have been drawn. Whilst this bottom-up approach may have fostered borders
reflecting loci of community interest, the eagerness of petitioners to avoid “pockets of antiincorporationists” would have mitigated against this.112 Fear of litigation deterred the central
government from redrawing the lines.113 The result was many small municipalities with arbitrary
boundaries based on eccentric ownership patterns. Significantly, the modest sizes worked against
functional diversity.
The Municipalities Act of 1867 was repealed in 1906 upon the advent of compulsory incorporation,
as outlined below. Prior to then, community pressure for municipalisation had been evident only in
centres of population where deteriorating road and sanitary conditions had prompted sufficient civic
interest. By that stage, NSW lagged behind other Australian jurisdictions to a considerable
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degree.114 (Only Queensland had also dragged the chain although it received compulsory
incorporation some thirty years earlier than NSW.) Yet in each colony - or State after 1901 - early
Local Government still comprised small units undertaking elementary tasks. This helps to explain
the fact that Local Government played no role in establishing Federation.
In summary, it seems that the early history of Local Government in NSW is one of initial tentative
steps, followed by eventual forceful moves, on the part of the colonial/State government to impose
municipalisation on an uninterested community. If anything, it explodes any myth that NSW
councils sprang from voluntary movements amongst local communities pushing for selfdetermination. It also, arguably, reveals the seeds of a widespread view that Local Government is an
institution of limited horizons warranting minimal attention. If Local Government is to be accepted
as necessary in arresting biodiversity decline, such a viewpoint must be challenged.
3.3

Development of Modern Local Government

3.3.1

Preamble

The limited extent of permissive incorporation and the narrow range of functions carried out by
councils meant that Parliament remained under considerable pressure from demands for minor
services from all corners of NSW. As Premier Carruthers complained in 1905, Parliament had to
endure “the immense task of attending to every petty little local requirement in every locality in this
large state”.115 The situation was inequitable as landholders in incorporated areas paid rates for
services whilst those outside escaped contributions altogether.116 In pressing for compulsory
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incorporation, the Premier pointed to the experience of other States, stressing that contrary to some
landholders’ fears, rates had not driven settlers “off their holdings”.117 He argued further that
Parliament’s limited resources should be devoted to “the work which properly appertains to it – the
true work of legislation and attention to the national requirements of the community”.118 Premier
Carruthers’ exhortations were successful. After several futile attempts by his predecessors, Local
Government became compulsory in 1905-1906. The Premier’s message was clear: Parliament was
delegating unwanted ‘housekeeping’ tasks to local agencies of the parent State Government.119
Carruthers introduced compulsory incorporation via a series of three statutes. The first, the Shires
Act 1905 (NSW), extended Local Government to that part of the state that remained unincorporated,
with the exception of the Western Division.120 The second, the Local Government Extension Act
1906 (NSW), applied corresponding provisions to the 192 existing municipalities that were allowed
to continue. The third, the Local Government Act 1906 (NSW) (LGA 1906), consolidated the two
enactments. Premier Carruthers based the locations of the new shires on recommendations of a
specially appointed Local Government Areas Commission. Boundary determination by experts was
a major departure from the previous scheme of local communities deciding upon borders.
Perimeters of municipalities established under the previous regime, however, were to remain.121 In
looking at townships already incorporated, the Commissioners considered the boundaries of Gipps’
former district councils in addition to roads and highways, cadastral lines and geographical
constraints such as rivers and mountain ranges.122 All this only added to the eccentricity of council
borders.
Premier Carruthers created 134 rural shires. The high number reflected the then remoteness of
districts due to poor communication networks and lack of motorised transport.123 Townships and
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their hinterlands tended to be placed under separate councils, reflecting the view that interests of
urban and rural constituents were substantially different, despite issues of social and economic
regional cohesion.124 Town-dwellers desired urban functions – such as sanitation, building safety
regulation and amenity enhancement – whilst their rural cousins wanted better roads to serve their
farms. The result was many small and isolated units struggling to furnish “even the minimum of
services”.125 Whilst the number of councils in NSW has since reduced significantly,126 many of the
early lines on the map prevail due to “simple agglomerations”.127 Their locations may now appear
artificial in view of changes in settlement patterns and improved transport conditions. As the Barnet
Inquiry noted in 1974, “what were relatively isolated places when local government was established
are now also integral parts of wider communities”.128 Many of the post-Barnet amalgamations
united towns and their surroundings, thereby reflecting wider communities of interest. From an
ecological perspective, both ancient and modern municipal boundaries still make little sense.
The LGA 1906 was to provide the foundation for Local Government in NSW for almost nine
decades. Parliament updated the 1906 legislation, without substantial overhaul, with the LGA 1919,
which was to survive for over 70 years. The sheer longevity of the 1919 Act underlines the fact that
until relatively recently - i.e. upon introduction of the ‘new’ LGA 1993 - councils operated under an
archaic scheme crafted in faraway times. During the early twentieth century, in contrast to today,
the public sector confined itself mainly to maintenance of law and order - a role that Local
Government had already lost – together with enhancement of private property and, in line with the
‘national’ vision, encouraging economic prosperity.129 By 1919, property improvement had become
Local Government’s central preoccupation, entrenched by dependence on its own property tax. The
resulting attitudinal context for council decision-making was the ‘ratepayer ideology’.130 This has,
arguably, restricted Local Government’s aspirations since its inception.
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3.3.2

Franchise Development

Changes to franchise requirements in 1906 provided some opportunity for weakening the ‘ratepayer
ideology’. Cumulative voting disappeared. The 1906 legislation widened voting rights beyond
owners and ratepaying lessees to “occupiers”, being direct tenants under lease of property worth £5
per annum or more.131 The 1919 Act maintained this approach.132 Any elector could stand for civic
office (with the exception of women who had to await the Women’s Legal Status Act 1918
(NSW)).133 These moves, whilst abhorrent to some propertied interests, reflected the influence of
Labour Parliamentarians who advocated a ‘one man one vote’ platform.134 But as Hogan points out,
the system “excluded lodgers paying rent for just a room or two”.135 Premier Carruthers himself
supported voting rights for the tenant, arguing that such a person nevertheless “indirectly pays the
rates in the form of rent”.136 Despite the broadened electorate, municipal preoccupation with
property services continued. This reflected ingrained cultures and limited funding outside the
property tax. Hogan observes that working class people were either unaware of voting entitlements
or uninterested in Local Government, seeing it as an instrument of the propertied class.137
In 1927, the Lang Government extended the franchise by handing the vote to all residents,
including lodgers, subject to a minimum residential requirement.138 In 1941, Parliament gave voting
entitlements to all those eligible to vote in State elections.139 Such moves discomforted propertied
interests.140 Yet as general acceptance of the broader franchise developed, councils were able to turn
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their interest to discretionary functions, such as providing libraries and baby health centres to serve
the wider community.141 But as will be seen below, a significant expansion of functions was not to
occur until well after WWII. This may have been assisted by the introduction of compulsory voting
in 1947,142 which guaranteed wider participation in municipal elections and encouraged broader
interest in Local Government. The conservative Askin Government, however, returned councils to
voluntary voting in 1968.143 Ratepayers’ associations enjoyed success in fielding candidates and the
‘ratepayer ideology’ was strengthened once again.144 Afterwards, following poor municipal
electoral turnouts in 1977, the Labor Wran Government restored mandatory voting,145 which still
remains.146
Under the current legislation, each “resident” entitled to vote at Parliamentary elections must
participate in council polls.147 Whilst this mitigates against ‘ratepayer ideology’ domination,
landholders can still argue that they deserve greater influence over council affairs because they are
the direct contributors to the rating tax.148 Furthermore, the continuing right of non-resident
landholders to vote, which enables multiple votes across different council areas, provides firm
evidence that the influence of the ‘ratepayer ideology’ is not confined to history.149 Whilst rates
remain at the core of Local Government financing, as will be discussed in detail in ch 7, the
‘ratepayer ideology’ will surely remain rooted in municipal culture.
3.3.3

Functional Development
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measures to extend Local Government areas, Premier Carruthers stressed that “practically all [the
new councils] want at the beginning of their existence are the powers of a glorified roads trust.”150
Proposals to extend council powers to other activities, such as the construction of public transport
infrastructure, erection of rabbit-proof fencing and the provision of public washhouses, were
defeated by Parliament.151 Purdie aptly describes the functions then given to councils as “a limited
range of works and services ... intended primarily to service the property of local ratepayers.”152
Despite the far wider range of functions available today, smaller rural councils may still be “little
more than roading authorities”.153
Obligatory functions under the LGA 1906 related to bread-and-butter services such as construction
and maintenance of streets and footpaths,154 bushfire prevention,155 garbage and nightsoil collection
(municipalities only)156 and drainage control.157 Various discretionary functions were available to
councils upon resolution,158 such as electricity and gas supply159 and maintenance of public
cemeteries.160 An important innovation for Local Government’s regulatory role was introduction of
optional comprehensive building control, enabling councils to regulate:
“the erection of buildings as to height, design, structure, materials, building line, sanitation
[and] the proportion of any lot which may be occupied by the building or buildings to be
erected thereon.”161
According to Wilcox, this power was “widely acquired”.162 Building control soon emerged as a core
council function. The mechanism, derived from British experience, provided the forbear for the
current building regulatory scheme.
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The later LGA 1919 rectified administrative problems. In terms of service functions, it failed to
institute radical change apart from the ability to create second-tier ‘county councils’,163 as will be
outlined in ch 4.164 Larcombe dismisses the 1919 Act as “a disappointing milestone” and “a
monument to … conservatism”.165 Yet despite such criticism, the fresh powers would have
appeared significant at the time. They extended to matters such as provision of art galleries,166
museums167 and gymnasia.168 Maiden contends, however, that councils tended to confine
themselves to more familiar activities by entering a “rather colourless span of municipal
inactivity”.169 Parker suggests that ratepayers “resisted the extension of local government activities
just as they had resisted incorporation in the first place”.170
The NSW Parliament nevertheless handed two significant regulatory functions to Local
Government in 1919. First, Pt XII brought subdivision under council control.171 P Ryan describes
subdivision approval as “simply the granting of authority to dispose of land in separate titles”.172
The new provisions were entitled ‘Town Planning’, reflecting the narrow conception then given to
the term. But the legislation also allowed regulation of, inter alia:
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•

“the standard number of houses to the acre” (i.e. residential density);173

•

“the amount of public garden and recreation space to be provided in the land to be subdivided”;174 and

•

“improvement and embellishment of the area”.175

These issues had emerged from an embryonic town planning movement bolstered, inter alia, by the
1909 report of a Royal Commission for the Improvement of Sydney and Suburbs, which had
generated popular interest in social, hygienic and aesthetic improvement.176 But at that stage, town
planning in provincial Australia, as opposed to Sydney, involved little more than laying down
gridiron street patterns and setting aside space for important public buildings and reserves.177
The second new function, another victory for the early planning lobby, was the ability to seek the
Governor’s proclamation of ‘residential districts’.178 This provided a primitive form of zoning by
prohibiting nominated land-uses, such as ‘trades’, ‘industries’ and ‘advertising hoardings’,179 in
designated areas. It comprised the “earliest form of statutory land use planning in NSW”.180 The
mechanism was designed for urban environments only and directed mainly at protecting residential
amenity.181 At this stage, land-use control was in its infancy. Nevertheless, as Proudfoot observes,
residential districts “became an essential part of … controlling the shape and character of urban
areas”.182 These early town planning powers fed the ‘ratepayer ideology’ by helping to preserve and
augment residential land values.
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Whilst Local Government has enjoyed a widening of functions in more recent times, particularly in
the field of environmental management during the 1990s, until the last few decades the emphasis
was on loss of powers.183 Since the 1880s, the NSW Government has usurped numerous functions
which it regards as most appropriately administered at a central or regional level. The focus has
been on improving efficiency. In many cases, specialist single-function non-elected agencies have
been created, often called ‘ad hoc authorities’184 but more recently, in the English context where a
similar trend prevails, ‘new magistracies’.185 As Bowman notes, central government preference for
these bodies reflected “a distrust of [local] ‘politics’ as being incompatible with efficiency”.186 In
the case of road maintenance, for instance, the State Government established the Main Roads Board
in 1924 due to Local Government’s incapacity to meet public pressure for higher road standards
arising from the advent of the motor vehicle.187 Carruthers’ original desire that shire councils
assume all road maintenance responsibilities was thus frustrated. As the Barnet inquiry noted with
irony in 1974, NSW had “returned to the nineteenth century days when central government was
responsible financially for the main roads system”.188
A comparable trend can be recognised in the far more recent creation of regional, appointed
committees (or ‘new magistracies’), namely Catchment Management (CM) Boards, Regional
Vegetation Committees (RVCs) and Water Management Committees (WMCs). In the biodiversity
conservation context, RVCs established under the NVCA 1997 have minimised opportunity for
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councils to plan for and regulate native vegetation clearance under the land-use planning system.189
The new committees are different in form to the earlier ‘ad hoc authorities’. They are closer to the
ground than the huge expert bureaucracies and provide for direct Local Government committee
membership. Furthermore, they administer regulatory, rather than service, powers. But they may
still work against Local Government assuming a leading role.
In terms of powers conferred upon Local Government rather than being taken away, Walmsley
suggests that between the early twentieth century and the 1970s, municipal functions in Australia
“changed very little”.190 Chapman and Wood observe that Australian Local Government had
“remained remarkably ossified” until this time.191 In 1984, the ACIR asserted that it was
“undeniable” that removal of important functions by the State Government had left councils with
only “minor regulatory functions”.192 But at that stage, the commentators might have given greater
emphasis to the beginnings of two significant areas of municipal functional expansion: town
planning, an essentially regulatory power, and the provision of community and welfare services.
Parliament introduced a comprehensive land-use planning system in 1945 by inserting Pt XIIA
into the LGA 1919. Part XIIA empowered councils to prepare ‘planning scheme ordinances’ which
could “contain provisions for regulating and controlling the use of land and the purposes for which
land may be used”.193 This ability to determine the development potential of private lands, whilst
subject to the ultimate control of the State Government,194 pushed Local Government into a far
more powerful realm than its traditional role of service provider and regulator of health and safety.
As Hamer notes, prior to then, Local Government powers “were barely sufficient to sustain local
interest at a worthwhile level”.195 Now, at the stroke of the council’s planning pen, landholders
could enjoy a financial bonanza through land value escalations or suffer the disappointing loss of
development expectations.196 Harrison refers to the “unprecedented power” that the planning system
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then conferred on both State and Local Government.197 It was far more potent that the amenitybased proclaimed residential districts.
The Pt XIIA system enabled councils to regulate a far broader range of activities than under the preexisting building, subdivision and residential district regimes. Whilst building regulation had been
directed at structures for health and safety purposes, the planning system related to the use of land,
its impact on neighbours and even wider environmental concerns. In preparing planning schemes,
councils were entitled to consider matters such as “the restriction of ribbon development” and the
“preservation of places of … natural beauty”.198 But councils were at first reluctant to exploit their
new plan-making powers.199 Although the legislation required appointment of a qualified person to
help prepare planning schemes, many considered this an expensive impediment to a needless
activity.200 Land-use planning seemed to be outside the limited range of services that ratepayers
wanted. Although preparation of planning schemes became compulsory in the Sydney area in
1948,201 councils preferred to keep the flexibility of dealing with development proposals under
fewer or no rules.202 Because of council resistance, in many cases the State Government imposed
planning functions on councils, either through regional planning schemes – in particular, the
Sydney-wide County of Cumberland Planning Scheme203 – or, more commonly, the handing down
of generic “interim” local instruments.204 But gradually, a municipal awakening to the sheer
“political purchase” of planning powers took place.205 Harrison notes, however, that councils still
directed most of their planning energy at “the protection of local amenity, usually residential
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amenity”.206 Because land-use control could protect and enhance property values by outlawing
undesirable neighbouring developments, zoning emerged as a regulatory service welcomed by
urban ratepayers. Land-use planning could be fitted snugly within the ‘ratepayer ideology’. The
situation in rural areas was very different, as will be seen in ch 6.
The planning profession’s prestige was fuelled by the Commonwealth’s involvement in urban
policy under PM Whitlam, with his commitment to broad social equity.207 Moreover, modern
environmentalism generated awareness of the potential of the system to widen its net to
environmental impact assessment and consideration of the natural environment. In response, the
NSW Parliament replaced Pt XIIA with the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
(NSW) (EPAA), which commenced in 1980 and transferred planning functions from the general
Local Government legislation to an entirely separate regime. The current planning system will be
discussed in detail in ch 6.
A second major post-war functional development was provision of community, welfare and cultural
services, such as personal counselling, subsidised meals and arts festivals.208 As early as 1963, the
then Australian Council of Australian Local Government Associations (ACALGA) complained
about the cost burden of “social and welfare functions”.209 Council involvement mushroomed from
the early 1970s onwards, prompted by novel Commonwealth funding programs that moved well
206
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beyond property-based services.210 But not all councils embraced the role with vigour. In 1990, the
NSW Committee of Inquiry into Local Government and Other Revenue Powers and Resources (the
‘Oakes Committee’) suggested that municipal expenditure on community services was “much less
than might have been expected”.211 This service role demonstrates the ongoing tension between
modern expectations of Local Government and the traditional ‘ratepayer ideology’.
Other new functional areas embraced by modern Local Government include, inter alia, promotion
of local tourism,212 profit-making ventures213 and developing industrial estates.214 These examples
reflect Local Government’s long-established interest in advancing local economic wealth. As Beer
notes, councils “are one of the biggest investors in local economic development”.215 These activities
are, of course, discretionary and the level of municipal involvement varies substantially.216
In the regulatory arena, councils have been involved in operational pollution control since the 1960s
and 1970s.217 In particular, councils have regulated air and noise pollution through serving notices
on, and prosecuting, offending operators. This function can be relevant to protecting neighbourhood
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amenity and, therefore, can feed the ‘ratepayer ideology’. It is another matter altogether if the
pollution threatens the natural environment but does not effect private property.
As put forward in the introductory chapter, the big ‘new’ function throughout the 1990s and beyond
is widely recognised as ‘environmental management’.218 This not only involves new emphases in
service delivery, land-use planning and regulation, and management of vegetated open space but
can extends across most traditional functions, such as mowing road verges, quarrying for gravel and
waste disposal.
Local Government is often wary of accepting fresh responsibilities and approaches due to cost
implications. Sufficient resources have not always accompanied the transfer of new functions to
Local Government.219 Accordingly, any discussion of municipal functions is incomplete without
attention to funding issues. The historical development of these mechanisms is summarised below.
3.3.4

Financial Development

Whilst the LGA 1906 narrowed the functions of early Local Government, it heralded a major
change in revenue raising by requiring general rates to be assessed on the unimproved capital value,
rather than assessed annual value, of lands.220 The new value was defined as:
“the amount of the capital sum for which the fee-simple estate in such land would sell, under
such reasonable conditions of sale as a bona fide seller would require, assuming the actual
improvements (if any) had not been made…”221
The former regime, based on the estimated revenue each property could generate, had been pilloried
on the grounds that by approximating a wealth tax, it proved a disincentive to land improvement.
This would have been antipathetic to the ‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions. Furthermore, the earlier
system had allowed owners of vacant land to enjoy rising land values resulting from works carried
out by others whilst being cushioned against rate increases.222 The regime was thus re-oriented from
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a ‘capacity-to-pay’ model towards a ‘benefit-related base’,223 with the underlying assumption that
unimproved land values would reflect the extent of benefits accrued from public expenditure.224
The 1906 regime also resuscitated a limited endowment system, with shires entitled to ‘permanent’
grants and municipalities subject to discretionary payments up to a fixed proportion of their general
rate receipts.225 A resurgence of government grants occurred during the economic downturn of the
1930s, when the State paid funds to councils for unemployment relief via the carrying out of public
works. This cemented Local Government’s agency role by having councils carry out State-allocated
works under State supervision.226 By that time, declining land values and an increase in
impecunious landholders had led to dwindling rate revenue. Many councils were struggling to repay
loans entered into during boom times. They saw grants from the parent State Government as the
only answer. But opportunity for rate collection was to later soar as population levels rose and land
values increased during prosperous times after WWII. The level of grants then contracted in real
terms. By the mid-1950s, according to Larcombe, “grants had a negligible influence on council
budgets and were far from a substantial stake in the local financial structure”.227 This enabled the
‘ratepayer ideology’ to flourish again. But spectacular rises in rate revenue occurred only in council
areas subject to development pressure. Sparsely populated rural shires remained far more reliant on
grant moneys, having been weaned on State funding since their establishment.228
Public concern about rate escalations emerged after WWII. Between 1947 and 1960, rate revenue
collected across Australia rose by 406% whilst the population increased by only 35%.229 A reason
which Local Government was keen to push in arguing for greater subsidy was growth of services. A
significant factor for urban councils was burgeoning demands for traditional functions such as
roads, drainage and building regulation arising from rapid post-war population growth. In 1953, the
ACALGA wrote to all Australian Parliamentarians complaining of “a revolution in public
expectations from Local Government” that demanded improved funding.230 It contended that:
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“[i]t is indisputable that Local Government, in the face of the demands of the modern era and
spiraling costs, was never in its history more impoverished than today ... taxation in the
aggregate has virtually reached the limit which the people can pay and it is quite impossible
for Local Government to increase its rates to the proportions needed...”231
Ten years later, the ACALGA protested that ratepayers were still suffering “harsh and unjust
treatment” and “an intolerable burden”, basing its argument on the lack of relationship between
newer “social and welfare” functions of councils and property ownership.232 Its argument
epitomised the ‘ratepayer ideology’, pressing for a fixed portion of Commonwealth income tax
revenue.233 Such lobbying helped focus the spotlight on the issue of what types of municipal activity
should be funded by rate moneys. This question has since become even more contentious as Local
Government functions have become more complex.234
Whilst a guaranteed slice of tax income was not to occur until the late 1970s, the ACALGA’s
efforts helped provide impetus for the NSW Government to launch the Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Rating Valuation and Local Government Finance in 1967 (the ‘Else-Mitchell
Commission’).235 The Commission expressed sympathy about the heavy impost on ratepayers
resulting from “growing demand ... for the provision of a far wider range of services”, concluding
that rates “should not be the sole source of revenue”.236 It recommended, inter alia, establishment of
a State body to make grants to supplement rate income, leading to the NSW Local Government
Grants Commission (LGGC) in 1969.237 The LGGC precipitated a resurgence of grant moneys,
hitherto a fluctuating and unreliable source of income vulnerable to central government whim.
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The financial landscape underwent dramatic change upon the entry of the Commonwealth
Government into council funding in the early 1970s.238 The Whitlam Government, elected in 1972,
desired a close relationship with Local Government. In his pre-election policy speech, Whitlam
promised that Labor would “make Local Government a genuine partner in the federal system”.239
The result, according to Jones, was Local Government’s rescue from “long-term decline and
impending irrelevance”.240 Labor saw Local Government as a convenient mechanism through which
to pursue regional fiscal equalisation policy in terms of equity of access to public services,
especially in poorer outer metropolitan areas.241
A longstanding Whitlam initiative was overhaul of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC)
via the Grants Commission Act 1973 (Cth). This saw substantial injection of funding to local
authorities via the States. Significantly, councils could only apply for funding through ‘Regional
Organisations of Councils’ (ROCs) established by Minister Uren’s Department of Urban and
Regional Development (DURD),242 which were to serve as funding “conduits” under various
schemes.243 CGC moneys were paid on an unconditional basis. Uren claims that this “was the
beginning of an evolutionary process that … changed local … politics forever”.244 The purpose of
the grants was not to supplement rate income but, in Whitlam’s own words, to enable poorer
238
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councils “to provide a standard of services to their communities that will be comparable with that
enjoyed by communities elsewhere”.245 In order to achieve this, the CGC undertook the complex
task of surveying areas throughout the nation in terms of revenue-raising capacities and expenditure
disabilities.246 State Governments and some local authorities, especially those that received no
additional funding, greeted such moves with distrust.247 Whilst the administrative regional elements
of the system have since disappeared,248 untied Commonwealth funding has remained a significant
portion of Australian Local Government revenue ever since.
Specific purpose grants for which Local Government had to compete against other eligible bodies,
such as community organisations, also burgeoned under PM Whitlam. Moneys became available for
various activities such as airport maintenance and community services. Hawker notes that because
many councils failed to take advantage of such opportunities, often due to ignorance, the ‘system’
was “scattered and unmonitored”.249 Nevertheless, the use of special purpose grants expanded. Yet
many councils lacked the capacity or expertise to embrace additional functions.250 These types of
grants tended to promote councils as administrative agents of central government with minimal
input into policy processes behind the schemes.
The subsequent Fraser Government dismantled various Whitlam/Uren initiatives but maintained
untied Commonwealth funding. As part of its ‘new federalism’ package, it devolved decisionmaking on municipal funding allocation to the States. The CGC was reduced to dividing the
funding pie between the States, whilst State-level grants commissions were to subdivide their
individual portions between councils within their own States. As a result, the role of NSW’s own
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LGGC was changed to distribute Commonwealth moneys rather than State Government general
grants.
The Fraser Government embodied its reforms in the Local Government (Personal Income Tax
Sharing) Act 1976 (Cth). Whilst s 6(2)(b) maintained the concept of fiscal equalisation between
councils, the later Report of the National Inquiry into Local Government Finance (the ‘Self
Report’) noted that other objectives of the Coalition were to promote Local Government autonomy
and, in Senator Carrick’s own words, to allow “containment of rates”.251 Local Government and its
ratepayers would have welcomed such aims. The scheme guaranteed to councils a fixed portion of
Commonwealth income tax revenue, thereby addressing a long-held demand.252 In 1981, Edmonds
asserted that it pre-empted “major reassessment of [Local Government’s] role and function”.253
Whilst this might be an overstatement, the move nevertheless occurred in an era of functional
expansion, especially in town planning and social/leisure services, promoted by Commonwealth
funding in the first place.254 The new arrangement must have helped loosen the hold of the
‘ratepayer ideology’ even further by establishing a guaranteed source of funding outside rate
collection serving a wider community.
The guaranteed share of income tax moneys reached a high point of 2% between 1980/81 and
1985/86.255 In 1986/87, the Hawke Government abandoned the system pursuant to a broader
“macroeconomic policy of fiscal restraint”.256 Since then, Commonwealth general purpose grants
have been the subject of a more arbitrary system of annual budget allocations. As stressed by the
Oakes Committee, they have declined in real terms.257 Local Government has always lamented the
loss of fixed revenue sharing. Under the existing framework, established by the Local Government
(Financial Assistance) Act 1995 (Cth), Commonwealth moneys are divided between the states on a
251
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per capita basis, whilst the states continue to distribute the money in accordance with fiscal
equalisation principles formulated, in NSW, by the LGGC.258 Whilst rural councils are less
dependent on rate moneys due to these unconditional grants, each landholder must still pay her or
his rates, which means that the ‘ratepayer ideology’ prevails.
In conclusion, the history of Local Government funding is a mixture of constancy and change. It has
been shaped by political forces far beyond Local Government as well as local resistance to new
directions. But several themes stand out. First, Local Government has adhered to an ancient and
historically unpopular property tax as its financial centrepiece, which has always influenced council
operations in terms of narrowing municipal enterprise. Second, there is the relatively recent
emergence of Commonwealth untied grants upon which councils have become highly dependent.
Third, there is an uneven history of specific purpose grants divested to councils as agents of central
government. Underpinning all these features nowadays is mounting pressure on Local Government
to shoulder additional functions, including biodiversity conservation. But whilst the municipal
agenda expands, its purse is limited.
3.4

1990s and Beyond: New Assertiveness and Management Styles

Whilst Local Government’s heyday of the Whitlam/Uren era is long gone, Chapman argues that the
period enabled Local Government “to build up a more assertive style at the national level”.259
Chapman has the benefit of hindsight. Some twenty years before, he had contended that Local
Government suffered a lack of legitimacy in the Australian government structure although hinting
that “the initial stage of such legitimation” was just beginning.260 At the same time, Parker noted
that under PM Whitlam, Local Government had became “for the first time a national issue”,261 as
reflected not only in its new direct financial nexus with the Commonwealth but also its
representation at the 1973 Constitutional Convention. Local Government had at last matured
sufficiently to gain a foothold on the national platform. The tax-sharing scheme introduced by the
Fraser Government helped to increase Local Government’s stature even further.
258
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The Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) has developed a strong national voice and
profile.262 It is ready to confront big issues of national, if not international, significance, such as
biodiversity conservation. Marshall and Sproats call it a “forceful and influential lobby group”.263
But the ALGA’s influence should not be overstated. As its former Chief Executive Officer has
warned, it “is a relatively small player on the national stage”.264 Furthermore, individual councils
are more closely linked with their own state or territorial Local Government associations, which are
more familiar with State/Territorial Government policy and legislation. Of course, enthusiasm at the
wider national level for environmental issues, such as biodiversity conservation, does not
necessarily translate to sympathetic on-ground decisions of individual local authorities. This reflects
the diffuse and diverse nature of Local Government as well as the independence of individual
authorities from their national body.265
A specially visible and powerful impact on Local Government during the 1990s and beyond has
been enforced managerial change. This is a direct product of organisational, industrial, financial,
legislative and regulatory reform that swept across Australian Local Government throughout the
1990s.266 Such moves have been wrapped up in modern managerialism underpinned by microeconomic reform,267 adopted by the ALGA itself in the 1995 Accord Between the Commonwealth of
Australia and Local Government.268 They have often led to more sophisticated management
activity. Many councils pride themselves on new administrative techniques.269 But as Marshall and
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Sproats observe, insufficient resources and inadequate staff skills, especially in small rural areas,
leads to poor strategic management.270 Macklin refers to the “culture of commercial management”
introduced by the “new breed” of managers,271 which can override wider community interests.
Influential, international trends towards downsizing the public sector, as well as shifts in national
policy, such as introduction of the influential National Competition Policy, have encouraged
councils to pare back publicly-funded activity and compete against the private sector in service
delivery.272 Whilst these developments have helped Local Government outgrow its ‘wastebin’
origins, they raise unsettling implications for civic experiment. Caddick warns that although
competitive market principles may attract local efficiency gains, they are “shaking the underpinning
values associated with ‘governing’ in local government”.273 B Ryan argues that contemporary
trends in “managerial and economic reform” across all levels of government, including councils, are
creating tensions with the “democratic agenda” with its traditional emphasis on community
participation in government decision-making that emerged several decades ago.274 Other
commentators are more blunt. Munro refers to “substitution of corporatisation and managerialism”
for “representation and accountability”, deriding modern councils as mere “contract managers”.275
Jones asserts that “the ‘hard’ financial approaches have swamped the ‘softer’ traditional values of
citizen needs, political participation [etc]”.276 He predicts, disturbingly, that there will be
“substantially less attention to human services and environmentalism”.277
This paints a dim prospect for conservation efforts that exhibit no immediate returns for modernday municipal accountants, who concentrate on “the assessment of more concrete activities”.278 It is
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output measures”279). The benefits are often intangible or unknown. Any focus on the market as the
determinant of local services will scarcely serve biodiversity imperatives. Adams and Hine,
however, are more optimistic, claiming that nothwithstanding Local Government being
“disadvantaged and marginalised” by ‘economic rationalism’, it remains a “key player” in
environmental management.280 But again, this is not the situation for all councils. More attention
must be paid to cross-boundary policy and action.
3.5

Conclusion

Local Government has travelled an epic journey since its early days. Whilst originally set up to
support police stations and gaols, and soon afterwards entrenched as provider of basic
infrastructural services, it has since embraced significant functions well beyond the limited horizons
of property protection and improvement.281 Yet the notion of Local Government as State
Government’s ‘wastebin’ – i.e. carrying out functions regarded by the State as expensive, irritating
and politically insignificant - still lingers. In 1987, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald
lamented that councils “remain condemned to deal with only the most tedious business of
government, in a climate of utter subordination to the State Government”.282 Daly held a similar
opinion in 2000.283 This viewpoint now demands reappraisal in view of Local Government’s
important environmental management responsibilities and expectations, including biodiversity
conservation. A major constraint, however, is a municipal mindset, derived from history, which
limits Local Government’s own outlook.
Of course, Local Government’s conventional position as provider of services directed at
improvement and enjoyment of private property has undoubtedly decreased in importance. In
particular, the proportion of council expenditure on capital works, such as road and bridge
construction, has contracted.284 Yet in some rural areas, it still dominates the municipal agenda.285
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As Chapman notes, despite the general “major shift” away from ‘rates, roads and rubbish’, the “old
view” can still continue.286 There is a strong suspicion, therefore, that the ‘ratepayer ideology’ can
still wield significant influence. Gray asserts that many councils still try not to deviate from
property services and that “[r]ural councils have generally been slower than urban councils to
expand the range of their activities”.287 The problem is not something that increased fiscal
generosity from central government will necessarily fix. Whilst encouraging signs may be occurring
in some locations, Local Government’s historical and cultural baggage cannot be swept aside. In
terms of pressure for new management approaches, the driving force of economic rationalism will
hardly support conserving aspects of nature for future generations.
It is worth considering whether parochialism and the ‘ratepayer ideology’ can be diluted if Local
Government was to operate on a regional basis. Recent official commitment to management of the
natural environment via a bioregional framework, makes this issue especially relevant. So does
Local Government’s relationship with the recent regional natural resource management committees.
Lessons from regional experiment are the subject of the next chapter.

285

D Tucker, “From Administration to Management” in B Dollery & N Marshall (eds), Australian Local
Government: Reform and Renewal (Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia, 1997a), 70.
286
Chapman (1997b), op cit n 59 at 1-2.
287
I Gray, “Power Relations in Local Communities” in G Lawrence, F Vanclay & B Furze (eds), Agriculture,
Environment and Society (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1992), 146.

110

CHAPTER FOUR
REGIONALISATION AND REGIONALISM
4.1

Prelude

This chapter builds on the previous three by investigating the development of one particular aspect
of Local Government activity: its participation in management of spatial units that transcend
individual council areas. As McNeil notes, emphasising the environmental impact of ordinary
council functions, there are “very few [Local Government] activities where the effects are purely
local”.1 Due to the fluid nature of the biophysical world across political boundaries, consideration of
opportunity for inter-council collaboration to conserve biodiversity is essential. As Ohlin et al
observe in a document designed to promote regional approaches to ESD, “some issues … can only
be addressed satisfactorily at a regional scale through the cooperative efforts of two or more
councils”.2 Significantly, the National LG Biodiversity Strategy supports the notion of councils
“group[ing] together into regions for the purpose of natural resource management”.3 One of its five
key objectives is to “encourage regional partnerships and planning”.4 The LG National Agenda,
states that:
“Local Government will promote the importance of regional cooperation between Councils
… as a means to enhance its own capacity to deal effectively with environmental issues and
contribute to national policy”.5
These statements are pertinent to the concept of bioregional planning. They also raise questions
concerning Local Government relations with the relatively new regional environmental structures in
NSW. By considering past and present institutional structures for council cooperation, this chapter
informs analysis of the potential role of Local Government to pursue biodiversity conservation at a
regional scale.
Because a council’s strongest powers, especially its land-use regulatory functions, are restricted to
its own area, forceful regional municipal action can only occur through interaction between
1

J McNeill, “Local Government in the Australian Federal System” in B Dollery & N Marshall (eds),
Australian Local Government: Reform & Renewal (Melbourne: Macmillan Education, 1997a), 23.
2
J Ohlin, V Brown & N Appleton, Reasons for Regions: Long-tern Sustainability from the Ground Up
(Canberra: Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, ANU, 1996), 14.
3
Australian Local Government Association & Biological Diversity Advisory Council, National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy (Canberra: the Association & Council, 1998), 13.
4
Ibid at 6.
5
Item 13 under ‘Environment and Planning’, Australian Local Government Association, National Agenda for
Australian Local Government 2002, www.alga.asn.au.page.cfm?site_page_id=393 (accessed 9 Jan 2002).
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individual authorities. This may involve councils working together to achieve mutual objectives or,
at least, realigning their plans and actions to prevent cross-border inconsistency. Councils may also
choose to provide positive services, such as reserve management, in a co-operative manner.
Collaboration may emerge from encouragement, or even pressure, by the State government.
Alternatively, it may arise from council initiative. These types of approaches may be labelled ‘top
down’ or ‘bottom up’ respectively. Imposition of regional organisation from above may also be
called ‘regionalisation’ whilst on-ground movement upwards comprises ‘regionalism’. This chapter
deals with both.
After first exploring the very notion of regions, the chapter presents a historical narrative of
municipal regional interaction. Regionalisation policies of central government – both the
Commonwealth and NSW - and their impact on Local Government will be discussed, followed by
initiatives by Local Government itself, including both the county council movement and, more
importantly, the recent emergence of voluntary ‘regional organisations of councils’ (ROCs).
Lessons will be drawn from these various experiments for modern-day Local Government and its
potential for regional conservation efforts.
4.2

Introduction of Notion of Regions in Australia and Implications for Local
Government

At the outset, a distinction should be made between (i) ‘functional’ and (ii) ‘political’ or
‘administrative’ regions. Functional regions are used to classify spatial areas by means of one or
more identifiable phenomena. The IBRA process, based on a combination of biophysical features,
provides a good example.6 Political or administrative regions, on the other hand, involve
organisation by government of activity into spatial units that go beyond neighbourhoods. Regional
structures may enjoy political responsibilities or, alternatively, merely carry out delegated
administrative tasks.
McCarty is talking about functional regions when he describes a region as having “one or more
dominant characteristics spread evenly across its area that give … its distinct identity and delimit it
from adjoining regions”.7 But establishing a precise approach is problematic. As Glasson suggests:

6

R Thackway & I Creswell (eds), An Interim Biogeographic Regionalisation for Australia: A Framework for
Setting Priorities in the National Reserves System Cooperative Program (Version 4.0) (Canberra: Australian
Nature Conservation Agency, 1995). See ch 2.
7
J McCarty, “Australian Regional History” (1978) 18 Historical Studies 88 at 91. For similar descriptions,
see G Andrews (chairperson), Towards Regionalisation, Access and Community Participation: Report of the
Taskforce on Regionalisation of Government Administration and Community Participation (Sydney: NSW
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“[t]he idea of a region has been much used and abused over the years and there have been
numerous controversies and disagreements over its meaning, perhaps reflecting the variety of
disciplines involved in regional studies”.8
The degree of difficulty in drawing lines on the ground will depend on the ‘function’ itself. In some
cases, the physical environment will provide ready borderlines, such as coastlines or watersheds. On
other occasions, there will be scope for argument.9 Defining regions based on vegetation, for
instance, can be difficult due to gradual change across the landscape. Units may be drawn from
human-based land-use patterns or more nebulous matters such as ‘communities of interest’.10 This
latter concept can involve a vast array of factors, such as communication channels, employment
nodes and even football team loyalties.11 It has been an important factor in reshaping Local
Government boundaries since the demise of the nineteenth century petitioners.12 Longstanding
municipal boundaries can themselves be a major contributor to community attachment.13
In the case of political regions, perimeters are a matter of fact. Precise delineation is essential in
order to delimit jurisdiction.14 In Australia, regional administrative boundaries frequently follow the
perimeters of groups of council areas; as Harris notes, Local Government borders provide the

Government Printer, 1980), 61; M Logan et al, Urban and Regional Australia: Analysis and Policy Issues
(Melbourne: Sorrett Publishing, 1975), 23.
8
J Glasson, An Introduction to Regional Planning (London: Hutchison, 1978), 35.
9
National Institute of Economic and Industry Research Pty Ltd, State of the Regions: A Report to the
Australian Local Government Association 1998 Regional Cooperation and Development Forum (Melbourne:
the Institute, 1999), 1. When more than one phenomenon is involved, difficult questions can arise about how
the various criteria should be weighted: Andrews, op cit n 7 at 61.
10
For discussion of this concept, see Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations (ACIR), Local
Government Boundary Reorganisation (Canberra: AGPS, 1984a), 32-36. The ACIR notes that the concept is
“important … but difficult to define”: at 32.
11
Wettenhall and Power have suggested that the “most persistent influence” on regional awareness in
Tasmania is competitive regional football teams: R Wettenhall & J Power, “Regionalisation and Public
Administration in Australia” in R Mathews (ed), Responsibility Sharing in a Federal System (Canberra:
Centre for Federal Financial Relations, ANU, 1975), 200; see also R Wettenhall, J Power & M Jones, “The
Australian Government’s Regional Programs – A Perspective from Below” (1975) 17 (14) Local Government
Administration 35 at 35.
12
Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations (1984a), op cit n 10 at 32-36. Significantly, the current
NSW Local Government Boundaries Commission, when investigating boundary readjustment, is required by
statute to consider, inter alia, the “community of interest and geographical cohesion in … existing areas and
in any proposed new area”: s 266(3)(b) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).
13
R Atkins, “Areas and Boundaries” in Proceedings of the Local Government Conferences, Armidale and
Taree 1958 (Armidale (NSW): Adult Education Department, UNE, 1958a), 23.
14
C Harris, “Local Government and Regional Planning” in B Higgins & K Zagorski (eds), Australian
Regional Developments: Readings in Regional Experiences, Policies and Prospects (Canberra: AGPS, 1989),
105.
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“building blocks”.15 This is a matter of both convenience and politics. Council borders provide
immediate, convenient lines on the ground. Any attempt to tamper with them is likely to antagonise
Local Government. Yet it is easy to appreciate that Local Government boundaries can hinder
effective environmental management.16 As seen in the previous chapter, municipal borders were
established on no firmer basis than historic arbitrariness.
There is also the stark contrast between the static nature of municipal boundaries and the dynamism
of functional regions. As Ohlin et al assert:
“examining the relationships between the factors which go to make up a region is as
important as deciding boundary lines. The rate and extent of social, economic and ecological
change will require concepts of regions which allow for … [inter alia] adaptability [and]
development over space and time”.17
There is no ready solution to this challenge. Nevertheless, frustration with the locations of council
boundaries has helped prompt the NSW Government to introduce ‘overlaying’ environmental
management regimes that provide the option for council perimeters to be ignored. These comprise
the Catchment Management (CM) Boards, Regional Vegetation Committees (RVCs) and Water
Management Committees (WMCs), all referred to in previous chapters.18
Of course, regional bodies come and go as new governments are elected and old ones alter policy.19
They are far more volatile than Local Government. Their ephemeral nature is the direct product of
lack of political entrenchment. Alexandra calls them the “bastard child of cooperative federalism”
that must strive to earn any legitimacy,20 whilst Munro talks of a “de-facto” level of government
occupying “no-man’s land”.21 It is by no means a fourth sphere. The ongoing parade of regional

15

C Harris (1989), ibid; see also C Harris “Regional and Local Government Policies in Australia” (1976a) 35
Australian Journal of Public Administration 101 at 109.
16
T Hundloe, “The Environment: How to Solve Problems that Don’t Respect Borders” (1998) 57(3)
Australian Journal of Public Administration 87 at 89.
17
Ohlin et al, op cit n 2 at 7. Over-emphasis on regional boundaries is also stressed by Andrews: op cit n 7 at
61.
18
See ch 2 at 57-59; ch 3 at 90.
19
Beer refers to “a ‘third world demography with high birth and high death rates”: A Beer, “Regional
Economic Arrangements in Australia” in J Dore & J Woodhill (eds), Sustainable Regional Development:
Final Report: An Australian-Wide Study of Regionalism Highlighting Efforts to Improve the Community,
Economy and Environment (Canberra: Greening Australia Ltd, 1999), 190.
20
J Alexandra, “Regions – the Bastard Children of Cooperative Federalism” in J Dore & J Woodhill,
Sustainable Regional Development: Final Report: An Australian-Wide Study of Regionalism Highlighting
Efforts to Improve the Community, Economy and Environment (Canberra: Greening Australia, 1999), 215.
21
A Munro, “Local and Regional Governance: Back to Basics”(1997) 56(3) Australian Journal of Public
Administration 77 at 78.
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experiment adds to the tension between the three levels of government.22 It creates particular
problems for Local Government, the weakest of the spheres. Councils may find themselves
competing against such bodies for limited resources or sidelined altogether.
Most regional initiatives have been the product of central government programs rather than local
initiative.23 A long-established network of State and Commonwealth offices situated away from
capital cities reflects a strong twentieth century tradition of regional management. But the emphasis
there has been on administration rather than governance.24 This chapter is less concerned about such
structures. The focus is on more innovative arrangements.
As will be seen below, at the Commonwealth level, regionalisation has generally been the domain
of Labor rather than Coalition Governments,25 with three significant forays into the area with
differing foci. State Governments usually resent Commonwealth regional activities, regarding
regional and Local Government policy as their own territory.26 Local Government, on the whole, is
suspicious of any regional program imposed upon it from above.
4.3

Regionalisation Initiatives by Central Governments

4.3.1

The Commonwealth’s First Initiative: the 1940s

The first attempts occurred during the 1940s under PMs Curtin and Chifley, developed through a
series of Commonwealth/State conferences and culminating in the publication of Regional Planning
in Australia by the Commonwealth Department of Post-War Reconstruction (CDPWR).27 The
emphasis was on promoting national security and reconstruction. This was to be achieved by
22

Ibid.
Wettenhall & Power, op cit n 11 at 196.
24
As Wettenhall and Power suggested in 1975, the focus has been on “deconcentration rather than
devolution” of power, with the establishment of “field-office networks” rather than semi-autonomous regional
bodies with substantial discretionary decision-making powers: ibid at 197. Examples include regional offices
of forestry, water management and social security. There is generally little coordination between
administrative regions. Garlick, for example, refers to the Commonwealth regional arrangements as a set of
“uncoordinated boards and committees operating with differing regional boundaries and reporting
arrangements”: S Garlick, “The Ebb and Flow of Regional Development Policy and Practice in Australia: An
Overview and Future Possibilities” in Proceedings of the Regional Cooperation and Development Forum
(Australian Local Government Association & Greening Australia, 23 November 1997b, Canberra), 27.
Garlick listed 24 “different programs across a range of agencies at the Commonwealth level alone that claim
to address regional issues”. See also J Woodhill, “Natural Resources Decision Making Beyond the Landcare
Paradox” (1996) 3(1) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 91 at 108.
25
L Fulop, “Competitive Regionalism in Australia: Sub-Metropolitan Case Study” in M Keating & J
Loughlin (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 215.
26
G Forth, “Redrawing the Map of Australia: The Commonwealth’s Regional Development Program” (1996)
2 Australasian Journal of Regional Studies 75 at 80; Harris (1976a), op cit n 15 at 102.
27
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, Regional Planning in Australia (Canberra: the Department, 1949).
23
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encouraging coordinated resource development in rural areas considered to be under-populated.28
Socio-economic policy objectives of full employment, increased living standards and urban
decentralisation underpinned the scheme.29 The nation was divided into almost 100 regions; in some
States, ‘regional development committees’ (RDCs) were established with significant Local
Government representation.30 The committees were to prepare resource inventories and regional
plans “directed towards the full development of the region’s resources in order to maintain the
maximum population”.31
At this stage, the ‘national’ vision was in full swing. National prosperity was the driving objective.
There was substantial faith in the development potential of seemingly under-utilised regions, such
as the Murray Valley.32 In line with ‘wise use’ principles, the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction
stressed in 1949 that “scientific study” and “careful working out of long-range plans” were
necessary to obtain the “best use ... of our resources”.33 Regionalisation provided an attractive
administrative framework for this to occur. Because modern environmentalism had yet to dawn, the
CDPWR Report contained no reference to conservation other than listing “natural vegetation” as a
subset of “physical resources”.34
Regional boundaries tended to observe council perimeters.35 The CDPWR believed that only “small
differences” existed between physiographic regional boundaries and Local Government borders.36
28

Harris (1989), op cit n 14 at 108-09; M Taylor & S Garlick, “Commonwealth Government Involvement in
Regional Development in the 1980s: A Local Approach” in B Higgins & K Zagorski (eds), Australian
Regional Developments: Readings in Regional Experiences, Policies and Prospects (Canberra: AGPS, 1989),
80.
29
L Sandercock, Cities for Sale (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), ch 5, especially at 101 &
106.
30
Committee composition varied between States. In NSW, Local Government representatives comprised 50%
of membership, whilst the remainder consisted of “three or four senior officers of State Government
departments resident in the region and two or three members who are prominent in commerce or secondary
industries of the region”: Department of Post-War Reconstruction, op cit n 27 at 17. See also Harris (1989),
op cit n 14 at 108.
31
Department of Post-War Reconstruction (CDPWR), ibid at 18; see also Harris (1989), ibid at 109; M
Neutze, “Urban Development” in B Higgins & K Zagorski (eds), Australian Regional Developments:
Readings in Regional Experiences, Policies and Prospects (Canberra: AGPS, 1989), 50. The CDPWR did not
restrict its purview to “physical” resources (listed as climate, physiography, water, soil, minerals, vegetation,
fisheries and land-use); it also stressed “economic resources”, such as primary and secondary industry, and
“social resources”, including housing, hotels and hospitals: Department of Post-War Reconstruction at 21-24.
32
L Orchard, “Shifting Visions in National Urban and Regional Policy 1” (1999a) 36 Australian Planner 20
at 20; see also ch 2 at 41.
33
Mr J Dedman, Foreword, Department of Post-War Reconstruction, op cit n 27 at 3. See also the main
report, where it is stated that “[t]he object of Regional Planning is to develop and wisely use resources in
order to provide a rising standard of human welfare”: at viii.
34
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, ibid at 22.
35
This was subject to a “few exceptions”: ibid at 11.
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Of course, modern appreciation of the natural environment now challenges such a perspective.
Nevertheless, reliance on council borders would have offered considerable convenience, with the
CDPWR stressing its intention to rely on individual councils to collect important information.37
In 1949, the newly elected Menzies Government abandoned the scheme and returned regional
development policy to the States. But it seems that the original program had already suffered from
deep-rooted problems that guaranteed its fall. Neutze notes that whilst some plans were developed,
their implementation received insufficient attention.38 The CDPWR’s Report itself failed to address
this crucial element.39 Taylor observes that cost implications were “barely addressed”.40 Wettenhall
and Power lament that “the debates of the period never explained clearly what was to happen to
existing State and local units”.41 Whilst the CDPWR stressed that regional planning was “a matter
primarily for the States”,42 it provided little or no indication of how this was to take place. Despite
the CDPWR’s express desire not to trespass on State jurisdiction,43 political resentment increased.44
Wettenhall and Power’s point raises the question of Local Government’s role. Curtin himself
recognised Local Government’s inherent interest in assisting local economies.45 The CDPWR
regarded councils as “most intimately concerned with conservation and development of regional
resources”.46 But there is little mention in the CDPWR’s Report of a role for Local Government
beyond feeding information into the inventories. Whilst it refers to councils being advised of
regional plans through the RDCs,47 there is nothing beyond passing reference about how councils
might have given effect to them. This should not be surprising: at that stage, Local Government’s
36

Ibid. The Department of Post-War Reconstruction based its functional regions mainly on physiographic
factors, such as “fundamental unity in topography”, but also economic factors and communities of interest.
37
Ibid.
38
Neutze (1989), op cit n 31 at 50-51; see also Sandercock (1975), op cit n 29 at 106.
39
The Report merely noted limply, and somewhat cryptically, that there had been “no attempt at
implementing regional plans, although considerable thought has been given to the implication of planning”:
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, op cit n 27 at 28.
40
M Taylor, “Regional Decentralisation: Push or Pull?” in Economic Planning Advisory Council (ed),
Regional Policies: Future Directions (Canberra: AGPS, 1990), 57.
41
Wettenhall & Power, op cit n 11 at 201.
42
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, op cit n 27 at 15.
43
Ibid at 3, 15, 16 & 18.
44
C Lloyd & P Troy, Innovation and Reaction: The Life and Death of the Federal Department of Urban and
Regional Development (Sydney: George Allan & Unwin, 1981), 12-13; see also F Hurley, “Regional
Development Policy in the Big Picture” (1994b) (8) Australian Journal of Regional Studies 1 at 3; Orchard
(1999a), op cit n 32 at 21. Wettenhall & Power note that by the late 1940s, the “mood” of the nation was
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“capitalist conspiracy” succeeded in defeating the Commonwealth Labor Government at the 1949 election by
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Department of Post-War Reconstruction, op cit n 27 at 1.
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Ibid at 16.
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Ibid at 19.
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functional activity was narrow and primitive.48 Councils had no background at all in strategic
planning. Furthermore, having been weaned on subservience to its parent, Local Government then
had no experience in entering partnerships with other spheres. In short, it was ill-equipped to seize
any opportunity that arose from a poorly planned, if well-intentioned, scheme.
Criticisms of the narrow outlook of Local Government in the 1940s may still apply today to small,
poorly-resourced rural councils where road maintenance remains the primary function. The
Curtin/Chifley initiatives suggest that to ignite council involvement in cooperative regional
planning, far more is needed than a vision splendid on the part of central government.
4.3.2

The Commonwealth’s Second Initiative: the early 1970s

Regional policy returned to the national agenda upon the election of the Whitlam Government in
1972.49 In 1975, Whitlam wrote that:
“some programs and services of government are most efficiently and effectively planned,
coordinated, and delivered at a level intermediate to those of State and Local Government”.50
The Whitlam Government created regional bodies in the form of ROCs (originally known as
‘regional assemblies’), overseen by the Department of Urban and Regional Development
(DURD),51 headed by Minister Uren, to coordinate financial assistance to Local Government. About
80 ROCs were established.52 Unlike the previous RDCs, membership was restricted to Local
Government. Council units, therefore, provided the ‘building blocks’. Nevertheless, the DURD
invested substantial research into choosing council boundaries, dismissing the 1940s lines as

48

H Maiden, The History of Local Government in New South Wales (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1966),
128.
49
It should be noted that shortly before the Labor victory in 1972, the McMahon Government had established
the National Urban and Regional Development Authority (NURDA) under the National Urban and Regional
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surrendered its policy role to the new Department of Urban and Regional Development: Standing Committee
on State Development (NSW), Regional Business Development in New South Wales: Trends, Policies and
Issues (Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 1993), 83.
50
‘Regional Policy’, Press Statement, 18 June 1975, quoted in Harris (1976a), op cit n 15 at 101.
51
See ch 3 at 97-98.
52
D Osborn & G Robin, “Local Government Support Networks” in Australian Local Government
Association (ed), The Australian Local Government Handbook (Canberra: AGPS, 1989), 51. Interestingly, the
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Government Development Programme” (1988a) 12 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
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“somewhat arbitrary”.53 This time, far less emphasis was placed on physiographic features. The
DURD divided metropolitan areas by means of socio-economic data, whilst it identified nonmetropolitan regions through analysis of “interaction of people and activities” with most attention
given to telephone traffic.54 Ecological factors played no role in the process at all.55 The
Commonwealth never recognised environmental management as an obvious ROC function. The
system was devised primarily to help “minimise spatial economic and social inequities” across
regions through direct participation by a better-funded Local Government.56 Despite the rise of
modern environmentalism, environmental interests were compartmentalised between federal
agencies.57
The ROCs never then became major forces. The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), as
Hawker notes, viewed them as mere “administrative devices or ‘post-offices’” that collated funding
submissions.58 This contrasts significantly with the NSW CM boards, which assess applications
from councils and other organisations. Fulop and Sheppard describe the CGC as a politically
conservative bureaucracy that refused to cooperate in what it viewed as intrusion into a State
portfolio.59 Manning observes that the level of CGC grants received by councils comprised “a
relatively minor part of that Government’s spending on urban and regional development”.60
The ROC system was only one of several regionalisation initiatives under the Whitlam/Uren
government. The Commonwealth instituted the Australia Assistance Plan (AAP), which established
‘Regional Councils for Social Development’ to coordinate social welfare programs. These
committees were very different to ROCs, being based on fresh boundaries and “controlled by

53
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citizen groups” rather than councils.61 This would have helped fuel municipal discontent with
Commonwealth regional policy and its ‘new magistracies’. Fulop and Sheppard note that councils
“either avoided the AAP or … played an obstructionist role”.62 Another scheme with a strong
regional element was the doomed Growth Centre Program, designed to facilitate decentralisation to
selected centres with improved services. There were further DURD projects, including the Area
Improvement Program (AIP), which assisted the sustainability of active ROCs.63 Whilst the AIP
placed emphasis on particular welfare and employment projects, in many circumstances it ceded
total discretion on expenditure by ROCs and local authorities. In one instance, funds were used for
controversial parkland development at Auburn in western Sydney, including the building of an
artificial hill.64 Interestingly, the location is now recognised by the local council as having
significant potential for a habitat corridor, containing remnant patches of important ecological
communities and an endangered plant species.65
Power and Wettenhall note that other Commonwealth authorities were “not far behind” in
developing “comprehensive regionalising schemes”.66 But the abundance of regional programs was
poorly coordinated.67 It must have provided a confusing milieu for Local Government which, apart
from distant memories of the 1940s, was unused to Commonwealth interest, let alone enforced
regional structures. Those councils that did exploit the ROC mechanism were far more interested in
receiving money to supplement rate revenue and repay debts than embracing the Commonwealth’s
regional vision.68
State Governments resented interference with their traditional jurisdictional territory, viewing the
ROCs as an unnecessary tier of government that threatened their own power base. Councils adopted
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a similar view notwithstanding that the DURD sought to strengthen Local Government.69 The
Commonwealth insisted that the ROC network could “eventually lead to permanent forms of
regional organisations without necessarily disrupting existing systems”.70 Yet Local Government
remained generally suspicious, seeing ROCs as a first step towards arrangements that would
dismantle individual authorities.71 Some councils were outright hostile,72 raising little resistance
when the Fraser Government stopped ROC support and most regional programs after 1975.73 Local
Government was more preoccupied with coming to grips with managing its own expanding
functional agenda rather than pursuing active participation in innovative regional arrangements. As
a result, the overwhelming majority of ROCs foundered.
The DURD’s regional experiments were too shortlived to bear fruit. But even with more time, their
downfall was, arguably, inevitable. The concept of regional priorities being determined by
structures imposed from above was surely misplaced. In 1976, Harris suggested that:
“[i]t is hardly conceivable that a regional view could emanate from a Regional Organisation
of Councils, or that all local government areas within a defined region faced sufficiently
common problems as local authorities to enable such a regional view to emerge”.74
It appears that Harris’ criticism was based on the compulsory nature of the ROCs, together with the
parochial outlook of individual councils, rather than any lack of appreciation of regional dimensions
to municipal activity. He goes on to refer to “significant advantages” of regional cooperation, noting
that some functions, such as “physical and environmental planning decisions”, were particularly
suitable for cross-boundary collaboration.75 In similar fashion, Power and Wettenhall argue that
“regionalism … imposed from above is usually a weaker form than that which could emerge if the
69
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initiatives arose from within the region itself”.76 Grounds is more direct in attributing the ROCs’
ultimate failure to their involuntary nature.77 Morgan holds a similar view, pointing to their
“prescriptive nature and undertones of compulsion”.78
How does all this inform recent interest in developing a bioregional approach to environmental
management? The lesson is straightforward as far as Local Government is concerned. The 1970s
ROC phenomenon demonstrates that Local Government will be unenthusiastic about regional
structures foisted upon it. Local Government is extremely sensitive to any centralist measures that
threaten the status quo. It is especially wary of any move towards reduction of power or autonomy,
let alone any hint of amalgamations. Whilst it will always welcome more fiscal resources, it will
want to retain its independence in deciding how its moneys are spent.
Of course, Local Government is a far more sophisticated institution nowadays than it was during the
1970s. The spectre of greater emphasis on regional policy by central government will not
necessarily daunt modern Local Government, apart from its most conservative elements, provided it
can be a major contributor in program development and implementation. But it will always prefer
regionalism to regionalisation.
It is worth noting that a handful of DURD ROCS survived, including the Western Sydney ROC
(WSROC), reputedly NSW’s oldest ROC,79 together with the Illawarra ROC (IROC) and the
Hunter ROC (HROC).80 The fact that WSROC then represented Australia’s highest funded region81
must have helped galvanise commitment. Those ROCs that outlasted the Fraser cutbacks did so
only because of financial and political support from member councils. They tended to be located in
socially disadvantaged areas that had fared best under Whitlam’s fiscal equalisation policies, such
as, notably, the AIP scheme. Moreover, the advantages of regional cooperation demonstrated the
attraction of ROCs to certain councils that had developed good, co-operative grantsmanship skills.
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It is at least arguable that the DURD’s efforts helped lay groundwork for later municipal
collaboration.82 As will be seen later, a new network of voluntary ROCs has emerged from the
ashes of DURD. Their sole role, however, is not to provide conduits for federal funding.
4.3.3

The Commonwealth’s Third Initiative: the 1990s

The Commonwealth’s third major entry into regional policy was heralded by the ‘Kelty’ Taskforce
on Regional Development of 1994,83 which promoted national debate on regional development and
led to a strong ‘regional development’ element in the Commonwealth’s ‘Working Nation’ policy.84
The Keating Government’s view of regional policy was very different from the Whitlam/Uren
approach. It embraced a heavy emphasis on economic development,85 still grounded on concerns
about regional disparity but less anxious about redistributive fiscal justice. Whilst the initiative was
politically expedient,86 it may be argued that it lacked any “widely shared” philosophical
underpinning other than promoting economic efficiency.87 More recent environmental imperatives,
such as ESD, were, according to Alexander, “effectively sidestepped”.88 Yet the program still
attracted considerable support.89
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Major differences from the earlier Commonwealth programs included modesty in funding90 and a
fresh vision of government as facilitator rather than the driving force.91 The new approach was to
provide a climate for economic initiative from within the regional communities themselves.92
Hurley notes that regions were now viewed as “units propelling the national economic wagon ...
discouraged from seeing themselves as recipients of assistance from a state gravy train”.93 This
ethos of regional self-help saw funds made available under the Regional Development Program
(RDP) for the establishment of voluntary regional structures, known as Regional Development
Organisations (RDOs), with membership determined by the regional communities themselves.94
The earlier pattern of enforced regionalisation was thus replaced with a novel form of prodded
regionalism.
Because RDOs were to rise from the ground upwards, the issue of top-down boundary delineation
became redundant. It was expected that regional leaders, from both the private and public sector,
would join together to form the new bodies, with their spatial areas of interest reflecting local
economic catchments.95 RDOs did not emerge everywhere,96 and some proved stronger than others.
Municipal borders again formed the ‘building blocks’ although drawing lines at the periphery was
not a major issue.97
Fulop and Brennan observe that one reason for the establishment of new bodies rather than utilising
councils, or existing groupings of Local Government, was the Commonwealth’s belief that Local
Government had not played “a sufficiently active role” in regional economic development.98 This
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ignored Local Government’s traditional preoccupation with boosting local economic growth as had
been recognised by PM Curtin as far back as the 1940s. As Marshall notes, the Working Nation
document stipulated that Local Government was assumed to provide a “key role ... in initiating and
establishing RDOs”.99 Local Government was quick to position itself as a key stakeholder. Fulop
and Brennan observe that it saw itself as having the “biggest stake” in regional development,
thereby wanting to “play a dominating role” in controlling RDO agendas.100 A survey of RDO
personnel confirms Local Government’s heavy involvement, including substantial contribution to
RDO funding.101 Northwood refers to Local Government’s “pivotal” role in RDOs, providing
examples of close linkages between voluntary ROCs and RDOs.102
In 1996, the newly elected Howard Government abolished the RDP, resulting in the dismantling of
most RDOs across the country. As Beer notes, Commonwealth interest in regional development
policy “evaporated”.103 Whilst some RDOs survived, in other places Local Government filled the
gap via the voluntary ROC movement. As Forth suggested in 1996, “the critical issue [was] whether
... larger councils or local government associations [would] become in effect alternative regional
economic councils to RDOs”.104 It appears that regional economic development has since been a
dominating concern in voluntary ROC circles, as demonstrated by papers presented at ongoing
ROC/RDO conferences.105 The problem here is that any regional environmental management
imperatives may be pushed aside.
Significantly, the Commonwealth never dictated the functions of RDOs but made funds available
for the preparation of regional economic strategies. Implementation of such strategies, of course,
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was to present a problem.106 The RDOs had no political constituency, organisational experience or
reliable income beyond the lifetime of their grants. It is interesting to speculate whether Local
Government, given the same opportunity, would have achieved more.
A chief lesson of the RDP experience is the sheer vulnerability of central government programs.
Despite the popularity of any regional scheme, it will always be liable to abandonment upon change
in political direction. There is, of course, no lasting tradition of regional structures in Australia. But
the RDP did attract a level of interest on the part of Local Government that had been absent during
previous excursions into the regional arena. This may be explained, in part, by Local Government
having become a far more aggressive institution. But more importantly, the RDOs were voluntary.
Local Government was prepared to jostle with other stakeholders to claim its share of the funding
pie and play an active role in shaping regional priorities. It did not want to be left behind, believing
it had an essential, if not the cardinal, contribution to make. This illustrates Harris’ point that
bottom-up regionalism will not emerge by itself but requires some form of financial and/or
administrative push.107 It also exemplifies modern Local Government’s keen nose for new funding
sources.
As noted earlier, the level of RDO activity was uneven across the landscape. As Murphy and
Walker point out, regions suffering from “geographical spread, lack of regional identity or political
disunity” were at an obvious disadvantage.108 Remoteness and sparseness of populations will
always mitigate against successful structures. Additional funding to bring people together may help.
Yet most successful RDOs depended largely on “personality and local goodwill”.109 These
ingredients are surely vital in any form of bottom-up regionalism. They will not be manufactured by
legislation nor new funding sources alone.
4.3.4

Current Commonwealth Directions

The Commonwealth has set up no new major regional structures since its abandonment of the
RDP.110 But it has exhibited interest in regional arrangements for natural resource management
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under NHT funding arrangements.111 More precisely, it has devolved NHT funding to the States to
administer, pursuant to joint agreements. In NSW, this was formerly assisted by appointed Regional
Assessment Panels based on ‘NHT regions’, which assessed grant applications submitted by local
Landcare and other organisations, including Local Government.112 The evaluation process was
directed by ‘regional environmental strategies’ prepared by appointed regionally-based committees
for each NHT region. This process has been superseded by the regional CM boards and their own
strategic ‘Catchment Blueprints’.
These regional arrangements are designed to provide an extension, or overriding umbrella, of the
recent phenomenon of community-based environmental management referred to in ch 2. Landcare
projects have not grown solely out of community activity but are the result of top-down funding.
They provide the best example of the recent “convergence” of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’
approaches described by Woodhill.113 They also reflect the Commonwealth’s appreciation of the
need to coordinate on-ground action within strategic frameworks. But as Alexander warns, the
process is scarcely straightforward because:
“[t]here are tensions between local group autonomy and regional coordination and great
institutional barriers to operating in an integrated way at the regional level. The strength of
Landcare has been its very local, action oriented, autonomous focus. The move towards catchments
and regions is not easy”.114
There is little evidence that Local Government is a major player in these developing experiments.
Local Government comprises only one ‘stakeholder’ on each regional body, including CM boards.
Whilst the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) believes that councils should enjoy a
far stronger role here,115 there is scant evidence of this. Briggs recommends that councils should
provide the required linkage between regional catchment planning and on-ground rehabilitation.116
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4.3.5

Regionalisation and the NSW State Government

The NSW Government’s historical regionalisation efforts, in contrast with the Commonwealth’s,
have historically been less spectacular. One exceptional, radical, early initiative was the
unsuccessful attempt to rationalise all State administrative regions under the Regional Organisation
Act 1972 (NSW). This saw the establishment of regional ‘advisory councils’ (RACs) for about nine
regions outside Sydney.117 The Government relied on Local Government boundaries to provide the
‘building blocks’ even though the legislation did not demand this.118 Membership comprised State
officials, appointed “citizen representatives” and/or Local Government councillors elected by
member councils.119 The primary focus of the committees was to promote social and economic
development,120 although the State Government also wanted a uniform network of regional
administrative decision-making.121 The system failed. Wettenhall and Power criticise the RACs as
“weak”, served by relatively junior officers with whom the powerful agencies were unwilling to
cooperate.122 It is unlikely that the State Government would have wanted to promote politically
powerful and potentially rival bodies.123 Local Government responded in similar fashion as it was
then doing to the DURD ROCs.124 The RACs faded into oblivion, again exemplifying the faddish
and transitory nature of regional policy.
A more long-lasting effort has been arrangements to promote economic development in regional,
non-metropolitan areas. Originally, decentralisation policies played a major role, reaching a zenith
during the 1970s.125 The State Government still encourages regional economic development through
its Department of State and Regional Development (DSRD), which, inter alia, provides modest
commercial establishment grants. The DSRD funds Regional Development Boards (RDBs), which
bring together regional stakeholders, including Local Government, committed to regional economic
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development. The RDBs do not drive an environmental management agenda. Lawrence and
Vanclay cite the example of Riverina RDB, which has promoted intensification of the local
agricultural industry, including irrigation and intensive feedlots, without attention to “the likely
environmental impacts of these proposals”.126 Of course, the same criticism of giving priority to
economic development over biodiversity conservation may be directed against Local Government
itself.
Moving away from an economic focus, interest in regional structures to deal with planning issues
across council boundaries developed throughout the 1970s, buoyed by the Commonwealth’s
initiatives and the rise of modern environmentalism. In 1974, Planning and Environment Minister
Fuller canvassed the idea of creating ‘regional planning councils’, putting forward various models
including reconstitution of the RACs.127 This proved controversial, with “general opposition to the
introduction of another level of bureaucracy or government”.128 But the NSW Government
remained strongly committed to regional planning, arguing openly that council borders invariably
bore “no correlation with particular environmental matters”.129 whilst supporting the notion of
regional studies and plans.130 It considered various structures, including the discretionary upwards
devolution of regional planning responsibilities by groups of councils to new bodies.131 The planmaking role of such bodies was to go far beyond land-use control to positive planning for
infrastructural works.132 As will be seen in ch 6, the subsequent Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA) provided opportunity for regional planning by introducing a
new species of plan, the ‘regional environmental plan’ (REP). But these plans are prepared at State
level rather than by regional bodies. The State Government’s traditional antipathy to politically
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powerful regional authorities guaranteed that Fuller’s innovative ideas were diluted beyond
recognition.
There has been a resurgence of interest on the part of the NSW Government in regional structures
for environmental purposes, as seen earlier - namely the CM bodies, RVCs and WMCs. None of
these new committees resemble the grand regional arrangements of former times. They have
narrower foci and, as far as environmental management is concerned, are “characterised by
segmentation between and within public agencies”.133 It would be misleading to suggest that they
have been forced on councils. Local Government is a part of the committee memberships.134 But it
may be little more than a single interest group from which participation is drawn. This has caused
discomfort in Local Government circles. In early 1998, the then joint NSW Local Government and
Shires Associations (LGSAs, since split into the two organisations but still sharing the same
secretariat) issued a discussion paper arguing that membership of the new committees “usually
reflects special interest and expertise rather than the community as a collective of people”,135
implying a disregard for Local Government as a democratically elected representative body. Cullen
notes the new committees are “hardly democratic” and that there “has been little consideration of
how this new model relates to local government”.136 In similar fashion, Munro observes that the
regional bodies are “readily controlled” by central government and “removed from [public] scrutiny
and influence”.137 They comprise the latest version of ‘new magistracies’ in a context further
described by Munro as a “regional dog’s breakfast”.138
As noted previously, the areas governed by the new committees can transcend council boundaries.
The CM boards deal with surface water catchments, described by the State Government as “the
most obvious physical unit of the environment”.139 A review of the system recommended that it
“continue to be based on water catchments”.140 The legislation makes it clear that the designated
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catchments need not observe municipal borders.141 Like the Catchment Management Act 1989
(NSW), the Native Vegetation Conservation Act (NSW) (NVCA) expressly states that RVC regions
need not follow council perimeters,142 but are to “generally reflect biogeographic boundaries”.143
Paradoxically, a preceding Departmental discussion paper recommended that the new borders
“should typically follow the boundaries of its component local government areas”.144 At the time of
writing, it appears that this advice has been followed.145 In the case of “water management areas”
under the WMA, the NSW Government intended that boundaries be determined “using biophysical
criteria” even though the legislation is not prescriptive.146 In contrast to experience under the
NVCA, it has been adamant that perimeters “will not be based on local government area[s]”.147 All
these differing boundary arrangements add to the sheer difficulty of Local Government assuming
an influential role in regional environmental management. In particular, if a committee’s region
straddles more than one council area, not all local authorities will be represented unless they enter
into some form of agreement where the appointee reports back to all the councils.
In its 2001 review of the plan-making provisions of the EPAA, called ‘Planfirst’, the NSW
planning agency proposed yet another species of regional plan – the non-statutory integrative
‘regional strategy’ – to comprise each “region’s principal environmental planning document” and
coordinate most, if not all, relevant regional mechanisms.148 The proposed regions reflect “regional
identities or ‘communities of interest’ but appear to coincide with statistical and NSW Premiers
Departmental boundaries.149 These moves have now been cast aside.
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4.4

Regionalism and Local Government

4.4.1

Preamble

The beginning of locally-inspired cooperative arrangements between local authorities is difficult to
pinpoint. It is likely that as communication channels improved and townships became less isolated
from each other, councils would have talked more frequently with their neighbours, seeking the
benefits of information exchange and apportioning maintenance responsibilities at common borders.
Hoffman refers to a “long history” of inter-council cooperation.150 Power and Wettenhall, on the
other hand, noted in 1976 that collaboration was hardly pervasive and “parochialism more often
than not carrie[d] the day”.151 Since then, an upsurge of regional municipal collaboration has
occurred. But before the early 1970s, when the Commonwealth laid the foundations of the ROC
network, cooperative arrangements on a regional scale were, apart from the more formal county
council movement, infrequent and fragmentary. This section is more concerned with systematic
regional structures rather than one-off collaborative projects or ongoing agreements on relatively
minor matters, such as bulk purchasing.152
4.4.2

Early Joint Action Between Councils153

Nineteenth century legislation provided negligible opportunity for joint action between councils154
until the Local Government Act 1906 (NSW) (LGA 1906) granted discretion to authorities, subject
to the Governor’s approval, to undertake various activities with their neighbours “for the mutual
benefit of their areas”.155 But the statute provided “no definite structure” and councils failed to
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exploit the power.156 Nevertheless, a unique episode of cooperative action arose outside the
statutory framework when north coast citizens established the Richmond River Water Hyacinth
Board (formerly known as the Coraki Water Hyacinth Board) to combat an introduced aquatic plant
that threatened river navigation.157 This was later supported by local councils. The move fell into
line with Local Government’s traditional absorption with property-related services but moved to a
wider geographical scale. The clearing of waterways would have improved access to homes, farms
and businesses in similar fashion to grading roads. River restoration for ecological reasons was not
the issue. Although eradication of aquatic pests fell outside Local Government’s powers at that
stage,158 this did not dampen enthusiasm to tackle a problem that threatened local economies and
‘national’ vision priorities. When the later LGA 1919 introduced county council provisions, it
expressly validated the Board’s operations.159 It appears that the Board’s activities made a
favourable impression on Minister Fitzgerald, who championed the county council concept.160 The
county council movement was to subsequently flourish years later.
4.4.3

The County Council Movement161

The LGA 1919 empowered the Governor to constitute “as a county district for local government
purposes any groups of wholes and parts of municipalities or shires, or of both”.162 It entitled the
Governor to constitute a county council upon the petition of a group of councils requesting the
transfer of any of their functions to a new body “for the joint benefit of the areas”.163 The aim was
to facilitate delegation of powers upwards to “second storey” councils.164 Members of the ‘lower
tier’ councils were to elect delegates to the county councils from amongst themselves, with one
156
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delegate from each unit, thereby providing a model of indirect democratic representation at a
regional level.165
Maiden remarks that during the early twentieth century, councils embraced the county council
concept not only as a means of strengthening their institution but, in the tradition of the ‘national’
vision, as a “logical instrument for the regional development of primary wealth … and an important
step towards decentralisation”.166 Bayley cites the example of Condobolin Municipal Council,
which lobbied in the 1920s, albeit unsuccessfully, for a county council to construct weirs and
regulate water access along the Lachlan River across ten council areas.167 At about the same time,
councils in northern NSW pushed for a vast county council across 42 local areas to establish and
operate a hydro-electric scheme.168 In 1925, the NSW LGSAs pressed the State Government to
create a network of second-tier councils, known as ‘district councils’, to assume certain State
responsibilities such as administration of lower courts, hospitals and fisheries.169 These ideas
provide a strong contrast to Local Government’s traditional ‘housekeeping’ tasks. They probably
represented visions of rare individuals who championed for far stronger council responsibilities. But
none came to fruition. It appears the State was unwilling to extend Local Government’s role beyond
rudimentary functions, not wanting to transform its own field-agent into something approaching a
rival political body.
The State Government’s lukewarm approach to county councils meant that relatively few were
constituted at first.170 But the system underwent significant expansion after 1945.171 County
councils became a means by which Local Government could exercise ordinary service functions
that were costly to administer on an individual basis due to economies of scale.172 Most functions
related to property enhancement, thereby extending the ‘ratepayer ideology’ to the ‘second
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storey’.173 The overwhelming majority provided electricity supply services,174 followed by water
reticulation and eradication of noxious plants. Municipal councils saw county councils as a means
to avoid usurpation by ‘ad hoc’ authorities.175 The Barnet Inquiry noted that councils viewed the
two-tier system as a useful way to circumvent amalgamations.176 By 1978, all but three local
council areas fell within county districts.177
In 1956, Parker suggested that county councils were “largely the product of local initiative”.178
Twenty years later, Wettenhall and Power asserted that “grass roots initiatives have played a

prominent part”.179 The commentators overlook the fact, however, that in many instances, the
State Government had forced county councils upon ‘lower tier’ councils. Elsewhere, Power and
Wettenhall claim that this occurred in the majority of cases.180 Whilst the 1919 Act had provided for
county councils only upon the petition of Local Government,181 subsequent amendments handed
power to the State Government to unilaterally create them.182 Larcombe notes that many councils
were “most reluctant” to relinquish powers to new ‘upper tier’ bodies, citing the example of four
Riverina councils who took legal action in 1957 against the enforced surrender of their electricity
service powers to a newly expanded county council.183 In this context, it may be argued that county
councils resembled a form of enforced regionalisation rather than bottom-up regionalism. They
were closer to a municipalised version of the ‘ad hoc’ authority rather than a pure extension of
173
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Local Government, which had instigated the county council movement in the first place at Coraki
many years earlier.
The argument that county councils fit more readily into the regionalism basket undermines the fact
that it is still solely Local Government representatives, rather than State Government appointees (as
is the case with the recent natural resource new magistracies), who manage county councils.
Nevertheless, apart from one significant exception outlined below, functions enjoyed by county
councils have rarely, if ever, been prestigious beyond a parochial level. More recently, county
councils have usually been little more than trading enterprises - often electricity supply authorities operating on a commercial basis and rarely reliant on external funding.184 Throughout history, their
activities have usually fallen within those ‘wastebin’ functions that the State Government has been
happy to divest to Local Government, albeit to its ‘second storey’.
A spectacular exception relates to town planning powers. In 1945, the new Pt XIIA LGA 1919
provided for preparation of a planning scheme for the entire Sydney area by a newly constituted
Cumberland County Council (CCC).185 This reflected widening appreciation of the need for a
holistic approach to Sydney’s development, even amongst Local Government circles.186 The CCC
was neither a direct creature of Local Government nor the invention of a State Government keen to
delegate away powers. It was a political compromise between two battling spheres of
government.187 The solution was a hybrid ‘second storey’ municipal body, stripped of rate levying
authority with only ten aldermen (and no State government members) representing 69 councils. But
it appears that the CCC soon assumed the mantle of an ‘ad hoc’ authority. Harrison notes that it
“came to be regarded as an agency of the State rather than as a representation of local interests”.188
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Aspects of the County of Cumberland Planning Scheme (CCPS) will be touched upon again in later
chapters..189 But the short lifetime of the CCC can be dealt with here briefly as a lesson on any
future usage of county councils for conservation purposes. Upon completion of the draft CCPS,
Minister Cahill extolled the CCC’s achievements by announcing that “local government had
completely vindicated the trust that Parliament reposed in it”.190 But as the plan-making phase gave
way to implementation,191 Local Government’s disenchantment with the CCC grew. Councils
resented the conferral of significant tasks on the CCC rather than themselves.192 In particular,
authorities at Sydney’s edge disliked the CCC’s responsibility for the ‘Green Belt’, a zone
encircling outer Sydney set aside for non-urban uses. Its purpose was predominantly for scenic
protection and recreation. In accordance with traditional municipal thinking, councils wanted the
zone unlocked for future development193 and, presumably, increased rate revenue. They also
resented municipal funding of the CCC via a special rate for that purpose.194
A common criticism of the CCC was that it became “bogged down in detail” rather than sticking to
broader issues,195 which led to friction with individual councils who were beginning to discover the
benefits of their own statutory land-use powers.196 But it seems that Local Government wanted the
best of both worlds. Whilst councils complained about the CCC, they still supported the notion that
metropolitan planning should remain a municipal, rather than centralised, function, albeit
administered by a ‘second storey’ body.197
The CCC’s preoccupation with detail should have been of little surprise to the State. After all, the
CCC was administered by municipal representatives who were unused to looking beyond their own
borders. They faced the difficult problem, as described by Fogg, of “segregat[ing] broad planning
189
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issues from detailed local ones”.198 After the introduction in 1945of Pt XIIA into the LGA 1919,
councils held rudimentary powers to assess and approve applications for ‘interim development’,199
apart from actions that were prohibited under ‘residential proclamation districts’200 or a subsequent
local planning instrument. The latter comprised planning scheme ordinances and interim
development orders,201 which demanded more detailed consideration of applications in determining
whether or not to grant consent.
The State’s attitude to the CCC was unforgiving. It disliked the institutional interest in encouraging
public input into planning decisions, which was probably second nature to progressive municipal
personnel who were far closer to their constituencies than State Government. Various State
instrumentalities refused to cooperate with the CCC, which found itself increasingly
marginalised.202 In short, the NSW Government discovered it had created a monster over which it
had limited control. Harrison describes how the relevant Minister found the CCC’s independence,
especially its criticism of his own actions, unpalatable.203 As a result, the NSW Government
dissolved the CCC in 1963 and replaced it with an ‘ad hoc’ authority: the State Planning Authority
of NSW (SPA).204 This was inevitable. As Stretton remarks, “[n]o state government could be
expected to put its central powers into the hands of a crowd of part-time municipal councillors”.205
Sandercock refers to the CCC as a “rival body in a contest it had little hope of winning”.206 In
introducing the relevant bill, Minister Hills – who had been responsible for dismantling the ‘green
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belt’ – explained his intention to wrest regional planning powers from Local Government in stating
that:
“co-ordination of planning is clearly beyond the physical capacities of local government even
under the county council system. It is essentially a function that can only be achieved at the
State level. … The simple truth is that local government is not the appropriate authority to
assume sole responsibility for regional planning”.207
The SPA recognised “planning … of a long-term nature … generated by top-level policies” as one
of its most important functions.208 The NSW Government saw this an inappropriate role for a
maverick municipal body that encouraged public input. Indeed, the SPA itself admitted that its
strategic planning work “to quite some extent will be ‘back-room’ planning not ripe for general
public knowledge”.209 Unlike the CCC – or any other county council – the SPA came under the
direct control of its Minister,210 as do the more recent natural resource ‘magistracies’. But in
contrast, the actual membership of appointed SPA officials comprised a far higher percentage of
Local Government representatives than is the case with the ‘new magistracies’.211
The demise of the CCC is more than just an interesting chapter in town planning history. It provides
a sobering lesson in the use of the county council mechanism for activities beyond traditional
‘housekeeping’ tasks. Unlike basic functions such as electricity supply, land-use planning involves
substantial discretionary power in determining the development potential of private and state-owned
land. Furthermore, the State Government realised that the CCC could frustrate the plans of its own
agencies.212 The CCC’s powers also threatened the prestige and power of State figures who desired
maximum scope for exercising their own political patronage. In short, the CCC’s planning function
proved far too powerful to be left to Local Government. It was the boldest use of a county council
ever seen. Anything comparable is unlikely to be witnessed again. Although planning powers are
shared between State and Local Government under EPAA, the State planning agency (i.e.
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, the SPA’s modern-day equivalent)
and its Minister clearly enjoy the upper hand.
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The county councils of today are faint shadows of the CCC. The LGA 1993 retains the county
council mechanism, providing for both council-initiated proposals and unilateral establishment (or
dissolution) by the State Government.213 It expressly enables the Minister to decline a proposal put
forward by Local Government,214 cementing the notion that county councils exist at the State
Government’s pleasure. In terms of both geographical area and numbers, the extent of the system is
now modest. At the time of writing, only nineteen county councils exist.215 None operate in
metropolitan areas.216 All but one carry out single functions; the most common is weed eradication
(eleven councils) followed by water supply services (five councils).217 Such responsibilities
represent ‘wastebin’ tasks.
In conclusion, county councils appear to be a weakened force. Without new horizons, they hold
little prospect for regional municipal action concerning any function of complexity, such as
management of the natural environment. This is due not only to their unfashionability. Their
tendency towards single service functions militates against delegation of complicated tasks.
Biodiversity conservation at the local level cuts across numerous council activities. It should be a
central, rather than fringe, activity. A council might consider delegating away politically benign
tasks, such as pooling expensive weed control equipment or collecting survey information on a
regional scale. Recent experience, however, suggests a preference towards more flexible
cooperative arrangements. But as will be noted in the final chapter, interest in the resurrection of
more creative county councils now appears to be brewing.218
4.4.4

Voluntary Regional Organisations of Councils: Background

Regional arrangements to serve broader interests beyond single functions present another story.
Brennan traces the first Australian efforts to 1922, when ten Tasmanian municipalities formed an
213
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Association, followed by the establishment of the Gippsland Municipal Association by 29 Victorian
councils in 1925.219 It appears these groups were set up essentially to lobby central government on
matters of regional mutual interest, such as economic development. In 1943, PM Curtin noted “a
marked tendency for local authorities to associate themselves in regional organisations in order to
advance proposals for the development of their regions”.220 Optional joint action in NSW, however,
did not attract serious interest until the termination of the DURD’s regionalisation programs.
Whilst the county council movement is now waning, involvement by councils in voluntary ROCs is
strengthening. These comprise a far more recent phenomenon. There are now approximately 50
ROCs throughout Australia,221 of which nineteen operate in NSW.222 ROCs provide a far more
informal means than county councils to achieve inter-council cooperation. They “come in all shapes
and sizes”, with varying legal and administrative structures.223 Whilst Commonwealth guidelines
for the operation of ROCs promote incorporation,224 the purely voluntary nature of ROCs defies any
rigid formula. The only common feature is that member councils are the only members of the core
governing body of a ROC, thereby guaranteeing a purely Local Government institution.225
Unlike the county council process, institution of a ROC does not require State approval. In NSW,
until recently, there was no express provision in the LGA 1993 relating to ROCs. The broad powers
conferred on Local Government under the LGA 1993 had already provided opportunity for councils
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to engage in a vast range of regional arrangements.226 However in 1997, Minister Page proposed
insertion of a simple reference to ROCs in the LGA 1993, primarily on the grounds that “legislative
recognition would positively enhance their status”.227 The Minister noted that ROCs were “taking
on additional and significant functions and becoming increasingly active in public policy
development and strategic planning”.228 The proposal attracted sufficient support for Parliament to
amend s 355 to expressly authorise councils to carry out any legitimate function “jointly [with] …
another council or councils (including by means of a Voluntary Regional Organisation of Councils
of which the councils concerned are members)”.229 In introducing the bill, the Minister referred to
his Government’s “strong support” for ROCs, describing the amendment as a “clear signal that
voluntary [ROCs] are able to represent their members”.230
A dominant function of ROCs, echoing the role of the earliest joint organisations referred to earlier,
is lobbying other spheres of government. A survey of contemporary ROCs carried out by Cutts in
1996 found that out of seven nominated roles, “political advocacy” ranked second in consuming
ROC resources.231 In 1993, Deputy PM Howe praised ROCs for providing “effective forums for …
advocacy” that had “led to improvements for the communities involved”.232 But he also stressed
that “advocacy alone is not enough”, challenging ROCs to become “more involved in national
priorities” including, significantly, environmental management.233
The most fundamental feature of contemporary ROCs is their optional nature. They represent
perhaps the most genuine example of bottom-up municipal regionalism. But this means that they
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provide neither a perennial nor comprehensive structural network. There is no requirement that a
council join its local ROC, should one indeed exist. Membership of ROCs is potentially fluid. A
ROC is vulnerable to the potential departure of any key member council.234 Some authorities remain
steadfast in resisting the ROC movement. Others belong to more than one ROC. Elsewhere, ROCs
have yet to emerge. In early 1998, 85% of NSW councils belonged to 22 ROCs.235 The general
observation may be made that the most well-resourced ROCs are in metropolitan and heavily
populated coastal areas. Councils in these areas enjoy not only stronger resource bases but also
shorter distances for delegates to travel to meetings. In more remote regions, if not non-existent,
ROCs may comprise little more than sporadic meetings supported by a part-time officer borrowed
from a member council.
Councils themselves make decisions on establishing a ROC and its regional boundaries.236 But the
emergence of a ROC relies on more than mere local interest. First, there is the lingering spatial
influence of the DURD ROCs whose boundaries were based on communities of interest.237 Second,
and more importantly, “limited but critical” Commonwealth funding became available under the
Local Government Development Program (LGDP),238 initiated in 1983/84 for the establishment of
new ROCs. The Commonwealth stressed the establishment of ROCs was optional, initially using
the shortlived term of ‘Voluntary ROCs’ (VROCs) to soften any antagonism carried over from the
Whitlam/Uren period. Whilst Fulop and Sheppard criticise the LGDP as “the least controversial or
ambitious program in Australia’s history”,239 it is unlikely that ROCs would have re-emerged
without this impetus. The LGDP also provided funds for various specific ROC projects.240 Its role
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in invigourating VROCs cannot be set aside. It is the ongoing political and monetary support from
member councils, however, that is most crucial.241
After 1990/91, the Commonwealth stopped funding creation of new ROCs. But at the same time it
subsidised a new national focus and networking forum for the ROC movement.242 The resulting
National Committee on Regional Cooperation (NCRC) drove debate and promoted voluntary
cooperation by commissioning various studies and holding conferences, all within a series of
programs, known as ‘phases’, for which Commonwealth support was crucial.243 This funding
ceased in 1997 upon the conclusion of ‘phase 5’. By way of comment, the NCRC was since been
renamed the National Committee for Regional Cooperation and Development, reflecting Local
Government’s increased preoccupation with economic development.
The ROC movement has continued throughout the 1990s and beyond. Its vigour in some places is
evidenced by the formation of several new ROCs without any external grants.244 This not only
reflects successful promotion of the ROC network but also reveals recognition by some authorities
of the genuine benefits of collaboration. ROCs are, arguably, the direct product of municipal selfinterest. They can relieve financial pressure by offering economies of scale or even the simple
pooling of resources.245 Schulze notes that “[c]ouncils have recognised that access to the collective
resources of the group enhances their capacity to better meet the needs of the community”.246 They
can also boost Local Government muscle in dealing with central government agencies. Councils
may also point to ROCs as an alternative to invasion of Local Government by ‘new magistracies’.
Brennan refers to ROCs as a “bulwark to future calls for amalgamation”.247 Yet ROCs should be
viewed as something more than resource-saving mechanisms or instruments of self-preservation.
There is evidence that ROCs reflect increasing awareness of the regional dimensions of various
241
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Local Government functions. In his discussion of selected ROC case studies, Northwood asserts
that ROCs have:
“strengthened local governments’ capacity to deal with ‘big picture’ issues impacting on
economic growth, human services planning and delivery, cultural development and
environmental management”.248
There has been growing appreciation of a greater role for ROCs in environmental management.
Whittaker et al, in proposing the notion of a regional Local Agenda 21 process, argue that ROCs, in
contrast to single-purpose regional authorities, are well-placed to assume an enhanced role in
regional environmental management.249 Munro argues that ROCs should be the “lead regional
agency” in a “framework within which environmental, social and economic organisations and
issues may be linked”.250 Thorman calls for ROCs to play a stronger role in natural resource
management.251 Is there any evidence that this is a core function of regional cooperative
arrangements?
It is difficult to generalise about the role and functions of ROCs. Each reflects the particular
priorities of the group of councils it represents. Nevertheless, Cutts’ 1996 analysis of ROCs
throughout Australia, with a 71% response rate, reveals those matters that receive most attention.252
Cutts’ report states that:
[t]he [voluntary] ROC survey presented respondents with a matrix containing 42 cells
applying roles to functions. They were asked to estimate how their resources (time and funds)
were allocated. ... When the seven role categories are each examined across all six functions,
the greatest share of the [voluntary] ROC movement’s resources are seen as being allocated
to strategic planning (average of 28%). This is followed by political advocacy (22%) and
resource sharing (15%). The matrix contained six broad functional categories. The three top
scorers were significantly more prominent than the remaining three. They were: physical
development (average 28%), economic development (25%) and environmental management
(25%). The highest average score for a single cell went to strategic planning/research for
environmental management (11.5%), followed by resource sharing in physical development
(8.3%) and political advocacy for economic development (7.3%).253
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The results, whilst now somewhat dated, might suggest at first that environmental management
enjoys top position on the ROC calendar. But the figures must be approached with caution. As Cutts
herself stresses, there is enormous variation between individual ROCs. For instance, in terms of the
listed function categories, the statistics reveal that at least one ROC devoted the entirety of its
resources to environmental management.254 So whilst the survey cannot be interpreted to suggest
entrenched environmental management activity throughout the entire network, it does confirm that
at least some ROCs are very active in this area. The author’s review of ROC Annual Reports and
other material reveals numerous environmental projects.255
Heavy involvement by various ROCs in environmental management activity is relatively recent. In
1993, following extensive consultation with ROCs throughout Australia, Efraemson and Regnis
reported significant activity in “community services and economic and employment development
programs”, whilst engagement in “environmental planning and protection activities” was only
“emerging”.256 The NCRC itself was tardy in embracing environmental management as a central
issue for project funding. Of the six projects commissioned by the NCRC during ‘Phase 1’ in the
early 1990s, none related directly to the natural environment.257 Most emphasis was then placed on
convincing councils of the economic and strategic benefits of voluntary cooperation. Yet the NCRC
did not overlook the potential environmental role of ROCs. In a 1990 briefing paper to the then
Minister, it argued that ROCs provided “an ideal vehicle to assist regional application and
integration” of key reform areas of the Hawke Government, including ESD.258 It seems that limited
funding led to other priorities.
A paper on the role of ROCs in environmental management was eventually presented in 1993 to the
Third National Conference on Voluntary Regional Cooperation by Graham, who stressed that
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ROCs at that stage were playing “only a limited role” in the area.259 In noting that commendable
efforts were nevertheless occurring, he suggested these tended to be “focused on particular
programs” rather than tackling fully integrated regional approaches.260 The criticism is easy to
make. As soon as the focus is moved away from individual projects, the issues become far more
complex. Integration is difficult enough to achieve within one council alone due to functional
segmentation. As Graham observed, it becomes even more problematic at the regional level due to
the sheer abundance of different agencies dealing with the environment in an uncoordinated
manner.261 Munro’s reference a canine mealtime quoted above is accurate.262
During the early 1990s, the Commonwealth’s ILAP (Integrated Local Area Planning) program,
developed mainly by the ALGA, challenged ROCs, in addition to individual councils, to adopt a
more integrated and inter-agency approach to environmental management. It incorporated a set of
principles developed by the ALGA that emphasised a whole-of-government approach to service
coordination and planning, awarding a driving role to Local Government.263 A report on the
potential role of ROCs to propel ILAP was prepared by Sansom in 1994 under ‘Phase 2’, including
six case studies.264 Sansom’s tone, however, is tentative, concluding that the ‘typical’ ROC is “illequipped ... to play a leading role in strategic planning or regional development”.265 He
acknowledges significant contraints, including the “proliferation of other regional bodies” that make
it difficult for ROCs “to establish a strong presence in regional affairs beyond being seen as simply
a lobby for Local Government interests”.266 This situation has not improved. If anything, the
regional structural environment in NSW is now even more difficult to navigate.
Another opportunity for ROCs to pursue a more strategic approach to regional issues arose with the
Commonwealth’s funding of the preparation of ‘regional environmental strategies’ by selected
regional organisations - mostly ROCs - under its Regional Environmental Employment Project
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(REEP), overseen by the ALGA.267 Whilst the Howard Government abolished the REEP in 1996,
various regional strategies were completed together with guidelines for future attempts.268 There is
anecdotal evidence, however, that the strategies may have achieved little. The strategy
commissioned by the Illawarra Regional Organisation of Councils (IROC),269 for example, appears
to play a negligible role in directing environmental decision-making in that region.270 One problem
is the sheer number of bodies identified as “responsible organisations” to implement the plan.271
The general guidelines published by the ALGA assume the importance of coordination and
partnerships but provide no practical advice.272 Echoing the Commonwealth’s ill-fated regional
experimentation of the 1940s, the emphasis is on strategy preparation rather than implementation. It
seems that few lessons have been learned since then. Notably, the REEP strategies have since been
overtaken by the NHT Program and its associated regional plans, namely the Catchment Blueprints
prepared by CM Boards.
All the above suggests that the level of ROC involvement in strategic environmental management
has not increased dramatically since Graham’s observations in 1993. Whilst there may be exciting
projects - undertaken not only by individual ROCs but also between ROCs - many are directed at
specific Local Government matters writ large rather than tackling complex issues with other
stakeholders. Whilst there may be exceptions, major projects usually rely on external funding. And
there remains the core problem of an uneven ROC network. Interest in regional action will not
necessarily occur where action is needed most. Different ROCs have varying mandates and levels
of commitment from member councils,273 which may deter central governments from utilising
267
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ROCs for policy implementation.274 There still remains the real hurdle of inadequate, local
resources. While many councils struggle to meet their own commitments, they may see regional cooperation as a luxury.
4.5

Conclusion

Whilst regional approaches to biodiversity conservation sound good in theory, the history of
regional structures suggests implementation is another matter altogether. Despite various
experiments, regional bodies with political power have never become part of the ongoing political
landscape. Regionalisation, in particular, has always been controversial. Attempts to impose
regional institutions from above have overwhelmingly failed due to a combination of poor planning,
change in political direction and opposition from other spheres of government. Local Government
has traditionally displayed a negative attitude, being concerned about loss of power, dignity and
potential amalgamation. Yet its experience with the RDP during the 1990s signalled a softening of
its conventional ‘dog in the manger’ attitude. Significantly, the RDP arrangements were sufficiently
flexible for progressive councils and their ROCS to wield some influence. In NSW, Local
Government’s relationship with the new regional community-based committees remains to be
tested. In similar fashion to the RDO experience, Local Government may push for a far more
prominent role than the current schemes allow. But the odds are against it. The State Government
prefers a natural resource ‘new magistracy’ model that places Local Government at the periphery.
Regional structures emerging from municipal aspirations have a far less solid history than those
created by central government. Apart from the odd impressive attempt, such as the early fight
against water hyacinth in northern NSW and various non-controversial joint arrangements via
county councils, regionalism has been virtually non-existent until the emergence of the voluntary
ROC movement. But ROCs owe their success to Commonwealth assistance. In particular, external
finance has enabled councils to look beyond parochial issues and peel away the ‘ratepayer
ideology’. Nowadays, however, there is no ready funding pot and ROCs survive on special one-off
grants and their own momentum, competing against other bodies such as those who seek funding
from CM Boards.
A strengthened and wider ROC system is worthy of critical consideration. This could provide a
network through which councils may assert a stronger role in regional environmental management.
In a very recent Commonwealth report on Local Government, ROCs are recognised as a valuable
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tool to “enhanc[e] local government’s capacity to play a stronger role generally”.275 The voluntary
nature of ROCs is consistent with the bottom-up emphasis in bioregionalism. But before any
launching of ROCs as the bioregional flagship, serious problems need to be addressed, including
limited and unguaranteed funding, unevenness and an overcrowded regional stage, scorned by
Dovers as a “recurring rash of regional initiatives”.276
As it stands, the legislative framework already affords substantial opportunity for councils to play a
central role in conserving the natural environment, both individually and in collaboration with one
another. But legislative opportunity will not fix inadequate revenue and outdated attitudes. Neither
will it, by itself, promote more effective municipal leadership in terms of engaging informed local
communities in environmental policy formulation and decision-making. If Local Government and
its ROCs want to forge a leadership position in regional environmental management, it must be
either prove its capability to the State Government and its relevant ‘new magistracies’.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1993:
OPPORTUNITY WITHOUT DIRECTION
5.1

Prelude

This and the following chapter consider opportunities and constraints for environmental
management, and biodiversity conservation in particular, under Local Government’s key legislative
framework. This chapter concentrates on mechanisms under the ‘new’ Local Government Act
(NSW) of 1993 (LGA 1993).
The historical background to the LGA 1993 has already been covered in detail in ch 3, from
Governor Gipps’ doomed efforts of the 1840s to the repeal of the ‘old’ LGA 1919 about ten years
ago. This chapter begins with a brief extension to that narrative by focusing on aspects of the
changing nature of municipal organisation. It then moves on to critically discuss how the LGA 1993
deals with Local Government’s service, or ‘positive’, functions. Emphasis is given to the broad
scope of powers conferred on councils and the two chief accountability mechanisms through which
councils must decide and report upon how they will exercise those powers: namely (i) the
management plan and (ii) the annual report, which, more importantly, encompasses the ‘state of the
environment report’ (SoER). This section is informed by the author’s own review of nine 1998/99
SoERS of councils in and around the NSW South-western Slopes’ IBRA Bioregion,1 held by the
NSW Department of Local Government (DLG).2 It is assisted further by impressive empirical
research of NSW councils by (i) Brown et al, (ii) Marshall and Sproats and, to a lesser extent, (iii) B
Smith.3 Special attention is paid to an easily overseen provision relating to and SoERs that exists
outside the main statute.
1
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SoER in 2000 for the Western Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils (see 167, infra): see C Parissi,
2
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The chapter then moves on to consider environmental assessment under the Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA) of service actions carried out by councils
themselves, followed by brief reference to the limited regulatory opportunity available under Ch 7
LGA 1993. Finally, attention is paid to the special provisions applying to the management of
council-owned lands, which will be elaborated upon further in ch 8.
As will be seen, a constant theme of this chapter is that whilst the LGA 1993 presents substantial
potential for biodiversity conservation initiatives by Local Government, particularly in relation to
municipal service powers, the statute provides minimal direction.
5.2

Statutory Background to LGA 1993 and its Administration

Introduction of the LGA 1993 was long overdue.4 Its predecessor, the LGA 1919, was the product
of municipal yesteryear, itself based on ancient 1906 legislation as chronicled in ch 3.5 The former
regimes handed to councils a fixed and narrow range of functions. Because unfamiliar action was
likely to be beyond power, entry into unexplored territory was bold and rare.6 The then Advisory
Council for Inter-Government Relations (ACIR) notes that progressive councils had to resort to
“liberal interpretation of their powers” in order to perform less traditional functions.7 In the case of
the welfare function, for instance, in 1983 - a full decade after community services had emerged
from the blossoming of Commonwealth funding – the NSW Parliament overcame the “spectre of
ultra vires”8 by inserting a brand new clause in the LGA 1919 to permit “community welfare
services” and validate all related existing and previous activity.9

“Lessons from Local Sustainability Monitoring: Outcomes and Aftermath of the Western Sydney State of the
Environment Report” (2003) 3(3) Environmental Health 54 at 56-57. For empirical research into Victorian
local ‘corporate plans’, see L Kloot, “Using Local Government Corporate Plans in Victoria” (2001) 60(4)
Australian Journal of Public Administration 17, passim.
4
For a background to the various issues confronted by the legislative architects, see J Mant, “The New Local
Government Act: Changes to the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act and to the Jurisdiction of the
Land and Environment Court” (1993) (34) Environmental Law News 26.
5
See ch 3 at 84, 86-87.
6
D Purdie, Local Government in Australia: Reformation or Regression? (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1976), 15153; E Wensig, “The Process of Local Government Reform: Legislative Change in the States” in B Dollery &
N Marshall (eds), Australian Local Government: Reform and Renewal (Melbourne: Macmillan Education
Australia, 1997a), 92.
7
Advisory Council for Inter-Government Relations, Responsibilities and Resources of Australian Local
Government (Canberra: AGPS, 1984b), 10.
8
Purdie, op cit n 6 at 151. See also C Aulich, “From Convergence to Divergence” (1999) 58(2) Australian
Journal of Public Administration 12 at 14; B Smith, op cit n 2 at 564 & 570.
9
Former Local Government Act 1919 (NSW), s 298A, inserted into the principal Act by the Local
Government (Amendment) Act 1983 (NSW). The provision stated that Local Government “shall be deemed
always to have had power to provide community welfare services”.

152

The architects of the LGA 1993 sought to overthrow the shackles of the ultra vires problem and its
associated potential for legal confrontation by disgruntled ratepayers, by conferring upon councils
sweeping authority to engage in a vast range of activities,10 as outlined below. The crux is that
councils no longer need to rely on any express or implied statutory hook on which to hang a
particular function.
The functional frozen constitution of compulsory Local Government for ninety odd years supports
the view that for decades, councils were little more than outposts under the tight reins of the State
Government.11 By keeping councils in a prescriptive straitjacket, the State stifled ambition such as
the grandiose pre-WWII county council plans described in ch 4.12 Even within well-recognised
municipal roles, the NSW Government exercised firm control. Prior to 1993, heads of professional
council departments were answerable not only to their own elected councillors but also to specialist
state authorities who imposed strict direction. Kelly and Mant describe a “continuous pattern of
specialist [NSW] state authorities directly delegating to their equivalent professional groupings”
leading to “the notion of council as a series of quasi-state government agencies”

13

In 1983,

Bowman cited the bizarre Victorian example of State health authorities dictating “the colour of
lavatory doors in municipal baby health centres”.14 This epitomises the worst of centralism and the
opposite of the subsidiarity principle. Such a milieu of stringent oversight and static legislation
would have helped foster an attitude of inertia and subservience, which, arguably, has not altogether
disappeared. In the ALGA’s Annual Report 1994/95, the then President spoke of “the lingering
notion of 19th century rigid hierarchies”.15 This undermines the potential for locally autonomous,
creative approaches to various matters such as biodiversity conservation.
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Wettenhall would suggest that such a conclusion is unfair. In 1988, he described Local Government
as frequently exhibiting “vigour, vitality and a readiness to take notable initiatives”.16 But he also
acknowledged that “parts … [were] still stodgy, conservative, unimaginative, slow to adapt”.17 His
examples of innovation, such as entrepreneurialism and regional collaboration, however, are not
groundbreaking. They are the direct result of policy change by higher levels of government and the
desire to overcome municipal economic hardship.18
It is ironic that Local Government underwent significant pre-1993 functional expansion whilst the
1919 Act continued in force for so long. Amendments to the antiquated LGA 1919 served to
validate various functions. More importantly, statutes outside the main municipal legislation handed
to councils some of their most potent regulatory powers. In particular, the laws of modern
environmentalism, especially the EPAA, have bestowed momentous potential for controlling
private activity. More recent second-generation environmental statutes, such as the Threatened
Species Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) (TSCA),19 provide even further clout.
Post-WWII functional development allowed new professions, such as town planners, to enter the
municipal stage.20 The staff at the top of the hierarchy – i.e. the town and shire clerks – were to
remain the guardians of the old Act under which they had received their training and
indoctrination.21 As Howard noted as recently as 1988:
“Local Government Administration has tended to remain inward looking … [it] tends to be
staffed by traditional managers, predominantly men, trained in “municipal administration”
where emphasis was on knowledge of the Local Government Act, preparation of reports
and returns, due process and stewardship. Many lack capacities to think strategically …”22
This old-fashioned form of management would have played a strong role in smothering creativity.
As protectors of the purse and gatekeepers of communication between staff and elected
16
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representatives, clerks with limited vision would have resisted pressure for change. This helps to
explain the “outdated organisational cultures” lamented by Jones.23 Eventual enactment of the LGA
1993, however, forged fresh horizons. It frees councils from administrative rigidity by enabling
individual authorities to devise their own staff structures and employ expertise as they see fit.24
General managers have now replaced the clerks.25 But there is no guarantee that ingrained cultures
have disappeared. Former chieftains and their helpers who did not seek retirement as a result of the
onslaught of change in 1993,26 remain active in council bureaucracies, especially in remote rural
areas. Marshall and Sproats observe that middle management personnel have often “seriously
inhibited organisational and cultural change”.27 In conservation terms, however, even if modern
management trends have been introduced, the senior executives of today’s most progressive
councils may be no more conservation-friendly than yesterday’s clerks. 28
This is a problem that legislation cannot fix on its own. But the statutes can help to remove
obstacles to innovation or impose obligations that require councils to at least confront biodiversity
conservation issues. The remainder of this chapter will consider what contribution the LGA 1993
can and does make.
5.3

Service Powers

5.3.1

Extent of Powers

Whilst s 21 LGA 1993 states that a council “has the functions conferred or imposed on it by or
under this Act”,29 s 24 goes on to read that:
“[a] Council may provide goods, services, and facilities, and carry out activities, appropriate
to the current and future needs within its local community and of the wider public, subject to
this Act, the regulations and any other law”.

23
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This relates to a council’s ‘service’ or ‘positive’ functions, as opposed to its regulatory obligations
and associated discretionary powers. Regulatory powers, as set out under Ch 7 of the LGA 1993,
provide authority to either (i) determine specific applications for approval, (ii) order that particular
action be undertaken or ceased, or (iii) take action against offences. Because they involve
interference with citizens’ private activities, they are far more circumscribed. The architects of the
legislation made it clear that the differentiation between ‘supply’ and ‘regulatory’ powers was not
only intentional but a major feature of the regime.30 The latter will be dealt with later.31
The idea to confer a general competence power on councils under s 24 LGA 1993 was neither
original nor new. The Queensland Parliament had granted similar broad powers to Brisbane City as
long ago as 1924,32 extending the same approach to all its other councils in 1936.33 This method has
since been adopted across all Australian jurisdictions as part of general Local Government reform.34
But at least in NSW, the ‘service’ powers are not limitless. Forner, a former DLG senior official,
claims that Parliament’s intention was to provide a grant of power “as general as possible ... without
making local government into a full plenary level of government”.35 This is made clear by s 23
LGA 1993, which authorises councils to “do all such things as are supplemental or incidental to, or
consequential on” their functions. This provision would be unnecessary if Local Government
enjoyed unconfined power.36 Furthermore, the exercise of some specific service powers, such as
managing council-owned public reserves, as will be seen later, is expressly restricted.
Notwithstanding these provisions, because the s 24 formula is expressed so widely, including
reference to the “current and future needs” of both the “local community” and “the wider public”, it
is difficult to imagine what type of reasonable service activities could fall outside into the realm of
30
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invalidity.37 The result is that the most effective limits on municipal ambition are resource
constraints and political conservatism rather than the legislation itself.38
Connors advances a more restricted view, suggesting that s 24 LGA “be read down to interpret
‘appropriate’ as limiting [it] … to the traditional role of Local Government”.39 The ‘traditional role’
notion is illuminated by several high-level judicial decisions. In Lynch v Brisbane City Council
(‘Lynch’), the High Court, per Dixon CJ, in reviewing legislation that conferred wide bylaw-making
authority on a council, ruled that the power was “not to be read as going beyond the accepted
notions of local government”.40 In an earlier NSW case, Ex parte Bowser & Co; Re Randwick
Municipal Council (‘Bowser’), Street CJ had referred, in similar fashion, to “the legitimate scope of
the functions of a local governing body”.41 But he also acknowledged that the limits were
“indefinite and elastic”.42 In Bowser, the Court invalidated the exercise of a council’s policy that
purported to prevent installation of petrol pumps manufactured outside Australia. In deciding that
the boycott was unlawful, Street CJ relied on the early High Court case of Randall v Northcote
Corporation (‘Randall’), in which O’Connor J had stressed that municipal discretion based on
“public interest” was undoubtedly fettered, ruling that:
“… there are many considerations of public interest having relation to the general morality
and welfare of the community with which [a council] has no concern, and which cannot
properly enter into the exercise of its discretion”.43
It is fundamental to note that in all these cases, the courts were dealing with the exercise of
regulatory, rather than service, powers. This undermines Connor’s argument. In Lynch, the High
Court had considered an order to remove a market stall in a public place whilst in Bowser, the
council had refused an application to erect a kerbside pump. Randall involved a ratepayer’s
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application for permission to use his premises for public amusement. Their relevance to s 24 LGA
1993 is, therefore, questionable.
Even if the judicial formulae are still apt in drawing the boundaries of valid positive services, they
are vague, unhelpful and appear to adopt an early twentieth century view of Local Government.
Community expectations of councils have expanded remarkably since then, especially during the
last few decades.44 As Chapman argues, not only is the ‘rates, roads and rubbish’ tag no longer
appropriate in most cases but the view of councils as mere “administrative arms” of State
Government is now outmoded.45 The result, adopting the language of Street CJ in Bowser, is that
the “indefinite and elastic” functional boundaries of Local Government have become even more
dynamic. Indeed, s 24 LGA 1993 countenances that councils can provide services to the “wider
public” beyond local interests alone.
It is possible, perhaps, to speculate that the broad service power provisions would not protect a
council indulging in something most extraordinary. Biodiversity conservation, however, can
scarcely be regarded as outlandish. After all, Local Government itself endorsed its crucial
conservation role by adopting the National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy at its ‘National
General Assembly’ in 1998.46 The NSW DLG, in its guidelines on planning for positive services by
councils through their management plans, cites biodiversity maintenance as a potential example.47
Then there is the specialist Biodiversity Planning Guide for NSW Local Government,48 which deals
solely with measures Local Government may take to conserve biodiversity. Furthermore, the nonbinding ‘Introduction’ to Ch 6 of the LGA 1993 cites “environmental conservation, protection and
improvement services and facilities” in a list of optional council services.49 The statute itself
contains various references to ESD, the definition of which includes biodiversity conservation.50
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5.3.2

Introductory Provisions

There are relevant references to biodiversity conservation efforts to the introductory provisions of
the LGA 1993. Section 7 LGA 1993, which sets out the overall objects of the statute, states, inter
alia:
“[t]he purposes of this Act are as follows:
(a)
to provide the legal framework for an ... environmentally responsible and open
system of local government in New South Wales;
...
(e)
to require councils, councillors and council employees to have regard to the
principles of ecologically sustainable development in carrying out their responsibilities”.51
Insertion of reference to ESD in this and other provisions occurred in 1997.52 In his second reading
speech to Parliament, the then Minister for Local Government, Mr Page, optimistically suggested
that integrating references to ESD throughout the LGA 1993 would “ensure that councils
consciously adopt a fully ecologically sustainable development focus when carrying out their
functions”.53 But he later stated, more lamely, that the purpose of the amendment was only to
“require councils to have regard to the principles of ESD in carrying out their responsibilities”.54
This is consistent with the wording of object (e) quoted above.
Parliament also injected reference to ESD in the universal statutory “charter” for councils set down
under s 8(1) LGA 1993. The charter might best be described as a fundamental set of non-binding
principles to guide council operations.55 It exhorts each council to, inter alia:
“properly manage, develop, protect, restore, enhance and conserve the environment of the
area for which it is responsible, in a manner that is consistent with and promotes the
principles of ecologically sustainable development”.
All these provisions mean little in isolation but may be given practical effect pursuant to s 24 LGA
1993 and the two key accountability mechanisms, discussed below. It is up to each individual
council to decide upon its desired level of conservation activity, if any. As Pearson notes, the LGA
1993 “provides little incentive or direction” for increased council involvement.56 Yet it seems that
51
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the insertion of reference to ESD in the LGA 1993 has at least prompted some action. Whittaker
observes that the 1997 amendments were a “key factor” behind an increase in the number of NSW
councils involved in preparing ‘Local Agenda 21’ (LA21) strategies.57 But elsewhere she notes that
ESD is taken most seriously by council departments involved in “traditional environmental policy
areas” rather than those dealing in matters such as economic development, purchasing and,
curiously, town planning.58 Fowke’s analysis of NSW urban council efforts to achieve ESD
suggests that a “clear majority” of councils have initiated organisational change as a result of
emerging environmental issues, including ESD.59 But his conclusions are more sobering, observing
that:
“… the [survey] results ... suggested that councils who placed greater importance on ESD
were no more likely to have translated that rating into policies designed to achieve ESD, or
even into the preparation of general environmental policies. The discrepancy between
rhetoric and practice is therefore evident”.60
This reinforces the suspicion that institutionalisation of ESD, at least at the Local Government
level, has often been little more than symbolic.
It is worth noting that the introductory sections do not rank environmental protection above
environmental exploitation. The objects clause, for instance, refers to giving councils “a role in …
the development of the resources of their areas”.61 Whilst this could encompass conservationfriendly action, such as sustainable harvesting of genetic biological resources, it might also extend
to ecologically destructive activity such as open-cut mining and forestry. There is no indication as
to what priorities should be employed in managing the natural environment or any other activity.
ESD is not infused throughout all the articulated objectives of the Act, which is the case elsewhere
such as the Native Vegetation Conservation Act NSW (NVCA),62 but comprises one of five equally
ranking aims. Even then, the LGA 1993 refers to ESD only having to be considered. Nevertheless,

57

S Whittaker, “Local Agenda 21 – A Variety of Approaches” in K Hannan (ed), Local Government
Environment Yearbook 1999 (Melbourne: Environs Australia, 1999), 20. Surveys carried out in 1995 and
1998 revealed an increase from “about 12” to “more than 25” councils in NSW involved in LA21 strategies.
See also B Cotter, “Australian Councils and Sustainability Survey” in K Hannan (ed), Local Government
Environment Yearbook 1999 (Melbourne: Environs Australia, 1999), passim.
58
S Whittaker, “Integrating Ecological Sustainable Development into Council Practices – the ‘ESD
Cookbook’ Approach” (2000) 5 Local Government Law Journal 157 at 160.
59
R Fowke, “Sustainable Development , the Environment and Urban Local Government: A New South Wales
Perspective” (unpublished M Built Env thesis, UNSW, 1995), 153. See also R Fowke & D Prasad,
“Sustainable Development, Cities and Local Government” (1996) 33 Australian Planner 61, passim.
60
Ibid.
61
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 7(d), emphasis added.
62
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW), s 3.

160

it is at least possible that a court may restrict Local Government’s powers by adopting a purposive
interpretation to the LGA 1993 and placing heavy emphasis on the ‘conservation-friendly’ statutory
objects and charter provisions. Ellis-Jones suggests that the Court might “imply limitations to the
scope of a council’s powers … by reference to the need to have regard to protection of the
environment”, as laid down in the ‘charter’ quoted above.63 But this is unlikely. In his overview of
statutory environmental objectives, Fisher observes that the courts “are for the most part
uncomfortable with the purposive approach”.64 In any event, even if the law does not prevent the
bad, it at least facilitates the good. The statutory doors are wide open for councils with sufficient
political will to engage in a variety of effective biodiversity conservation programs.
The range of potential services is almost limitless. Interesting examples include:
•

a planting program by Cootamundra Council to “boost the population numbers” of the
Cootamundra wattle in order to increase its range of location, facilitate “future collection of
indigenous propagation material” and provide “aesthetic qualities”;65

•

provision of grants by tiny Boorowa Council to landholders to assist the restoration of native
vegetation alongside rural roads, by means of fencing and planting of trees, after interference
from roadworks;66

•

entry by Yass Shire Council into a Voluntary Conservation Agreement with the NSW National
Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) for Monteagle Cemetery, which contains a “four-hectare
remnant of high conservation grassy white box woodland” that comprises part of only 75
hectares of this type of vegetation left in eastern Australia;67

•

financial assistance of up to $1000 for property owners within mapped ‘Greenweb’ corridors to
carry out ‘ecological restoration’ or ‘bushland conservation’ on their lands;68

•

the ex-situ propagation of a ‘listed’ local, endangered, indigenous plant species by Wollongong
City Council.69
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The LGA 1993 goes further than many would expect. It does not prevent councils going on to
private lands, with the permission of the landholder, to provide conservation services.70 A council
may also enter an agreement with a private landholder to carry out “any kind of work”.71
Significantly, the non-statutory explanatory notes to this section refer to “tree planting and tree
maintenance” as one of several examples.
Positive services may also be provided beyond a council’s own boundary. As observed in ch 4, the
LGA 1993 expressly authorises a council to undertake functions on a joint basis with its
neighbours.72 Furthermore, s 357 authorises a council to exercise any of its non-regulatory functions
outside its geographic jurisdiction.73 Whether a council chooses to follow such an option will
depend heavily on local politics. Unless financial benefits can be demonstrated, ratepayers will be
most interested in property services.
5.4

The Management Plan

Councils that embark on major new projects, including conservation works, must do so via the
management plan process. As described by the DLG, this is the “central mechanism … by which
councils allocate their resources and prioritise their activities”.74 Section 406(1) LGA 1993 requires
every council to ratify a management plan before the end of each year. It is essentially an overall
management tool, which addresses a council’s strategic direction and proposed major activities.
Similar plans are required in all States.75 Importantly, in NSW it is a purely local document.76 The
69
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State Government has no power to direct a council to address any matter in its plan, reflecting the
emphasis placed on council autonomy.
In theory, the management plan is the vehicle through which a council decides, with the benefit of
community input, how it intends to exercise its broad service powers conferred by s 24 LGA 1993.
Mandatory consultation provisions,77 together with a requirement that general managers report
periodically to their councils on implementation,78 illustrate that the management plan is an
instrument for public input and accountability. Martin describes public accountability in terms of:
“making … officials responsive to the needs of citizens. It means establishing criteria to
measure the performance of public officials, as well as mechanisms to ensure standards are
met”.79
Preparation of the annual management plan is compulsory. The legislation directs that it contain
details about a council’s proposed “principal activities” for, at least, the following three years, and
its “revenue policy” for the ensuing year only.80 In relation to the former, the plan must identify
those “principal activities” that the council intends to carry out, as well as “statements” on:
•

the objectives and performance targets for each such activity;

•

the means by which a council proposes to achieve those targets;

•

the manner in which a council proposes to assess its performance in respect of each
specified activity; and

•

any matters prescribed by regulation (see further below).81

The extent to which the above matters are addressed is variable. Of the 25 plans studied by Marshall
and Sproats in 1997/98, six “contained no performance indicators at all”.82
“Principal activity” is not defined. But s 403(2) LGA 1993 lays down a non-exhaustive list of
activities that, if carried out, the statement must address. It refers to archetypal municipal functions
in broad terms such as “capital works projects” and “services”. Whilst some conservation projects
could be expected to fall into one or more of these categories, the list also makes specific reference
to “activities to properly manage, develop, protect, restore, enhance and conserve the environment
77
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in a manner that is consistent with and promotes the principles” of ESD.83 In accordance with the
Local Government (General) Regulation 1999 (‘LGGR’), these are known as “environmental
protection activities”.84 It would appear that the formula, including the term ‘activity’, is broad
enough to extend beyond physical conservation works to measures such as incentive schemes to
private landholders, educational programs, preparation of a local environmental plan (LEP) under
the EPAA and even negotiations with other councils towards common conservation outcomes. But
it is clear that the LGA 1993 does not compel councils to undertake ‘environmental protection
activities’. It only requires councils to detail such activities in the prescribed manner should any be
undertaken.
As a result of regulatory amendments in 1997, special public consultation requirements now apply.
A council must “consult” and “involve” the community, including “environmental groups”, in
developing “environmental management strategies” for ‘environmental protection activities’.85
Even the term ‘environmental strategy’ is undefined. The legislation is silent on how a council
should meet these obligations. Of course, the extent to which councils engage their local
communities will vary.86
The LGGR requires a council, when preparing that part of the draft management plan relating to
‘environmental protection activities’, to “apply” the principles of ESD.87 In view of the imprecise
nature of ESD, it is difficult to see how this obligation can be met. The explanatory note to the 1997
regulatory amendments simply states that councils are to “take into consideration” the principles of
ESD,88 which is consistent with the statutory object under s 7(e) LGA 1993. This is scarcely
onerous. In the case of resource-poor or uninterested councils, ESD is likely to receive nothing
more than lip service. These councils are unlikely to engage in any ‘environmental protection
activities’ in the first place.
83
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The weakness of the regime becomes even more apparent in the case of principal activities falling
outside the ‘environmental protection activity’ umbrella. Apart from s 7(e), the LGA 1993 does not
expressly demand the factoring of any environmental concerns into the decision-making equation
here. For instance, a council might decide to construct recreational facilities, including a sportsfield,
which will involve removal of remnant, rare native vegetation.89 As the activity comprises a “capital
works project”, various statements must be provided in the draft management plan, such as
articulated objectives and performance targets, as noted earlier. The concern is that the specified
objectives of the proposal may relate to recreational matters alone. There is no express requirement
under the management plan provisions that environmental issues, such as the impact of the proposal
on vegetation loss, be confronted. The situation is not helped by the LGGR, in which the provisions
relating to ESD apply only to ‘environmental protection activities’, should any be undertaken, and
not to any other activities identified in the plan.90 This is ludicrous. It suggests that ESD has been
saved only for those activities intended in any case to conserve or improve the environment. It
belies the former Minister’s vision that “councils will apply [ESD] principles throughout all their
activities”.91 It is also inconsistent with the DLG’s own guidelines, which state that “ESD principles
apply to all of the activities of the council”.92 This aspect of the LGGR is likely to be invalid in
view of the statutory object relating to ESD in the primary Act, which on its face is not restricted to
a particular subset of a council’s activities. Whilst the courts may rely on s 7(e) and other
introductory provisions to ensure that ESD is at least considered by councils for all their activities,
it is still unfortunate that s 7(e) suffers from lack of supportive, substantive provisions throughout
the remainder of the Act. This provides an example of the failure of legislatures to provide
workable frameworks for achieving ESD. It should be noted, however, that these problems do not
deny the relevance of any environmental assessment requirements imposed on a council by
legislation outside the LGA 1993, in particular the EPAA, as will be discussed below.93
There is one qualification to the apparent limitations of the management plan provisions. The
community may use the public consultation process to demand appropriate environmental
89
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objectives are injected into the management plan. This would be an example of “facilitating the
participation of citizens as policy-makers as the local level”.94 But this depends, of course, on the
level of community awareness of the process, its commitment to environmental matters and the
extent to which a council seeks feedback beyond the necessary formal public exhibition.95 The DLG
urges councils to pursue a more “proactive and targeted approach” beyond the bare requirements,
noting that mere exhibition at the end of the plan-making process “does not, in itself, provide for
adequate community and stakeholder input”.96 Brown et al assert that the 1997 changes to the LGA
1993, especially in relation to ‘environmental protection activities’, have now rendered
council/community partnerships obligatory.97 But their research concludes that “the baseline of real
partnership” is “low”.98 Marshall and Sproats’ study provides a similar conclusion, observing
“marginal input from the public” and the failure of the regime to achieve strong citizen
participation.99 Smith describes the participation requirements as tokenistic, leading to
disappointing levels of response and concern on the part of councils about “delaying affects and
cost”.100
Even if participation processes can be improved, there is no guarantee that each community will
want its local biodiversity conserved rather than developed for other purposes, such as
sportsfields.101 But if there is a commitment to biodiversity conservation, the management plan has
enormous potential. It provides opportunity for councils to integrate conservation principles across
the entire spectrum of their actions by incorporating them into their adopted “objectives” and
“performance targets” for every principal activity. In terms of biodiversity conservation, this will be
more effective than the occasional one-off project to help protect a special place. It should also help
minimise inconsistent action between different departments of a council. Local Government’s
multi-purpose nature means that this can easily happen. As Jones explains, Local Government:
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“… has inherent problems in developing vision and leadership. It is multipurpose, often
administering a bewildering range of major and minor functions, whereas most successful
organisations are specialised and single purpose ... State and Federal organisations are based
on the principle of functional specialisation. The multipurpose nature of local government
makes coordination very important and very difficult to achieve. Numerous localgovernment units make broader co-ordination very difficult. Local government runs a real
risk of being a ‘jack of all trades and master of none’”.102
This problem of co-ordination is especially acute in environmental management, as stressed in the
1992 TASQUE Report referred to in ch 1.103 TASQUE found that many celebrated local
environmental projects tended to work in isolation from other spheres of council activity, leading to
potentially inconsistent action.104 It cited the unfortunate example of a council with an active native
bushland rehabilitation program that at the same time was using wetlands for “sanitary landfill”.105
As Keen, Mercer and Woodfull argue, a commitment to desired environmental objectives must
permeate council activities in order to achieve an integrated approach.106 In theory, the management
plan process provides opportunity for this to occur. There is also opportunity for the management
plan process to inform a council’s plan-making process under the EPAA. The DLG suggests that
“[a]n effective relationship between management planning and land use planning is critical”.107
Whilst the management plan process may promote strategic co-ordination within a council, coordination between councils is another matter altogether. A particular council might actively pursue
biodiversity conservation through its management plan whilst its neighbour may follow different
priorities. The regional dimensions of environmental management mean that without effective
cross-boundary cooperation, the good work of one council can be undermined. For example, a
council that condones land clearance, despite its implications for increased siltation, may thwart
active wetland conservation by its neighbour downstream. The system provides scant
encouragement for councils to work together towards common regional goals through their
individual management plans. A small exception is found in the required “particulars” for matters
prescribed by the LGGR to be addressed in management plans.108 The LGGR demands that
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management plans include certain information on “any proposed council activity relating to the
management” of “stormwater”, “coasts and estuaries”, “sewage” and “waste”.109 Details are
required on “the relevant characteristics of the area, catchment or region” as well as council
membership on relevant bodies and “any action to be taken jointly with other councils or bodies”.110
These provisions should encourage councils to at least turn their minds to opportunities for
cooperative action, not only with their neighbours but also with other bodies, such as WMCs and
the NPWS. It is a rare statutory example of pushing councils, as described by Smith, into
“creat[ing] networks … with other agencies” and attempting to “persuad[e] other agencies to
achieve prescribed ends”.111
The reference to “coasts and estuaries” may prompt councils to develop biodiversity policy for
these aspects of the environment, preferably at a regional scale. But the statutory nudge relates only
to a discrete component of the environment. It does not extend to non-coastal environments unless
affected by stormwater discharge and the like. Even within their narrow ambit, these clauses hardly
enjoy a high profile, tucked away in subordinate legislation.
Of course, references to biodiversity conservation in management plans should become more
common as Local Government grows more familiar with the concept. Influences such as the
National LG Biodiversity Strategy and the LA21 phenomenon may well prod councils to wrestle
with the issue. But for effective biodiversity conservation to be achieved, much more is needed than
heart-warming statements in official documents. An example of a hopeful objective with no detail
whatsoever on implementation is found in Yass Shire Council’s 1995 management plan:
[l]ocal government is the sphere of government closest to the people and as such, it behoves
Council to maintain local genetic diversity and protect the natural resources of the area”.112
Sadly, the 1999/2000 management plan for Yass makes no reference to biodiversity at all. Instead,
emphasis is on asset replacement, human resource management and balance sheets.113 It smacks of
corporate management rather than environmental governance and serves as a ready example of how
conservation matters can be shunted aside.
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In conclusion, despite wide opportunity presented by the management plan mechanism, there is a
danger that for some councils, limited outlooks derived from history, conflicting priorities, resource
shortcomings, managerialist trends and perhaps even uninterested neighbours will ensure that
effective biodiversity conservation remains in the realm of empty talk, if addressed at all in
management plans. Requirements relating to ‘state of environment’ reports (SoERs), however, as
outlined below, may assist to drive new environmental directions.
5.5

Annual Reports, SoERs and Linkages to Management Plans

In addition to management plans, the LGA 1993 requires each council to prepare an annual
report.114 The legislation is very specific as to what it must address in relation to the previous year.
The report must contain, inter alia, information “as to [a council’s] achievements with respect to the
objectives and performance targets set out in its management plan”.115 It thereby provides a layer of
environmental accountability with respect to a council’s “principal activities” depending on the
extent to which environmental concerns have been incorporated into the “objectives and
performance targets” in the management plan. By enabling the outcomes of all proposals outlined in
the management plan to be evaluated and reported upon, it goes beyond being a merely descriptive
document.
More specific environmental reporting is required under s 428(2)(c) LGA 1993, which demands
that the annual report contain the follow particulars:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)

land,
air,
water,
biodiversity,
waste,
noise,
Aboriginal heritage
non-Aboriginal heritage,

with particular reference, with regard to each such environmental sector, to:
(ix)
(x)

114
115

management plans relating to the environment,
special council projects relating to the environment,

Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 428.
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 428(1).
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(xi)

the environmental impact of council activities.116

This aspect of the annual report is known as the SoER. The reference to “biodiversity” here is
especially significant, being one of a handful of references to the term in the entire statute.117
Parliament inserted the term into the list of matters when it overhauled the provision in 1997
following much criticism of the earlier situation.118 The amendment provides firm evidence of
growing recognition of biodiversity as a matter of Local Government concern. It at least requires
councils to face biodiversity as an issue.
Introduction of the original SoER requirement in 1993 created a bombshell. It was inserted in the
Local Government Bill 1993 by the then Opposition, with the support of independent members, and
opposed by the then Government. Mr J Turner, who had chaired a special Parliamentary committee
to oversee development of the bill, warned that the costs would be “crippling”, describing the
amendment as a “blatant political stunt”.119 The then Minister for Local Government, Mr G
Peacocke, quoted costly estimates for the preparation of SoERs and stressed opposition by the then
joint Local Government and Shires Associations.120 The Local Government Association,121
interestingly, despite initial chagrin, later decided to support the SoER concept subject to State
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Government assistance.122 But no monetary help has ever been forthcoming.123 In other words, the
SoER requirement was simply dumped upon a largely unprepared Local Government. The only
substantial support councils have received is written guidelines.124 The resource-intensive nature of
SoER preparation has been softened slightly, however, by provisions introduced in 1997 allowing
for four-yearly ‘comprehensive’ SoERs updated by annual ‘supplementary’ SoERs.125
In 1997, the then Minister for Local Government suggested that the SoER requirements had
“worked well”.126 But he also noted that the quality of reports varied widely.127 There is still
evidence of municipal resistance to SoERs. Gundagai Shire Council, for example, refused to
prepare a SoER in 1995 because it believed that “all environmentally sensitive issues are more than
adequately controlled by other existing legislation”.128 It is disappointing that the other statutes
receive no mention. Its 1998/99 SoER contains less than one page of “comments … in respect of
the environment”.129 Minimal interest in SoERs on the part of many other rural councils must be
common, although perhaps less blatant. Of the nine 1998/1999 SoERs studied by the author,130
three still referrred to the pre-1997 law.131
Whilst councils at least recognise the statutory obligation to prepare SoERs, this does not
necessarily translate into utilising them as effective environmental management tools. An
invaluable contribution SoERs may make is to alert councils to the need for appropriate policy
responses to existing or foreseeable environmental problems.132 For example, a SoER might reveal
122

Information supplied by Mr R Bonner, Local Government and Shires Associations, during an interview
with the author on 14 March 1994.
123
Ellis-Jones, op cit n 63 at 106.
124
Department of Local Government (1999b), op cit n 118. Councils are under an obligation to consider these
guidelines in preparing their SoERs: Local Government (General) Regulation 1999 (NSW), cl 34(a). For the
original guidelines, see Environment Protection Authority (NSW), State of the Environment Reporting by
Local Government (Sydney: the Authority, 1993). This document was prepared pursuant to Local
Government Act 1993 (NSW), Sch 7, cl 50.
125
Supplementary reports need only identify “new environmental impacts” and update “the trends in
environmental indicators”: Local Government (General) Regulation 1999 (NSW); cl 37, see also cll 3, 33, 35,
36 & 38. A comprehensive SoER is required only for each “year ending after each election of the councillors
for its area”: cl 38(1).
126
Mr Page, Parliamentary Debates, NSW Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 17 Sep 1997, 160.
127
Ibid.
128
Gundagai Shire Council, Management Plan 1995/98.
129
Gundagai Shire Council, Annual Report 1998/1999.
130
See ch 1 at n 20.
131
See Gundagai Shire Council, op cit n 129; Junee Shire Council, Annual Report 1998/1999, 10-19; Temora
Shire Council, Annual Report Vol 1, 21 ff.
132
Environs Australia, Biodiversity and Local Government Forum: Report and Recommendations from a
Forum Held on 4 July 1996 at Baulkham Hills Council (Report for the National Parks and Wildlife Service
(NSW)) (Melbourne: Environs Australia, 1996), 17.

171

a particular area to be more ecologically significant than previously believed. The council might
then, for instance, choose to use the information to support preparation of a LEP under the EPAA to
protect it.133 Or it might decide to negotiate with landholders to encourage active environmental
management. Alternatively, it may decide to carry out environmental protection works itself.
Clearly, SoERs can do far more than provide interesting data.
Upon the commencement of the LGA 1993, SoERs needed to go no further than describe various
aspects of the environment. A review of the first set of SoERs found that “the majority of councils
... treated [them] as a data gathering exercise rather than as an effort involving collection of data to
aid in decision-making”.134 In 1997, the DLG observed that there appeared to be little change since
then.135 This view is confirmed by Brown et al’s investigation of councils in the HawkesburyNepean catchment, where senior managers of half of the councils surveyed held the view that a
SoER was “of no use as a management tool, but an audit produced to meet statutory reporting
requirements”.136
Since 1997, the legislation requires each council, when compiling its SoER, to address each of the
eight specified ‘environmental sectors’ in the context of “management plans relating to the
environment” (see s 428(2)(c)(ix) above). This widens the net for all identified principal activities
to be assessed against a variety of environmental criteria, including biodiversity. The linkage with
management plans makes good sense.137 It was recognised in some quarters well before 1997138 and
is now championed by the DLG, which recommends an optional ‘environmental management plan’
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(EMP) as a “sub-plan linked to the management plan”.139 By bringing local environmental problems
to the attention of the council, a SoER may influence the types of ‘principal activities’ that a council
may decide to engage in. In turn, a later SoER can be utilised to evaluate the environmental
outcomes of those activities. In other words, the SoER may be seen as an extension to the
management plan process and address follow-up action. The DLG commends a “management
planning – annual reporting cycle”.140 It has even raised the idea of relationships between SoERs
and voluntary LA21 plans.141
It seems that the potential of SoERs is not being reached. Senior municipal personnel interviewed
by Brown et al in 1998 are quoted as calling the SoER “an exercise in futility” and a “compliance
document … [done] because we have to”. Whittaker similarly reports of managers complaining of
difficulties in interpreting SoERs, with some asserting that they “have not seen, let alone read [the
SoER] for their council”.142 Brown et al’s findings are especially disturbing as they involve councils
at Sydney’s periphery with relatively large budgets and, presumably, far more environmental
expertise than remote resource-poor councils.143 They reflect, arguably, managerialist trends that
emphasise cost-cutting rather than long-term environmental improvement. But the SoER is a very
different mechanism to the usual budgetary instruments with which council executives are familiar.
As Brown et al note, the SoER “has as its central reference point the whole environment … rather
than council’s activities in that area”.144 It deals with big issues, such as biodiversity decline, which,
are difficult to reduce to financial returns. A narrow perception of SoERs means a minimal role in
shaping municipal agendas.145
This is discouraging. As seen already, the statutory obligations require that the SoER be more than
a mere ‘compliance’ document. Furthermore, the LGGR demands that comprehensive SoERs apply
the “pressure-state-response” model in analysing data, identifying appropriate indicators for each
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sector and presenting results.146 The ‘response’ component is especially noteworthy. It is defined as
identifying “the response of councils, government agencies, industry and communities to the
pressures on, and state of the environment”.147 Not only do the provisions require a council to
canvas its own approaches, if any, but those of other bodies. They appear to encourage a council to
adopt the role of environmental steward wherein it considers a full range of issues affecting its area,
including matters beyond its conventional jurisdiction. A SoER may, for example, address the
impact of other authorities’ policies on biodiversity. It might contain information on reserves
managed by the NPWS or implementation of any ‘regional vegetation management plan’
(RVMP)148 under the NVCA. Both these matters, inter alia, are listed in the DLG’s guidelines as
possible “indicators” of local biodiversity.149 In theory, consideration of such matters may lead to
lobbying by councils or even inter-agency partnerships.
There are further linkages with the management plan as a result of the 1997 amendments. One of
the items listed under s 403(2) LGA 1993 (in relation to the required “particulars” for proposed
‘principal activities’ to be addressed in management plans) reads:
“activities in response to, and to address priorities identified in, the council’s current
comprehensive report as to the state of the environment and any other relevant reports”.
Clearly, councils are expected to respond to issues raised in their SoERs. In addition, the LGGR
requires a council, when preparing that part of its management plan dealing with ‘environment
protection activities’, if any, to “consider” its most recent comprehensive SoER.150 These provisions
further encourage the management plan/SoER ‘cycle’.
The National Local Government Biodiversity Survey reports that a “high proportion” – more
specifically, 45% – of surveyed councils in NSW had “incorporate[d] biodiversity objectives into
their corporate/operational plan [i.e. ‘management plan’]” in 2000.151 In view of the statutory
linkages between the management plan and SoER, with its specific reference to biodiversity, the
figure is disappointing, suggesting that more than half of the councils had paid minimal, if any,
attention to the requirements relating to biodiversity accountability and potential management.
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Public involvement may influence the direction of SoERs. Prior to 1997, there was no requirement
that the SoER undergo public scrutiny before adoption.152 Nowadays, in preparing their SoERs,
councils must consult with their communities, including ‘environmental groups’, and also involve
people in “monitoring changes to the environment”.153 But again, there are no details on how this is
to occur. Terms such as ‘environmental group’ are undefined. Brown et al found their desired
council/community partnership here “almost non-existent” amongst the authorities surveyed, with
three managers viewing the community as “irrelevant and/or disinterested [sic]”.154 This is despite a
longstanding recommendation on the part of the Environment Protection Authority (EPA),155 as
well as support from individual, committed local environmental officers,156 for improved
community input.
No public comprehensive review of SoERs has been undertaken to test the extent to which they
direct council policy on the ground. The nine SoERs studied by the author,157 however, provide
some indication. None refer to community input into the SoER preparation process. Six
acknowledge the importance of local landholders, as opposed to the councils themselves, in
achieving conservation outcomes, especially via Landcare groups. But there is generally little
attention to such groups combatting biodiversity loss. Whilst there is widespread recognition of the
fragile and limited extent of vegetation remnants, the emphasis appears to be on the need to gather
more information rather than setting down concrete responses. This does not deny noteworthy
intentions on the part of some councils. Harden Shire Council, for instance, whilst noting a tree
coverage of a mere 1.1% over its shire, describes an ongoing ‘Remnant Vegetation Study’ being
undertaken jointly with other organisations, encompassing satellite mapping and radiometric soil
survey, which it intends to underpin review of its own LEP.158 But there is no immediate action to
stem further loss. Several SoERs note tree planting by the council and/or community groups.159
Others may be less promising despite the SOER’s potential, with vague references to public
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education and the possibility of tree preservation orders if anything at all.160 In conclusion, the
review confirms that the potential for SoERs to serve as key biodiversity conservation tools remains
largely untapped. The SoERs do not reflect the opportunities, let alone obligations, imposed by the
LGA 1993 and LGGR. In many cases, the detailed statutory rules appear to have been disregarded.
Of course, there is scope for SoERs to evolve. But biodiversity will continue to diminish whilst we
wait.
There is also the issue that environmental sectors which SoERs must address, including biodiversity
information, clearly transcend municipal borders and are ill-suited to be dealt with on a piecemeal,
council-by-council basis. This raises the idea of regional SoERs. In their review of early SoERs,
Brown and Greene observed that “[m]any issues were considered [by council staff] more
appropriate for regional or catchment treatment than for separate attention by each Council”.161 In
an effort to minimise costs for individual member councils, but also in recognition of the sheer
common sense in adopting a regional perspective, some voluntary ‘regional organisations of
councils’ (ROCs) have promoted regional approaches to SoERs, or at least certain environmental
sectors that councils can slot readily into their individual SoERs.162 The Southern Sydney Regional
Organisation of Councils (SSROC), for example, has been active here since the mid-1990s.163 In the
case of south-eastern NSW, the ACT’s Office of the Commissioner for the Environment has
combined with seventeen NSW councils in preparing a regional SoER.164 In 2000, the ‘Western
Sydney Regional SoER’ was published for the Western Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils
(WSROC), described by Parissi as “the first regional [SoER] in Australia … based on sustainability
principles”.165
None of these examples remove the statutory requirement that each council prepare its own
individual SoER. In a 1997 discussion paper on SoERs, Minister Page acknowledged wide support
for regional SoER reporting but remained steadfast in his commitment to individual SoERs.166 This
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is perhaps unfortunate. From an ecological management viewpoint, SoERs prepared on a
bioregional basis would make far more sense than many unconnected SoERs of varying quality.
In introducing the 1997 amendments to the LGA 1993, Minister Page promised that regional
reporting would “be encouraged where environmental issues are best addressed at that level”.167 The
relevant provision is in the LGGR. It requires a council to include in its SoER “information relating
to the general region” if analysis of any of the factors listed under s 428(2)(c) “cannot be met”
solely by reference to the local municipal area.168 A council must then observe all the statutory
requirements for SoER reporting, such as adopting the ‘pressure-state-response’ model, in the
‘regional’ part of its SoER.169 Information on biodiversity would be a ready contender for regional
attention. But the LGGR fails to define ‘region’. There is no statutory requirement, nor even a
suggestion in the DLG’s guidelines, for a uniform approach to regional information. None of the
SoERs studied by the author exhibited a marked regional perspective to biodiversity apart from
occasional acknowledgement of the said work by the ACT Commissioner for the Environment.
Their emphasis is clearly on local environmental issues. As for WSROC’s regional SoER, Parissi
raises many concerns raised by council staff but concludes “that a strengthened foundation is
needed for future SoE reporting, and indeed for local SoE reporting”.170
In conclusion, the picture is again one of unfulfilled opportunity. The future success of the SoER as
a conservation tool relies on a combination of political commitment, sufficient resources and
regional willingness. As far as politics are concerned, many councils will already have other
priorities modelled by tradition. Cowra Shire Council’s SoER provides a ready example. Under the
‘biodiversity’ heading, it suggests that conservation be restricted to “rocky outcrops of land which
can not be cultivated” because the floor of the Lachlan Valley “is too valuable ... to not be cleared
and put into intensive agricultural production”.171 This Council’s priority is clearly on boosting the
local economy grounded in agriculture.
5.6

Recovery Plans

An easily overlooked matter to be addressed in SoERs, which flows from provisions outside the
LGA 1993, involves the implementation of ‘recovery plans’ (RPs), a strategic planning mechanism
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made under the ‘threatened species’ statutes: i.e. ss 70(2) Threatened Species Conservation Act
1993 (NSW) (TSCA) and 220ZT(2) Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) (FMA).172 Both the
Director-General of the NPWS and Director of Fisheries must prepare a RP for each threatened
species, population or ecological community (‘threatened species etc’), other than those presumed
extinct,173 as listed by specialist ‘Scientific Committees’ under these statutes.174 The TSCA and
FMA demand that a RP specify what must be done to enable the recovery of ‘listed species etc’.175
Under the TSCA, a RP must also address ‘performance indicators’ to ascertain success in
“promoting the recovery” of the relevant species etc..176 The critical factor, however, is that a RP
has to “identify the … public authorities who are responsible for the measures included in the
plan”.177 The statutes then go on to describe RPs as binding in the sense that “public authorities …
are to take appropriate action available to them to implement those measures”.178 The definition of
‘public authority’ explicitly includes a ‘local authority’.179 Should a RP specifically refer to a
council and the measures it must undertake, there is an express obligation on the authority to
address, in its SoER, “action taken by it to implement those measures”.180 This adds to the potential
accountability benefits of the SoER.
The concept of Local Government implementing RPs for biodiversity conservation purposes may at
first appear promising. Closer scrutiny of the provisions, however, suggests that this need not be the
case. The TSCA states that:
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“[a] measure must not be included in recovery plan for implementation by a public authority
unless the chief executive officer of the public authority approves of the inclusion of the
measure”.181
In the case of Local Government, the person who approves or declines demanding measures in a RP
would appear to be the General Manager of an individual council. It is these people who may be far
more interested in corporate efficiency than costly conservation measures. The attitudes of senior
municipal executives towards SoERs compiled by Brown et al as referred to earlier,182 and
reinforced by Parissi,183 strongly support this.
The RP system is further weakened by the legislative expectation that where a RP seeks to confine a
public authority’s statutory discretion, it “does not operate to exclude the discretion”.184
Accordingly, the RP need merely be taken into account. The NPWS recognises this by emphasising
that “authorities can only be bound to actions in a [RP] by agreement”.185 Clearly, the RP does not
carry any special weight in the assessment of proposals under Local Government’s regulatory
functions, such as assessment of development applications under the EPAA. But as far as noncompulsory positive services under s 24 LGA 1913 are concerned - such as decisions on whether or
not to mow a road verge or spray a cemetery with herbicide – the legal position is less certain. A
discretion already exists as to whether or not such action should take place and, if so, to what
extent. Accordingly, it is at least arguable that the restrictions may have wider scope than might first
appear.
Another issue is limited resources to produce and implement effective RPs.186 At an ecological
conference in 1997, Brebach gave a rough ‘estimate’ of $425,000 over five years for preparation
and implementation of a faunal RP.187 Burbidge suggests that achieving hundreds of effective RPs
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is impossible.188 For instance, formulation of RPs for ‘ecological communities’ with widespread,
complex biotic assemblages must be especially difficult, time-consuming and costly.189 Notably, the
output of RPs is currently slow. At Dec 2002, the NPWS recorded 877 threatened species etc as
having been listed under the TSCA (including 79 presumed extinct);190 at the time of writing, only
65 RPs have reached completion.191 Under the FMA, nineteen threatened species etc have been
listed192 but no RP yet exists.193 The costs continue to expand as the lists of threatened species etc
continue to grow.
RPs are likely to have most impact on management of council-owned lands. There is anecdotal
evidence that the NPWS seeks Local Government interest and cooperation beforehand. This
suggests that only committed councils will be actively involved. Brebach describes ‘recovery
teams’ that carry out both plan preparation and implementation as including “local government
representatives (if relevant)”.194 The reference to Local Government readily relates to the closeness
of councils to their communities rather than statutory prompts. Burbidge advocates that:
“[t]he participation of local groups in the implementation of recovery plans should be
strongly supported. Local ‘ownership’ of recovery plans will enhance the chances of success
and should also enable more to be done for less money”.195
These measures need not be restricted to open space but may extend to roadsides, street closures,
cemeteries and other lands. They demand strong leadership and encouragement of volunteers. Lack
of commitment by financially struggling councils wrapped up in maintaining rudimentary property
services will work against this.
There is also the issue of cross-boundary recovery planning where the habitats of “wide ranging”
threatened species etc, such as the yellow-bellied glider, the powerful owl and the Cumberland
Plain woodland, transcend council borders.196 Interest in implementing recovery ‘measures’
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contained in a widespread RP may differ between individual councils. This raises a similar issue to
the unconnected approaches in addressing ‘environment protection activities’ in individual council
management plans, as raised earlier.197 In the case of RPs, Saxon recommends use of a regional
statutory instrument under the EPAA, namely the ‘regional environmental plan’, as a potential
solution.198
Brief mention should also be made of ‘threat abatement plans’ (TAPs) made under the TSCA and
FMA, which deal with listed ‘key threatening processes’ (KTPs). A TAP must be prepared for each
listed KTP “so as to abate, ameliorate or eliminate its adverse effects” on ‘threatened species etc’.199
KTPs of interest under the TSCA include, inter alia, ‘clearing of native vegetation’ and ‘bushrock
removal’.200 Listing provides a virtually identical system to the RP. The strength of TAPs as they
emerge, which is so far extremely slow,201 will depend on the extent to which are incorporated into
other mechanisms, such as management plans, environmental planning instruments (EPIs) under the
EPAA and plans for council reserves (see below).202 This concept of integration also applies to RPs.
The usefulness of RPs and KTPs in achieving effective biodiversity conservation at the municipal
level provides opportunity for empirical research as more plans reach fruition. It is likely, however,
that because the requirements on addressing implementation of the plans in SoERs are hidden away
from Local Government’s central statute, they will receive little attention unless supported by
strong community action that is already implementing RPs.

5.7

Environmental Assessment of Council Service Activities outside the LGA 1993

As mentioned in passing earlier, an action carried out by a council under s 24 LGA 1993 may
attract environmental assessment requirements under the EPAA. A council proposal may well
require development consent under Pt 4 EPAA, thereby demanding environmental evaluation in
197
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accordance with relevant EPIs.203 Alternatively, it may attract environmental scrutiny under Pt 5
EPAA (see below). Furthermore, special legislative provisions relating to assessment of impact on
listed ‘threatened species etc’ and their habitats, which piggyback on the EPAA, may be
triggered.204 This brief section of the chapter deals with the situation where Local Government not
only carries out the project itself but is also the decision-maker: i.e. when it is the judge of its own
case, enabling traditional political bias to take charge.
The situation of a council submitting an application to itself for Pt 4 EPAA approval is more
common that one might expect. Two controversial examples that involved merits appeals to the
Land and Environment Court (LEC) are Myall Koala and Environmental Support Group v Great
Lakes Shire Council, about the construction of a large boat ramp and car parking on a council
owned wetland,205 and Leatch v NPWS, which dealt with a 60 metre bridge over a vegetated
gorge.206 Both projects required consent under the local EPI. The ‘planning system’ under which
these proposals were assessed will be discussed in detail throughout ch 6.
If development consent under Pt 4 EPAA is unnecessary, consideration must be given to Pt 5. The
two systems are mutually exclusive. For instance, construction of utility installations and
roadworks, which are common council ‘wastebin tasks’, usually do not attract Pt 4.207 Attention
must then be paid to Pt 5. Notably, if the same project is recognised by a council as a “principal
activity” under s 403(2) LGA 1993, or part of such activity, environmental assessment criteria may
already be set out in the management plan via articulated objectives and performance targets. If so,
the environmental outcomes must be addressed in the subsequent annual report. But unlike Pt 5
EPAA, this assessment regime is not compulsory unless the project comprises a ‘principal’ activity.
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Capture of a project by Pt 5 EPAA is not guaranteed. As Farrier et al point out, not all of the
activities listed under s 403(2) LGA 1993, such as asset replacement programs, will be caught.208
Furthermore, Pt 5 EPAA will only be attracted if the action is of sufficient substance to comprise an
“activity”. At first blush, the meaning of ‘activity’ appears broad. It extends to, inter alia, the “use
of land” and “the carrying out of a work”.209 But the LEC has limited the term’s scope. In Rundle v
Tweed Shire Council (‘Rundle’), it decided that herbicide spraying of farmland did not comprise an
‘activity’ despite a neighbour’s serious concerns. Bignold J decided that the action was neither “the
physical product of labouring operations” nor “something done to the land itself”.210 At that stage,
major amendments to Pt 5 in 1985 had already narrowed its scope to exclude various decisions,
such as allocation of funds and leasing land, which do not involve physical action.211
Once Pt 5 EPAA is triggered by the LGA 1993, the council, as the “determining authority”, has a
general duty to “take into account to the fullest extent possible all matters affecting or likely to
affect the environment”.212 Whilst this may sound onerous, judicial construction has diluted its
potency.213 The determining authority must also consider impact on ‘threatened species etc’ listed
under the TSCA or FMA, and their habitats,214 with the possibility that preparation ‘species impact
statement’ (SIS) may be required (see below). Even if the action does not comprise an ‘activity’ in
terms of Pt 5 EPAA but involves harm or damage to ‘threatened species etc’ or their habitat, a
licence is required.215
There are further provisions. The Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (NSW)
(EPAR) demands that certain factors be taken into account including (inter alia):
•
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•

“any impact on the habitat of protected fauna (within the meaning of the National
Parks and Wildlife Act 1974”; and

•

any endangering of any species of animal, plant or other form of life, whether living
on land, in water or in the air”.216

Section 112(1) EPAA lays down further demands. If the proposal is “likely to significantly affect
the environment ... of threatened species, populations, ecological communities or their habitats”, the
proponent must submit an environmental impact statement (EIS) to itself.217 Amendments made to
the EPAA also demand, in some circumstances, preparation of a SIS, a specialist form of miniEIS.218 In either case, the council prepares the document for its own consideration and ultimate
determination of the proposal. This enhances the prospect for weak local decisions that afford low
priority to biodiversity conservation,219 influenced by economic demands and the ‘ratepayer
ideology’. By way of comment, in the case of an EIS, councils are exempt from the general need for
Ministerial approval.220 Should a SIS be prepared, concurrence is needed from the Minister for the
Environment in the case of ‘threatened species etc’ listed under the TSCA.221 The provisions
relating to listed ‘threatened species etc’ under the FMA are more complex, and need not be given
attention here.
There is also the question of expertise in carrying out the Pt 5 EPAA assessment. Again, evaluation
of such proposals rarely operate within structured framework, except for any relevant well-prepared
RP or the management plan process.
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Part 5 EPAA clearly has important implications for councils. But the ‘planning system’ offers far
more scope to formulate individual environmental assessment requirements for particular places
and anticipated proposals. Unless a well-prepared RP or management plan can assist, assessment of
Pt 5 activities tend to be dealt with on a one-by-one basis rather than via a structural framework. For
this reason, this thesis is more concerned with Pts 3 and 4 than Pt 5 EPAA, especially as far as
activities on private land are concerned. In the case of council works, such as provision of
engineering infrastructure and development of open space, Pt 5 may receive insufficient attention
from old-fashioned engineers and other council personnel.
More focus should, arguably, be directed on the management plan/SoER ‘cycle’. The management
plan/SoER provisions, with their references to ESD and biodiversity, together with their community
accountability emphases, are a good example of second-generation laws of modern
environmentalism. Part 5 EPAA still belongs to the first generation. Its introduction in 1980 may
have been momentous when it first cast new environmental obligations on powerful resourcedevelopment agencies. Nowadays, as far as Local Government is concerned, more effective tools
are available elsewhere to pursue biodiversity conservation policy. Perhaps consideration could be
given to legislative change that enables a council to avoid Pt 5 if it can convince the Minister
responsible for the EPAA that a satisfactory environmental appraisal has already been undertaken
under the management plan/SoER ‘cycle’.
5.8

Regulatory Provisions

5.8.1

Approvals

In contrast to a council’s service powers, Local Government’s regulatory capacity under the LGA
1993 offers negligible scope for strong, strategic approaches to biodiversity conservation. As a
result, it will be dealt with here only briefly. As will be seen in the following chapter, the planning
system provides far more opportunity to regulate impact of development on the natural environment
within a systematic framework.
A council cannot demand that any type of activity it might be concerned about requires approval
under the LGA 1993 before being carried out. It is restricted to regulating only those things listed
under s 68.222 The list extends from installation of caravans to operation of camping grounds. It does
not encompass matters such as vegetation clearance or landforming. Notably, the NSW Parliament
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substantially reduced the ambit of s 68 LGA 1993 in 1998 when it transferred building and
demolition control from the LGA 1993 to the EPAA in an attempt to streamline development
assessment procedures.223 The result is that the LGA approval system provides even fewer
opportunities for regulating activities affecting the natural environment. Nevertheless, many things
needing LGA 1993 approval can still have an adverse impact on biota, such as the disposal of
waste, the carrying out of stormwater drainage work or engagement in a trade or business on a
vegetated council reserve.224
A key mechanism in determining applications for LGA 1993 approval is the ‘local approvals
policy’ (LAP), a policy document made at council level subject to a process of public
consultation.225 Its chief function is to assist a council’s assessment of proposed activities.226 The
mechanism provides an optional but convenient device to apply locally devised environmental
criteria. For example, a council could demand, through its LAP, that priority be given to conserving
the natural environment when an application arises in relation to identified sites. Regardless of
whether or not a LAP is in force, s 89(1)(c) LGA 1993 expressly requires a council to take into
account the principles of ESD. This is one of the few clauses providing substantive support to s 7(e)
LGA 1993. In practice, it is likely that those officers who have traditionally implemented the
regulatory aspects of the LGAs 1919 and 1993 – i.e. health and building surveyors227 – will give
priority to their more established areas of concern, namely structural safety and sanitation. Perhaps
this may change. Even before 1998, health and building officers were moving into environmental
evaluation roles as councils amalgamated their internal building and planning control divisions.228
The TASQUE Report observed in 1992 a “shift in the focus of Health Surveyors towards
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environmental concerns (water quality, air quality, healthier local environments etc)”.229 But major
change will not occur overnight. Officers with backgrounds in technical health building control may
be insufficiently qualified to appraise wider environmental ramifications of proposals. Increasing
management emphases on procedural efficiency and cost cutting will not assist.
Part 5 EPAA is again relevant to regulation under s 68 LGA 1993. The ‘second limb’ of Pt 5 relates
to activities carried out by private interests that need some form of ‘approval’ other than
development consent under Pt 4 EPAA.230 Adopting terminology used by Farrier, Pt 5 is thereby
“grafted” on to the LGA 1993’s regulatory provisions.231 There is nothing in the LGA 1993 that
clearly ousts the effect of Pt 5.232 In Herring Daw & Blake NSW Pty Ltd v Gosford City Council,233
the LEC held that Pt 5 applied to determination of (former) applications for building approval under
s 68 LGA 1993. Farrier et al interpret the judgment broadly in stating that Pt 5 applies to all
activities controlled by the LGA 1993’s approval procedures.234 The observations made in relation
to the ‘first limb’ – i.e. actions carried out by a public authority itself, as discussed above –
therefore apply.
5.8.2

Orders and Offences

In laying down the regulatory functions, Ch 7 LGA 1993 complements the approval provisions by
conferring on councils wide powers to prohibit or require the doing of a range of things, on both
public and private land, through the issuing of orders.235 Unlike the approval process, councils
initiate orders. There is no need to await an application. But again, the mechanism is not available
229
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must be “clearly apparent”: at 334. Hurell and Jardim conclude that the LEC’s judgment confirms that any
statutory approval regime that does not explicitly oust Pt 5 is subject to Pt 5: J Hurrell & J Jardim, “Part 5 of
the EP&A Act Nets Another Big Fish” (2000) 5 Local Government Law Journal 230.
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(1995) 87 LGERA 220. For commentary, see J Hurrell, “Building Approvals and Environmental
Assessment: What We Suspected But Were Too Afraid to Confirm!” (1995) 1 Local Government Law
Journal 44.
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Farrier et al (1999), op cit n 90 at 498.
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Since the removal of building and demolition control from the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) to the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) in 1998, certain orders may now also be issued
under the latter Act: see s 121B and, more generally, ss 121A & 121C-121ZP.
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for any purpose a council chooses. It does not entitle a council to order the stopping of any form of
environmental destruction, such as land clearing, just because the council is opposed to it. Instead,
the situations in which an order may be issued are heavily circumscribed.236 This is no surprise. It is
inconceivable that State Parliament would confer such carte blanche powers on Local Government.
Orders are commonly directed at unauthorised or hazardous activities. In these circumstances, it is
the unlawfulness of the action itself, or its danger to humans, rather than its effect on the
environment, that will instigate the issuing of an order. Nevertheless, there are some types of orders
that have potential use for biodiversity conservation purposes.237 In particular, Order No. 11 can
require or prohibit activity in order to repair or prevent “environmental damage”. The circumstances
in which it can be issued, however, are restricted to drainage matters and watercourse obstruction.238
Nevertheless, the Biodiversity Planning Guide for Local Government describes the power as:

“particularly significant since disturbances to natural habitat in urban areas are often
related to changes made to the hydrological system”.239
The greatest potential for the use of orders for conserving natural areas probably relates to council
land. Where a person is responsible for “damage to a public place” by means of excavation, works,
surface drainage or irrigation spray, a council is entitled to serve an order on that person to take
“whatever steps are necessary” to prevent and/or repair that damage.240 Such damage could relate,
for example, to interference with ecosystems on council reserves. Presumably, the order could be
issued against a landholder adjacent to, or upstream of, the council property, whose activities, such
as pesticide spraying, directly affect the ecological integrity of the reserve.
Approvals and orders under the LGA 1993 are underpinned by offence provisions that enable
councils to prosecute, on a summary basis, an activity that is unauthorised or contrary to an order.241
There is also a range of specific offences including certain actions in public places. The DLG
identifies s 629 LGA 1993 as relevant to biodiversity:
236

The circumstances in which a council may issue an order are set out under Local Government Act 1993
(NSW), s 24. Note should be made that s 159 gives councils the option to prepare local orders policies (LOPs)
in order “to specify the criteria which ... must [be taken] into account in determining whether or not to give an
order”. Due to the restricted circumstances in which orders may be issued, there is limited opportunity to
develop criteria designed to protect the natural environment.
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Refer Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 124, Order Nos 3(c), 5, 11, 12, 18, 21, 22 & 27-30.
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Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 124.
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Fallding et al, op cit n 48 at 14.
240
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), Order No 28, pursuant to s 124. “Public place” is defined to include
public reserves in addition to Crown land and reserves under the Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW): see Local
Government Act 1993, Dictionary, pursuant to s 3.
241
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 626-628; see also Pearson (1994), op cit n 36 at 272-73.
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(1) A person who, without lawful excuse, wilfully or negligently injures or unnecessarily
disturbs any plant or animal in a public place is guilty of an offence.
(2) A person who, without lawful excuse, removes any plant or animal from a public place is
guilty of an offence.242
This gives councils considerable power to deal with interference with native vegetation on public
land. A council may serve a penalty notice on an offender or take summary action in the Local
Court, but not the LEC.243 Action takes place, of course, after the damage is done. Furthermore, any
fine moneys will not necessarily be directed to environmental restoration. Significantly, the
emphasis is on imposing pecuniary penalties. This may be contrasted with the LEC’s powers in
dealing with an offence under the EPAA involving destruction or damage to a tree or vegetation,
such as unauthorised clearing where a LEP demands consent for this. The LEC may, in addition to
imposing a monetary penalty, direct the offender to “plant new trees and vegetation and maintain
those trees and vegetation to a mature growth”.244 This demonstrates again the wide gap between
regulation under the EPAA and the LGA 1993 for biodiversity conservation purposes.245 The
weakness of the LGA’s regulatory sphere, however, provides a strong contrast to the huge potential
of the positive powers under the same Act.
5.9

Introduction to Public Land Provisions

There is nothing to prevent a council implementing biodiversity protection policies on its own
property. The LGA 1993 compels councils to classify all “public land” as either “community” or
“operational”.246 It then requires councils to prepare “plans of management” (as opposed to
‘management plans’) for all community lands.247 Most council lands used or set aside for
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See n 240, supra; see also Department of Local Government (1999b), op cit n 92 at 64.
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 679(1) & 691.
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Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 126(3)(a). See also s 126(3)(b) which
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a requirement.
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environmental remediation.
246
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Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 36(1). For practical information on plans of management, see
Department of Conservation and Land Management (NSW), Land Management Manual: Local Government
Act 1993 (Sydney: the Department, 1993); Department of Local Government (NSW), Public Land
Management: Practice Note 1 (Bankstown: the Department, 2000c).
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community purposes, such as public reserves,248 were deemed to comprise community land upon
the commencement of the LGA 1993.249 Land brought into council ownership since then is
automatically deemed to be community land unless subject to a prior contrary resolution.250 Even
land not formally identified for community use but nevertheless enjoyed by the public without
council intervention may be deemed to constitute community land.251
The ‘plan of management’ is the lynchpin for managing most municipal lands. Community land
must be “used and managed” in accordance with its ‘plan of management’,252 an obligation that the
courts are willing to enforce.253 Plans of management can also “require the prior approval of the
council to the carrying out of any specific activity on the land”.254 They therefore provide a
potential additional layer of control, on top of Ch 7 LGA 1993 and the EPAA. But a plan of
management can go much further than traditional ‘command-and-control’ mechanisms. It lends
itself to planning for active management. For example, a plan of management could specify
strategies to help restore a patch of degraded remnant bushland, such as a weed control program to
be carried out by a certain date. The potential for biodiversity conservation to be woven into plans
of management is considerable. The NSW Biodiversity Strategy recommends “council plans of
management for community land identify and protect significant native vegetation wildlife
corridors and other environmentally sensitive areas such as wetlands”.255
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“Public reserve” is defined in the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), Dictionary, pursuant to s 3.
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), Sch 7, cl 6(2). Any other public land was to be automatically
regarded as community land on 1 July 1994 unless it had already been classified by way of council resolution:
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The LGA 1993 does not identify the types of specific measures a plan of management might
contain. These are to be determined by each individual council through a process of public
consultation.256 The law instead demands that a plan of management address:
•

the objectives and performance targets for the plan;

•

the means by which the council proposes to achieve those objectives and targets; and

•

the manner in which a council proposes to assess its performance with respect to those
objectives and targets. 257

The language is almost identical to provisions relating to management plans referred to earlier. The
themes of conservation opportunity and public accountability are again evident. Importantly, NSW
Court of Appeal has strictly enforced these provisions.258 It should be noted, however, that the
potential to achieve biodiversity conservation through mandatory plans of management does not
reach all council lands of conservation value. Cemeteries, for instance, which sometimes contain
valuable remnants,259 will not necessarily comprise community land. Roadside verges, another
potential biodiversity reservoir,260 fall under the regime of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW),261 which
contains no strategic provisions for managing roadside vegetation.262
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Every draft plan of management must be placed on public exhibition, and public submissions considered
prior to final adoption: Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 38(2), 40(1). For amendments to plans of
management, see ss 40(2)-(3) & 40A-41. See also Local Government (General) Regulation 1999 (NSW), cll
20-23. The former Minister for Local Government described the system as one “whereby councils, in
consultation with their local communities, became responsible for deciding how public land in their areas
would be used and managed”: Mr Page, NSW Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 8 Sep 1998, 7280, emphasis
added.
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See Seaton v Mosman Municipal Council, where the Court decided that the Council’s adoption of a plan of
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one requiring persons to obtain permission from a council (or other relevant road authority) before interfering
with a tree on a public road: s 138(1)(c). Not only is there is no guidance at all for the road authority on the
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ESD matters. The crude obligations under Pt 5 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW),
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Otherwise, the Roads Act 1995 is an ineffective tool for roadside conservation.
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The LGA 1993 requires categorisation of community lands by plans of management.263 Community
land must be categorised as a ‘natural area’, ‘sportsground’, ‘park’, ‘area of cultural significance’ or
for ‘general community use’.264 Furthermore, ‘natural areas’ – but no other categorised lands - must
be further subcategorised, with a choice of five subcategories: ‘bushland’, ‘wetland’, escarpment’
‘watercourse’ and ‘foreshore’.265 In 1998, the Local Government Amendment (Community Land
Management) Act 1998 (NSW) inserted ‘core objectives’ for each category and subcategory.266 In
presenting the bill, Minister page argued there had previously been “too much scope for misuse of
environmentally sensitive land”.267 But as will be seen in ch 8,268 in terms of ensuring conservation
rather than recreational outcomes, the key amendments are disappointing.
Significantly, the LGGR sets down “guidelines” for when community land should fall within a
certain category and subcategory.269 The spirit of the provisions relating to ‘natural area’ and its
subcategories clearly reflects a conservation ethos. For instance, a plot of native vegetation need not
be in a pristine state to attract the ‘natural area’ category.270 The ‘bushland’ subcategory extends to
non-forested communities, including “highly disturbed” communities that are “capable of being
rehabilitated”.271 But despite the good intentions, councils need only take the clauses into
account.272 Moreover, a privative clause in the LGGR prohibits any civil cause of action against a
council on the grounds that it has not given the guidelines due regard.273 This again suggests that
only the most dedicated councils will apply the conservation aspects of the guidelines. Others will
be able to exploit the weaknesses of the regime to give precedence to other interests, as will be
discussed throughout ch 8 in the context of recreation.274
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A further setback is that lands may be unwisely categorised in the first place. There is no guarantee
that a patch of remnant vegetation on community land will be earmarked ‘natural area’ and thereby
attract the limited assistance of its relevant objectives. The LGA demands land be categorised as
‘natural area’ in only three circumstances:
•

where a council declares, by way of resolution, that the site is either (i) “a known natural,
geological, geomorphological, scenic or other feature that is considered by the council to
warrant protection or special management considerations” or (ii) a “wildlife corridor”;275

•

where the site has been designated as ‘critical habitat’ under either the TSCA or FMA;276 or

•

where the site is subject to a ‘recovery plan’ (RP), made under the TSCA or FMA, which
“requires measures” to be undertaken by the relevant council.277

The first circumstance relies on a specific council resolution that may never be forthcoming, even if
the site comprises the last known remnant of a native species. The second situation relates to only
two terrestrial sites declared under the TSCA278 and ten marine sites, most likely outside council
areas, relating to the one species under the FMA.279 The third scenario holds the most promise. But
to date, as noted earlier,280 the extent of output of RPs is disappointing. Without good empirical
research, it is too early to assess the extent to which RPs influence action by councils on council
lands.
The trio of exceptions also relates to another obstacle: the ability for councils to prepare the same
‘plan of management’ for two or more parcels of community land.281 Local Government officers
speak of ‘generic plans’ – a term having no statutory support but recognised by the DLG282 – that
may cover more than one area of open space. This type of plan would be attractive to efficiencydriven, cost-saving managers. But it encourages weak, diluted plans. The details of individual sites
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Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 36C(1), 3(b). For a brief overview, see Department of Local
Government (NSW) (2000c), op cit n 247 at 15-16.
276
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 36A(1), 3(b).
277
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 36B(1), (2) & 3(b); see also Department of Local Government
(NSW) (2000c), op cit n 247 at 13-15.
278
i.e the habitats of (i) the Mitchell’s rainforest land snail at Stotts Island Nature Reserve in the Tweed
River, northern NSW, and (ii) the endangered little penguin colony in Sydney’s north harbour, near Manly;
see www.npws.nsw.gov.au/wildlife/threatened.htm#recovery (accessed 19 Feb 2003).
279
i.e the ten recognised habitats of the grey nurse shark; see www.fisheries.nsw.gov.au/thr/thrspecies/register-gns.htm (accessed 10 Oct 2003).
280
See supra.
281
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 36(2).
282
Department of Local Government (NSW) (2000c), op cit n 247 at 30.

193

may receive negligible detail. Whilst there are circumstances where the LGA 1993 demands a
singular, rather than generic ‘plan of management’,283 the opportunity is narrow.
Co-ordination between conservation-oriented plans of management within individual council areas
is important. The best approach for biodiversity conservation purposes is where a set of plans for
‘natural areas’ can be regarded as an integrated whole. However, the LGA 1993 does not
necessarily require plans of management to be prepared for all public open space under Local
Government control, even if it remains in its natural state. Land to which the Crown Lands Act 1989
(NSW) (CLA) applies does not meet the definition of “public land” under the LGA 1993, even if it
falls under council care and control.284 In the case where a council manages a trust for a Crown
reserve under the CLA,285 the council appears to have an option, with the approval of the Minster
for Lands, to prepare a plan of management for the land via a compulsory process of public
consultation.286 There are also Crown reserves not subject to trusts for which care, control and
management is vested in Local Government.287 There is nothing at law to stop a council preparing
its own plans of management for these lands. The whole system is a fragmented and confusing
shambles. It thwarts the potential for an integrated approach. By way of comment, the amount of
Crown reserves in a Local Government area might be more significant than the extent of council
owned lands. This is the case in North Sydney, for instance, where the Council has chosen to
prepare its own set of plans.288
Integration across council boundaries will be even more difficult to achieve. As Ramsay and Rowe
predicted in 1995, different approaches to ‘natural areas’ between councils will “frustrate the
establishment of consistent expectations and standards of management”.289 Co-ordination of plans
of management for lands within the same general ecosystems could be a suitable task for regional or
283
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sub-regional partnerships. But such a program would, of course, need adequate resources. Central
funding would help reflect the fact that biodiversity is far more than just a matter of local interest. It
could also assist integration between plans of management and mechanisms made under other
regimes, such as plans of management for adjacent conservation reserves made under the National
Parks and Wildlife Act 1979 (NSW), RPs for threatened species etc crafted under the TSCA and
FMA and EPIs prepared under the EPAA.
5.10

Conclusion

Several themes constantly recur throughout the LGA 1993:
•

detailed procedural requirements;

•

public accountability and potential for community input in decision-making;

•

substantial municipal autonomy;

•

opportunity for imaginative projects and programs; and

•

limited prospect for strategic regulation other than

As stressed earlier, the wide scope for innovative action arises from Local Government’s service
powers. The regulatory regime, in contrast, provides little room for creativity. It represents the rump
at the end of a statute that otherwise confers enormous discretion on architects of municipal
agendas.
In terms of biodiversity conservation, the LGA 1993 provides minimal direction. Whilst it appears
to require councils to consider ESD and, therefore, local biodiversity, it does not demand
conservation. Policy objectives are to be determined by each individual council. As a result, one
council may be active in conserving remnants whilst its neighbour might want to bulldoze them.
The legislation, by itself, will not change outdated attitudes moulded by historical tradition.
Furthermore, political timidity will scarcely be helped by modern managerialist tendencies.
Opportunity for inventive solutions via management plans, SoERs and plans of management can
easily be overshadowed by preoccupation with procedure and cost minimisation. Davis and RussellSmith, in their paper on Dubbo City Council’s ‘environmental management plan’,290 refer to the
problem of “pro-development corporate culture”.291
Clearly, the LGA 1993 awards the community a driving role. In theory, people can influence the
council agenda during the preparation of management plans, SoERs, LAPs and plans of
290
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management. Commitment to biodiversity conservation at the Local Government level is most
likely to occur where there is both strong community support and facilitated opportunity for input
into plan-making. If interest is weak, a council may always attempt to educate its constituency. But
there is no guarantee that the electorate will respond. Because a far wider, global community
‘enjoys’ the benefits of biodiversity conservation, the immediate advantage to ratepayers of, say,
maintaining a remnant patch of heath may be insufficient or outweighed by other perceived gains.292
The various mechanisms in the LGA 1993 will not, by themselves, save the scrub. As far as the
SEoR is concerned, it might do little more than provide annual updates on what is being lost. As a
result, conservation might only be feasible if it can be cloaked in another gown. If the site can be
seen to provide passive recreational or amenity benefits, it may be able to be kept. These notions
will be explored in more detail in chs 8 & 9.
Despite the huge potential offered by the LGA 1993, the Centre for Local Government observes
that “[t]he framework and opportunities [the LGA 1993] created remain under-used”.293 The
findings of Brown et al and Marshall and Sproats reinforce this. Whilst commendable conservation
efforts may be able to be pinpointed in some places, the situation is not universal. This raises the
issue of whether the fate of ecosystems should be left wholly in the hands of local communities. It
elevates the idea of regional action, spurred by mechanisms well beyond the LGA. It also advances
the notion that central governments should have a role in assisting, and in some cases perhaps even
directing, councils to protect their local natural environments. This would run counter to the general
theme of municipal autonomy underlying the LGA 1993. Yet as will be seen in the next chapter, the
planning system under the EPAA provides scope for the State Government to guide, and even
interfere in, council decision-making. But it will not necessarily be biodiversity’s saviour.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PLANNING SYSTEM:
PROCEDURE AND POTENTIAL1
6.1

Prelude

The Environmental Planing and Assessment Act (NSW) (EPAA) is the second of the two most
significant statutes for NSW Local Government. Whilst the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW)
(LGA 1993) provides councils with service powers, the EPAA confers substantial regulatory
authority. As noted in ch 1,2 the planning system represents Local Government’s most potent
function. Tucker describes it as Local Government’s “most controversial responsibility”.3 This is
because it equips councils to determine the extent to which land may be developed. Harrison refers
to “a system of control open to profitable manipulation”.4
There is considerable faith placed in the potential of the planning system to deal with biodiversity.
Knox and Francis describe it as a recognised “means of protection of biodiversity values”.5
Goudberg calls for “a new ecological approach to planning at the local level”, arguing that land-use
planning is a “key issue” for stemming biodiversity loss.6 Greening Australia cites planning as an
“obvious tool” to “help secure valuable vegetation”.7 Jay contends that planners are “well placed” to
develop biodiversity conservation strategies.8 Adam, in highlighting the drawbacks of bringing land
into public conservation reserves, argues that environmental assessment processes under the EPAA
must be used “to the fullest extent possible”.9 Berwick, the primary architect of the National Local
1
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Government Biodiversity Strategy, describes its implementation as “essentially a land use planning
exercise”.10 Cox refers to the planning system as a “powerful tool for conservation” whilst
conceding that it was “not specifically designed for this purpose”.11 The purpose of this chapter is to
set the groundwork for critical review of such claims.
This chapter comprises two main parts. The first provides a selective overview of the historical
background to the NSW planning system. It aims to demonstrate how traditional emphases still
inform current practice. In particular, attention is paid to the ‘hands-off’ approach to regulating the
non-urban environment, where significant biodiversity occurs. In previous chapters reference to
earlier statutory planning regimes has been scant, apart from scattered mention of pre-1980
municipal land-use control in ch 312 and discussion in ch 4 on early regional planning.13 Because the
histories of NSW Local Government structures in and local plan-making did not realistically
converge until 1945, there has hitherto been insufficient consideration of the sheer force of planning
traditions. In view of the heavy influence of early British planning on local systems, it is necessary
to trace existing planning culture to its English roots. As Auster claims, the background to
England’s early planning legislation is “part of Australian planning history”.14 British legislation
provided ready templates for Australian town planning statutes.15 Furthermore, Australia recruited
many British planners, whilst local pioneers visited the UK for professional development.16 This
chapter will follow the subsequent development of planning law in NSW, leading to enactment of
the EPAA and moves towards widening the planning net beyond its conventional urban realm.
The second and longer part, like the previous chapter, reviews the mechanics of the legislation at
the Local Government level.

Following an overview of the general thrust of the EPAA, it

investigates opportunities and constraints under (i) the plan-making provisions and (ii) planimplementation aspects. Most attention is paid to plan-making, as this is where councils can be
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more influential. As Toon observes, the EPAA gave councils, for the first time, power to devise and
implement their own planning policies.17
6.2

Historical and Statutory Background

6.2.1

Origins of the Planning System

The origins of Anglo-Australian planning systems lie in British post-industrial urban reform. The
overcrowded, unclean and miserable conditions of British towns and cities that developed
unchecked during and after the Industrial Revolution prompted responses that would lay the
foundations of many modern-day planning systems. Cholera outbreaks from the 1830s onwards
inspired emergence of the British public hygiene movement, whose pioneers not only pushed for
improved public infrastructure, such as sewerage and street lamps, but championed the need for
building regulation to address housing safety and sanitation.18 These efforts culminated in the
Public Health Act 1848 (UK), giving rise to a battalion of technical specialists who, according to
Benevolo, attacked housing problems “without taking into account their interrelationship and
without having an overall vision of the town as a single organism”.19 The laws provided the
ancestor to modern universal building control in NSW, introduced in NSW in 190620 and, more
recently, transferred from the LGA 1993 to the EPAA.21
Mid-nineteenth century public acceptance of building regulation encouraged community leaders to
stretch the reform boundaries further, their ambitions roused by more radical reactions to urban
squalor. They saw wealthy industrialists construct model workers’ towns,22 which demonstrated not
only that a desirable level of amenity could be achieved in working-class neighbourhoods but that
the town could be viewed as an integrated whole. Reformers also witnessed utopian intellectuals
draw up revolutionary plans for ideal societies,23 which encouraged injection of social ideals into
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planning thought. Town planning was born. But it seems that little attention, if any, was paid to
areas outside the towns.
Against this background, one of the most influential reformers, Ebenezer Howard, devised the
garden city concept as outlined in his powerful Tomorrow, A Peaceful Path to Real Reform of 1898,
republished in 1902 as Garden Cities of Tomorrow.24 Howard wrote:
“[t]here are in reality not only, as is so constantly assumed, two alternatives - town life and
country life - but a third alternative, in which all the advantages of the most energetic and
active town life, with all the beauty and delight of the country, may be secured in perfect
combination, and the certainty of being able to live this life will be the magnet which will
produce the effect for which we are all striving - the spontaneous movement of the people
from our crowded cities to the bosom of our kindly mother earth at once the source of life,
happiness, wealth and power”.25
Howard’s vision was to build a network of cities amongst verdant gardens. Whilst he was
influenced by a philosophical movement that yearned for a pre-industrial pastoral ideal, he also
embraced technological progress that could promise spacious and hygienic housing in uncongested
sunlit settings, separated from industry by parkland and countryside.26 Howard viewed the purpose
of the non-urban environment as important, providing a source of fresh air, aesthetic pleasure and
agriculture.
Howard’s emphasis on lower density housing developed into a favourite recipe for curing urban ills.
Mueller-Wille argues that at an international level, low-density suburbia “evolved into a separate
cultural category in antithesis to the city”.27 According to Sandercock, it became the “overriding
principle” underlying early UK planning legislation.28 By that time, the garden city concept had
become, as Armytage notes, “an establishment - a movement without opposition”.29 A Garden
Cities Association had been set up in 1899 to oversee construction of a new town on garden city
principles: “the first attempt on a large scale to express the emerging town planning practice and
ideas”.30 In 1907, the Association became the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association, which
24
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fostered a new profession that lobbied, successfully, for the statutory institutionalisation of town
planning.31 The early planners restricted their attention to physical detail of the urban fabric, such as
lot sizes, housing density, curvilinear roads and, in particular, strict segregation of incompatible
land-uses. Their view of the countryside, on the other hand, was limited to a font for natural
resources, a ready ‘green belt’ to contain urban sprawl and a reservoir for future housing estates.
They saw it as warranting protection but requiring little or no planning unless pinpointed for urban
expansion. Its most pleasing aspects, however, were to be reinterpreted into the residential
environment to promote spaciousness and greenery.32
The landmark Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909 (UK) empowered local authorities to
formulate planning schemes for areas in the course of development. Its “general object” was to
“secur[e] proper sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out and
use of the land”.33 In presenting the bill, the President of the Local Government Board stressed that:
“[t]he object ... is to provide a domestic condition for the people in which their physical
health, their morals, their character and their whole social condition can be improved by what
we hope to secure in this Bill. The Bill aims in broad outline at, and hopes to secure, the
home healthy, the house beautiful, the town pleasant, the city dignified and the suburb
salubrious. It seeks and hopes to secure more houses, better houses, prettier streets, so that the
character of a great people in towns and cities and villages can be still further improved and
strengthened …”.34
The intention was clearly to manipulate the physical urban environment to improve human welfare.
As Glass notes:
“[p]lanning was no longer mainly thought of as a code of regulations to repair the damage of
laissez-faire ... but as the instrument of the welfare state”.35
This thrust of the planning movement thus fell squarely into what McAuslan calls the ‘ideology of
public interest’, under which planning is driven by the State to advance broader community
wellbeing.36 McAuslan’s analysis describes a perennial tension between this doctrine and the
competing ‘private property ideology’, which upholds the landholder’s perceived ‘right’ to develop
31
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and use her or his property as desired without governmental interference.37 The first schemes posed
a direct and unparalleled assault on property interests.38 Model clauses developed by the Ministry of
Health contained, inter alia, land-use prohibitions, density controls, height restrictions and open
space reservation.39 But scheme preparation was voluntary and few reached fruition. Those that did
emerge, according to Cullingworth, were “little more than an extension of the old public health and
housing controls”.40 The emphasis was on quarantining heavy industry from housing and preventing
sub-standard, overcrowded development by laying down restrictive standards. It seems that the
aspirations of the early reformers for social engineering were heavily diluted and reduced to rigid,
technical statutory rules.41 This also shaped land-use controls in NSW: namely, to begin with, the
simple residential districts described in ch 3.42
The British planning movement continued to gain momentum whilst the politicians saw improved
community health and urban amenity as desirable objectives. The 1909 legislation provided the
forerunner to a series of statutes, including the landmark Town and Country Planning Act 1932
(UK), which authorised schemes to be prepared over almost any lands.43 Scheme preparation
became compulsory in 1943.44 Cherry attributes this widening of the regulatory net to growing
twentieth century acceptance of the interventionist role of the State. More specifically, he
emphasises the high level of public confidence then placed in British Local Government, arguing
that:
“[h]ad local government been weaker, and had not the spirit of local democracy been built
into effective machineries of government at this level, British town planning would have
followed a different course. The benevolent guiding hand of a local Council was a sure
rock on which town planning could rest”.45
Colman records that NSW “substantially copied” the 1932 UK Act when it introduced Pt XIIA into
the LGA 1919 in 1945.46 But unlike the British situation, Local Government in NSW was then, as
37
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observed throughout ch 3, a minor institution that inspired little public imagination.47 Accordingly,
planning implementation in NSW emerged in a context markedly different from its source. This
may help to explain the longstanding strong position of the NSW State Government in land-use
planning.
It appears that post-1932 British schemes maintained the earlier pattern of concentrating on built-up
areas, backed by firm land-use controls and density restrictions.48 In 1948, however, the UK
abandoned its statutory schemes - which the Australian jurisdictions had already followed - and
adopted, through the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 (UK), a regime based on plans carrying
persuasive force only.49 In other words, the English schemes became policy plans rather than rigid
subsidiary-legislative instruments. Since then, British and Australian regimes have developed in
very different directions.50 Yet both have extended their scope far beyond their original precursors’
preoccupations with social improvement ideals, health and townscape. In Australia, the original
devices forged by the British planners to deal with essentially urban problems, namely prohibitive
zoning and development standards, still comprise the main components of the planners’ toolbox.
But these are now being expected to deal with very different issues to those which prompted the
system in the first place. It is pertinent that the (former) NSW Department of Urban Affairs and
Planning acknowledged concern about a lingering “urban and built environment bias of the [NSW]
planning system”.51 The National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy similarly refers to the
need to “[a]ddress the urban bias in planning systems”.52
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It would be misleading to suggest that British planning mechanisms were developed solely for town
and city. The term country in the title of the 1932 Act suggests a broader ambit. Indeed, a lobby
group known as the Town and Country Planning Association was founded in 1899.53 But Gilg’s
description of this organisation as an “amenity society” reveals its key concern.54 Planning
authorities with responsibility for the countryside focused attention on maintaining the physical
beauty of rural areas, seeking to stop sporadic building outside townships and preventing ribbon
development along rustic laneways.55 Other rural issues such as preserving viable farming land,56 or
planning ahead for major utilities,57 were to emerge much later. Otherwise, planners paid trifling
regard to the use of rural land. By the 1960s, as Green notes, most rural areas were marked as
uncoloured “white lands” on official plans, with no detailed planning mechanisms other than a
broad policy statement pronouncing that “existing uses of land are intended to remain largely
undisturbed”.58 As late as 1981, Ratcliffe observed that UK rural planning “remained a much
neglected aspect”, with farming and forestry activities left largely unregulated.59 NSW was to
slavishly follow this ‘hands-off’ approach.
6.2.2

Pre-1980 Planning in NSW60

As noted in ch 3, the NSW Parliament handed residential density, subdivision and primitive zoning
controls to Local Government in 1919. The then Minister for Local Government, Mr JD Fitzgerald,
a leading member of the indigenous town planning lobby, described the provisions in terms of
“enabl[ing] … town plotting or planning on scientific lines”.61 Sandercock observes that the
Australian town planning lobby had been founded on enthusiasm for social reform but quickly
became dominated by conservatism.62 This is not surprising in view of the prevailing ‘national’
vision and the narrow perspective of Local Government, then the chief land-use regulatory agency.
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Its major planning concerns became “health, convenience and amenity: order, efficiency and
beauty”.63 These issues were regarded primarily as urban matters only.
Anticipation of post-war metropolitan expansion triggered enactment of a far more comprehensive
land-use control system: i.e. Pt XIIA, entitled ‘Town and Country Planning Schemes’, inserted into
the LGA 1919 in 1945.64 (Pt XIIA supplanted, but did not abolish, the original ‘residential
proclamation district’ mechanism referred to in ch 3.65) Despite the reference to country, local planmakers continued the tradition of directing their efforts to the built environment. After all, it was the
dynamic problems of metropolitan growth that had brought about land-use regulation in England in
the first place. In introducing the bill, the then Minister for Local Government, Mr JJ Cahill, made
this urban focus clear in stating that:
“[t]he need for adequate town and country planning machinery is now so insistent, having
regard to the need for the orderly regulation of post-war development and for the correction of
the evils of the largely haphazard and uncontrolled development of our cities, towns and
villages in the past, that satisfaction of these needs can no longer be denied”.66
Notwithstanding the Minister’s grandiose vision for an improved urban environment, the legislation
did little more than authorise discretionary preparation of statutory planning scheme ordinances
(PSOs) which, similar to the English experience, were to become inflexible “two-dimensional
zoning plans”.67 A PSO typically divided a municipality into various zones based on specified
permissible and impermissible uses. Consent authorities - mostly local councils - were thus able to
regulate or even prohibit development proposals as they arose. Zones placed over developed areas
tended to mirror the prevailing dominant land-use. Undeveloped tracts of land received minimal
attention unless urban expansion was pending. This unsophisticated approach was inevitable. The
limited training and background of council planners militated against innovative plans. Burdess
describes how council engineers then dominated local planning, which suffered “very low status”
within municipal hierarchies.68 Furthermore, ratepayers would have welcomed PSOs that protected
63
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their own land values. A simple way to guarantee this was to ensure that new development followed
predominant land-use patterns. As Graham notes, by working in an institution where property
services dominated the agenda, planners’ outlooks were narrow and unimaginative.69
Municipal interest in planning in NSW was initially slow.70 Statutory procedures for preparing
PSOs were complex and cumbersome.71 Apathy and scarcity of resources meant action was delayed
or non-existent,72 unless emerging land-use conflicts or intense development pressure prompted
ratepayers to clamour for planning controls to defend their property interests. For these constituents,
the ‘public interest’ underpinning land-use control was protection and enhancement of property
values: the very essence of the ‘ratepayer ideology’. Jakubowicz describes some of the momentous
‘green ban’ actions as “bourgeois bans” in “middle-class areas” against developments that
“shattered the peace of suburbia”.73 Embracement of the planning system by urban landholders
thereby led to the meshing of McAuslan’s ‘public interest’ and ‘private property’ ideologies into the
one institutional framework. The ‘public interest’ benefit that had advanced the early planning
movement was now reduced to feeding urban property interests.
In most rural areas, on the other hand, population density and residential amenity were non-issues.
Growth was often negligible and land values remained stagnant. Landholders outside urban centres
would have regarded development control as remote and irrelevant. As Williams noted in 1976,
mainstream land-use planning was then only “[r]arely connected with rural areas”, which were seen
as “stable, simple” districts that raised few, if any, issues of import.74 In farming regions, property
interests would have been served by encouraging agricultural development rather than regulating it.
Provision and maintenance of basic infrastructure, namely roads and bridges, would have been rural
ratepayers’ main concern. As a result, here the ‘private property ideology’ wore a very different hat.
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Until the 1970s, most rural areas in NSW were not subject to any planning controls at all.75 When
plans were introduced eventually, the relevant zone was ‘non-urban’ rather than ‘rural’, reflecting,
at least symbolically, the dominance placed on town and, in Breckwoldt’s description, a focus on
“stage[s] in urbanisation rather than a positive rural zone”.76 According to the former NSW State
Planning Authority (SPA),77 the “general intention” of the non-urban zoning was to “encourage the
use of the land for agriculture and control urban-type development and ribbon development”.78 The
standard non-urban zone prohibited certain urban uses but allowed all types of agriculture,
regardless of scale and intensity, without any need for planning permission at all.79 Significantly,
the State Planning Authority Act 1963 (NSW) enshrined this rural ‘hands-off’ approach by
forbidding the SPA from determining that “any rural land shall or shall not be used for any
particular agricultural or pastoral purpose”.80 This measure was inserted in the bill during
Parliamentary debate at the insistence of the then Opposition. The proponent of the amendment, Mr
Hughes, argued that regulating farming enterprise was abominable, asserting that:
“… [rural land-use control] is the widest power that has been sought by any government, and
it reaches out to every acre of land in [NSW], whether it is used for grazing, dairying,
farming, irrigation farming, or mining. Here is the intention of the bill in a field outside town
and country planning. Here the Government is creating an octopus whose tentacles will reach
to every corner of [NSW] and into every rural activity, irrespective of its relation to what we
consider to be the proper functions of a town and country planning authority. … The
authority should not and must not have this power, for it cuts at the very roots of private
enterprise, private ownership of land, and the best use of rural land and production”.81
The force of the ‘private property ideology’ behind Hughes’ demands is clear. Yet elsewhere in the
debate, he acknowledged the importance of protecting national parks, the “beauty of the coastline”
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and highway corridors between urban centres.82 The vast bulk of NSW, however, was outside such
places, and still is. So despite the visible decimation of natural landscapes across the State outlined
throughout ch 2, there was no conception at all of protecting the non-urban environment from
agriculture. Even after the emergence of modern environmentalism, opportunity to regulate
agricultural uses remained confined largely to soil conservation and noxious weed regimes.83 But
these laws had been crafted to benefit, rather than restrict, farming. Their introduction had preceded
modern environmentalism by decades. As Farrier remarks, there has never been any “significant
[Australian] historical tradition of vigorous land use control in rural areas”.84
Parliament responded to the sluggish emergence of PSOs by introducing a fresh instrument in 1962,
the interim development order (IDO), designed to provide temporary local land-use control
prepared at State level pending completion of a fully-fledged PSO by an individual council.85
Despite its name, the IDO became an almost permanent form of control in many areas.86 It provided
a convenient vehicle for the State Government to impose land-use regulation on uninterested
councils, especially in rural areas. Various councils still championed the ‘private property ideology’
by resisting planning controls. Gray describes how former Waugoola Shire, for instance, rejected a
draft IDO prepared by the SPA in the mid-1970s.87 Waugoola was still under no form of planning
control at all when it amalgamated with Cowra Municipality in 1980.
A standard form of IDO devised at State Government level, with strict subdivision controls and
limitations on dwelling-houses erected on rural holdings, became the norm across many rural areas
across NSW. Sorensen and Cunningham describe the plans as “extremely simple” with “naïve”
objectives.88 A standard subdivision formula of a minimum 100 acres per lot in rural subdivisions
(later updated to 40 ha) was adopted across a diversity of rural areas, regardless of soil quality and
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settlement patterns.89 The 40 ha minimum subdivision size requirement was to become official State
Government policy in 1973,90 reflecting the rudimentary approach to rural land-use planning at that
time.
The patchy emergence of local planning controls across rural NSW paralleled a far stronger
movement for the integrated planning of Sydney as a whole, which led to the County of
Cumberland Planning Scheme (CCPS) as outlined in ch 4. The CCPS, with its “antidote for
promiscuous urbanisation” in the form of a ‘Green Belt Area’ zone,91 harked back to garden city
design. Freestone describes it as “the classic planning statement in the garden city tradition in postwar Australia”.92 Alexander notes that the CCPS was imbued “with a sense of equity or social
justice”.93 It contained, for instance, concerns about ‘slum’ living conditions in inner Sydney.94 The
regional scale of the scheme helped to dilute parochial concerns and enable its architects to address
matters of broad public interest beyond ratepayer preoccupations. But the “great experiment”, as so
described by Winston, was to founder.95 Nevertheless, it served to shape zoning patterns in many
local plans.96

89

Logan (1987), op cit n 47 at 55.
See State Planning Authority of NSW, Annual Report 1972-1973, 23. The report notes that many rural
interim development orders (IDOs) formulated in the early 1960s prepared by the Department of Local
Government, a non-planning authority, had adopted 10 hectares as “the general minimum for non-urban
allotments”. Some subsequent IDOs opted for a minimum subdivision size of 16 hectares, which reflected “a
common occurring size in parish boundaries”. The standard was later increased to 40 hectares because the
smaller size “did not appear to be agriculturally viable or to maintain rural character”. The basis of the
decision to fix upon a standard of 40 hectares is far from clear; the fact that it was applied across disparate
regions strongly suggests a strong element of arbitrariness. For further discussion, see Breckwoldt, op cit n 50
at 12-13.
91
R Freestone, “Sydney’s Green Belt 1945-1960” (1992) 30 Australian Planner 70 at 72.
92
R Freestone, Model Communities: The Garden City Movement in Australia (Melbourne: Nelson, 1989),
235.
93
I Alexander, “Post-war Metropolitan Planning: Goals and Realities” in P Troy (ed), Equity in the City
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 148. See also Logan (1987), op cit n 47 at 50.
94
E Kenworthy Teather, “Early Postwar Sydney: A Comparison of its Portrayal in Fiction and in Official
Documents” (1990) 28 Australian Geographic Studies 204 at 218-19.
95
D Winston, Sydney’s Great Experiment: The Progress of the Cumberland County Plan (Sydney: Angus &
Robertson, 1957), passim. The County of Cumberland Planning Scheme became increasingly redundant as
local instruments overrode it. Interestingly, in 1999 the then NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning
(1999c) noted the Scheme “still partially operate[d]” in three council areas: op cit n 51 at 2.
96
H Whitmore, Local Government and Environmental Planning Law in New South Wales (Sydney: Law
Book Co, 1981), 124.
90

209

The SPA, which commenced operation in 1964,97 pursued a fixation with metropolitan issues by
devising the advisory Sydney Region: Outline Plan in 1968.98 The broad ‘public interest’ emphasis
then shifted to urban efficiency.99 In regard to non-urban issues, a review of SPA Annual Reports
by the author100 reveals limited attention to a handful of matters. In addition to concern about the
number of dwellings on rural allotments near the urban fringe, references are made to restriction of
ribbon development along highways, strategic planning studies in coastal areas (often prompted by
proposals to mine mineral sands or develop ports) and, in 1973/74, the introduction of the nonstatutory Coastal Lands Protection Scheme.101 But it appears that most attention was directed at
urban land-use minutiae. In its first year of operation, the SPA dealt with about 2,700 applications
for development in the Sydney region alone,102 reflecting the State Government’s unwillingness to
delegate extensive land-use decision-making powers to councils.103 The town planning function was
too powerful to be a ‘wastebin’ activity for wholesale hiving off to Local Government.
At the tail end of an unprecedented property boom, the NSW Parliament reconstituted the SPA as
the Planning and Environment Commission (PEC) in 1974.104 Whilst the PEC maintained the
SPA’s urban focus, it nevertheless turned its attention to certain emerging issues affecting rural
NSW. It directed much attention to urban decentralisation, in parallel with the Commonwealth’s
‘growth centre’ efforts, and more notably, encouraged councils to adopt new environmental
protection zones in their PSOs and IDOs.
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6.2.3

The Planning System Embraces the Natural Environment

A landmark step in paying more attention to the vast tracts of non-urban land was introduction of
the PEC’s ‘New Zoning Policy for Land Outside Urban Areas’ in 1977.105 This policy signalled a
departure from the convention of seeing rural areas as ‘white lands’ that warranted scant attention.
The new policy proposed that plans contain well-formulated ‘rural’ rather than ‘non-urban’ zones,
thereby encouraging, for the first time in NSW, an emphasis on the country in ‘town and country
planning’. Moreover, it recommended a series of new environmental protection zones for places of
“especial quality”, namely:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

7(a) rural environmental protection (wetlands)
7(b) rural environmental protection (estuarine wetlands)
7(c) rural environmental protection (water catchment areas)
7(d) rural environmental protection (scenic)
7(e) rural environmental protection (escarpment)
7(f) rural environmental protection (foreshore protection)
7(g) rural environmental protection (archaeological site)
7(h) rural environmental protection (historic site)
7(j) rural environmental protection (scientific site)
7(k) rural environmental protection (wildlife refuge).106

The policy extended a clear mandate to Local Government to broaden its planning function to the
natural environment.107 In the eyes of the State Government, the public interest in justifying landuse regulation now stretched beyond amenity, health and urban efficiency to undeveloped
landscapes. Admittedly, the concept of a ‘scenic’ zone suggests that conservation could be pursued
for more superficial reasons. But the policy’s reference to wetland and foreshore protection zones
indicates another view, fuelled by modern environmentalism, that the countryside contributed far
more than pleasant vistas and holding zones for urban expansion.
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The policy is no longer in force.108 Of the 57 ‘comprehensive’ Local Environmental Plans (LEPs)
prepared between 1995 and 2000 reviewed by the author, all of which but two contain zoning
provisions,109 28 (i.e. 49.2%) include ‘environmental’ protection zones. The policy failed to
advocate a representative approach to conservation. Its accompanying text betrays a selective
analysis, with no reference, for instance, to the fragmented habitats west of the Great Dividing
Range. It foresaw that the new zones:
“… will be found in places on the coast, running up the river valleys from estuarine lagoon to
the headwaters, marking particular sites of historic and scientific interest and protecting
significant hill lands and escarpments”.110
The statement reflects the long distance then yet to be travelled by conservation imperatives
towards a more ecologically ‘CAR’ (i.e. ‘comprehensive, adequate and representative’) approach,111
including ecosystems beyond the coast and mountains. Yet it also acknowledges implicitly that the
most extensive tracts of undeveloped land were flood-prone locations and the rugged mountains of
the Great Dividing Range. Agricultural expansion during the ‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions had
left only sad, scattered remnants of ecosystems further inland.
The policy did not prevent councils devising their own species of protection zones to suit local
circumstance. Furthermore, there was no compulsion to give effect to the policy. Development
control still remained a relatively foreign concept outside cities and towns.112 Whilst the new zones
may have been easy to place over public lands, such as coastal Crown reserves, rural landholders
would have viewed planning controls on private lands as an infringement on perceived private
property rights, in similar fashion to Parliamentarian Hughes’ comments cited above.113 This is
apparent from the case study of Moree Plains Shire Council’s ill-fated attempt to introduce stringent
conservation controls in the early 1980s.
In 1981, Moree Plains Shire Council, in north-western NSW, exhibited a draft local environmental
plan (LEP – i.e. the EPAA equivalent to a PSO) proposing several restrictive environmental
protection zones over certain lands, including remnant woodlands containing rare brigalow and
ooline communities. According to Giblin and King, community opposition to the draft plan was
108
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“swift, strident and bitter”.114 The Council abandoned the proposal after a Commission of Inquiry,
established in response to public outcry, recommended against it. The local State Member of
Parliament, Mr Murray, was particularly critical, advancing the ‘private property’ ideology by
deriding the proposed zones as “resumption by proclamation” and “totally unacceptable to freehold
land”.115
Opposition to controls over private rural land still prevails. Hughes’ tirade thirty years ago would
not sound out of place today. During Parliamentary debate preceding the Threatened Species
Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) - which, as will be seen later, amended the EPAA to introduce more
rigorous environmental assessment across NSW – a country representative argued, conveniently
without any reference to ‘existing use’ privileges,116 that “freehold land will no longer be freehold
land because they [i.e. landholders] will not be able to operate as they used to be able to”.117 In
debate on the then proposed Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) (NVCA), an
Opposition member argued that the EPAA was:
“… designed to deal primarily with built structures and development in urban areas where
conflict is likely to arise. It was never really designed, although there is capacity for it within
the Act, to deal with the broader resource management issues, and its regulatory approach in
many ways is an inappropriate mechanism for dealing with broader issues involved in
resource management, including native vegetation”.118
Such comments are telling. They specifically attack rural land-use control. Whilst regulation of the
built environment enjoys longstanding acceptance, a deep-seated reluctance to embrace its
extension in the rural context remains.119 This is still reflected in the fact that in countless rural
zones, many facets of agriculture are permissible without any need for planning permission at all.
Of the 44 ‘comprehensive’ LEPs made between 1995 and 2000 that involve rural or peripheral
urban Local Government areas, 42 contain traditional rural zones,120 of which 40 allow most forms
114
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of agriculture without consent.121 Unless land clearance or a similar activity is mentioned in the
zoning provisions, and can thereby be recognised as a separate form of development, removal of
vegetation for agriculture can be expected to fall into the basket of farming activity that can be
carried out without permission.
6.3

The Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW): Advent and Overview

6.3.1

Emergence of the EPAA

The most crucial task imposed by Parliament on the PEC was to investigate “the law and practice
relating to town and country planning, and land use and environmental planning”.122 Use of the term
‘environmental planning’ was significant, implying new appreciation of the need to plan beyond the
traditional urban land-use territory. The PEC, in its final report to the Minister, conceded that ‘land
use planning’ should be seen as “subsumed within the broader context” of ‘environmental
planning’.123 In calling for a new regime, it echoed modern environmentalism but foreshadowed the
notion of biodiversity by articulating the need to “protect the total environment against serious, and
often permanent damage by man”.124 Minister Fuller had already warned that the planning system
concentrated too heavily on urban issues, observing that PSOs:
“tended not to consider adequately the environmental consequences of land use decisions,
and the strong connection between development and environmental degradation”.125
Ultimate enactment of the EPAA in 1980 enshrined the notion of environmental planning in both
title and substantive provisions.126 As Toon observes, the terminology reflected the “importance
attached at that time to environmental conservation”.127 When introducing the bill, Minister Landa
referred to the widening “scope of planning effectively to embrace … ecological considerations in
the preparation of environmental plans and development control”.128 He added that the “concept of
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land use planning [had been] too narrow” in the past, noting his intention to integrate it with
“environmental assessment and protection”.129 Clearly, the force of the ‘ecological’ vision affected
the composition of the new law.
The NSW Government established a new state bureaucracy to administer the EPAA and replace the
PEC, known as the Department of Environment and Planning (DEP). Inclusion of the term
‘Environment’ in its name provides more evidence of broad political support for wider issues. In
1988, the DEP lost its ‘environment’ label to become the Department of Planning (DoP). A further
name change in 1995 to the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP)130 suggested even
more bluntly, at least at an indicative level, a weakening of the original dynamism that sought to
broaden land-use planning beyond the urban to the wider environment.
A major impetus behind the EPAA, as noted in ch 2,131 was community demand for greater input
into environmental decision-making. In its first major report on formulating a new planning system,
the PEC had endorsed the concept of planning agencies “exhibiting their plans at all stages of
preparation or indeed ... soliciting public involvement to help in the formulation of their ideas”.132
Such rigorous obligations failed to ultimately find their way into statute. Nevertheless, the
legislation compelled both the DEP and councils to seek public input on most draft plans and
certain development proposals, as detailed later, thereby putting into practice the EPAA’s express
objective to “provide increased opportunity for public involvement and participation in
environmental planning and assessment”.133 Accordingly, the EPAA embodied McAuslan’s third
planning ideology: i.e. planning law as “a vehicle for public participation”.134 This doctrine, in
theory, turns the community, rather than the bureaucrats, into the planners, in stark contrast to the
earlier ‘wise use’ approach to environmental management. In the case of rural communities,
however, this meant that the ‘planners’ on the farm would not want any regulatory plans at all.
A second significant stimulus behind the EPAA was increased interest in regional environmental
management, as raised in ch 4.135 It its final report on the proposed planning system, the PEC had
pronounced that environmental issues should be “evaluated primarily” at the regional level.136 Upon
129
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the outset of the EPAA, the DEP forecast that regional planning would “assume much greater
importance than before”.137 But this has never been achieved.
6.3.2

Overview of the NSW Planning Legislation

Whilst the EPAA has undergone almost countless amendments since 1980, its core procedural
framework has, arguably, remained essentially intact. A revision of the system in 1991
recommended only selective “fine tuning” on the basis that the system was generally working
well.138 Substantial change occurred in 1998, directed at procedural reform.139 According to senior
DUAP officials, the reforms reflected the fact that the EPAA was already “fundamentally sound”.140
But as will be observed later, the changes have received much criticism.141 More recent attempts to
review the plan-making aspect of the EPAA appear, at the time of writing, to be in a state of flux.142
The wide-ranging articulated purposes of the EPAA make it clear that planning activity is able to
reach far beyond its traditional domain of urban land-use conflicts.143 Section 5 reads:
“[t]he objects of this Act are (a) to encourage(i) the proper management, development and conservation of natural and man-made
resources, including agricultural land, natural areas, forests, minerals, water, cities, towns
and villages for the purpose of promoting the social and economic welfare of the
community and a better environment;
...
(vi) the protection of the environment, including the protection and conservation of native
animals and plants, including threatened species, populations and ecological communities
and their habitats; and144
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(vii) ecologically sustainable development [ESD]”.145
…
Whilst the clause relating to ESD was inserted in 1998, surprisingly without any accompanying
definition of the term, the references to “forests”, “water” and, most significantly, “natural areas”
existed at the outset.
In order to enable such objectives to be achieved, the EPAA establishes two environmental
assessment regimes. The first, the ‘planning system’, is set up under Pts 3 and 4. Part 5, as outlined
in ch 5, was designed to catch many proposals falling outside the planning system. It need not be
dealt with again here.
Part 3 EPAA provides the framework for the preparation of environmental planning instruments
(EPIs), which replace the former PSOs and IDOs.146 The three species of EPI, which have been in
operation since 1980, comprise:
•

State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs), prepared and made at State Government level,
but generally implemented at council level, designed to deal with matters of state environmental
planning significance;147

•

Regional Environmental Plans (REPs), similarly prepared and made at State Government level,
and generally implemented at council level, but designed to deal with matters of regional
environmental planning significance;148 and

•

Local Environmental Plans (LEPs), prepared and implemented at council level, and capable of
incorporating an array of state, regional and local issues, but finalised at State Government
level.149
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The EPAA also provides for non-binding plans, known as development control plans (DCPs),
designed to provide additional detail to REPs or LEPs.150 Any relevant DCP must be considered in
the assessment process but does not carry statutory force.151 The NSW Court of Appeal has stated
that a DCP may “provid[e] more detailed planning considerations, by imposing criteria by way of
restriction or specification of necessary requirements to be met”.152 In any event, the resulting
multiplicity of statutory and policy instruments has led to a complicated system,153 adding to Local
Government’s resource burden.
All types of plans, including DCPs but with the exception of SEPPs, must undergo a process of
public consultation before finalisation,154 thereby putting McAuslan’s third planning ideology into
effect. The consultation requirements are formal in nature, involving exhibition of draft plans
subject to public notice and consideration of written submissions.155 This tends to benefit the more
articulate, usually urban, members of the community,156 from whom the demands for public
participation originally arose. Interestingly, the EPAA provisions contrast with the more recent
second-generation obligations under the LGGR in relation to management plans and ‘state of
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environment reports’ (SoERs), which are far more explicit in requiring councils to “consult” and
“involve” the “community (including environmental groups)”.157
Part 4 EPAA provides the procedures for implementing EPIs and DCPs, mostly through the
assessment of individual development applications for proposals as they arise. In most, but not all,
cases, the EPI nominates Local Government as the consent authority.158 In some instances, the plan
will identify uses considered to be so unacceptable that they are prohibited altogether in particular
areas,159 thereby maintaining the most powerful feature of planning law. In other situations, the EPI
may allow specified developments to proceed without permission.160 An example is agriculture and
forestry in many rural zones. If the project is permissible with ‘development consent’, the
provisions of relevant EPIs and DCPs operate to constrain and guide the environmental assessment
and decision-making process.
6.4

Plan-Making Under Part 3 EPAA

6.4.1

Opportunities

The EPAA wiped the slate clean to enable EPIs to deal with a vast range of issues in a variety of
creative ways. Section 24 states that an EPI “may be made ... for the purposes of achieving any of
the objects of [the] Act”.161 Section 26(1) is more specific, but hardly prescriptive:
“[w]ithout affecting the generality of section 24 or any other provision ... an
environmental planning instrument may make provision for or with respect to any of
the following:
(a)
protecting, improving or utilising, to the best advantage, the environment;
(b)
controlling (whether by the imposing of development standards or otherwise)
development;
(c)
reserving land for the use for purposes of open space, a public place or public
reserve within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1993, a national park or
157
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other land reserved or dedicated under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, a
public cemetery, a public hospital, a public railway, a public school or any other
purpose that is prescribed as a public purpose for the purposes of this section;
…
(e)
(e1)
(f)
(g)
(h)

protecting or preserving trees or vegetation;
protecting and conserving native animals and plants, including threatened
species, populations, ecological communities, and their habitats;
controlling any act, matter or thing for or with respect to which provision may be
made under paragraph (a) or (e);
controlling advertising; and
such other matters as are authorised or required to be included in the environmental
planning instrument by this or any other Act”.

This section has undergone several amendments since its inception. In particular, Parliament
inserted paragraph (e1) via the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) (TSCA) to boost
opportunity for plan-makers to include conservation provisions in EPIs.162 These amendments were
preceded by more limited provisions inserted by the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act
1991 (NSW) (EFIPA), which related only to listed faunal species. Even before then, the provisions
were already broad enough to support biodiversity conservation measures.163 The original (and
surviving) references to “trees or vegetation” and “protecting the environment”164 demonstrate an
unambiguous mandate for EPIs to address ecological habitats as far back as 1980. It may be argued
that one of the reasons for introduction of the specialist threatened species laws was Local
Government’s failure to take advantage of the original provisions in preparing conservationoriented LEPs.
The breadth and language of s 26 EPAA leaves no doubt that plans can do far more than simply
control development under s 26(1)(b), as had been the case under Pt XIIA. The corresponding
provision under the previous regime had stated merely that a plan could contain “provisions for
regulating and controlling the use of land and the purposes for which land may be used”.165 Despite
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new opportunities heralded by the EPAA, early LEPs closely resembled their cumbersome
predecessors.166 There was no template for instruments to move beyond simple land-use regulation.
LEPs of today carry less detail than they did twenty years ago. But the basic tools they employ – i.e.
zoning and development standards – still dominate, reinforcing the fact that much of s 26(1) EPAA
remains unutilised.167 As Dore observes, land-use planning in NSW concentrates on “regulating
sites rather than making places”.168 Whilst other parts of the subsection appear to afford wide scope
for alternative strategies, such as sophisticated incentive provisions, active management programs
and even community funding schemes, plan-makers have confined their craft to familiar and more
limited mechanisms derived from British town planning. Whilst this may, perhaps, still be
appropriate in dealing with urban land-use conflicts, it is out-of-step with modern biodiversity
conservation imperatives, which view regulation as only one measure in a preferred suite of
integrated mechanisms.169
Plan-makers probably cling to regulatory approaches due to both habit and the level of power they
bestow. The extent of regulatory opportunity explains why the State Government retains significant
muscle under the EPAA rather than delegating it all away to councils. It is scarcely a ‘wastebin’
activity. Yet once one accepts that regulation provides the NSW planning system’s real bite, closer
examination reveals that its teeth are blunter than might otherwise be expected. First, whilst
‘development’ has always been defined broadly under the EPAA, reaching beyond subdivision and
the erection of structures to “the use of land” and “the carrying out of a work”,170 the NSW Court of
Appeal has made it clear that the notion does not extend to the “ordinary and normal pursuit of an
existing land use”.171 For instance, the Land and Environment Court has ruled that the filling of
rural land to 10 centimetres was not ‘development’ requiring consent, noting that it “was merely
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what a prudent farmer would normally undertake to maintain and improve the quality of the
vegetation on his [sic] land for the benefit of the animals that graze thereon”.172 In considering
whether an activity falls within the ‘development’ basket, the LEC will consider its nature in terms
of both permanence and scale, as well as its relationship with the overall use of the land.173 But what
might appear to be a minor activity subsumed into an ongoing use may well pose environmental
havoc. In mid-1998, the definition of development was widened to include “any … act, matter or
thing referred to in s 26 that is controlled by an [EPI]”.174 Plan-makers under Pt 3 may now seek to
control a vast range of actions without worrying about whether they meet the notion of “work” or
“use”. A LEP might, for example, require consent for removal of bushrock.175 But this needs to be
made very specific. Otherwise, “ordinary and normal” pursuits of farming or other uses may
continue unchecked.
Second, even if a council decides to bring in stringent controls over unconventional forms of
‘development’, there remains the major hurdle of the strong protection afforded to non-conforming
lawful uses, or ‘existing uses’. This is a longstanding feature of planning statutes. The EPAA makes
it clear that if a particular use was set up in accordance with planning requirements prevailing at
that time (or before planning controls existed over the land), it may continue notwithstanding any
subsequent change in planning controls.176 Such changes could otherwise introduce rigorous
assessment requirements or outlaw the use altogether. This means that a particular use pinpointed
by plan-makers as totally inconsistent with the intent of a plan may carry on without interference.
As Kirby P noted in the oft-quoted North Sydney Municipal Council v Boyts Radio and Electrical
Pty Ltd, the law here attracts criticism that it is “insufficiently attentive to social rights and the
gradual development of the environment in a harmonious way”.177 In an overview of the case law,
Edgar notes that the judiciary has tended to “take a ‘liberal’ approach in order to protect as far as
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possible private property rights and property values”.178 All this highlights the tension between the
‘private property’ and ‘public interest’ ideologies. Under the law of existing use, the ‘private
property’ ideology wins hands down.
Fogg notes that the existing use mechanisms are the direct descendants of similar provisions
inserted in early British planning statutes in order for land-use planning to win political credence.179
The original regulatory assault on property interests had to be softened for landholders to accept the
new controls. Wilcox argues that the provisions are nevertheless a “sheer practical necessity”
bearing in mind the “economic hardship and dislocation” that would result if existing uses had to
comply with any new plan.180 Yet the concessions may be viewed as particularly generous today in
view of improved understanding of the long-term adverse environment impact of many undesirable
land-uses. The privileges extend forever. Comparison may be drawn with other environmental
regulatory regimes, such as the pollution control system, wherein continuation of an activity can
require approval without any special treatment afforded to established uses.181
These non-conforming use provisions provide particular difficulties for local plan-makers eager to
bring restrictive planning controls to places outside the cities and towns, where the rural ‘hands-off’
approach has always applied. Because agricultural and forestry activities have traditionally been
permissible without consent in non-urban zones, any change in a plan that attempts to prohibit or
regulate them will be frustrated as far as existing enterprise is concerned. Unless a non-coercive
strategy is employed, the current use, together with ‘ordinary and normal pursuits’ associated with
it, can continue unhindered notwithstanding any adverse environmental impact. The council can do
nothing under the traditional regulatory aspects of the EPAA other than watch from afar.
Commitment to ESD will be of no help. Moves are needed to encourage and persuade, rather than
merely coerce, the landholder to conserve and restore native vegetation. More attention needs to be
given to increasing the planning tools beyond mere regulation.182
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The EPAA is rigid in restraining change to non-conforming uses. Continued operation of the use
must be restricted to the area of land “actually physically and lawfully used” at the time the relevant
EPI changed.183 The law also does not protect, inter alia, any alterations or intensification of the use
without development consent.184 This can raise difficult questions in the agricultural context. For
example, should land clearance, or even removal of undergrowth, on a working farm be regarded as
an ordinary aspect of the farming activity or an alteration or intensification of the existing use?185
The answer will be matter of fact and degree, depending on the scale and exact nature of the action
concerned. This level of uncertainty reflects the fact that whilst non-conforming use provisions may
be able to be applied readily to questions about occupation of buildings, they cannot be adapted
easily to non-urban uses where environmental impact may be far more severe. It provides another
example of difficulties in applying traditional land-use planning approaches to biodiversity
conservation.
6.4.2

SEPPs and REPs

(i)

SEPPs

Various SEPPs and REPs do provide examples of planning regulation going well beyond its urban
origins to ecological matters. They are proof of the State agency’s view that planning is no longer
confined to the urban sphere. As noted earlier, SEPPs and REPs are foisted upon councils. They
provide mechanisms through which the State Government can influence council decision-making
directly.
SEPPs either deregulate planning controls or impose further restrictions on top of LEPs.186 All SEPPs
relating to the biophysical environment fall into the latter category. These comprise only a handful of
the entire array of almost 60 SEPPs. SEPP No 14 - Coastal Wetlands187 requires councils to undertake
183

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), ss 107(2)(b) & 109(2)(b). For an example of
strict application of this rule, see Vaughan-Taylor v David Mitchell-Melcann Pty Ltd (1991) 73 LGRA 366.
184
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), ss 107(2)(a), (b1) & (e); 109(2)(a), (c) & (e).
Changes to non-conforming uses are, however, permissible with consent: Environmental Planning and
Assessment Regulation 2000 (NSW), cll 42-46. Applications for such changes are particularly difficult to
assess because all the rules and guidelines established in Environmental Planning Instruments and
Development Control Plans are geared towards development that is permissible under the zoning clauses: E
Armstrong, “Existing Use Rights - Development Applications” in A Kelly (ed), Proceedings of the 1989
Planning Law and Practice Short Course (Sydney: School of Town Planning, UNSW, 16-20 Oct 1989), 3.3c1.
185
For a detailed discussion and analysis of non-conforming use provisions in the context of land clearance
controls, see Farrier (1991), op cit n 79.
186
Butterworths, Local Government Planning and Environment NSW, Vol C, L Taylor & A Kelly, “Land-Use
Planning, Development and Building Control” in vol C, Service 9, [para 450,110].
187
Gazetted 12 Dec 1985.

224

rigorous environmental assessment of proposals within identified wetlands. SEPP No 26 - Littoral
Rainforest188 provides a similar regime in relation to identified patches of remnant coastal vegetation.
SEPP No 19 - Bushland in Urban Areas189 places increased regulatory control over certain
metropolitan open space lands containing remnant vegetation. SEPP No 44 - Koala Habitat
Protection190 demands staged ecological assessments to be carried out as development projects come
forward in nominated areas, for the purpose of determining whether or not a ‘koala management plan’
is required. These SEPPs advance a selective, rather than representative, approach to biodiversity
conservation. They relate to special ecosystems – namely coastal environments and prized bushland
remnants in metropolitan areas – or, in the case of SEPP No 44, a longstanding popular faunal
symbol. As a result, it is left to council-prepared LEPs to either protect the wider environment or
contemplate its gradual destruction.
(ii)

Former SEPP No 46 and NVCA

Attention should also be paid to former SEPP No 46 – Protection and Management of Native
Vegetation, introduced in 1995 and repealed in 1998 by the NVCA.191 Its application was far broader
than other, more specific conservation-based SEPPs, with the explicit aim of “prevent[ing]
inappropriate native vegetation clearance in NSW”.192 It overrode countless LEPs throughout rural
NSW by requiring development consent for “clearing” of “native vegetation” with both concepts
defined widely, subject to various exclusions and exemptions.193
The focus was on rural and peri-urban council areas. In many places, the SEPP was the first EPI to
contain clearing controls. If planning regulation already existed, the SEPP served to override it.194
Significantly, it appointed the then Minister for Land and Water Conservation, rather than Local
Government, as the consent authority for land clearance.195 But it appears that rural councils were
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relieved to be pushed aside, probably reflecting both their paucity of resources and the opposition to
land-use control over farming country by their constituents. At its 1996 Annual Conference, the NSW
Shires Association resolved that it would “resist any moves by State Government to appoint local
councils as the consent authority under SEPP 46, and that the role of councils be a consultative
one”.196 Lee, Baird and Lloyd describe a “period of disharmony” between the NSW Farmers
Association and the then NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC) whilst SEPP
No 46 remained in operation.197
The replacement of SEPP No 46 by the NVCA comprised a major shift away from the planning
system to a fresh regime. It arguably served to allay concerned rural landholders who had distrusted
and misunderstood a relatively unfamiliar statutory system, with its urban origins and zoning tools.
But the farming community has still not welcomed the new specialist legislation. Salvin, an executive
of the NSW Farmers Association, has noted the Association’s “dismay” at the NVCA.198
The NVCA operates by providing two scenarios for controlling land clearance:
•

prior to the compulsory preparation of a Regional Vegetation Management Plan (RVMP) – i.e.
yet another member of the ‘plethora of plans’ criticised by the then DUAP in its review of Pt 3
EPAA;199 and

•

after the making of a RVMP by the Minister for Land and Water Conservation. At the time of
writing, only two RVMPs have been finalised.

In the pre-RVMP context, regulation of land clearance of native vegetation falls fully into the hands
of the Minister for Land and Water Conservation, who determines development applications for
clearing land.200 But there are numerous exceptions that carry over from SEPP No 46, including,
inter alia:
•
196
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•

‘minimal tree cutting (i.e. cutting up to seven trees per ha per year for on-farm usage (eg fence
building); and

•

clearing of regrowth of no more than 10 years of age originally cleared for farming or forestry
purposes.201

Whilst these exceptions erode the potential strength of the NVCA, they do not prevent councils
from filling in the gaps. A council may address any pocket of exemption in its own LEP, as is the
case with the impressive Port Stephens LEP 2000.202 Outside the statutory exceptions, the NVCA
overrides all clearance controls in LEPs,203 leading to the sidelining of interested councils.
In addition to the exceptions, certain lands are excluded from the NVCA. These include, inter alia,
(i) listed urban council areas,204 and (ii) neighbourhood lands zoned residential (but not rural
residential), village, township, industrial or business under an EPI.205 Accordingly, in regulating
urban and township lands, councils must continue to rely upon their own local instruments as their
primary conservation management mechanisms. It also means that by rezoning land to residential
etc, a council may remove land from the clutch of the NVCA.206
Once a RVMP is in place, it prevails over any EPI, including LEPs, to the extent of any
inconsistency.207 Furthermore, when permitted clearing takes place pursuant to a RVMP, a LEP
cannot regulate it as well.208 This leaves rural councils in the backseat in preparing strong
conservation-oriented LEPs as RVMPs emerge. The RVMP must, however, at least maintain “the
same level of protection and conservation” contained in an existing LEP.209 Whilst a council might
attempt to convince the Minister that its own LEP contains sufficient conservation and management
provisions consistent with the NVCA’s own objectives to not warrant a fresh RVMP,210 several
attempts by committed coastal councils have failed.211 It remains to be seen if councils can convince
the State Government to enable new LEPs to coincide with RVMPs by filling in any gaps.
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The RVMP plan-makers are Regional Vegetation Committees (RVCs), referred to in previous
chapters. These ‘new magistracies’ arguably comprise the most threatening of all the new regional
bodies to rural councils who wish to advance their conservation role. In practice, apart from the
‘exceptions’ and ‘exemptions’ described above, the system sidesteps Local Government
altogether.212 But for struggling inland councils who see conservation as a non-issue, this may be a
blessing.
(iii)

REPs

Generalisation about the 40 odd existing REPs is difficult due to their even wider variation.213
Nevertheless, REPs carry significant potential to tackle, in a co-ordinated manner, issues that go
beyond municipal boundaries. But this opportunity lies primarily in the hands of the State agency.
There is no council-initiated equivalent, apart from the rare exception of a jointly-prepared LEP.214 Of
course, councils can work together in regional groupings to align all their individual LEPs. Otherwise,
Local Government must go cap in hand to the State agency to seek its agreement to initiate the REPmaking process.215 There is anecdotal evidence that the then DUAP was reluctant to embrace this
role.216
Whilst the EPAA authorises the Minister for Planning to declare “regions”,217 it does not dictate how
the boundaries are drawn.218 At the time of writing, the DUAP had recognised five regions across
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NSW, with boundaries based on council perimeters.219 A single region may encompass diverse
environments. The largest - the gigantic ‘western region’ – extends from the rugged Snowy
Mountains Shire to the arid outback Central Darling Shire. A REP may, however, apply only to part
of a declared region,220 which provides opportunity for plans to be made over areas drawn on
biophysical factors alone. The first attempt to achieve this was the Williams River Catchment REP
1997, which covers a drainage catchment straddling two council areas. It is one of a handful of
catchment-based REPs that move away from traditional reliance on meaningless borders as the
‘building blocks’.221
REPs have never reached the same level of prominence as SEPPs. They are the poorest of the EPI
cousins, despite being the direct product of the fierce interest in regional planning that preceded the
EPAA.222 The DUAP admitted in 1999 that the system had failed to achieve integrated regional
planning, suggesting that the REP mechanism had never been sufficiently utilised.223 As noted in ch
4,224 as a result of the 1999/2001 review of Pt 3 known as ‘Planfirst’,225 the State planning agency
proposed to re-invigorate regional planning by bringing REPs and other regional plans from other
regimes, such as RVMPs, within the umbrella of a suite of ‘regional strategies’ (RSs). One RS was
to be prepared for each of about fifteen regions across NSW.226 This new interest in regional
planning echoes the visions of Minister Fuller over twenty years ago when the groundwork for the
EPAA was laid. The very recent critical review of ‘Planfirst’, however, takes a very different
approach, raising the possibility that the REPs will become very different policy instrument.227
Brief mention should also be made of the relationship between REPs and regional ‘water
management plans’ (WMPs), prepared by regional ‘water management committees’ (WMCs) under
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the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).228 These plans may include regulatory “environmental
protection provisions” for the purpose of “any aspect of water management”,229 where the purpose
may be to provide “benefits to the environment”.230 Such factors must be integrated into REPs, with
the relevant Minister being the consent authority and the WMP overriding council LEPs.231 This
provides further evidence of the sidelining of Local Government. It might be counter-argued,
however, that the land-use planning system has traditionally been hesitant to extend its hands
beyond the riverbank into the water. Local Government has remained on the ground, despite the
wide definitions of ‘environment’ and ‘land’.232 In similar fashion, the State Government’s water
agency generally restricts itself to the river. This not only highlights the lack of integration in
another aspect of environmental management; it confirms how Local Government faces being set
further aside.
6.4.3

LEPs and their Mechanisms

Council ambitions to prepare innovative LEPs are tempered by the State planning agency, which
checks all draft LEPs before they are finally made - or rejected - by the Minister.233 The Minister
has substantial control over the contents and form of draft LEPs through her or his ability to issue
directions234 and determinations.235 Another mechanism is the use of SEPPs and REPs to lay down
requirements binding subsequent LEPs.236 The Minister also enjoys wide power to make “changes
of substance” to draft LEPs in relation to matters which are of State or regional significance,
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without the benefit of further public feedback.237 This equips the State Government to ride
roughshod over councils who respond to local public pressure that conflicts with the State priorities.
What types of clauses are found in LEPs? Platt’s analysis of American municipal land-use
mechanisms falling within three main categories – i.e. acquisition, incentives and regulation (or
‘command-and-control’)238 - applies readily. Each will be addressed in turn below, with a case study
on zonal objective clauses. Whilst all these are relevant to all EPIs, discussion will focus on LEPs
as the only council-initiated EPI. Other common mechanisms beyond ‘Platt’s trio’ include
articulation of general aims, compulsory advertising of certain applications239 and requirements for
referral of particular applications to State agencies for advice or concurrence.240
The ability of EPIs to reserve land for future acquisition for public purposes flows directly from s
26(1)(c) EPAA, quoted earlier. Reservation clauses are a conventional feature of planning
instruments. They have traditionally been used to set land aside for community infrastructure, such
as road widening and public reserves. There is nothing under the EPAA to stop a council from
reserving a site for biodiversity conservation purposes. The notion will be discussed briefly in ch 8.
As an alternative to bringing land into public ownership, a plan-maker may attempt to achieve a
particular objective through inducement. Incentive mechanisms in NSW typically allow the
relaxation of nominated development restrictions in return for the provision by private interests of a
public good. Sophisticated programs allow forgone development potential to be transferred from
one site to another.241 Whilst such provisions might be accurately described as a subset of regulatory
controls, their thrust is different in that they rely on persuasion rather than coercion. Incentive
provisions are relatively undeveloped in NSW, being confined mostly to conservation of the built
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heritage.242 The Australian Local Government Association’s (ALGA’s) National Local Government
Biodiversity Survey of 2000 found that “[i]ncentives are not widely used by councils for
biodiversity conservation”.243 This contrasts with experience in the US, where the use of
‘transferable development rights’ has become a popular tool to conserve habitats on private land.244
But increasing attention is now being directed towards the potential of councils across Australia to
initiate and implement incentive mechanisms for biodiversity conservation.245 Bateson refers to
various opportunities including “integration” of transferable development rights “with local
planning schemes or DCPs” for biodiversity conservation purposes.246 But he raises ideas rather
than concrete suggestions. Significantly, some interstate councils interstate, including Brisbane City
Council,247 have introduced incentive mechanisms into their local plans. The trend is not
widespread and has yet to take root in NSW.248 The DUAP, in its review of Pt 3 EPAA, called for
“more versatile” tools that would include incentive mechanisms.249
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‘Command-and-control’ is by far the most common approach, as stressed already. The primary
approach is identification of permissible and prohibited uses in zoning ‘tables’, whose provisions
may or may not be modified by later clauses. Even though there is no requirement for zoning under
the EPAA, it remains the cornerstone of the planning system and appears to enjoy considerable
support from councils and their communities.250 This reflects the force of history in land-use
planning. An apparatus engineered long ago to segregate urban land-uses is now relied upon to
achieve a far wider array of environmental objectives.
Because zoning provisions affect the permissibility of various uses, the characterisation of
proposals is crucial. Much energy often goes into trying to squeeze proposals into definitions of
permissible or prohibited development rather than assessing proposals on their merits.251 In an
attempt to steer the focus from cataloguing proposals to environmental evaluation, LEP-makers
have invested considerable effort in formulating specific objectives for each zone against which
individual applications must be assessed to ensure permissibility.252 Zonal objectives are discussed
further below as an example of problematic statutory provisions.
In addition to zonal objectives, there are other ‘condition precedent’ provisions that demand a
specified state of affairs exist before the proposal is permissible.253 Many clauses require the council
to be of a certain “opinion” or “satisfied” that particular conditions prevail before it can proceed to
issue consent. In order to be effective, these provisions demand good information on which to base
the preliminary decisions.
Most EPIs also contain ‘development standards’ – i.e. specified criteria against which proposed
permissible projects must be assessed. They do not relate to permissibility but to the extent to, and
manner in, which permissible development may be carried out. The distinction between a
prohibition and a restriction is important, if not always clear, because regulatory controls imposed
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by development standards may be waived by virtue of SEPP No 1 – Development Standards.254
“Development standard” is defined expansively under the EPAA to mean a provision “by or under
which requirements are specified or standards are fixed” in respect in relation to proposed
development.255 The definition contains a long and non-exhaustive list of factors that a standard
may address, including “tree planting or other treatment for the conservation, protection or
enhancement of the environment”.256 But in a determination issued under s 71 EPAA in 1983,257 as
part a policy requiring more flexible LEPs, the State planning agency placed severe restrictions on
the types of standards that councils could insert in draft LEPs.258 The tolerated standards relate to
subdivision and building size, which comprise traditional, quantitative planning controls designed
to regulate urban form, density and settlement patterns. They hardly lend themselves to dealing with
the natural environment.
A result of the s 71 EPAA determination is that detailed assessment criteria have been shunted into
DCPs and other documents that carry persuasive force only. There has also been encouragement for
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standards to be articulated in terms of desired objectives rather than strict numerical criteria.259 For
example, a clause could refer to retention of on-site vegetation as far as practicable or demand the
maintenance of the habitat of an identified species. There is nothing under the EPAA to prevent a
development standard requiring positive conservation action to be taken, as indicated by the
statutory reference to the “planting of trees”. But such standards, if given statutory force, would still
be subject to SEPP No 1 and would, in any event, fall foul of the said s 71 EPAA determination.
These mechanisms serve to frustrate any progressive council’s ambitions to exploit development
standards in planning for biodiversity conservation.
6.4.4

The Emergence of Flexible LEPs260

In 1985, Fogg noted “Australia [was] clearly progressing towards vagueness and uncertainty in
existing planning rules in approved schemes”.261 Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the NSW
Government encouraged councils to prepare flexible instruments, containing far less control over
development than had been the case under earlier plans.262 A major thrust was to encourage, if not
require, councils to move the detail from statutory LEPs to their DCPs. In addition to the s 71
EPAA determination referred to earlier, a notable catalyst was a rudimentary ‘sample draft rural
LEP’ introduced in the late 1980s to assist inland rural councils “wishing to update their planning
controls into a modern instrument”.263 Flexible plans soon became the norm across the State,264 with
a handful of councils going as far as producing LEPs with no prohibited uses at all.265 At a stage
when rural councils were grappling with the extension of planning controls across farmlands and
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natural areas, the trend was to minimise regulation and make any necessary controls as elastic as
possible.
The State Government made it clear that its push for flexible plans was aimed at paving the way for
increased development through procedural efficiency. In its 1986/87 Annual Report, the DoP
expounded that:
“[t]hese modern and flexible plans will provide more development opportunities and need
relatively fewer amendments thus reducing delays in the processing of development
applications”.266
The policy could be viewed as a direct response to the general decline in economic growth during
the early to mid-1980s. In contrast, NSW had prepared its two comprehensive land-use control
systems for times of economic development – i.e. Pt XIIA for post-WWII expansion and the EPAA
during the late 1970s.267 When economic recession was to arise, tight regulation over land
development was no longer seen as desirable but a hurdle to employment opportunities. The nature
of the ‘public interest’ behind the system thus shifted. The result was plans containing fewer
impediments to development and the placement of wide discretion in the hands of decision-makers.
This approach coincides with the current popularity of deregulation that pervades public sector
management. Modern municipal managers may prefer EPIs that demand fewer resources. Those
that demand rigorous assessment of many proposals will be the most expensive to administer. This
trend will be discussed further below. A LEP that requires detailed investigation of the impact of
proposals on biodiversity may readily be seen as inflexible and unnecessarily costly to manage.
Many flexible plans are still being prepared for rural areas in inland NSW. An extreme example is
the brief Gundagai LEP 1997,268 which appears to absolve almost everything from any need for
consent other than a narrow range of high-impact activities known as ‘designated development’ (see
below). Whilst there has been debate in the planning profession questioning the desirability of
flexible plans,269 any new interest in more stringent controls runs counter to recent deregulatory
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trends that champion fewer land-use controls.270 The prospect for stringent controls for conservation
purposes is not encouraging.
6.4.5

Case Study: Zonal Objectives

A specific response on the part of plan-makers to the rise of flexible plans, with the support of the
State planning agency,

271

was to devise specific objectives for each zone, as briefly referred to

earlier. The clauses that give effect to zonal objectives appear in a variety of formulae, although the
LEC appears to treat all varieties in a similar manner. A common clause reads as follows (or
something very similar):
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this plan, the Council shall not grant consent to the
carrying out of development on land to which this plan applies unless the council is of the
opinion that the carrying out of the development is consistent with the objectives of the zone
within which the development is proposed to be carried out”.272
The provision requires the decision-maker to reach an “opinion” as to the consistency or otherwise
of the proposed development with the articulated objectives. If the opinion is favourable, the
council may proceed to detailed evaluation and final determination, including assessment against
the objectives. But if the opinion is adverse, the council’s hands are tied: it “shall not grant
consent”. Accordingly, a finding of consistency is necessary before any consent may be granted. In
Rosemount Estate v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning,273 Stein J made it clear that a zonal
objective provision affected permissibility directly, rejecting an argument that it was “merely a
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control on the exercise of ... planning discretion”.274 This was also the view of the DUAP.275 Zonal
objective clauses comprise classic ‘condition precedent’ clauses. Importantly, many zonal
objectives are expressed in terms of conserving nature.
Arguments that proposals are inconsistent with specified objectives, and thereby unlawful because
the required ‘condition precedent’ cannot be met, have provided opportunity for judicial scrutiny of
zonal objective clauses. (Interestingly, the cases provide an example of the potential apparent lack
of differentiation between merits-based review of decisions and judicial review based on legal
validity). In one of the first cases, Coffs Harbour Environment Centre v Coffs Harbour City Council
(‘Coffs Harbour’),276 the Court of Appeal had to decide whether a proposed controversial sewage
outfall works on a prominent headland zoned ‘6(a) ‘Open Space (Existing)’ was prohibited due to
inconsistency with the relevant objectives. The objectives were stringent:
•

“to enable the development of land within this zone for recreational purposes”; and

•

“to enable the development of land within this zone for purposes associated with recreation”.277

The Court deliberately refrained from drawing a precise line between permissible uses and those
that fell foul of the objectives. But it was clear to the Court that the proposed sewage works fell well
over the line into the realm of prohibited uses. According to Clarke J, the proposal was
“antipathetic” to the objectives regardless of any attempts by the applicants to mitigate the effect of
the works on the potential recreational use on the headland.278
The Court of Appeal’s approach in Coffs Harbour was endorsed in Challister Ltd v Blacktown City
Council (‘Challister’),279 even though the key clauses were very different in each case.280 Challister
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concerned an application for a service station and convenience store in an industrial zone. After
quoting from Coffs Harbour, the LEC went on to test the merits of the proposal against the
objectives. But Talbot J soon found that some of the objectives were hardly relevant to the proposal
at hand. For instance, one related to commercial offices whilst another referred to provision of
community facilities. As a result, it made little sense to talk in terms of the development achieving
the objectives. Instead, Talbot J went on to consider whether or not the proposal would be counterproductive to the objectives.281 The development duly passed an easy test.
Talbot J elaborated on this approach in Bellas v Penrith City Council,282 concerning a restaurant in a
rural zone. A problem here was individual zoning objectives being inconsistent with one another.
Talbot J surmounted the problem by ruling that:
“[t]his dilemma is solved to a large extent by accepting that a positive finding of
compatibility is not required … The proper approach to the test of consistency with the
objectives of the zone is to consider them as a whole and to be satisfied that the development
as proposed will not be incompatible or inconsistent with them as a set of criteria”.283
Talbot J’s response represents, arguably, a sound legal approach to a poorly drafted plan. With the
benefit of hindsight, the planners might have made a stronger attempt to formulate tighter and more
mutually consistent objectives. The judgment may have started to dampen planners’ enthusiasm for
zonal objectives. It was now becoming clear that the assessment of developments against zonal
objectives was to be a negative, rather than a positive, test. This was made even clearer in a more
unsettling case. In Schaffer Corporation v Hawkesbury City Council (‘Schaffer’),284 Pearlman CJ
considered the permissibility of a quarry against the backdrop of seemingly rigorous zonal
objectives. After quoting directly from Clarke J in Coffs Harbour, Pearlman CJ stated:
“[t]he guiding principle ... is that a development will be generally consistent with the
objectives if it is not antipathetic to them. It is not necessary to show that the development
promotes or is ancillary to those objectives, nor even that it is compatible”.285
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Pearlman CJ fell into line with the emerging approach that proposals were not to be tested against
the stated objectives for positive compatibility. By fixing upon the reference to “antipathetic
development” in Coffs Harbour, Pearlman CJ suggested that the preferred method was to ask
whether a proposal was fundamentally inconsistent with those objectives. Even more puzzling,
Pearlman CJ seized upon the words that Clarke J had used in Coffs Harbour to describe the
particular case before him. As Farrier et al point out, Pearlman CJ turned the words into a general
rule.286 The point here is that whilst Clarke J had decided that antipathetic development was
definitely outlawed, he had not supported any proposition that non-antipathetic development would
always pass the zonal objective test. Yet this is how Pearlman CJ construed his judgment. The
direct upshot of Schaffer was, therefore, a far weaker role for zonal objectives. The permissibility
hurdle was now much lower than before: a proposal would only be prohibited if it were seen to be
“antipathetic” to the objectives with a finding of positive compatibility being out of the question.
The lesson for plan-makers now was that zonal objectives would carry negligible force unless the
intention of the zone was specified in precise and narrow, unqualified terms.
The Schaffer approach has since become entrenched.287 It has only served to emasculate zonal
objective clauses, with yet wider discretion in the hands of decision-makers. It appears that the
judiciary has marched in time with government in attempting to loosen the tight controls in
planning instruments. This will undermine biodiversity conservation when plan-makers rely on nonprohibitive zonal clauses. If destructive development is prima facie permissible under the zoning
table, poorly formulated and inconsistent objectives will not stop it being carried out. The lesson is
that in drafting rigorous biodiversity conservation clauses, attention should be given to formulating
stringent objectives, identifying priorities and even moving away from the standard formulae.
Notwithstanding the above, examples of recent cases where proposals have been refused on zonal
objective grounds should provide some encouragement, notwithstanding that they deal with issues
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other than conservation.288 Furthermore, the term ‘antipathetic’ does not appear in all zonal
objective cases. More interestingly, in the recent case of Gillespies v Warringah Council
(‘Gillespies’), which concerned a housing development for elderly or disabled persons, Bignold J
chose not to rely on the ‘antipathetic rule’, stating that term “indicates a far stronger, but narrower,
interpretation of the word ‘inconsistent’”.289 He preferred to interpret ‘consistent’ according to its
dictionary terms whilst opining that “[i]nonsistency can arise without any antipathy”.290 He also
revisited Coffs Harbour, describing Clark JA’s use of the term ‘antipathetic’ as “nothing more than
postulating an obvious and unarguable proposition that [the proposed sewerage works] could not
qualify as being ‘generally consistent’ with the [relevant] zone objectives”.291 Whilst Bignold J’s
decision is hopeful, it represents the judgment of a lower court. In contrast, the NSW Court of
Appeal has readily adopted the ‘antipathetic’ formula.292 It should be noted that Gillespies was
based on a non-traditional LEP, with special objectives for every neighbourhood rather than
standard zones.293
6.5

Plan Implementation Under Part 4 EPAA

As noted earlier, Pt 4 EPAA lays down the procedures for implementing EPIs by means of
assessing development applications as they come forward. This is achieved through three main
avenues. First, Pt 4 demands consent authorities take into account certain matters in deciding
whether or not to grant approval. Second, it sets down a more rigorous assessment process for
special subsets of applications including, in particular, those relating to adverse ecological impact.
Third, it provides the parameters for any conditions to be attached to development consents. Each of
these will be discussed briefly below.
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6.5.1

Recent Amendments

As referred to briefly earlier, the EPAA underwent major change in 1998. This was described by the
then Minister for Planning as “the most fundamental changes to the laws associated with land-use
planning and assessment” since introduction of the EPAA.294 The statutory upheaval was clearly
designed to benefit developers by simplifying –and in some cases even removing – the assessment
process. It resulted in, inter alia:
•

integrating development consent under the EPAA with certain approvals under other
environmental legislative regimes, thereby shortening the overall approval process;295

•

reducing the statutory of factors of consideration in determining applications (refer below);

•

providing scope for private sector involvement in determining proposals regarded as ‘lowimpact’;296 and

•

removing various minor projects from environmental scrutiny altogether.297

Strong political pressures for micro-economic reform prompted these changes, fuelled by
Commonwealth encouragement of, and State commitment to, improved efficiency in land-use
regulation.298 All this formed part of the wider economic rationalist agenda, centred upon
deregulation and competition policy.299 The Commonwealth’s encouragement of municipal
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procedural reform had manifested itself in the Local Approvals Review Program (LARP).300 An
influential 1990 Commonwealth report that heralded the LARP reforms had estimated, without any
analytical basis, that savings of about $1 billion could be made through local regulatory reform of
environmental decision-making.301 The modern municipal managers would have welcomed the
implications for Local Government. But there was no inspiration to improve protection of
biodiversity. Instead, the fashionable face of the ‘public interest’ became promoting procedural
efficiency and removing procedural obstacles to new development.
A detailed consideration of recent reforms is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is worth noting
that the new emphases signal a philosophical realignment away from welcoming government
intervention in development and community input in decision-making.302 As Gleeson observes in
relation to similar trends across Australia, the original purpose of planning is now being “brushed
aside in favour of a new minimalist form of spatial regulation whose chief purpose is to facilitate
development”.303 Stein J, commenting extra-curially, goes even further, describing the system, now
with fewer proposals falling under Local Government’s scrutiny, as having undergone “virtual
gutting”.304 Widespread acceptance of ESD as an overall principle of environmental management
has made no readily identifiable difference.
6.5.2

Matters for Consideration

Upon enactment of the EPAA, former s 90(1) set down a long list of 27 factors that the decisionmaker had to “consider” in determining applications for development.305 There was no express
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reference to conservation matters. Yet due to the wide definition of “environment”,306 former s
90(1)(b) still demanded consideration of a proposal’s impact on its biophysical surroundings. It
read:
“the impact of [a proposed] development on the environment ... and, where harm to the
environment is likely to be caused, any means that may be employed to protect the
environment or mitigate that harm”.307
Parliament inserted a direct reference to impact on faunal habitat in (former) s 90(1) EPAA in
1991,308 perhaps indicating its view that development assessment had failed in giving adequate
consideration to faunal impact assessment.309 In 1995, the TSCA substituted several new heads of
consideration in s 90(1) EPAA relating to, inter alia, the likelihood of significant effect on
statutorily-listed threatened species, populations, ecological communities or their habitats.310 This
reinforced the unmistakable duty on councils to consider impact on the biophysical environment
during the assessment process, despite any lack of in-house expertise.
As cited earlier, the 1998 amendments overhauled former s 90(1) EPAA, replacing it with a new s
79C(1) which reduced the number of ‘heads of consideration’ to five.311 According to the former
Minister for Planning, the aim was to streamline and rationalise environmental assessment within
the context of “align[ing] the level of assessment with the complexity and likely environmental
impact of a development proposal”.312 One of the ‘new’ matters for consideration makes specific
reference to the ‘natural environment’ by referring to:
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“the likely impacts of [the proposed] development, including environmental impacts on both
the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality”313
The paragraph is too broad to be helpful by itself. Guidelines produced by the then DUAP on
applying s 79C(1) EPAA suggest it be approached by considering 21 potential matters, each broken
down again into a multitude of sub-factors.314 Curiously, the length of the list tends to undermine
the desire to move away from the earlier and much-criticised ‘checklist’ nature of former s 90(1)
EPAA.315 More significantly, one of the main headings reads “flora and fauna”, which cites, inter
alia, “maintenance of biodiversity” as a sub-consideration.316 But another, in contrast, is “economic
impact” which refers, inter alia, to “employment generation” and “economic income”.317 There is
no requirement that decision-makers give any particular weight to either, or any other, factor. Each
matter listed under s 79C(1) need only be given due consideration as far as it is relevant.318 As
Farrier et al note, “[a] particular decision-maker may decide that conservation should be given a
much lower weighting than development”.319 The fact that a proposal may have a devastating
impact on the last colony of a species, for instance, will not demand its refusal, or even mitigation
of impact through conditions of consent, unless the law can intervene.
If the weighting given to a particular matter is unreasonably disproportionate, the courts will not
uphold the decision.320 But otherwise, the law does not prevent political values from entering the
decision-making equation.321 And there is strong argument that is should not. The elective nature of
Local Government legitimates decision-making based on value judgments that, in theory, should
reflect the aspirations of the local constituency. Unfortunately, in contrast to the minimal
information on local ecologies – a common situation despite the mandatory SoER - there is often
good, even if misguided, appreciation about what a particular development might contribute to the
short-term economy of a locality, especially in the case of ailing rural communities.322
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Tucker describes with some accuracy the nature of decisions on development proposals as based on
both technical and evaluative factors, with the latter frequently involving “conflicting ideals …
traded off against one another in the search for an acceptable compromise”.323 Consideration of
competing factors is often articulated in terms of achieving an appropriate ‘balance’. But when the
‘balance’ involves weighing up the benefits of economic development against biodiversity
conservation, the scales appear to be frequently tipped in favour of development. At a series of
workshops for NSW council officers in 1995 to identify needs for implementing biodiversity
conservation policy, many participants raised the “cultural” problem of “conservatism or
favouritism towards certain [developmental] values or stakeholders” that was “inhibiting
biodiversity conservation”.324 A senior council officer notes that “short term and ad hoc processes
tend to favour the economic sector”.325 Whitehouse argues similarly that “[e]nvironmental decisionmaking reflects a pro-development, pro-growth philosophy where there is an implicit acceptance of
a ‘right’ to develop”.326 The result is that in practice, the assessment process appears to focus on
facilitating, rather than stopping, development proposals as they come forward, with most attention
paid to cosmetic amelioration through conditions of consent.327 This hypothesis is difficult to
establish beyond question without a detailed survey of applications and decisions (including
amendments to applications) across councils, which is well beyond the scope of this study. But
there are strong grounds for a firm suspicion that a ‘culture of consent’ indeed exists. Even a former
LEC judge describes a “sense of virtually never saying ‘no’ to a proposal”.328 Mamouney refers to
323
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Local Government’s view of developmental approvals as a “sign of success”.329 The best evidence,
perhaps, is the historical development of Local Government itself, which, arguably, still informs
planning practice and philosophy.
The ‘ratepayer ideology’, a direct subset of McAuslan’s ‘private property ideology’, respects almost
outright landholder expectations to improve their own lands. Whilst the planning system still
constrains unmitigated development, its focus on identifying prohibited uses whilst allowing
everything else to go ahead still serves ratepayer interests by protecting and, in many cases,
boosting, land values.
Scrutiny of individual planning reports on individual proposals is unlikely to betray a prodevelopment bias. Decisions tend to be made under the guise of technical analysis whilst political
values remain unexpressed. As one commentator notes, the decision-maker:
“… does not engage in a full planning analysis of [a] proposal. ... Instead, an ad hoc decision
is recommended by the planner to the Council which can be influenced greatly by an
amalgam of unexpressed desires for an area, the politics of Council, the commercial need for
the use, or the predilections of the planner”.330
In a similar manner, the NSW Independent Commission of Inquiry has noted that in the

administration of development control, “the issues are in the end about political values”
such as “to what extent should the natural environment be affected by new urban
development”.331
In the case of biodiversity conservation, even the technical analysis may be inadequate. This is
because there is generally insufficient information about the impact of development on habitat and
ecosystems. Good information on the types of species and communities inhabiting a site, especially
invertebrates and micro-organisms,332 will invariably be non-existent. On the other side of the coin,
applications accompanied by complex scientific information that is inaccessible to the layperson
can favour development approval.333 The conceptual mantle of ESD, as expressed in the objectives
clause of the EPAA (at s 5(a)(vii)), will not assist whilst the goal is loose and the ‘ratepayer
ideology’ remains pervasive.
329
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6.5.3

Special Assessment: EISs and SISs

The urban emphasis in planning practice has been challenged, to some extent, by rigorous
environmental impact assessment requirements. The EPAA demands additional environmental
scrutiny of particular proposals listed as ‘designated’ developments.334 An application for such
development must be accompanied by an environmental impact statement (EIS)335 and placed on
exhibition for public comment.336 Many of these types of development are potentially heavy
polluting projects,337 such as intensive agriculture and mines located in rural areas. This means that
non-urban councils must have sufficient resources to carry out assessment and, if necessary, defend
their decisions upon appeal.338 But there are many actions that fall outside the narrow ‘designated’
category list that may wield a substantial impact on the natural environment, such as land clearance
and forestry. These projects receive far less attention if they require development consent at all.339
When an EIS is produced for a project that raises serious ecological threat, there is nothing under
the EPAA to guarantee its refusal.340 The EIS does not constrain the decision. The emphasis is on
providing detailed information for a well-informed decision. In the words of Cripps CJ, formerly of
the LEC, a fundamental purpose of the EIS is to enable the decision-maker to have a “hard look” at
the proposal.341
A drawback of the EIS is that is arises towards the tail end of the process. The proponent is likely to
have invested in site location and project planning well before undergoing the expenditure in
obtaining an EIS. From an environmental perspective, more attention needs to be placed on welldesigned EPIs with appropriate ‘conditions precedent’ clauses demanding certain matters be
addressed together with specific documentary evidence.
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These aspects also apply to proposals accompanied by species impact statements (SISs). The initial
trigger, however, is very different. Part 4 EPAA demands a SIS to accompany a development
application if the proposal is likely to significantly affect threatened species, populations or
ecologically communities (‘threatened species etc’), as listed under the TSCA or Pt 7A Fisheries
Management Act 1994 (NSW) (FMA), or their habitats.342 In contrast to EISs, which are only
relevant if the project fits within a list of defined proposals, the need for a SIS relies on an initial
test concerning the effect of the proposal. In reaching this preliminary decision on whether or a not
a SIS is needed, the following sequential approach should be pursued:
In reaching the initial decision on whether or not a SIS is needed, the EPAA provides a catalogue of
factors, known as the ‘8 part’ test, which the council must consider.343 Recent legislative change,
proclaimed but not yet commenced, is expected- should it indeed go ahead - to reduce this to a
revised ‘7 part’ test, which will read:
(a) in the case of a threatened species, whether the action proposed is likely to have an
adverse effect on the life cycle of the species such that a viable local population of the species
is likely to be placed at risk of extinction,
(b) in the case of an endangered population, whether the action proposed is likely to have an
adverse effect on the life cycle of the species that constitutes the endangered population such
that a viable local population of the species is likely to be placed at risk of extinction,
(c) in the case of an endangered ecological community, whether the action proposed:
(i) is likely to have an adverse effect on the extent of the ecological community such that its
local occurrence is likely to be placed at risk of extinction, or
(ii) is likely to substantially and adversely modify the composition of the ecological
community such that its local occurrence is likely to be placed at risk of extinction,

(d) in relation to the habitat of a threatened species, population or ecological
community:
(i) the extent to which habitat is likely to be removed or modified as a result of the action
proposed, and
(ii) whether an area of habitat is likely to become fragmented or isolated from other areas of
habitat as a result of the proposed action, and
(iii) the importance of the habitat to be removed, modified, fragmented or isolated to the
long-term survival of the species, population or ecological community in the locality,
(e) whether the action proposed is likely to have an adverse effect on critical habitat (either
directly or indirectly),
(f) whether the action proposed is consistent with the objectives or actions of a recovery plan
or threat abatement plan,
342
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(g) whether the action proposed constitutes or is part of a key threatening process or is likely
to result in the operation of, or increase the impact of, a key threatening process.344
In Byron Bay Businesses for the Future v Byron Shire Council, which arose under the pre-TSCA
regime, Pearlman CJ described the assessment of the extent of impact on listed fauna as a
“threshold question”.345 Because the application was unaccompanied by what was at that point a
‘fauna impact statement’, it was incomplete and unable to be determined.346 In Timbarra Protection
Coalition Inc v Ross Mining (‘Timbarra’), the Court of Appeal followed the same approach under
the TSCA, with Spigelman CJ stating that “[a] consent authority may be called upon to decide
whether or not it has a valid application before it”.347 Furthermore, the Court upheld the
administrative law principle of jurisdictional fact: i.e. a certain fact must be established before the
relevant public authority has the power to proceed in the decision-making process.
The following sequential approach is recommended in applying the ‘7/8 part test’:
•

review of any existing ecological information of the site;

•

if needed, site investigation to check for presence, or likelihood of presence, of threatened
species etc, which may include detailed targeted field surveys;

•

if evidence of threatened species is found, assessment of the potential effects of the proposal on
the ‘threatened species etc’ in order to determine whether or not there will be a ‘significant
impact’ on them.348

In the event of a decision that a SIS is required, the concurrence of the Director-General of the
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) or Director of Fisheries is mandatory before a council
can grant consent.349 This requirement is an exception to the general trend throughout the 1990s to
reduce concurrence mechanisms under the planning system: i.e. demanding approval from a second
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authority in addition to the council.350 But because of the reasons discussed below, few applications
reach this stage.351 SISs are a rare species in themselves.
Assessment of the ‘7/8 part test’ demands a sophisticated level of expertise on the part of councils.
Good internal information, such as detailed SoERs backed by surveys and mapping of the
biophysical environment, will assist. But this is not the situation everywhere.
There is also the issue that a council may misapply, dilute or even ignore the ‘7/8 test’. For
example, a council may choose to stop the assessment process at the beginning if it believes the site
is devoid of biota. But it should be aware that environmental context does not necessarily mean
absence of ‘threatened species etc’. For example, a listed bat listed bat species has been discovered
in a derelict power station.352 The lesson is that the test applies to all development applications. In
some cases, application of the test will be scarcely onerous. On other occasions, detailed analysis is
needed.
Whilst the responsibility of carrying out the ‘7/8 part’ test lies with the consent authority, on many
occasions the council will rely on information, in the form of a ‘s 5A EPAA report’, compiled by
the applicant or her or his consultant.353 Douglas refers to unsuitable professionals such as architects
and surveyors providing inaccurate information to decision-makers.354 A council itself may not have
sufficient capability to evaluate such a report. 355
Applicants who become aware that a proposal is likely to significantly ‘affect threatened species
etc’, especially upon the advice of concerned council staff, may seek to renegotiate their plans to
avoid not only costly SIS preparation and NPWS concurrence. They may also want to elude any
compulsory public exhibition of the proposal.356 Saxon, a senior NPWS officer, claims that “[i]t is
clearly logical” for projects to be redesigned “in such a manner that they do not lead to a significant
impact in the first place”,357 going on to list several impressive examples of changes to development
350
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proposals in this manner.358 Substantial change to project design after determination, via conditions
of consent, however, is another matter altogether. The EPAA does not permit conditions of
approval that go beyond mere modification of details.359
A further, more problematic, matter raised by Farrier, Whelan and Brown is that acceptable
scientific research for ‘s 5A reports’ can be hard to achieve due to expected short assessment
timeframes.360 Pressure for fast decisions is commonplace.361 There is a widely held, albeit
erroneous, view, that applications must be determined within 40 days of full submission.362 One of
the “key performance indicators” of individual councils recognised and published by the
Department of Local Government (DLG) is ‘mean’ and ‘median’ “time[s] in calendar days for
determining applications”.363 Quick decisions appease efficiency driven managers at both local and
State levels. They also coincide with an embedded developmental ethos. But speed may be
anathema to sound ecological assessment.
A hypothetical scenario is a development that would reduce woodland occupied by the listed
vulnerable barking owl. In 2001, the NPWS tracked a female whose foraging home range extended
to almost 6,000 hectares.364 Only two pairs were located within woodland habitat near Dubbo. It is
most likely that without such prior knowledge, any ‘s 5A report’ would totally overlook the species.
An actual example arose in Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council,365 wherein the plaintiff argued
that a flora and fauna assessment report submitted with a development application was insufficient
because it was based on mid-winter surveys and, therefore, badly timed. It was contended that the

2 May 1997), 90. In Smyth v Nambucca Shire Council (1999) 105 LGERA 65, the Land & Environment
Court legitimised the consideration of post-application amelioration of development proposals in the
assessment under s 5A Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). See also Diane Campbell,
“Threatened Species and Urban Bushland Management” in G Mather (ed), Conserving Threatened Species –
the Local Government Role (Sydney: Threatened Species Network (NSW), 1993), passim.
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360
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report failed to address various species due to their migration and/or hibernation characteristics.
Whilst Talbot J made no substantial decision on this point, it seems to have influenced his decision
that there was sufficient impact to warrant a full SIS. He noted in passing that:
“a proper assessment of a development site may require investigation during more than one
season and the utilisation of a range of techniques to take account of migratory movements
and seasonal variation”.366
Another example is raised by Farrier, Whelan and Brown in their description of cases about the
impact of various development proposals on Tetratheca glandulosa, a plant reliant on soil seed
banks that is invisible unless in flower.367 In Lean v Ku-ring-gai Council, the Council had rejected a
19 lot subdivision application on a site abutting a council-managed Crown reserve, itself adjacent to
a national park.368 Sheahan J recognised the existence of the plant but decided that “removal from
the site of [the] small numbers and their unknown seed bank will not unduly impact on the species
overall”. Whilst in this instance it was Ku-ring-gai Council that had wanted to protect the species, it
was the LEC that chose to adopt the inbuilt cultural bias of developmentalism.
The recent legislative changes will introduce a requirement that SISs “be prepared in accordance
with survey standards” set by the NPWS,369 with associated regulations for accreditation of
“suitably qualified and experienced persons” who prepare the document.370 There is no such
expectation concerning application of the ‘7/8 part test’, which may not even be submitted at all.
Even if there is evidence of considerable ecological damage, the final decision by a council may be
to grant approval. The result is nothing more than informed habitat destruction.371 Like the EIS, the
SIS does not dictate the final decision.372
Even if an authority is keen to use its powers under Pt 4 EPAA and, hopefully, its own
conservation-friendly LEP, to protect threatened species etc via rigid conditions of consent or even
outright refusal, the next-door authority may be far less sympathetic. If the species etc extends
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across municipal borders, a greater interest in regional planning is needed.373 This raises again the
desirability of firm, regional, strategic approaches such as REPs, joint LEPs and RPs integrated into
such mechanisms.
All the above, apart from the last point, relates to proposals as they arise. Various commentators
reveal considerable faith in EPIs to achieve more strategic approaches to protecting threatened
species etc.374 Worthwhile LEPs, however, are few and far between. The problems of the land-use
planning system, such as its developmentalist tradition, the domination of social and economic
concerns, existing use rights and inadequate regional approaches, remain.
6.5.4

Conditions of Consent

The focus of the planning system on facilitating projects as they arise highlights the importance of
well-designed conditions to promote biodiversity conservation, or at least mitigate the
environmental impact of proposals. Section 80A EPAA gives potentially wide scope for effective
conditions, extending from requiring modification of proposals375 to the carrying out of works.376
Furthermore, pursuant to s 94 EPAA, a council may also require dedication of land or monetary
contributions for “public amenities and public services”, the demand for which is generated by the
proposed development.377 The dubious potential of pursuing biodiversity conservation under s 94
will be outlined in ch 8.378
Section 80A(1)(a) EPAA authorises consent authorities to impose conditions in relation to “any
matter referred to in section 79C(1) of relevance to the development”. As seen above, the subject
matter of s 79C(1) clearly extends to biodiversity conservation.379 Moreover, s 80A(g) permits the
council to “modif[y] details” of proposal before it. It is not difficult, for example, to point to cases

373

S Briggs, “Linking Ecological Scales and Institutional Frameworks for Landscape Rehabilitation” (2001)
2(1) Ecological Management & Restoration 28.
374
Douglas, op cit n 328 at 143; Kelly & Prest, op cit n 351 at 588-89; Saxon, op cit n 357 at 88 & 93. See
also M Fallding et al, Biodiversity Planning Guide for NSW Local Government (Sydney: National Parks and
Wildlife Service (NSW), 2001), Pts 5 & 6; National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW), Urban Bushland
Biodiversity Survey Stage 1: Western Sydney Overview & Recommendations (Sydney: the Service, 1997), 9.
375
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 80A(1)(g).
376
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 80A(1)(f).
377
These types of conditions can only be imposed pursuant to s 94 Environmental Planning and Assessment
Act 1979 (NSW): Fitch v Shoalhaven City Council (1987) 67 LGRA 165.
378
See ch 8 at 306-09.
379
See supra.

254

where the LEC has ameliorated impact on the natural environment through conditions of consent.380
This is far easier than outright refusal, especially at council level where economic development is a
key issue and the ‘ratepayer ideology’ is strong.
In addition to the statutory limitations, there are two common law tests on validity of conditions that
restrict the potential for stringent requirements. These tests, derived from English case law381 and
adopted by the LEC,382 demand that a condition must, as paraphrased by Taylor and Kelly:
“[firstly] fairly and reasonably relate to the development for which permission is given; and
[secondly] be reasonable in the sense that it must be a condition which a reasonable local
authority properly advised might impose”.383
The second limb provides protection to applicants against arbitrary decision-making. It might be
argued that until biodiversity conservation becomes a universally embraced objective of the
planning system, restrictive conservation conditions may remain open to attack. The first limb poses
an even greater hurdle. Imagine a situation where a council approves an application to erect a
structure on a parcel of rural land that also contains a thickly vegetated belt of land providing a
faunal corridor. A condition imposed to guarantee the survival of the corridor - such as fencing or
weeding requirements - could be challenged on the grounds of an insufficient nexus between it and
the proposed structure. Rather than relating to the subject of the application, the condition could be
viewed as relevant only to the pre-existing state of the land. In the comparable case of St George
Building Society v Manly Municipal Council,384 the LEC had considered an application to rebuild an
existing commercial building that already contained an arcade between two streets. The council,
anxious to maintain the public convenience of the arcade, had imposed a condition requiring
continued provision of a public thoroughfare. Bignold SA, as he then was, decided that the
condition failed both tests and was, therefore, invalid. In relation to the first limb, he stressed:
“the undisputed fact that the proposed development does not itself create any need for the
provision of the arcade access and that the question of that access is wholly extraneous to
the proposed development”385
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The same argument could be mounted in our hypothetical scenario if the proposal directly affected
the faunal corridor. The example provides more evidence of the continuing uncomfortable
application of planning law to the natural environment.
6.6

Conclusion

This chapter has covered an enormous amount of ground, from the English origins of planning
regulation to the complexities of the EPAA today. But one theme stands out: the slow and uneasy
movement of land-use planning from the city and town to the non-urban context and, especially,
over the native biophysical environment. In the mid-1980s, Sorensen and Cunningham described
the translation of tools devised for dynamic urban conditions to rural councils areas as “mistaken
surgery”.386 Their criticism is hard to refute. The social issues that had prompted planning
regulation in the first place have always been non-existent in areas outside the urban sphere.
Continuing the pioneering ethic that had characterised Australia’s early inland development, rural
councils have always wanted to bolster growth rather than organise or constrain it. By the time
plans eventually reached rural areas, the very tools that had been originally welcomed by residential
ratepayers had become far less rigorous, assisted by the State’s promotion of flexible plans and
recent trends towards deregulation. An attitude of resistance to land-use control has dogged rural
planning ever since, despite growing awareness of biodiversity loss and widespread acceptance of
ESD.
All this calls into question confidence in the planning system to deliver effective biodiversity
conservation outcomes as exemplified in statements quoted at the beginning. Whilst urban residents
may appreciate strict controls over neighbouring pockets of bushland, the situation is very different
out of town. And as will be seen in later chapters, even motives to keep greenery in the urban
environment will not necessarily accord with biodiversity conservation principles. Whilst
community consultation is an embedded feature of the EPAA and informed communities can
influence plan-makers to produce conservation-friendly LEPs, there if no guarantee that this will
occur. Ratepayers may oppose stringent controls that affect the development potential of own
development lands.
Several points need to be made in defence of planning. First, in contrast to the mechanisms
introduced relatively recently under the LGA in 1993, as discussed in the previous chapter, the
planning system is strong, familiar and well entrenched. Second, its sheer potential remains largely
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untapped whilst plan-makers adhere to regulatory techniques. Third, there is scope for stronger
regional planning approaches to be developed - namely via the REP - that may help overcome
parochial perspectives. Fourth, the ‘threatened species etc’ provisions equip councils to obtain
ecological information on land-use proposals. Unlike the ‘new magistracy’ regimes, they rely
largely on the role of councils.
Unfortunately, Local Government may not be in the best position to take advantage of all these
opportunities to champion biodiversity conservation. Its local communities may not necessarily
want conservation but prefer unsustainable economic development that promises improved land
values. A conventional Local Government culture in which serving local property interests is
paramount will guard against both innovation and rigid land-use controls. Even where a council is
keen to regulate archetypal rural activities, such as land clearing and agriculture, legal peculiarities
of statutory planning, especially existing use privileges and zonal objective evaluation, will stifle
plan-makers’ aspirations. Development of alternative approaches will be difficult as a result of
longstanding professional association with ‘command-and-control’ approaches to urban problems.
And whilst the State Government may impose plans upon Local Government, councils will be
indignant about implementing measures forced upon them.
One can still point to good examples of genuine attempts to achieve biodiversity conservation under
the EPAA, as will be seen in ch 10. The best attempts relate to strategic approaches rather than oneoff assessment of development proposals. But good plans are isolated and rarely integrated. There is
also the issue of insufficient resources for local, let alone regional implementation. Moreover,
biodiversity conservation planning demands an ongoing costly process of research, planformulation and implementation. Local Government finance is the subject of the following chapter.
As will be argued there, the very nature of municipal funding helps keep Local Government in its
outdated cultural stranglehold.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK
7.1

Prelude

Any critical discussion about municipal environmental management is incomplete without serious
consideration of financial structures. It is almost trite to note that the ability of any council, or
regional organisation of councils (ROC), to embark on fresh environmental programs is totally
dependent on adequate resources. New activities require additional funds or reorganisation of
existing functions, or both. Insufficient income can provide a convenient excuse to adhere to the
familiar and shun the new. So in terms of positive services, whilst the doors were flung wide open
by the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (LGA 1993), they may simply flap in the wind. In
similar fashion, reluctance to exploit opportunities to devise innovative Local Environmental Plans
(LEPs) under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA) is reinforced
by funding limitations. The National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy notes that whilst
“[c]ouncils are well placed to play an active role in biodiversity conservation … lack of resources is
a major deterrent”.1 The primary aim of this chapter is to critically explore Local Government’s
financial system and its implications for biodiversity conservation.
So where do councils look to meet their costs in carrying out their responsibilities, both optional
and otherwise? In NSW, local authorities rely on rates, charges on land, fees for services, developer
contributions, grant moneys (from both Commonwealth and State Governments), investments,
loans, donations and profits from entrepreneurial activity.2 In 2001/02, rates and annual charges
comprised 47% of total council earnings, of which 66% of total rates revenue (excluding mining
rates) derived from residential rates.3 ‘User charges and fees’ generated 16% of council income,
slightly below grant revenue at 17%.4 In terms of Local Government’s own revenue-raising ability,
the rating system is by far the most significant.
The first part of the chapter provides a background to municipal financial issues, building upon the
brief historical narrative in ch 3 but focusing on the ingrained nature of rating. The chapter then

1

Australian Local Government Association & Biological Diversity Advisory Council, National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy (Canberra: The Association & Council, 1999), 14.
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3
Department of Local Government (NSW), Comparative Information on New South Wales Local
Government Councils 2001/2002 (Sydney: the Department, 2003), 21 & 28.
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moves on to consider the rating system in detail, in terms of (i) its operational mechanics, (ii)
underlying policy rationales, if any, and (iii) specific relevant features and their effect on
conservation action. Attention will also be paid to government grants in terms of (i) their
importance for non-traditional services and (ii) how various types of grants relate to conservation
policy. Whilst rates and grants are by no means the only sources of revenue, they are the most
important in terms of conservation implications. But the bulk of the chapter is devoted to the rating
system. This is not only because of its primacy as a funding source but also in view of a hypothesis
that it sits uncomfortably with biodiversity conservation.
7.2

Rating

7.2.1

Background to Rating

Councils frequently cry poor. This is understandable. Local Government is the financial weakling
of the Australian public sector, collecting less than 4% of tax moneys across the country.5 In
financial terms, Australian councils represent one of the lamest municipal systems throughout the
developed world.6 Whilst it might be countered that local authorities elsewhere enjoy a far wider
range of functions,7 the fact remains that the vertical fiscal imbalance suffered by Australian Local
Government puts it in a difficult position to embrace additional and innovative roles.
Reluctance to indulge in discretionary functions due to resource constraints is one thing. Difficulty
in meeting statutory obligations due to limited resources is quite another. The problem of restricted
5

House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, At the
Crossroads – A Discussion Paper (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), 3; see
also Department of Transport and Regional Services (Cth), National Office of Local Government, 2002-2003
Report on the Operation of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 (Canberra: National Office
of Local Government, 2003), 11, referring to a proportion of a mere 3.1%; R Chapman, “The Role of Local
Government in Australia” in R Chapman, M Haward & B Ryan (eds), Local Government Restructuring in
Australasia (Hobart: Centre for Public Management and Policy, UTas, 1997b), 1; M Jones, Transforming
Australian Local Government: Making it Work (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 27; A Worthington & B
Dollery, “The Debate on Australian Federalism: Local Government Financial Interrelationships with State
and Federal Governments” (2000) 59(4) Australian Journal of Public Administration 25 at 26.
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Government Handbook (Canberra: AGPS, 1989), 119. For a brief discussion of reasons for the traditional
limited nature of Local Government functions in Australia, see P Self, “The Federal Government’s Role in
Local Government Finance” in G Brennan (ed), Local Government Finance (Canberra: Centre for Research
on Federal Financial Relations, ANU, 1987), 1.
7
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funding opportunities becomes particularly acute when viewed in the context of recent escalation of
responsibilities. The former joint Local Government and Shires Associations (LGSAs) complained
about “devolvement of an increasing number of additional responsibilities ... without a
corresponding shift in financial resources”.8 This has been reinforced more recently in a
Commonwealth Parliamentary discussion paper, which states:
“[t]he evidence indicates … that the growth in local government’s functions has thus far
outstripped its financial capacity to [these new] functions adequately. This is especially true
in rural and remote regions where councils are small and have a very limited revenue base”.9
The National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy, despite its emphasis on the role of Local
Government,10

admits
11

responsibilities”.

that

“Local

Government

faces

falling

revenue

and

growing

Various external commentators support this observation. Daly, for instance,

refers to “an ever widening array of duties … without commensurate financial assistance”.12 The
phenomenon of expanding obligations is starkly apparent in the realm of environmental
management. Immediate examples include, inter alia, preparation of ‘management plans’ and ‘State
of Environment Reports’ (SoERs) under the LGA 1993 and increased responsibilities under the
EPAA in relation to threatened species assessment.13
Each council is under a statutory obligation to make and levy an “ordinary rate” every year.14
Ordinary rates may be used to fund any lawful activity, including biodiversity conservation, with
the exception of “domestic waste management services”.15 Councils also have the option to levy
‘special rates’ across all or part of their areas in order to fund a specific activity that benefits
identifiable property, as discussed again below.16 In addition, a council may impose annual charges
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on property owners for explicit services prescribed by the LGA 1993.17 The list relates to traditional
‘housekeeping’ activities such as waste and sewerage services.18 It does not extend to
environmental conservation. An authority may also apply a ‘non-annual’ charge to ratepayers for
“the actual use of a service provided by the council”.19 Alternatively, it may demand a fee from any
person for direct use of any service it provides. Unlike charges, fees are not levied against property.
But both fees and charges apply to local utilisation of services. They do not lend themselves readily
to biodiversity conservation action, which caters not only for neighbourhood interests but also the
global community and future generations. Whilst it is still possible that some conservation activity
may be able to be funded on a user-pays basis - such as, for example, provision of locally
indigenous shrubs for backyard planting or ridding farmlands of noxious weeds – the potential
range of action is limited.
There is enormous variation between councils on sources of income. For example, in 2000/01, Lane
Cove Council on Sydney’s lower north shore derived 70.2% of its total income from rates whilst
remote Central Darling Shire Council relied on a meagre 9.4%.20 During the same period, quiet
Nundle Shire Council received 59.8% of its revenue from grant moneys whilst inner city South
Sydney drew a corresponding figure of only 4.6%.21 The general situation is that residential rates
provide the most important income source for urban councils whilst rural authorities with sparser
populations and extensive road networks to maintain are heavily reliant on untied Commonwealth
grant revenue.22 Since the Whitlam Government’s entry into Local Government funding in 1974/75,
as outlined in ch 3,23 Commonwealth financial assistance has outflanked State-based support.
Greening Australia, which plays a major role in facilitating council access to grants for
environmental projects, estimates that “[o]ver 80% of all government financial assistance provided
to local governments comes from the Commonwealth”.24
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Local Government funding, especially rate revenue, has always been a vexed issue. In the late
1960s, the NSW Government convened the Royal Commission into Rating Valuation and Local
Government Finance (the ‘Else-Mitchell Commission’),25 referred to briefly in ch 3. Its chairperson
remarked later that few issues of public interest have attracted so many reports.26 A NSW
Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Rating and Other Revenue Powers and Resources
(the ‘Oakes Inquiry’) scrutinised the issue again in 1990.27 Both investigations highlighted
significant problems and recommended sweeping reforms. But they also recognised the benefits of
retaining a longstanding and familiar revenue structure. The Else-Mitchell Commission lauded rates
as “the most convenient, logical and lucrative means” of raising local finance.28 This might help to
explain why most of its recommendations were not adopted.29 The Oakes Inquiry similarly
acknowledged “great strengths” of the system.30 The Government believed that “the many reforms
suggested in the Oakes Report ... could not be guaranteed to improve the system sufficiently given
the disruption to the community they would create”.31
At the Federal level, the Commonwealth commissioned a comprehensive study in the mid-1980s,
known as the National Inquiry into Local Government Finance (the ‘Self Report’).32 In 1994, the
Australian Urban and Regional Development Review published a discussion paper on Local
Government finance in 1994 (‘AURDR Report’).33 In 2001 the Commonwealth Grants Commission
(CGC) issued a review of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 (Cth)
(LG(FA)A).34 These studies focus on Commonwealth grants rather than reviewing the rating
system, refecting the fact that rates are levied under State law. But the earlier ones also consider the
theoretical underpinnings of rating. The Self Report anticipated that the rate would “remain an
25
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important source of local government revenue,”35 whilst the AURDR Report praised the rating
system for making a “positive contribution to the overall equity of the Australian tax system”.36 The
CGC report confirms that municipal rates “remain local government’s primary revenue source”.37
All this confirms the observation made throughout ch 3 that the rating system is deeply embedded
in the Australian municipal system. Kirwan suggests that Local Government “is simply not
important enough” to warrant major fiscal reform.38 After all, rates are older than Local
Government itself. In noting the antiquity of rating, the Oakes Committee observed that a
“continuous line” could be followed as far back as the United Kingdom’s Poor Relief Act of 1601.39
As Local Government’s principal independent source of revenue,40 the rating system plays a vital
role in influencing municipal agendas. If Local Government is to assume a stronger role in
biodiversity conservation, questions of the adequacy and appropriateness of rates arise immediately.
These will be explored directly below.
7.2.2

The Nature and Mechanics of Rating

The traditional, or ad valorem, rate represents an amount in the dollar expressed in percentage terms
applied to the “land value” of each rateable property.41 ‘Land value’ is an artificial statutory concept
invented for taxation purposes, borrowed by the LGA 1993 from the Valuation of Land Act 1916
(NSW).42 It represents a modified version of ‘unimproved capital value’, comprising the estimated
market price of a property in its raw state subject to several exceptions factored into the valuation.43
Implications of the valuation base for biodiversity conservation will be explored later.
In theory, in order to strike its ordinary rate, a council divides the total sum of land values of
properties within its area by the amount of money it plans to raise. But this description is too
simplistic due to various sub-mechanisms. In addition to raising special rates, a council has
discretion to:
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•

derive up to 50% of its entire rate revenue from a fixed ‘base amount’ levied on all rateable
properties, or properties falling within a specific ‘category’ or ‘sub-category’;44

•

impose a minimum rate, thereby requiring a minimum payment from landholders
irrespective of land values;45 and/or

•

apply differential rate levels to lands categorised as ‘farmland’, ‘residential’, ‘mining’ or
‘business’, with opportunity for further variation between optional sub-categories
(discussed further below).46

These sub-mechanisms provide councils with substantial flexibility in distributing the rate burden.
This freedom is matched by public accountability requirements via the annual draft management
plan process under the LGA 1993: i.e. the ‘revenue policy’ component, which must incorporate
details on “each ordinary rate and each special rate to be levied” for the following year, including
anticipated yields.47 Accordingly, a council is required to formulate its rating arrangements with the
benefit of community consultation.48 However, as indicated in ch 5,49 the extent of meaningful
public input into draft management plans is questionable. Objections to rate increases and new
special rates are more likely to arise when landholders receive payment notices in the mail.
There are also compulsory sub-mechanisms that complicate the system. These include:
•

exemption of certain lands from rating;50

•

postponement and eventual cancellation of rating debts in specific situations where the
property is occupied but has not been developed to its highest economic use;51
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•

availability of rate concessions to resident ratepayers who are “eligible pensioners”,
allowing reductions of one-half of recipients’ debts up to a specified maximum amount;52
and

•

‘rate pegging’, which prevents councils from increasing their annual rate beyond a figure
prescribed (i.e. ‘pegged’) by the Minister for Local Government.53

Unlike the discretionary mechanisms, which enable councils to manipulate rating arrangements,
these features serve to inhibit capacity to raise rate moneys. Exemptions and rate pegging have
always been controversial. Parker refers to exemptions as a “permanent bone of contention”.54 The
LGSAs pressed the Oakes Inquiry, without success, to support lifting of a wide range of exemptions
primarily on the grounds of lost revenue.55 They have since continued to lobby against the
mechanism.56 Councils must find rate pegging to be even more galling, and a constant reminder of
their constitutional subservience to the State Government. The LGSAs derided it as “an unnecessary
and inefficient intervention”.57 Walmsley argues that rate pegging “has effectively denied local
authorities meaningful control over their own affairs”.58 The UTS Centre for Local Government
points to evidence that rate pegging limits are “set significantly below the level of cost increases
facing Councils, apparently sometimes purely as an exercise in political points scoring”.59 It goes on
to observe how the mechanism can undermine service provision and frustrate community demands
for improved environmental management.60
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Councils also resent their lack of input in providing compulsory pensioner concessions.61 Whilst the
State Government must reimburse to each council 50% of moneys forgone,62 the remaining loss of
income can still be significant.63 In 1997, the LGSAs contended that:
“[p]ensioner rebates are placing increasing strain on Local Government finances. One
council, for example, has reported a 40 per cent increase in the number of eligible pensioners
since 1989 with the cost to council having risen by 82 per cent in the same period. This is by
no means an exception. The cost to individual councils commonly exceeds $1m per annum.
This rapidly escalating burden of Local Government finances is ultimately affecting the level
of services that councils are able to deliver”.64
Councils in areas attractive to retired persons, such as coastal locations, are especially vulnerable.65
Inland districts with aging citizenry, such as those described by Forth,66 would be similarly affected
although the figures would be less spectacular. Both types of area can be important in terms of
biodiversity conservation.
A council eager to improve or expand its services may attempt to offset these constraints by
increasing its rate as far as it may lawfully do so. But authorities are generally reluctant to impose
sharp rate rises. As seen throughout ch 3, Local Government’s history reveals longstanding public
antipathy to property taxation. Modern-day contempt for the rate, of course, may be mellow in
contrast to the hostility that plagued early Local Government when political paradigms demanded
government play a minimum role. But contraction of the public sphere has become fashionable
once again. Amongst all taxes, rates have always been especially unpopular due to their sheer
visibility.67 Payment is far more obvious than, say, sales taxes or automatic paypacket deductions.68
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As a result, rate hikes are typically met with public outcry. The NSW Wran Government justified its
decision to introduce rate pegging in 1976 on the grounds of protecting landholders from “excessive
rate burdens [involving] unwarranted rate increases well above inflation”.69 Rate escalations beyond
the consumer price index (CPI) will always be politically difficult to justify.70 This places Local
Government in a difficult position because, as Morse observes, its traditional role as an engineering
infrastructure provider means that its own inflation rate is far higher than the CPI.71 This function is
“labour-intensive and dependent upon oil-based products and costly imported machinery”.72 The
result is that a council tempted to employ new ecological expertise or carry out resource-intensive
conservation works may well be unwilling to raise sufficient funds. It is more likely to seek
alternative funding sources, such as one-off grants, and rely upon voluntary community work. The
same overall argument applies to special rates. As observed in a recent discussion paper on issues
facing modern Local Government, special rates are “highly visible and ratepayers are sensitive to
their imposition in terms of purpose, amount and duration”.73
Walsh suggests that public antagonism towards rates “has more to do with technical deficiencies in
their implementation than with their desirability”.74 He argues that minor restructuring, such as
more frequent payments with lower instalments, may help to improve rating’s image.75 This
approach calls for the system to be made more palatable rather than overhauled. The problem here,
however, as will be argued below, is the sheer difficulty to discern an acceptable policy foundation
to justify clinging to an outdated system. As Kirwan suggests, “[t]he problem with rates is the
underlying ambivalence about their basis and rationale”.76 When biodiversity conservation enters
the equation, attempts to establish a theoretical basis become even more confused.
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7.2.3

Towards a Policy Rationale

Several decades ago, the NSW Local Government Association claimed that a primary aim of the
rating system was “to foster and encourage development”.77 More recently, the Oakes Inquiry
acknowledged that a rate based on unimproved property values (or its modern equivalent, ‘land
value’) “encourages development and better land use”.78 Because the same amount is payable on a
piece of land regardless of the extent to which it has been developed, the system provides a
rudimentary incentive for landholders to ‘improve’ their properties in order to maximise economic
return. In the rural context, it provides what Young et al call a “perverse incentive to clear land” for
agriculture or other commercial, but environmentally destructive, purposes.79
The desire to stop rating being a tax upon enterprise provided a major reason behind the switch of
valuation base from assessed annual value to unimproved value in 1905/06.80 As one
parliamentarian then expounded, “anything in the shape of taxing a man’s energy” was repugnant to
economic development imperatives.81 Directly associated with this was a desire to stop the practice
of leaving potentially productive lands undeveloped. As Premier Carruthers contended:
“… the man who keeps his land idle and is simply gaining an extra value by the industry of
his neighbour, who spends money on improvements, is the man who least of all should
escape from bearing a fair share of the burdens of local government”.82
Such views were apposite to that era, when the ‘colonial’ vision was melting into the ‘national’
vision. Prosperity through rapid development was a hallowed objective and Local Government
provided the very services that would assist. It is easy, therefore, to appreciate the embracement of
unimproved value for rating purposes at that stage. But in view of modern demands for ESD and
biodiversity conservation, its aptness is now questionable. The ‘incentive to develop’ factor relates
to all development rather than sustainable development alone. It is incapable of separating out
77
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development that is environmentally acceptable. The implications of the current valuation base,
which comprises a modified version of unimproved value, will be discussed in more detail below.
The Oakes Inquiry considered rating theory in some detail. It identified three “basic concepts” still
commonly used to justify rating:83
•

the use of rates to capture back for the wider community unearned benefits accrued by
landholders, in terms of increases in property value, as a consequence of public expenditure on
services provided by Local Government (the ‘Georgist principle’, named after the influential
Henry George);84

•

the use of rates as a means to recoup, from landholders who directly enjoy the benefit of council
services, the cost of providing those services (the ‘benefit principle’); and

•

the use of rates as a form of wealth tax by placing a heavier burden on those who have a
greater capacity to pay (the ‘capacity-to-pay principle’).

Each is discussed in turn directly below.
The Georgist principle underpinned the ‘incentive to develop’ factor that shaped the rating
provisions underlying compulsory incorporation in 1905/1906. During Parliamentary debate on the
Local Government (Shires) Bill 1905, Premier Carruthers argued that:
“[i]t is a fair thing to say that all occupiers or owners who benefit by the expenditure of rates
should contribute towards it, and if there be any increment in value - and I believe there is from the expenditure of the people’s money, or through the people’s labour in the locality,
the Government must get some of that increment”.85
The policy has appeal. Private appropriation of unearned increments in land value derived from
public expenditure is difficult to justify on public policy grounds. It enriches those privileged
enough to own property whilst reducing the power of the municipal purse. But the sheer complexity
of public administration undermines the argument. As the Oakes Inquiry noted, “the major impact
83
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on enhanced values may derive to a far greater degree from State or Federal Government
action/investment than from Local Government”.86 Furthermore, land values reflect factors far
beyond public expenditure, such as general economic trends87 and nearby private investment.
Accessibility to motorways and shopping marts may add positively to the valuation pot. It is
impossible to disentangle the various contributing factors in order to isolate that part of the
increment brought about by Local Government’s own contribution.
There is also the problem that less traditional Local Government functions, such as community and
welfare services, may have negligible impact on land value.88 The Georgist principle was far more
apt when Local Government activity was restricted to property-related tasks, such as construction of
roads and kerbside gutters. The principle is clearly consistent with the ‘ratepayer ideology’; it
supports use of rate moneys for only those activities that boost property values.
In the conservation context, increased land value is only possible when the notion of nature
conservation is construed narrowly. Consider the case of services that enhance the perceived quality
of a neighbourhood such as improving neighbourhood amenity by planting locally indigenous trees
alongside roadways or bringing a wooded scenic backdrop into public ownership. It may be argued,
in true Georgist fashion, that it must be the wider community in the local council area, rather than a
minority of nearby landholders, who should benefit from the consequent increases in local property
values. The fact that the services are not used directly by the landholder, unlike roads and drainage
works, should not make any difference: the property owner has still received an unearned increment
through rising values. It is these increments that need to be passed on to the broader citizenry. But
the problem explained above of extricating the contribution of ‘conservation services’ from all the
other contributing factors still remains.
A further difficulty emerges when one moves from amenity enhancement to biodiversity
conservation. Actions to protect and/or restore the biophysical environment will not always boost
property values. Conservation activity on remote lands, for example, will have no impact on urban
values. There is even the potential for conservation works to adversely affect land values. Consider,
for example, a council proposal to revert a manicured park to its pre-European state. Both local
residents and potential property buyers may dislike the project. Denial of public access to assist
regeneration may mean loss of a popular recreational facility. The re-emergence of unattractive and
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prickly undergrowth may be seen to detract from neighbourhood amenity. Its impact on the local
property market may, therefore, be negative. In similar fashion, preservation of a swampland by
strict zoning controls may stagnate nearby property values. Allowing its transformation to a canal
estate, on the other hand, may see values skyrocket. The clear message here is that the market
cannot be relied upon to respond positively to biodiversity conservation strategies. In this context,
application of the Georgist principle is plainly absurd.
Unlike the Georgist principle, the benefit principle is a direct, municipalised version of the ‘user
pay’ concept wherein the landholder ‘user’ pays, through the rating mechanism, for municipal
services that he or she utilises. It is a direct manifestation of the ‘ratepayer ideology’. It assumes
that council services benefit only those who pay for them.
Throughout municipal history, ratepayer interests have articulated the benefit principle to argue that
it is inequitable for landholders, as Local Government’s only taxpayers, to bear the burden of
funding non-property related services.89 In 1966, for example, even before the burgeoning of
welfare services, Maiden bemoaned the “intolerable burden ... placed on the property owner, who ...
is virtually called upon to finance all local government activities, irrespective of the nature and
extent of the service given”.90 The viewpoint is a direct hangover from an earlier age when a clear
nexus between a far narrower range of council services and ratepayers’ contributions could be
drawn. Yet even well after the expansion of council functions and the advancement of untied
Commonwealth funding, the ‘ratepayer ideology’ has continued to influence local politics. Halligan
and Paris claim that it has “foreclos[ed] policy options” for councils.91 In similar fashion, Mowbray
argues that it promotes concentration on “basic physical works and a relatively orderly system of
land use [control] over which property capital can … gain other advantages”.92 Maloy notes that
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ratepayer demands have made it difficult for councils to justify expending limited rate monies on a
project for the wider community “while the ratepayers believe that only they meet the bill”.93
Of course, in practice, the rate burden is not carried by landholders alone but is passed on, in the
case of rented property, to the tenant or, in the case of commercial property, to the consumer of the
service produced or sold on the premises.94 It may be argued that those who contribute indirectly to
the rate suffer the rawer end of the deal because they do not receive the benefits of increased land
values. But these arguments appear to have failed to make significant inroads in weakening the
‘ratepayer ideology’. Wherever the benefit principle remains the dominant political paradigm in
setting the functional calendar, innovative environmental programs will be difficult to initiate.
Accordingly, the principle does not easily support conservation of biodiversity, which, as noted in
ch 1, is a global resource.95
Limited conservation projects may still be considered to directly benefit ratepayers, such as
traditional civic improvement works. Restoration of bushland in a local park, for example, may
provide popular passive recreational opportunities, as will be discussed further in ch 8.96 But it will
be difficult to identify which ratepayers (or other people who contribute to the rate burden
indirectly) actually enjoy the park. Even people from outside the municipality, who make no
contribution to the rate base whatsoever, may visit the reserve. This is major weakness of the
principle across the board. As the Oakes Inquiry stressed, its “inherent problem ... is that it is often
difficult to determine specifically the person/property which benefits”.97
The example of open space is a relatively simple one because it involves direct usage. The principle
becomes more troublesome when the public benefit is less tangible, as is the case with biodiversity
conservation. Consider, for example, protection of a visually unexceptional but extremely rare and
only recently discovered plant in an inaccessible corner of a shire. Direct enjoyment by ordinary
ratepayers is out of the question. Any immediate benefit of the plant to humankind, other than
providing curiosity for an elite band of scientists, is unknown. The benefit principle provides no
help here at all. Ratepayers may call upon its failure to support their unwillingness to pay for
93
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keeping the plant. It is easy to imagine the reticence of local elected representatives in expending
limited rate moneys on something the benefits of which cannot be readily demonstrated. As a result,
the benefit principle, like the Georgist principle, is plainly incongruous in the context of a modernday council whose functions transcend the direct servicing of ratepayers’ property. Whilst ever it
attracts credence, it will work against the expansion of Local Government into newer roles.
The legislative provisions reveal that the benefit principle is alive and well. An important
justification for introducing the base rate option in 1993 was the argument that those who suffer the
highest rate payments on a purely ad valorem basis have no claim to greater enjoyment of
municipal benefits.98 The same principle is also evident in the special rate provisions.99 Section
495(2) LGA 1993 reads:
[t]he special rate is to be levied on such rateable land in the council’s area as, in the council’s
opinion:
(a) benefits or will benefit from the works, services, facilities or activities; or
(b) contributes or will contribute to the need for the works, services, facilities or activities; or
(c) has or will have access to the works, services, facilities or activities.
A council must clearly be able to demonstrate a nexus between the benefit of the service and those
properties subject to the special rate.100 As seen above, this can be a difficult task in relation to
biodiversity conservation ‘services’.101 Where the benefits are diffuse or undiscovered, the task is
impossible. Even if the aims of a project are viewed in narrow conservation terms, such as amenity
enhancement, establishment of a clear property nexus may still be problematic. For example, during
the mid-1990s, a NSW rural council considered the option of using special rates to pay for the aerial
bundling of electricity wires in order to prevent damage from trees and the possible need to remove
majestic street plantings throughout its major township. The project was abandoned, however,
apparently on the grounds of legal difficulties in substantiating a clear connection between the
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works and rateable properties.102 The conclusion is that special rates appear to fail as a strong source
of income for biodiversity conservation activity.
The third justification is the ‘capacity-to-pay’ principle. The Self Inquiry recognised that the
rating system comprises “at least a partial wealth tax”.103 The AURDR Report noted that it
represents “one of the few Australian taxes on wealth”.104 But it is, arguably, an ineffective and
crude one. Unimproved land value - or its modified, current equivalent, ‘land value’ - is scarcely an
accurate reflection of a landholder’s ability to pay. It is easy to point to the ratepayer who is wealthy
in terms of land assets but income poor.105
As noted in ch 3, the pre-1906 system based on assessed annual values was intended to roughly
mirror landholder capacity to pay.106 Interestingly, the very origins of rating in the UK reveal an
early emphasis on a wealth tax concept. As Kirwan observes, “[p]roperty income, in fact, was
[then] the only sort of income available to assess and to tax”.107 But rates have travelled a long
journey since then. Not only have new public policy rationales emerged to justify the system’s
continuation but changes to the basic mechanics of rating, especially the ‘minimum rate’ and ‘base
rate’ options, have muddied any vestigial notion of rates as a direct wealth tax. The base amount
provisions, in particular, enable the reapportioning of the rate burden away from owners of land of
higher values.108 Differential rating, discussed below, enables further manipulation of rate debts.
At a theoretical level, the notion of a wealth tax to fund services whose benefits flow to the broader
community is appealing. This is despite what Thomson describes as a “traditional Australian

102

Personal communication, Cootamundra Council officer, 24 Jan 1996.
Self (1985), op cit n 32 at 15; see also Thomson (1987), op cit n 68 at 32.
104
Australian Urban and Regional Development Review, op cit n 20 at 107.
105
Else-Mitchell (1967), op cit n 25 at 13. For acknowledgement of contrary views, see Oakes, op cit n 27 at
20.
106
See ch 3.
107
Kirwan (1987), op cit n 38 at 15. Kirwan quotes the UK’s Royal Commission on Local Taxation statement
that “the theory which underlay the Act ... upon which the whole system of local government was founded,
seems to have been that the rates were to be a kind of local income tax, toward which every member of the
community should contribute according to his means”.
108
This is amply demonstrated by a modelling exercise undertaken by Bankstown City Council in 1994: see
Appendix to Department of Local Government (NSW), Circular No 94/66: Withdrawal of Minimum Rates
and the Introduction of Base Amounts of Ordinary and Special Rates, 7 Oct 1994. The figures disclose that
residential properties of lowest value in Bankstown (i.e. those falling within the $1-10,000 range, of which
there were thirteen) would have suffered a tenfold increase in annual rates if the system had been
hypothetically switched from a pure ad valorem basis to one with 50% of rates derived from a base amount.
On the other hand, the rates imposed on the most expensive properties (i.e. those falling within the
$1,000,000+ range, of which there were nine) would have been almost halved. Whilst these figures represent
the extremes of the spectrum, they nevertheless undermine the notion of rating as an effective wealth tax.
103

274

opposition to any form of wealth tax”.109 In the conservation context, local efforts to conserve
biodiversity as a global resource may be best funded, on public policy grounds, on a capacity-to-pay
basis by the wider public. But questions arise as to the appropriateness of Local Government
involvement in income redistribution. The Oakes Inquiry stated a firm opinion that fiscal policymaking should be the realm of the Commonwealth and State/Territorial Governments alone.110
Numerous commentators appear to share this view.111 It is easy to appreciate why. As the Oakes
Committee warned, a redistributive role for Local Government would be “piecemeal in
character”.112 Without direction from central government, the vast number of councils across NSW,
all with their individual policy emphases, would mean uneven approaches. In some cases,
parochialism could too easily override the wider public interest. Furthermore, there is the issue that
income may need to be redistributed across Local Government boundaries. In the case of
biodiversity conservation, for example, it may be reasonable to expect urban taxpayers to fund
action in thinly populated regions.
Even if a limited redistributive role is considered acceptable, the problem remains as to whether the
rating system, as it stands, can actually achieve this. As suggested already, its approximation to a
wealth tax has already been severely eroded. But perhaps the most powerful factor condemning its
effectiveness is its regressive nature: that is, as described by the Joint Steering Committee into
Local Government Finances in Australia and New Zealand in 1976, “the lower the householder’s
income the greater the proportion taken by rates”.113 This appears to be one of the most common
criticisms levelled against rating.114 The Self Inquiry criticised it as “the most regressive tax
currently levied ”.115 Significantly, its regressive character may be apparent both within and across
council areas. At the regional scale, landholders in poorer areas pay a higher proportion of their
property values than do their counterparts in wealthier municipalities.116 The result is imbalanced
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revenue-raising capacity and less chance for poorer councils to adopt new functions. Daly sums up
the situation aptly by observing that:
“[w]ealthy areas produce wealthy councils. These can generate substantial rate income
because property values are high … [p]oor councils cannot generate large income from rates
because property values are low, and they have little opportunity for making up the deficit
through other means”.117
The losers are generally non-metropolitan councils, with declining economies and aging
populations, which may well boast significant natural areas. If conservation efforts are seen to
benefit the wider community, it is unreasonable to expect local ratepayers in impoverished regions
to shoulder increasing burdens. Without targeted external assistance, the most likely scenario is that
these councils will give conservation activity low priority, or perhaps not even consider it at all.
Rating inequity can also occur across time. In a study of rate levels and personal incomes in 98
Local Government areas west of the Great Dividing Range between 1981 and 1986, Breen found
that in many cases, the proportion of personal income required to cover rate payments had increased
whilst incomes had fallen in real terms.118 In Conargo Shire, the most extreme example, total real
incomes had dropped by almost 38% whilst the ratio of rates levied to total income rose over
75%.119 Again, the trend appears to be most apparent in rural districts. This leads to a strong
argument that external funding is needed such bodies are to tackle biodiversity conservation
effectively.
It is no surprise that the Oakes Inquiry found “little solace” in the three rationales outlined above.120
So while there is little, if any, agreement on a public policy foundation for rating, how can its
perpetuation be tolerated? There are several reasons. First, history has ensured that rating is a longfamiliar and entrenched tax. Second, rates offer administrative convenience. More than a decade
after the Else-Mitchell Commission issued its findings, Else-Mitchell himself remarked that “[t]he
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main virtue of the rating system ... is the ease of collection”.121 The Oakes Inquiry acknowledged
that “a tax on land value is simple and relatively cheap to administer”.122 The LGSAs lauded the
system on the grounds that “[t]he yield is predictable and administrative costs are relatively low”.123
Rate payments are difficult to avoid or evade,124 thereby providing councils with guaranteed
income.125 Unpaid rates can now be readily recovered.126 It seems, therefore, that rating is likely to
remain due to its familiarity and expediency rather than any philosophical justification. Sixty years
ago, Leech argued that the likelihood of:
“… a practicable alternative improved structure … [being] found is extremely doubtful,
and it is much safer to rebuild on the old, firm foundations … why sacrifice the labour of
340 years?”127
Such comment would not seem out-of-place today. A further factor is that Local Government can
be expected to fiercely guard its own, sole taxing system. The LGSAs argued that rates are
“fundamental” to municipal autonomy, adding that “[m]easures designed to reduce Local
Government reliance on rates are frequently ill-conceived”.128
All this suggests that rates are a permanent fixture. Whilst a fundamentally different taxing system
for Local Government is possible in theory,129 in practice it is unlikely. The result is that the
‘ratepayer ideology’ will continue to help stifle any prospect of biodiversity conservation becoming
a core Local Government function across the board, despite all the rhetoric. It will also undermine
the likelihood of activities being carried out on a regional basis by councils unless ‘local’ benefits
are readily apparent.
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It is not just the case of traditional principles underlying the system being inconsistent with modern
conservation imperatives. As will be seen below, it can be argued that specific features of the
system can also work directly against conservation.
7.2.4

Questioning the Valuation Base

Demands for biodiversity conservation on private land must call into question any revenue raising
system that promotes an ‘incentive to develop’ factor. The broader community may now view
patches of remnant native vegetation as too valuable to be lost to agricultural enterprise,
notwithstanding that land clearance may promise greater economic return to individual landholders.
Whatever might constitute an ‘improved’ use of land in economic terms, as encouraged by the
rating system, might also be the most ecologically disastrous. It is not intended to suggest here that
the rating regime is the most villainous factor behind land clearance. It may not even be a major
element. But whenever it relies on unimproved values on an ad valorem basis, there will always be
tension with conservation strategies on rateable lands. It sends developmental signals to landholders
that are inconsistent with various protective mechanisms, such as offers of conservation grants or
strict zoning controls. The message is almost subliminal: the system seems to be telling landholders
that land left in its undeveloped state is not what the rating agency wants.
Other jurisdictions are not wedded to unimproved value, or a modified version of it, as the sole
basis for rating. Three other Australian States provide councils with a choice between valuation
bases, including assessed annual value and capital value.130 It seems, therefore, that a move away
from unimproved value is at least feasible. Such a switch could bring the rating system closer to a
wealth tax. Moreover, it would overcome the ‘incentive to develop’ factor.131 But such a change
would not be easy to achieve. Not only might there be political difficulties associated with a more
transparent wealth tax but there is the sheer practical effort and expense involved in determining
alternative land valuations. Calculating unimproved values, in contrast, is convenient and costefficient as it does not demand detailed inspections of individual properties.132 Nevertheless,
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interstate experience reveals that commitment to unimproved value need not be embedded. Of
course, the problem of uneven revenue-raising capacity between Local Government areas would
still remain.
Significantly, there is already a special subset of properties in NSW where valuation for rating
purposes must take into account certain improvements. Owners of property of major heritage
significance enjoy a reduction in rates through the concept of “heritage valuations” under the
Heritage Act 1977 (NSW) (HA).133 But the scope of such relief is available only to properties listed
on the State Heritage Register.134 Rates are levied on a special value calculated on the strict
assumption that no further improvements may be made and that the current use will remain
unchanged.135 Accordingly, in assessing the rateable value, the NSW Valuer-General is prevented
from taking into account the potential of the land to reach its highest commercial use. The resultant
ad valorem rate is levied, therefore, on an artificially reduced valuation. Because the statutory
notion of heritage extends to the natural environment,136 the mechanism may potentially benefit
owners of listed properties with significant remnant vegetation. But natural heritage is the very poor
cousin of built heritage under the HA.137 The bias towards protecting built heritage under the HA is
overwhelming.138 Despite this, the very concept of ‘heritage valuations’ indicates that legislative
and policy change could afford similar rating benefits to landholders of lands with recognised
biodiversity conservation value.
The issue remains as to whether the statutory concept of ‘land value’, as opposed to pure
unimproved value, has its own conservation implications. In determining ‘land value’, the valuation
process must address specific “land improvements”,139 which comprise:
(a)
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

the picking up and removal of stone;
the improvement of soil fertility or the structure of soil;
the restoration or improvement of land surface by excavation, filling, grading
or levelling, not being works of irrigation or conservation;
the reclamation of land by drainage or filling together with any retaining walls
or other works appurtenant to the reclamation; and
underground drains.140

Accordingly, crucial steps in converting natural landscapes into productive farmlands must be taken
into account. Although final improvements, such as fencing and cropping, are disregarded, the most
environmentally destructive processes, such as land clearance and changing natural drainage
patterns, are relevant.
The original unencumbered notion of unimproved land value was altered following
recommendations by the 1960 ‘Committee of Inquiry on Certain Matters Arising under the
Valuation of Land Act 1916-1951’ (the ‘Bridge Inquiry’).141 Parliament inserted the amendments
mainly to render the valuation process easier. As the Bridge Inquiry considered:
“[t]he valuing authority and the land holder should not be faced with the unsatisfactory task
of determining, firstly, the extent and density of the original timber or scrub long after it
has ceased to exist, and secondly, the probable present cost of clearing the land as
originally timbered when it is unusual to find this class of work being still performed. It can
readily be appreciated, therefore, that in determining unimproved values in respect of
pastoral and agricultural lands, the most contentious matters are those relating to the
amounts allowed for the treatment of timber, scrub and undergrowth.142
The idea was to remove the difficult task of identifying and quantifying invisible improvements,
such as land clearance, when trying to conceive a picture of the original condition of the land and
calculating the cost of converting it into its current state. A second reason was to remove perceived
rating inequities between landholders on naturally treeless plains, such as the Monaro region, and
those on lands that had been cleared many years previously. The argument went that in the case
where both types of farmland enjoyed similar production capacities, those occupying naturally stark
landscapes suffered unfair rate burdens. Owners of previously forested country enjoyed lower rates
due to reduced valuations based on land in its unproductive condition.143
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The version of unimproved value was never modified for conservation purposes. The Bridge
Inquiry, in outlining its arguments, supported the ‘incentive to develop’ factor by stressing that “it
would not be desirable to discourage the development of land”.144 Yet it seems that assessments
based on this refined version of unimproved value may actually help to protect natural areas by
default. Consider, for example, the hypothetical scenario of two adjacent properties: the first was
cleared for farming during the 1800s under the ‘colonial’ vision whilst the other still remains intact
with remnant forest ecosystems. Resting on the assumptions that farming represents the highest
economic use for both parcels, and that there is no ready market for the second allotment in its
undisturbed state, it is clear that the forested land must attract a lower valuation. Factoring in the
price of the ‘need’ to clear it for productive purposes pushes the value downwards. As a result,
lower rate payments may provide an unintended incentive to keep the land in its natural condition.
This ‘unintended incentive’ to leave remnants alone in order to enjoy lower rate bills tends to turn
the ‘incentive to develop’ factor on its head, if only in the context of potentially productive lands.
This issue has not been lost on farming interests, who argued before the Else-Mitchell Commission
that moving away from pure unimproved value would only create a “tax upon management”,145 reechoing the legislature’s original motivation for converting to unimproved valuations back in 1906.
The Else-Mitchell Commission, however, was unmoved. In noting the availability of income tax
deductions enjoyed by rural producers for the costs of various improvements, it concluded that
modifying unimproved value would “not be a discouragement to improvement and increased
productivity”.146
It would be unwise to draw rapid conclusions on this ‘unintended incentive’ without empirical
research. It may be more apparent than real. Even if it does wield some effect, it remains a hamfisted means to achieve biodiversity conservation. Nowhere is it clearly expressed that landholdings
will attract lower rates due to their conservation values. Moreover, any system that produces good
results by default will hardly promote attitudinal change. A backdoor, non-transparent approach is
inconsistent with the emphasis now placed on greater community involvement in biodiversity
conservation. The idea of an ‘unintended incentive’ is nevertheless compelling. A system rooted in
the promotion of headlong rural development providing even a morsel of enticement to ratepayers
to keep natural areas intact is ironic. It would have been inconceivable to the convenors of the
Bridge Inquiry with their narrow ‘national vision’ focus on removing obstruction to development
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and simplifying valuations. The quote from its report cited above, with its reference to “timber,
scrub and undergrowth” that had “long ... ceased to exist” provides a grim reminder of the extensive
loss of natural ecosystems.
It may be argued that the ‘unintended incentive’ factor is of little consequence because there are so
few places left in NSW comprising vast expanses of undeveloped landscapes in private hands, such
as the hypothetical property referred to earlier. Yet throughout most of NSW, landholdings can still
include patches of remnant vegetation surrounded by farmland. Depending on the size of such
remnants, the cost of clearing and the potential economic productivity of the land, lower land values
and rates may still award an ‘unintended incentive’ to the landholder. But again, the result is an
indirect way to achieve conservation. A revised valuation structure with far clearer objectives,
including a modified version of the ‘heritage value’ subsystem, would be far more effective.
7.2.5

Differential Rates

In their criticism of the rating system as a source of ‘perverse incentives’ for landholders to develop
their lands, Young et al stress that the problem is most apparent when “farmland is rated at a lower
rate than land kept for nature conservation purposes”.147 This is the case in NSW. Whilst differential
rating in NSW is voluntary for councils,148 the practice is widespread.149 Whenever a council levies
differential rates, the LGA 1993 demands that the lowest ad valorem rate be allocated to lands
categorised as ‘farmland’.150 The LGA 1993 also gives councils the option to create sub-categories
within the four primary categories (i.e. ‘farmland’, ‘mining’, ‘residential’ and ‘business’),151
although any ‘farmland’ sub-category land must still be rated at a lower level than all other
properties.
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In considering differential rating, the Oakes Committee traced its origins in NSW to amendments in
1934 requiring rural municipalities to levy a lower rate over ‘urban farm land’.152 The idea was to
shield rural producers on properties nearby townships from rate escalations flowing from increased
land values. Later amendments culminated in the Local Government (Rating) Amendment Act 1974
(NSW), which conferred discretion on all councils to levy a lower rate on rural land.153 In
introducing the provisions, the Minister for Local Government stressed the need to overcome “the
inequitable rate burden ... borne within a country shire by primary producers carrying on their
occupation in close proximity to but not within a municipality”.154 Whilst agreeing with this aim
(but not the mechanics of the bill), the Shadow Minister remarked that:
“[s]ome land used for farming purposes has risen in value a thousand times, forcing genuine
farmers to pay rates that are a great burden. Some of them have even been forced from their
farms”.155
Differential rural rates are now commonplace throughout non-urban areas, including even remote
districts where development pressure is non-existent and the threat of rate hikes from increasing
land values is negligible. It seems, therefore, that the original purpose of rural rates to protect
certain vulnerable landholders has waned. Rural rates now appear to mainly comprise an embedded
subsidy to primary producers across NSW, regardless of equity issues and location. As Howard
notes:
“[m]ost differential rating systems appear to be directed towards raising less revenue from
certain groups, particularly farmers. The lower level of rural rating in rural Local
Government authorities represents a major concession to the farming community and often
amounts to a disproportionate sharing of the rate burden between urban and rural
ratepayers”.156
Accordingly, a special form of income redistribution in favour of farmers is tolerated, despite the
general concerns raised earlier about putting Local Government in this role. Young et al’s argument
is that the expectation of rating discounts may encourage landholders with remnant vegetation to
convert land into farms, or even clear their lands to make their lands appear to be farms.157
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Section 515 of the LGA 1993, which stipulates those lands to be classified ‘farmland’ and thereby
attract any lower rate, reads:
(1)

(2)
(3)

[l]and is to be categorised as “farmland” if it is a parcel of rateable land valued as one
assessment and its dominant use is for farming (that is, the business or industry of
grazing, animal feedlots, dairying, pig-farming, poultry farming, viticulture,
orcharding, beekeeping, horticulture, vegetable growing, the growing of crops of any
kind, forestry, or aquaculture within the meaning of the Fisheries Management Act
1994, or any combination of those businesses or industries) which:
(a) has a significant and substantial commercial purpose or character; and
(b) is engaged in for the purpose of profit on a continuous or repetitive basis
(whether or not a profit is actually made).
Land is not to be categorised as farmland if it is rural residential land.
The regulations may prescribe circumstances in which land is or is not to be
categorised as farmland.158

The formula is very similar to the corresponding provision under the former Local Government Act
1919 (NSW).159 It was amended in 1988 to incorporate the “commercial purpose” and “profit” tests
in line with judicial decisions.160 In introducing the amendments, the then Minister for Local
Government, Mr D Hay, explained that:
“[t]he Government wants to help councils to weed out those persons who have exploited the
vagueness of the current rural rating provisions of the Act to obtain rate concessions when in
fact they have not been genuine primary producers”.161
Clearly, the tests were intended to restrict the concession to ‘genuine’ farmers.
The long list of ‘acceptable’ farming land-uses in the first paragraph of s 515 is also very close to
the pre-1993 approach, although several uses were added by the LGA 1993.162 The earlier list was
similar to the original approach applied to “urban farmland” more than sixty years ago, updated in
1974 to embrace forestry and oyster farming.163 Because the description is old, it is hardly
158
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surprising that it fails to mention management of land for conservation. It originates from a time
dominated by the ‘national’ vision when rural lands were viewed as nothing more than an
agricultural resource to be exploited.
Even if management of land for conservation purposes was expressly mentioned, or was somehow
able to be squeezed into one of the listed uses, it would still need to overcome the hurdle of the
“commercial purpose” and “profit” tests. This is a major problem. Conserving biota in situ is rarely
profitable. (As a result, the general approach has been to leave it to the public sector via the public
reserve system.) The rare person intending to ‘use’ her or his own land for biodiversity conservation
purposes is not the type of land manager the legislation seeks to assist through rating subsidies.
It might be argued that conservation of biodiversity on private land may one day lead to profitable
exploitation of biological resources through the development of biotechnology. But in order to
overcome the ‘business’ hurdle, the landholder will still need to demonstrate an enterprise that goes
beyond speculative hope. As the Department of Local Government (NSW) (DLG) has advised, it is
“reasonable for a Council to enquire ... whether there is evidence to support a conclusion that the
activities will be economically viable in the future”.164 A developing market for rare biochemical
that is abundant on a property may be one thing. The faint wish that somewhere on the property is
some aspect of biodiversity whose valuable contribution to humankind will one day be discovered
is another matter altogether.
The definition of farmland does, however, refer to the dominant use. This enables a primary
producer to manage part of her or his land for conservation, or even merely leave remnant
vegetation aside untouched, whilst still enjoying a ‘farmland’ classification due to the paramount
activity. This is particularly relevant in cases where remnant vegetation occurs in fragments on land
used predominantly for agriculture, particularly on the NSW western slopes and plains.
Determining the dominant use will depend on the facts of the particular case, including the amount
of space devoted to each activity, time involved in carrying them out and the general layout of the
site.165
The situation is very different in the case of a landholder who manages land primarily for
conservation purposes. Here, any minor farming activity carried out on the side will be insufficient
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to attract a ‘farmland’ classification. As Binning and Young point out, differential rating “may
penalise owners of bush blocks if they are not classified as rural land”.166 Subject to whether or not
the land can be recognised as “vacant”, as discussed below, the most likely classification will be
“business”. This is the residual category that catches all uses falling outside the other defined
categories.167 Significantly, ‘business’ lands are traditionally rated at a higher level than the other
categories.168 As a result, differential rating may not only provide a ‘perverse incentive’ to clear
land but may carry a substantial disincentive against keeping large tracts of uncleared land intact.
The bizarre prospect of a business categorisation for ‘bush blocks’ is subject to two important
provisos. First, if the land is occupied by a dwelling, it may fall within the scope of “rural
residential” and thereby attract a residential classification and, probably, a lower rate.169 This
requires, inter alia, that the parcel be “not less than 2 hectares and not more than 40 hectares in
area”, thereby instantly excluding larger parcels, which are far more suitable for biodiversity
conservation than isolated fragments.170
The second proviso relates to “vacant” land. This is a crucial issue. Section 519 LGA 1993 reads:
[i]f vacant land is unable to be categorised under section 515, 516 or 517, the
land is to be categorised:
(a)
if the land is zoned or otherwise designated for use under an environmental planning
instrument - according to any purpose for which the land may be used after taking into
account the nature of any improvements on the land and the nature of surrounding
development; or
(b) if the land is not so zoned or designated - according to the predominant categorisation
of surrounding land.
This means that throughout the vast swathes of land zoned ‘rural’ or non-urban’ under the EPAA,
where agriculture is invariably permissible (usually without development consent), a ‘farmland’
categorisation for ‘bush blocks’ is highly likely. This will be even more certain when working farms
exist nearby. A ‘bush block’ surrounded by a sea of farming would, therefore, attract farmland
rating subsidies. A ‘residential’ categorisation would be out of the question. In the case of tracts of
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uncleared land where there are few or no farms, such as rugged terrain of the Great Dividing Range,
a ‘business’ categorisation is still a real possibility, especially if the land is zoned ‘environment
protection’ and agriculture demands consent.
A critical question remains. If land that is not used for traditional farming purposes (i.e. land falling
outside the description under s 515(1) LGA 1993 quoted earlier) can still be categorised as
‘farmland’, albeit vacant farmland, to what degree can improvements be carried out, and activities
undertaken on the land, before the property loses the ‘vacant’ classification? For example, could
land that is actively managed for conservation purposes alone, upon which large fences and wildlife
watering devices have been installed, be regarded as ‘vacant’? Parliament’s failure to define
‘vacant’ makes these questions difficult to answer. But s 519(a), in its reference to “the nature of
any improvements on the land”, indicates that at least some level of development is acceptable. The
point at which development becomes so intense that the land is regarded as occupied is unclear.
Once it drops outside the vacant ‘farmland’ category, it will be designated ‘business’.
The situation where the manager lives on the property is more certain. If there is a dwelling on the
land, a ‘vacant’ classification is irrelevant. Depending on the size of the property, as seen above, it
could then only be classified as either ‘rural residential’ - and thereby ‘residential’ - or ‘business’.
The exception is where conservation activity is subsidiary to agriculture as the dominant use. As
noted earlier, the s 515(1) LGA 1993 formula still labels such land ‘farmland’. Accordingly, it
seems that whilst the differential rating system discriminates against ‘bush blocks’, it may benefit
conservation as long as it comprises a sideline activity.
Several commentators refer to opportunity for councils to create ‘conservation sub-categories’ to
provide rating concessions to landholders who conserve remnants on their lands. Bateson suggests
that authorities may devise sub-categories “based upon conservation outcomes” for both ‘farmland’
and ‘residential’ areas.171 Cripps et al refer to the possibility of establishing conservation subcategories under all primary categories, with particular reference to a “farmland – conservation”
sub-category offering lower base and ad valorem amounts.172 The problem, however, is that the
LGA 1993 strictly limits the factors that may be taken into account in developing sub-categories. In
the case of ‘farmland’, a council may only distinguish sub-categories “according to the intensity of
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land use or economic factors affecting the land”.173 The focus, therefore, appears to be on the scale
of farming. In applying a conservation sub-category to a property, a council may therefore consider
only the restriction of farming activity rather than the degree of any conservation action.
All of this may be of little practical effect. As Binning and Young observe, “it is difficult to judge
the extent to which differential rating affects land clearance”.174 But at a theoretical level, it is clear
that differential rates can undermine conservation policy efforts concerning private land. The very
possibility of paying ‘business’ rates for ‘bush blocks’ sends the wrong signal to anyone interested
in keeping remnants intact. Even if the land value is so low - due to, for example, remoteness or
physical development constraints - that a higher ‘business’ rating would have little practical effect,
the symbolism is still wrong. In cases where lower ‘farmland’ rating is guaranteed, such as where
remnants are conserved on a working farm, the concessions are still directed at the limited extent of
agriculture rather than conservation outcomes. All this reflects the developmental origins of the
rating system. Manipulating a system for a purpose for which it was never designed is inherently
problematic.
This presents a ripe area for legislative reform. The best option would be for Parliament to devise a
new rating category that rewards good conservation activity with lower rates, funded by
reimbursements from central government in similar fashion to pensioner discounts. An alternative is
to alter the ‘farmland’ definition so that it captures land managed for conservation. Binning and
Young appear to support this latter approach.175 Whilst this would remove statutory obstacles to
devising conservation sub-categories, the ‘commercial purpose’ and ‘profit’ tests would still need to
be revised in order to safeguard non-profitable conservation activity. Whilst the ‘farmland’ heading
is retained, the symbolism is still skewed towards agriculture. Firmer change is required.
A further policy option, which may or may not be tied into differential rate mechanisms, is the
introduction of rate rebates – i.e. direct discounts or reimbursements - for private landholders who
keep, and preferably manage, their land in its natural state.176 There is interstate experience with
rebates for environmental purposes, notably in Victoria and Queensland.177 Almost a decade ago,
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Stevenson and Durkin described how the (former) Victorian Shire of Eltham offered a rate rebate of
up to 40% to landholders with significant vegetation who agreed to undertake approved
“conservation works”.178 The NSW LGA 1993 fails to expressly authorise rate rebates, with the
exception of mandatory rebates for eligible pensioners.
A potential concern about awarding lower rates to managed ‘bush blocks’, whether by low
differential rating or direct rebates, is the argument raised earlier that Local Government is not an
appropriate level of government to be involved in income distribution. But in view of the fact that
rural producers have enjoyed reduced rates for decades, the argument holds little force. The bigger
problem is that biodiversity is spread unevenly across Local Government areas, meaning that the
burden will fall more heavily on some councils than others. Those councils with large expanses of
uncleared lands may well be the least able to afford reduced revenue. If creation of rating
conservation incentives is voluntary, financially strapped councils may be unwilling to reduce their
income any further. This again raises the idea of reimbursement to councils for ‘conservation
subsidy’ from the wider public purse, perhaps administered on a bioregional basis.
7.2.6

Manipulating the Rate Base

There is anecdotal evidence that some council personnel, especially elected representatives, tend to
welcome development at any cost on the grounds of increased rate revenue. Perhaps this is what
TASQUE had in mind when it referred to the “market based property system upon which Councils
must depend for a significant proportion of their income” as a major barrier to Local Government
making “significant contributions to ecological sustainability”.179 But the idea of ‘more
development means more rates’ is simplistic. Because rates are based on a modified version of
unimproved land value, neither the approval nor subsequent carrying out of a proposed
development should make any difference to the property valuation and subsequent rate payments. It
is at the point of rezoning where the value may change. As planning controls determine the extent to
which land may be developed for maximum economic gain, they comprise essential ingredients in
calculating property market value.180 Vacancy is irrelevant.
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Even if land values are increased, a rise in rates does not automatically follow. In theory, if a
council does not wish to expand its services, higher land values should lead to a drop in the actual
rate in the dollar. A larger sum of total land values - i.e. the rating base - means that a lower
percentage may be struck in order to raise the desired amount. In practice, however, increased
responsibilities and community expectations mean that councils will want to increase their rating
income as far as practicable. But as noted earlier, the combination of rate pegging and the political
unpopularity of rate increases will guard against substantial increases. Instead, councils will look to
expanding their rating base.181
Other than obtaining Ministerial consent to increase rates above the prescribed ‘pegging’ figure,
there are two main, related ways by which councils can expand their rating bases. Both open the
door to development, which reflect Local Government’s fixation with economic growth.182 First,
councils may facilitate greater land values through the loosening of planning controls. Less
restriction generally means greater development potential and higher land values. For example,
rezoning rural land for rural residential purposes may boost its value to a significant extent. Whilst
there may be little demand for rural residential allotments in remoter regions, they are highly sought
after at the urban periphery and in biodiversity rich areas such as the NSW North Coast.183 In inland
Local Government areas with decaying economies, even a handful of such allotments would be
attractive. The fate of any remnant vegetation on the land is likely to be of scant concern to a
financially struggling council.
Second, a council may increase the number of taxable properties by creating new allotments
through subdivision approval. Continuing with the above example, the ultimate creation of new
rural residential blocks will clearly provide the council with a larger pool of rateable properties. It is
also likely to spell doom for any remaining biodiversity value of the land. The key message here is
that the rating system, together with the financial pressures on councils, encourages councils to pave
the way for development by making environmental planning instruments less restrictive. This is
consistent with the general push for flexible local planning promoted by the State Government
account limitations imposed by the “general law”. These were seen to include zoning provisions under
planning scheme ordinances.
181
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referred to in ch 6. The consequence is increased discretion when individual proposals are put
forward for approval under the EPAA.
There is also the issue that lands allocated for conservation purposes are not good for rate revenue.
This is the flip side of the ‘more development means more rates’ coin. Lands reserved or dedicated
for conservation under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) (NPWA), including
national parks and nature reserves, fall within the narrow band of properties totally exempt from
rates.184 It is possible that councils may view dedication of lands under the State reserve system in
terms of foregone revenue and thereby resent such action.
In 1997, the NSW Parliament amended the LGA 1993 to extend rating exemptions to include lands
subject to ‘conservation agreements’ made between landholders and the Minister for the
Environment under the NPWA.185 These instruments are an example of conservation by incentive.
A landholder’s decision to enter into a conservation agreement is purely optional. Once in force, a
conservation agreement may require the landholder to, inter alia, undertake “specified activities”,
such as fencing remnants, restricting land use and/or even implementing a plan of management.186
In return, the Minister may, inter alia, offer financial assistance, technical advice and/or arrange the
carrying out of works.187 Significantly, the agreement binds subsequent purchasers of the land.188
Minister Page, upon introducing the amendment, touted the agreements as “an important means of
securing conservation outcomes on private land”.189 But councils may well view them with
suspicion due to reduced rate income.190 They may even see them as less attractive than major
public reserves, such as national parks, because there is no side-benefit of attracting tourists into the
local area.191 In some quarters, the suspicion could sour into opposition on the grounds that councils
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are subsidising a mechanism in which they have no stake. Local Government has no formal role in
initiating or shaping conservation agreements on land other than its own.192
There is a strong argument for central Government reimbursement for income foregone from
conservation agreement rating exemptions.193 Such a program might need to go even further in
order to provide an incentive to councils to encourage ratepayers to enter conservation agreements.
This could be achieved, perhaps, by manipulating the untied Commonwealth grant formula, as
discussed below, so that councils with conservation agreements within their areas are rewarded with
additional funds. Local Government itself could even be given express statutory authority to enter
conservation agreements with private landholders. The National Local Government Biodiversity
Strategy supports such moves.194 Councils could then dangle the carrot of rate exemptions in front
of owners of biodiversity rich lands. In view of the fact that councils in several other Australian
jurisdictions enjoy the power to enter similar agreements with landholders,195 the idea is hardly
radical. But councils would need external financial and technical assistance.
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7.2.7

Rates and Regional Structures

Rates are a purely local tax, levied only by Local Government and, interestingly, ‘Rural Lands
Protection Boards’ in NSW, which are beyond the scope of this study.196. In contrast, the regional
‘new magistracies’, such as the RVCs, rely on direct funding from State Government. Whilst their
strength will depend on the level of revenue provided, they should be immune from any influence
of the ‘ratepayer ideology’. They draw their funds from a far wider fiscal purse than does Local
Government. In contrast, county councils enjoy all the financial powers of local councils other than
the ability to levy ordinary rates.197 Their power to raise special rates and levy charges on land
reflects their traditional and limited role as the provider of a limited range of ‘housekeeping’
services.
Voluntary municipal structures, such as ROCs, have no authority to raise taxes or charges on
property. Of course, if incorporated, a ROC may exact fees in return for services. But if it enters
functional territory that barely lends itself to a fee-for-service approach, it must rely on
contributions from member councils or compete against other organisations for external grant
moneys. Due to both the ephemeral nature of discretionary grant programs and the collapse of the
Commonwealth’s Local Government Development Program, financial backing from member
councils is critical. As Grounds observes, monetary and in-kind contributions from individual
councils must provide enduring support.198 This means that any real or perceived financial
incapacity on the part of councils, including reluctance to increase rates, must discourage voluntary
regional collaboration. Whilst regional action may help councils to minimise expenditure through
economies of scale,199 this will not be the case in all functional areas. In implementing conservation
strategies at a regional scale, for instance, individual councils are likely to face increased costs
without external assistance. A financially strained council with other priorities will most likely view
regional biodiversity programs as an unnecessary luxury.

196

For the general functions of Rural Land Protection Boards, see Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s
42; for their rating regime, see ss 51 & 58-83.
197
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), s 400(1)(a).
198
R Grounds, Regional Organisations of Councils in Australia (Canberra: AGPS, 1987), 4.
199
M Schulze, Resource Sharing: The Practical Application (Canberra: National Committee on Regional
Cooperation, 1994), passim.

293

7.3

Financial Grants

7.3.1

The Importance of Grants

The unhappy position of the rating system in terms of supporting enhanced biodiversity
conservation means more attention must be paid to grants. External grants can supplement rate
income, address financial inequality between councils and help weaken the iron grip of the
‘ratepayer ideology’. Grants can also aid regional cooperation. As seen in ch 4, the availability of
Commonwealth grants was pivotal in the re-emergence of ROCs during the 1980s. ROCs that have
continued to flourish appear to have been especially proficient in attracting grant money.200
Grants have been important to Local Government since compulsory incorporation, especially rural
councils with limited rate bases.201 Bowman observes that councils, to varying extents, have always
relied on grants and subsidies since the central government originally “prime[d] the pump ... to
encourage fledgeling councils to carry out permitted tasks”.202 Nowadays, poorer councils rely on
grants for their very survival.203 Although they may prefer to rely on rate moneys and be more
autonomous, grants are now an essential part of the financial landscape. In recent years, however,
the ratio of grant revenue has dropped whilst the proportion of rate contributions has generally
increased.204 Whilst this might suggest a growing level of financial independence,205 it more likely
underlines Local Government’s struggle to meet its functional responsibilities. As Daly notes, the
“regular drip-feed of external support systems” is “insufficient to meet enlarged responsibilities”.206
Preparation and implementation of strategies for biodiversity conservation is a prime example.
Grants are either untied or conditional. ‘Federal Assistance Grants’ (FAGs), paid to state grants
commissions by the Commonwealth pursuant to s 96 of the Australian Constitution and
administered under the LG(FA)A, are unconditional. Both the ‘general purpose’ component and the
‘local roads’ element, which together make up the FAGs, are untied. Councils therefore enjoy total
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autonomy as to how the funds are spent.207 Accordingly, there is no assurance whatsoever that the
moneys will be directed towards biodiversity conservation or any other function. According to the
Commonwealth, the object of the ‘general purpose’ component, which forms the majority of FAG
income, is to “strengthen” Local Government and “promote equity between councils”.208 Because
FAGs represent Local Government’s most significant grant income,209 they will be discussed in
more detail below. The only other notable source of untied moneys is the pensioner rebate scheme,
which is small in comparison.
There is also a raft of conditional grants paid by both Commonwealth and State Governments for
specific purposes. These see councils operating primarily as agents of central government. The
AURDR Report refers to a “plethora” of Commonwealth specific purpose grants.210 A good slice is
aimed at children’s and aged care services, originating from the Commonwealth’s entry into Local
Government affairs in the 1970s.211 There is no immediate equivalent for biodiversity conservation
apart from funding programs under the NHT. Conditional grants from the NSW Government
comprise regular funding by specialist agencies for specific tasks, such as payments by the Roads
and Traffic Authority for development and maintenance of classified roads. The overwhelming
proportion appears to be directed at capital intensive services, especially road funding,212 and need
not be considered further here.
A second way to classify grants is according to whether they are guaranteed or applied for at an
individual council’s discretion. Councils receive FAGs automatically.213 Many State Government
specific purpose grants are also assured. In contrast, there is an array of voluntary grants that Local
Government can only seek through submission, with no certainty of success as it competes against
other organisations. These sources are volatile; they alter as governments rewrite policy. An
important source for biodiversity projects, the NHT, will be discussed briefly below.
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7.3.2

Untied Federal Assistance Grants

‘General purposes’ payments are divided between the states and territories on a per capita basis,214
whilst the ‘local roads’ grants are distributed on a well established formula under which each state
and territory receives a fixed share. Interstate variations in municipal functions or local
environmental conditions are therefore not taken into account. Far more effort goes into distribution
by the States and Territories. In accordance with the LG(FA)A, individual state grants commissions
must devise their own distribution formulae in accordance with “national principles” set down by
the Commonwealth Minister.215 Payment to the States and Territories is then subject to
Commonwealth approval.216 Five “national principles” have been declared:
“1. Horizontal Equalisation
... [t]his is a basis that ensures that each local governing body in the State or Territory is able
to function, by reasonable effort, at a standard not lower than the average standard of other
local governing bodies in the State or Territory ...
2. Effort neutrality
... [t]his means as far as practicable, that policies of individual local governing bodies in
terms of expenditure and revenue effort will not affect grant determination.
3. Minimum Grant
4. Other Grant Support
Other relevant grant support provided to local governing bodies to meet any of the
expenditure needs assessed should be taken into account ...
5. Aboriginal Peoples and Torres Strait Islanders
Financial assistance shall be allocated to councils in a way which recognises the needs of
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders within their boundaries”.217
It is apparent immediately that no reference is made to environmental management, let alone
biodiversity conservation. Accordingly, there is no requirement or expectation that state grants
commissions, in devising their formulae, recognise the differing conservation needs between
individual council areas. Moreover, the ‘effort neutrality’ principle ensures there is no reward or
penalty for councils that pursue or ignore particular objectives. Accordingly, a council that has no
conservation policy, or is even hostile to conservation, is treated on the same basis as any other.
Young et al highlight the failure of the system to factor in biodiversity conservation considerations
as a fertile area for reform, arguing that:
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“[i]f biodiversity were included as a consideration by the Grants Commission, local
government would be provided with a financially-attractive incentive to encourage and
support the protection of biodiversity”.218
The argument is attractive. If Local Government is to play a meaningful role in biodiversity
conservation, this should be reflected in its funding system. The NSW system provides a case in
point. The NSW Local Government Grants Commission (LGGC) distributes the roads component
amongst councils according to a formula based on population, road length and extent of bridges.219
There is no element relating to management of remnant communities in rural road reserves.
Allocation of the ‘general purposes’ component is far more complex. The LGGC sums up its
approach as attempting to:
“assess the extent of relative disadvantage between councils. The approach taken considers
cost disabilities in the provision of services on the one hand (expenditure allowances) and an
assessment of revenue raising capacity on the other (revenue allowances)”.220
The revenue allowances are designed to factor in disparities between councils in their revenue
raising capacities. Their calculation is based on a comparison of land values between council areas
using a hypothetical rate in the dollar. This enables councils with relatively low rate bases, such as
those in economically stagnant rural areas, to be recognised as disadvantaged and given a positive
weighting to boost funding. It thereby lessens their reliance on rate revenue and, at least in theory,
makes it easier for them to extend their range of functions. In practice, the funds may be used
simply to cushion rate escalation. They provide no guarantee of entry into new functional territory.
The expenditure allowances “attempt to compensate councils for the extent of their relative
disadvantage resulting from issues beyond their control”.221 Different variables are applied to a set
of 21 “functions or areas of expenditure” for which standard measures across the State have been
calculated.222 Notably, none of the listed functions directly refer to management of the natural
environment. Instead, they tend to relate to more traditional property and community-directed
services. Nevertheless, several of the functions potentially encompass conservation activity,
namely:
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•

maintenance of “cemeteries” (in view of the potential of cemeteries to contain remnant
vegetation);

•

“cultural facilities’ (adopting a wide approach to the concept to embrace indigenous icons);

•

planning and building services” (including planning for biodiversity conservation, as
discussed in chapter six);

•

“recreation” (including conservation of remnant communities on open space, as discussed
in more detail in chapter eight);

•

noxious plants and pest control” (including ecosystem regeneration by weed eradication);
and

•

two functions dealing with rural road maintenance - i.e. – ‘sealed’ and ‘unsealed’ roads (in
view of the potential for road corridors to provide biodiversity reservoirs).

In practice, however, the LGGC describes these functions in such narrow terms that biodiversity
conservation objectives seem be overlooked. ‘Town Planning’, for instance, has been previously
merely described as “housing and community amenities”.223 Admittedly, the descriptions are not
definitive in terms of limiting potential expenditure disability factors. But the nature of the variables
reflects a narrow perspective. In the case of allocating money for cemeteries, for example, the
LGGC only takes into account “population distribution” in order to recognise “costs of staff travel
and duplication of services”.224 Apart from a variable relating to noxious plant control, which
concerns levels of weed infestation,225 there is only one that clearly encompasses a council’s local
biophysical environmental conditions: one of eight variables applied to the ‘Planning and Building
Services’ cost standard is “environmental sensitivity”.226 Based on information provided by the
NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA), the LGGC divides councils into five categories “on
the basis of environmentally sensitive areas”.227 This approach is a relatively recent development.228
In 1999/2000, the LGGC increased the weighting for ‘environmental sensitivity’ to “better reflect

223

Local Government Grants Commission (NSW), Annual Report 1999/2000, 44.
Local Government Grants Commission (NSW), Annual Report 2002/2003, 54.
225
Ibid at 65.
226
Ibid at 60.
227
Ibid.
228
The Local Government Grants Commission (NSW) (LGGC) refers to the “restructur[ing of] the measure
and weighting applied to environmental sensitivity” as a “highlight” of the 1999/2000 year: Local
Government Grants Commission (NSW), Annual Report 1999/2000, 14. Prior to 1999/2000, the Local
Government Grants Commission (LGGC) combined the concepts of ‘heritage’ and ‘environment’ and, on
advice from the then Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, based its disability scores “on issues such as
the age of settlement, development pressure, and areas of particular natural environmental sensitivity”: Mr C
Mather, LGGC officer, written correspondence, 2 May 1997.
224

298

changes in the State’s legislative requirements and the responsibilities faced by [councils]”.229 But
because ‘environmental sensitivity’ is only one of over 60 variables, the impact of the change will
be minimal. Nevertheless, it at least conveys welcome recognition of Local Government’s emerging
role in managing the natural environment.
Current rankings of local government areas for ‘environmental sensitivity’ appear to adopt a
selective approach to gauging disability. The EPA acknowledges that the process involves
“subjective assessment”, with limited resources preventing “a more rigorous and objective”
evaluation.230 Of 177 councils (as at March 1999), ten (5.6%) are listed as exhibiting “extreme”
environmental sensitivity whilst 24 (13.6%) are earmarked “very high”. Forty six (30%) are ranked
as “average or below”.231 It is difficult to discern an obvious pattern. Some of the ‘winners’ are
councils with expanding populations on Sydney’s periphery, authorities in popular coastal locations
and, curiously, councils in the New England region. Most of the ‘losers’ are small councils on the
NSW western slopes and plains, including the majority in the decimated ‘NSW South-western
Slopes’ IBRA Bioregion232 and other rural areas where land clearance has been rife, such as the
remote Bogan Shire.
Notwithstanding the questionable classification system, the fact that ‘environmental sensitivity’
wields such little influence on individual grant levels refects a feeble attempt to weave biodiversity
conservation costs into the overall equation. This is lamentable. Not only is biodiversity
conservation relegated to a minor function but there is scant compensation to those councils
carrying the heaviest conservation burden. Young et al, in generalising about all State Local
Government Grants Commissions, contend that the “process ... gives a perverse (unintended) signal
to local governments that they should give preference to economic development rather than the
conservation of biodiversity”.233 This is because many of the variables reflect population levels and
development factors rather than the natural environment. There is substantial scope for the formula
to be revised to give far greater weight to conservation needs. A bigger step would be to partially
dispense with the ‘effort neutrality’ principle in order to remunerate councils that achieve
worthwhile conservation outcomes. This would require major change to the system. It is most
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unlikely due to the CGC’s recent endorsement of the principle.234 Alternatively, a second regime
directed specifically at biodiversity conservation that works alongside the FAG regime, could be
established. Of course, this would demand substantial political and financial commitment.
7.3.3

Specific Purpose Federal Grants

The biggest source of grants for specific conservation projects by Local Government is, by far, the
Commonwealth’s NHT, established by the Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 1996 (Cth)
(NHTAA) and funded by the partial sales of Telstra.235 According to the Commonwealth
Government, the NHT “represents a transfer from investment in a telecommunications company to
an investment in natural capital”.236 The NHT incorporated the National Landcare Program initiated
by the Hawke Government in 1989, which had already provided an umbrella for several
conservation funding programs utilised by Local Government.237 It expanded its portfolio to further
projects such as the (former) ‘Native Vegetation Initiative’,238 which contained ‘Bushcare’.239 One
of the specific purposes of NHT expenditure is “environmental protection”,240 defined to include,
inter alia, “conserving or restoring biological diversity”.241 The NHTAA requires the relevant
Minister, when issuing grants, to take into account the principles of ESD,242 thereby confirming its
position as a ‘second-generation’ environmental statute.
The guidelines to applicants for NHT funding state that:
“priority is given to projects which improve the condition of existing native vegetation or
revegetate cleared land with local native species, especially those that help conserve the
habitat of endangered species or ecological communities”.243
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The emphasis appears to be on active management and works. This is confirmed by the
Commonwealth’s own advice to Local Government on Bushcare, which refers to support “by
providing technical assistance and funding to develop and implement on-ground projects”.244 Whilst
relatively few grants have provided for employment of new officers,245 there are examples of grants
for preparation of strategies or plans of management to identify future action. For example, in
1998/99, Port Stephens Shire received $16,000 for a ‘Vegetation and Biodiversity Management
Plan’ whilst (former) Nymboida Council obtained $3,600 for a ‘Roadside Vegetation Management
Plan’.246
In 1999/2000, NSW councils received about $1.52M for 41 projects from Bushcare funds, out of a
total of approximately $7.8M awarded nationally to 131 Local Government projects.247 Councils
attracted only about 3.4% of all Bushcare revenue in that year. Councils also receive grants under,
inter alia, the National Landcare Program (NLP), although the amounts are even smaller.248 The
NLP funded 45 projects by Australian councils, including only nine in NSW, at an overall cost of
about $3.37M comprising a mere 0.9% from a total national pool of $381.22M. Whilst such grants
may be exciting for individual councils, they are small beer. In 1999/2000, Bushcare grants
comprised a mere 0.028% of total council revenue in NSW.249 After the launch of the NHT, Pittock
highlighted the fact that the amount allocated by the Commonwealth to its Environment Program in
1996/97 comprised only 0.21% of its projected overall expenditure.250 And Local Government
receives only a very small component.
Importantly, the NHT has a strong regional component. The Commonwealth has encouraged
regional bodies, including ROCs, to apply for ‘devolved grants’.251 If successful, the regional body
becomes responsible for determining applications from sub-regional organisations, including
councils, mostly for ‘on-ground works’ supported by regional strategy. An impressive example
involved over $5000,000 awarded to the Inner Metropolitan Organisation of Councils (IMROC) to
determine applications for, and allocate funding to, Sydney councils to “undertake initiatives
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recommended under the Green Web Sydney action plan”.252 This will support projects beyond onground works, including education programs and even the development of biodiversity-friendly
plans under the EPAA.253
Putting the question of regional approaches aside, reliance on specific grant income to achieve
biodiversity conservation at the local level raises serious problems. First and foremost, experience
shows that the amount of moneys is small. Whilst strategic planning exercises and site surveys
demand costly expertise, on-ground conservation work is extremely labour intensive. Kirkpatrick
observes that the sheer cost of bushland regeneration makes dependence on volunteers
mandatory,254 whilst Spies points out that training and supervising volunteers draws heavily on
limited funds.255
A second issue is that one-off grants have limited life spans. When the money runs out, there may
be no other funds to allow the project to continue. This could mean, for instance, that an
expensively produced strategy may never be implemented. It could also lead to on-ground
conservation efforts having no follow-up activity, with little attention to long-term implications. On
the other hand, a single grant may catalyse organisational change, which Jones describes as:
“… the ‘flypaper’ effect of grants (meaning that the money sticks where it hits). This refers to
the process whereby councils accept grants and increase spending on new activities, but do
not revert to their previous spending policies after the grants are cut back or eliminated. The
grants often take councils into new spending areas”....256
The ‘flypaper’ effect simply means a reapportioning of spending priorities. But in a climate of
increasing responsibilities imposed on financially strapped councils, this is likely to be uncommon.
In most instances, biodiversity conservation is likely to receive short shrift once the grant moneys
dry up.
A third and critical problem, which will not necessarily disappear even if grants are augmented in
terms of both size and duration, is that applications for funding are entirely discretionary. Only
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those authorities with a commitment to conservation will apply. Even if a council is interested, it
will still need an up-to-date knowledge of relevant schemes and expertise in preparing submissions.
This ability will hardly be spread evenly. Councils with limited staff struggling to meet basic
functions will be especially disadvantaged unless regional cooperation can be ignited and there is a
local ‘champion’ to light the fuse.
7.4

Conclusion

As the National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy argues, Local Government’s “limited
taxing powers” demand “additional funding from central Governments”.257 But as suggested
already, the rating system is here to stay. Councils will fight any major overhaul that threatens their
own taxing power, which affords most of Local Government’s functional autonomy. Once this is
accepted, there is strong argument for statutory change to help soften the ‘incentive to develop’
factor in situations where conservation should take priority.
An immediately obvious opportunity for statutory amendment is formulation of a new differential
rating category for private lands managed for acceptable conservation purposes. Even if this makes
little cash difference for landholders in remote places, the symbolism crucial. Consideration may
also be given to legislative change, such as allowing rate rebate mechanisms for landholder
conservationists, introducing a different valuation method for recognised ‘biodiversity lands’
(thereby following the example of ‘heritage’ properties) or even exempting such lands from rating
altogether (in similar fashion to properties subject to conservation agreements, perhaps entered into
by NSW Local Government itself). The major problem with such actions is that Local
Government’s own funds will be limited even further, with some councils carrying a far heavier
burden than others.
The only answer is increased external funding. Because the above changes may merely tinker with
the rating system, stronger financial assistance from central government is crucial. After all, as
highlighted throughout this study, biodiversity is a global resource. It is argued here that it is the
role of the Commonwealth Government, as the signatory to the Biodiversity Convention,258 to
subsidise necessary action. But if the broader community is to pay for biodiversity conservation, is
it wise to leave the detailed on-the-ground decisions solely to local communities? Is it likely that
local councils may hold attitudinal stances towards the benefits of conservation that may work
against basic biodiversity principles? This will be the main issue in the following two chapters.
257
258

Australian Local Government Association & Biological Diversity Advisory Council, op cit n 1 at 14.
Convention on Biological Diversity, entered into force 29 Dec 1993, ATS 1994 No 2.

303

CHAPTER EIGHT
FACILITATING PICNICS AND NATURE RAMBLES:
CONSERVING NATURE FOR RECREATION ON MUNICIPAL OPEN SPACE
8.1

Prelude

This chapter is the first of two about common attitudes concerning the benefits of conserving the
biophysical environment. The chapters do not cover all environmental outlooks. But each position
is especially relevant to Local Government. Moreover, they demonstrate potential conflict with
biodiversity conservation. In this chapter, the focus is on the provision and management of
recreational open space.
Key strategic documents acknowledge substantial scope for the objectives of biodiversity
conservation and provision of recreational services to be met together. The preamble to the
Biodiversity Convention states that the contracting parties are “conscious of the ... recreational …
values of biological diversity and its components”.1 In listing the advantages of protecting
biodiversity, the National Biodiversity Strategy specifies “recreational benefits of our ecosystems
are highly valued by an increasing number of people”.2 The NSW Biodiversity Strategy informs that
“biodiversity is highly valued” for “recreational … reasons”.3 The NSW Government’s own
guidelines on managing urban bushland assert that “[a]ny natural area will be suited to a range of
recreational opportunities”.4 The National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy identifies
“recreation areas for the local community” as a “direct benefit” of biodiversity conservation.5 The
main purpose of this chapter is to seriously question the ability for recreational and biodiversity
objectives to be met together by Local Government. As will be seen, there is a clear disjuncture
between the two.
Recreation is an extremely broad term. In the Local Government context, it extends beyond the use
of sportsgrounds to civic squares, botanical gardens and, importantly, bushy reserves. It can also
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embrace built facilities, such as pools and gymnasia, and even educational programs. For the
purposes of this thesis, the notion is restricted to recreation on public open space.
The chapter commences with the history of open space management by NSW Local Government,
which established a mindset that has not altogether disappeared. It then moves on to current
approaches, emphasising the recreation/conservation conflict. It then considers the means by which
Local Government can bring lands into its own possession. Finally, the chapter focuses on relevant
aspects of key legislative frameworks, adding to earlier discussion on ‘community lands’ under the
Local Government Act 1993 (1993) (LGA 1993) and ‘environmental planning instruments’ (EPIs)
under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA). A common theme is
that Local Government tends to commonly approach nature conservation with a recreational
perspective rather than concerned with biodiversity. As Farrier suggests, “it has been taken for
granted that nature conservation goes hand-in-hand with the provision of passive public
recreation”.6 This chapter puts this assumption, in the context of Local Government open space,
under scrutiny.
8.2

Historical Background to Local Open Space Management

The history of public open space management in NSW is odd. During the mid-nineteenth century,
the NSW colonial government was eager to shed day-to-day responsibility for maintaining
parklands, recognised as a ‘wastebin’ activity. Enactment of the Public Parks Act of 1854
authorised appointment of independent trustees to manage Crown open space “for the purpose of
recreation health and enjoyment of inhabitants”7 (the first national parks in NSW were also
established under this Act8). Three years later, the Municipalities Act of 1858 allowed Local
Government to manage “botanical gardens or other public places of recreation”.9 Both trustees and
municipalities were empowered to make regulations for open space lands under their own care and
6
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control.10 Accordingly, a dual system of park management developed which, according to
Larcombe, “created some friction” between the rival institutions.11 In 1884, a new Public Parks Act
permitted councils to act as trustees for Crown land reserved for public purposes.12 But historically,
the NSW Government preferred to appoint private trustees rather than councils.13 This twin regime
of trust and council managed lands still continues, albeit in modified form.
According to Powell, nineteenth century town authorities tended to be “heavily elitist” in their
provision of leisure services by concentrating on the “civic trinity” of library, art gallery and
museum.14 Any municipal parklands were centrally located nearby such facilities, including also
churches, courthouses and banks,15 and perhaps more likely, directly outside the municipal
chambers. They were designed to augment civic pomp. The emphasis would have been on aesthetic
dignity rather than provision of recreational opportunity, let alone the biophysical environment. The
‘colonial’ vision emphasised ornamentation rather than conservation. Interestingly, it seems that
this preoccupation has not altogether disappeared. In 1989, Smith noted that in Warringah Shire (as
it was then known), at Sydney’s beachside northern edge, popular “bushland reserves receive[d]
less funding, by a factor of 10, per hectare than the grounds of the Council Chambers”.16 Figures for
Ku-ring-gai Council, which boasts an impressive 1,100 hectares of bushland under its care and
control,17 indicate a similar position. Couston reveals that in 1998/99, the Council’s budget for
maintaining its formal ‘Station Gardens’ exceeded expenditure on bushland management, on a per
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square metre basis, by almost 75%.18 Clearly, the tradition continues that limited open space
budgets are directed at decorative parks.19
An early but rare example of a statutory provision relating to conservation occurred in the (now
repealed) series of Public Parks Acts, which enabled trustees - including councils from 1884
onwards - to regulate for “the protection of the shrubs, trees, and herbage growing upon the land
vested in them”.20 Local Government’s own legislation contained no analogous provision until the
Municipalities Act of 1867 authorised councils to make by-laws with respect to “planting and
preserving trees and shrubs”.21 The power evaporated in 1906 when the NSW Parliament narrowed
municipal enterprise. However, the LGA 1906 authorised councils to engage in the establishment
and maintenance of “parks and recreation grounds” and “public gardens”.22 This was seen as an
appropriate but optional role for councils. In practice, local authorities extended their nineteenth
century experience by concentrating on orderly parklands. Neat public gardens would have fed the
‘ratepayer ideology’ by making local residential areas more attractive and increasing property
values. Larcombe refers to a surge in local acquisition of local parklands during the early twentieth
century, particularly after WWI.23 Sandercock provides a disturbing example from 1925 when:
“the wealthy Woollahra Council resumed 35 acres from Chinese market gardeners to create a
new park. No doubt the removal of the Chinese heightened the residential respectability of
the area and enhanced local property values”.24
Councils borrowed heavily to expand their open space portfolio when, in accordance with the
‘national vision’, Australia “entered the supposedly golden age of perpetual prosperity”.25 They
wanted to exhibit their proud position in national development by establishing monumental gardens.
The 1909 Royal Commission for the Improvement of Sydney and Suburbs, with its emphasis on
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beautification, wielded considerable influence.26 Proudfoot observes that it led to “a scattering of
suburban parks to make … physical growth aesthetically palatable”.27 Interest in property
acquisition for new parklands was to continue until increases in land values, particularly after
WWII, pared momentum.28 Councils then turned to rely upon developers to transfer lands to
municipal ownership for open space upon subdivision approval. The LGA 1919 required councils,
in considering applications for subdivision approval, to take into account “the amount of public
garden and recreation space to be provided in the land to be sub-divided”.29 This mechanism was
“haphazardly enforced”.30 Nevertheless, it conveniently provided parks without payment, which
remains the main avenue for local open space creation today. Its implications are discussed further
below.
Throughout the twentieth century, the emphasis moved away from establishing formal parklands for
aesthetic purposes to providing local recreational facilities.31 Cunneen refers to the ‘Parks and
Playground Movement’ of the late 1920s and 1930s, an “offshoot of the Town Planning
Association”, led by war historian Bean who fought for suburban recreational space with a heavy
emphasis on active sports to promote community health, especially amongst the young.32 This fell
easily within the ‘national’ vision. Conservation was irrelevant, with sandy and swampy areas
becoming sportsfields.
The LGA 1919 provided far more elaborate provisions than its predecessors, including:
Section 348
(1) The council may provide, control, and manage grounds for public health, recreation,
convenience, enjoyment, or other public purpose of the like nature, including(a) parks
(b) children’s playgrounds, drill-grounds, sports grounds;
(c) gardens.
(2) Such children’s playgrounds, drill-grounds, sports grounds and gardens may be provided
either in public -reserves or on other lands of the council.
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Section 349
The council may improve and embellish public reserves that are under its care, control and
management.
Section 350
In any public reserve under its care, control, or management the council may provide, control
and manage(a) musical entertainments;
(b) chairs for hire to the public;
(c) public refreshment rooms;
(d) buildings for public entertainments conducted or authorised by the council;
(e) public entertainments;
(f) boat sheds for the hire of boats to the public;
(g) boats for hire to the public;
(h) grandstands, pavilions, seats, shelter sheds, picnic kiosks, privies, and other buildings
for the convenience of the public.
These provisions remained unaltered until the statute’s repeal in 1993. They reveal that parks were
places of recreational delight. The words trigger images of sporting spectacles, pleasure boating and
brass bands, similar to activities enjoyed in our earliest national parks. The provisions are the direct
product of their era. What is surprising is that they survived for so long.
Cridland provides the sad example of Darook Park on the Gunnamatta Bay foreshore at Cronulla in
southern Sydney. This contained “dense and sub-tropical” vegetation in its “natural state” until
Sutherland Shire Council ‘improved’ the park during the 1920s by clearing the native undergrowth,
presumably to establish picnic grounds.33
After WWII, civic interest in open space focused more and more on active recreation. The town
planning lobby, bolstered by the pre-war recreation agenda, drove this trend. It encouraged
authorities to broaden their focus beyond traditional engineering functions and embrace notions of
advancing local community wellbeing, in conformity with McAuslan’s ‘ideology of public interest’
referred to in ch 6. After the early 1970s, introduction of untied Federal funding relaxed the
‘ratepayer ideology’ by encouraging services for the wider population, as noted in ch 3.34 Marshall
remarks that the new stream of moneys led to “an expansion of recreational … services”.35 At the
fringe of metropolitan areas, councils were able to take advantage of greenfield sites to develop
sporting facilities to cater for booming populations dominated by young families. In more congested
33
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areas, where few vacant pockets remained, Larcombe notes a pattern of “progressive filching of
parklands by sporting clubs”.36 In 1993, research by Mowbray revealed that recreational
expenditure by councils was dominated by serving active sports needs.37 Facilities for less intensive
recreational pursuits, such as bushwalking or picnicking, present a very different picture.
8.3

Current Approaches

8.3.1

Broad Classification of Open Space Lands

Provision and maintenance of public open space is a core council activity.38 In 1992, Mowbray
noted that councils were “easily the largest government recreation facility provider”, noting a
general trend throughout the 1980s of increased expenditure on local sport and recreation.39 In
1995, Suter observed a decline in the proportion of NSW council budgets allocated to recreation as
a result of financial constraints and efficiency pressures.40 A recent report of the Department of
Local Government (DLG) refers to “an overall decrease of 8.7% from 2000/01 to 2001/02” for
undefined “recreation and leisure services”.41 But recreation still remains a central municipal
function,42 with NSW councils having spent $347.3 million on net recreational and leisure expenses
during 2001/02.43

36

Larcombe (1976), op cit n 11 at 221. For examples of such practice in a ‘middle-ring’ suburban
municipality, see M Sander, “Preservation of Urban Bushland in NSW: Implications for Recreation Facility
Development” in Proceedings of the Metropolitan Prospectives in Parks and Recreation Conference
(Canberra: Royal Australian Institute of Parks and Recreation, 25-29 Oct 1987), passim.
37
M Mowbray, “Unfixing the Game: Sport and Recreation Policy and Local Government” (1993) 11 Urban
Policy and Research 150 at 150; see also Department of Transport & Regional Development (Cth) and
Bureau of Sport & Recreation (ACT), “Active Australia – Initiative for Local Government and the
Community” (1998) (224) Urban Futures Journal 25 at 25; G Spies, “Community in the Bush: Community
Involvement - Is it Working?” in B Diekman (ed), Bushland in our Cities and Suburbs Part 2: Making Bush
Regeneration Work (Sydney: Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 1995), 164.
38
Department of Local Government (NSW), Comparative Information on New South Wales Local
Government Councils 2001/2002 (Sydney: the Department, 2003), 230. See also R Elphinstone & C Johnston,
Recreation Facilities: Needs, Planning and Management (Canberra: AGPS, 1987), 7 & 15; D Osborn & L
Cutts, Enhancing Local Government’s Effectiveness in Natural Resources Management, Volume I: Final
Report (Canberra: Australian Centre for Regional and Local Government Studies, UoC, 1995), 13-14;
Manidis Roberts Consulting, Outdoor Recreation and Open Space: Planning Guidelines for Local
Government (Sydney: Department of Planning (NSW), 1992), 1.
39
M Mowbray, “Local Government Recreation Planning and Equity” (1992) 10(2) Urban Policy and
Research 17 at 17.
40
S Suter, “Changes in Local Government: Implications for Recreation Professionals” (1995) 31(1)
Australian Parks and Recreation 6 at 7.
41
Department of Local Government (NSW) (2003), op cit n 38 at 231.
42
Department of Transport & Regional Development (Cth) and Bureau of Sport & Recreation (ACT), op cit n
37 at 25; NSW Physical Activity Taskforce, Simply Active Everyday: A Plan to Promote Physical Activity in
NSW 1998-2002 (Sydney: NSW Health Department, 1998), passim.
43
Department of Local Government (NSW) (2003), op cit n 38 at 231.

310

In her discussion on challenges for local recreation professionals, who distribute and review funding
for recreational services, Suter suggests:
“[r]ecreation has a very broad focus and recreational professionals require an understanding
of a number of disciplines including parks and reserves planning, sport, cultural
development, urban design, tourism and community services (youth, aged, disability and
children’s services)”44.
The lack of any reference to conservation is lamentable. Howat and Crilley’s survey of municipal
recreational officers in 1995 adds no cheer.45 Respondents were asked to rate, in terms of ‘current’
and ‘future importance’, a list of 59 ‘goal statements’. A pool of 165 officers from different
councils accorded highest ‘current’ priority to the suggested objectives of “maintain[ing] a positive
image” and “ensur[ing] that [their] organisation receive[d] a fair share of the tax dollar”.46 Such
objects are the lifeblood of modern municipal managers. The third most popular goal statement was
“secur[ing] government grants for the provision of services”,47 reflecting Local Government’s
shrinking purse. In terms of ‘goal statements’ of future importance, fiscal issues were outranked
only by the goal of “develop[ing] long range plans and strategies”,48 perhaps mirroring the ‘plan of
management’ requirements under the LGA 1993. Again, it is telling that none of the suggested goal
statements refer to conservation. Biodiversity appears to fall outside the standard recreational
management purview.
Until about the mid-1980s, Local Government planners and park managers made a clear distinction
between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ recreation/open space.49 The differentiation is still common. Modern
councils provide facilities for both. Passive, rather than active, recreation tends to involve more
relaxing pastimes, such as bushwalking along short trails and/or picnicking in scenic shady spots.
During the 1990s and beyond, municipal recreational policy has become more sophisticated. A
major influence has been the ‘recreation opportunity spectrum’ (ROS), developed by the US Forest
Service, which recognises a need to satisfy a range of recreational needs. In its 1992 guidelines on
44
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‘outdoor recreation and open space guidelines’ for Local Government, adopted by the then
Department of Planning (DoP), Manidis Roberts Consulting advocated use of the ROS, describing
it as:
“based on what experiences users gain from a visit rather than what facilities are present. ...
The basis of ROS is that the recreational needs of a community are most likely to be satisfied
if a range of experiences are provided through the provision of a range of settings ... Councils
that have adopted a setting approach include Newcastle, Lake Macquarie, Ku-ring-gai, Coffs
Harbour, Warringah, Wyong and Sutherland.50
Thomas et al hail the ROS as a “valuable aid” for recreation planners but note drawbacks in relation
to lands to be kept in their ‘natural’ state.51 They warn that some ecosystems, such as swampland,
may offer minimal or no recreational opportunity. With its emphasis on recreational benefits,
application of the ROS is of questionable assistance in the conservation context. Manidis Roberts
Consulting recommends a list of “setting classifications” derived from the ROS, ranging from
‘indoor facilities’ and ‘civic spaces’ through ‘outdoor sports facilities’ to ‘bushland’ and
‘undeveloped’.52 The emphasis again appears to be on direct usage of the open space. It is notable
that the “undeveloped” setting is marked as having “no present use”.53 Van Oosterzee also criticises
the ROS for its “utilitarian bias”, lamenting that its questionable use to justify habitat conservation
“reduces the environment to a mere contingency”.54 If biodiversity conservation is to be a serious
objective, the ROS must be used cautiously, if at all.
Local Government by no means enjoys a monopoly over public open space. Most attention is
directed at the vast network of reserves managed by the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service
(NPWS), of which national parks enjoy the “high[est] community status”.55 As observed in ch 2,
national parks have provided the community with special recreational assets since the late
nineteenth century.56 Today, the system furnishes the most widely appreciated public destinations
for those seeking both active and passive recreation in natural settings. At the same time, it

50

Manidis Roberts Consulting, op cit n 38 at 7.
D Thomas, M Canaider & A Wicks, “Application of the R.O.S. and L.A.C. Techniques to Urban Parkland”
in Proceedings of the Open Spaces People Places Conference (Sydney: Royal Australian Institute of Parks
and Recreation, 16-20 Oct 1988), 12/5.
52
Manidis Roberts Consulting, op cit n 38 at 8.
53
Ibid.
54
P Van Oosterzee, “The Recreation Spectrum: Its Use and Misuse” (1984) 16 Australian Geographer 97 at
99.
55
Visions for the New Millennium Steering Committee, National Parks Visions for the New Millennium:
Symposium Workshop Papers (Sydney: National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW), 1998), 15.
56
See ch 2.
51

312

comprises the State’s major vehicle for protecting its native species and ecosystems.57 This should
not mean that Local Government is relegated to the sidelines. For instance, it has land-use planning
powers over private lands for buffer and corridor protection. More importantly in the context of this
chapter, councils manage their own public lands.
Establishment of the NPWS in 1967 was a triumph for modern environmentalism. But its attempts
to reconcile the demands of providing recreational services and conserving the natural environment
have continued to plague its existence. Turner describes national parks as an amalgam of both
“conservation reserves and recreation parks”.58 A specialist external report submitted to the then
Minister for the Environment in 1998 described national parks as “bedevilled by the preservationuse conflict”.59 Adopting language popularised by US academic Herman, the biodiversity values of
national parks are at risk of being loved to death by visitors seeking nature-based experiences.60
Decades after the advent of the ‘ecological’ vision, the NPWS is still expected to “ensur[e] public
access to and enjoyment of” its reserves.61 The 1998 Ministerial report confirmed that the agency
plays “a significant role as a provider of nature based recreation and environmental tourism”.62 It
refers also to recreational opportunities for regional economies.63 The NPWS itself sees the
provision of “facilities and services ... on parks and reserves” as one of its key roles,64 referring to
visitors to reserves as “customers”.65 Even the judiciary, in determining the lawfulness of various
uses in national parks, has stressed the need to maintain public access for community enjoyment.66
All this highlights the dilemma faced by park managers in balancing conservation needs against
recreational demands.67 The issue extends beyond the NPWS to Local Government, which enjoys
57

T Flannery, The Future Eaters: An Ecological History of the Australian Lands and People (Sydney: Reed,
1994), 377; see also H Bridgman, R Warner & J Dodson, Urban Biophysical Environments (Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 115.
58
Turner, op cit n 8 at 78.
59
Steering Committee to the Minister for the Environment, Visions for the Millennium: Report of the Steering
Committee to the Minister for the Environment (Sydney: the Committee, 1998), 48.
60
D Herman, “Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development in the National
Parks” (1992) 11(3) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 3, passim.
61
Visions for the New Millennium Steering Committee, op cit n 55 at 12.
62
Steering Committee of to the Minister for the Environment, op cit n 59 at 54.
63
Ibid at 35-36 & 45.
64
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW), Annual Report 1995/96, 8.
65
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW), Annual Report 1998/1999, 8.
66
In Packham v Minister for the Environment, Kirby P ruled that “national parks must be available for public
use, and their benefits should be retained for the public generally”: (1993) 80 LGERA 205 at 209. This case
followed Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for the Environment (1991) 73 LGRA 379, per Gleeson CJ
at 383 & Kirby P at 395. See also Willoughby City Council v Minister Administering the National Parks and
Wildlife Act (1992) 78 LGERA 19 at 27.
67
J Richardson, “Appropriate Developments in National Parks” (1993) 37(3) National Parks Journal 21; G
Westcott & J Molinski, “National Parks” (1993) 21(1) Habitat Australia 14; Visions for the New Millennium

313

neither the same amount of conservation funding nor the same level of expertise. If the NPWS
experiences difficulty, how can Local Government realistically cope?
In 1976, Larcombe expressed disappointment that Local Government had been “by-passed” in the
setting up of the NPWS ten years earlier.68 But he overlooks the fact that Local Government had
then never assumed a notable role in conservation. Bonyhady chronicles the appalling example of
former Koroit Council, in rural Victoria, which managed that State’s first national park, at Tower
Hill, from its establishment in 1892 until its transfer to the Victorian government in 1960.69 The
Council used the park as a source for road materials throughout the entire period. It also encouraged
grazing within the park, deposited sewage waste and, in line with Local Government’s fixation with
providing active recreational facilities, approved a motorcycle track on the slopes of the mountain.
The scenario provides an early example of the incongruity between traditional ‘active’ recreational
facilities and protection of the biophysical environment.
8.3.2

The Recreational/Conservation Conflict

It is beyond argument that a major difficulty facing biodiversity conservation on municipal open
space is the adverse impact flowing from recreational activity. Active recreation services can be
totally antipathetic to conservation. Using an example raised in passing in ch 5,70 the conversion of
bushland to a sportsfield demands indiscriminate clearing followed by planting imported turf.
Sander cites the actual example of construction of tennis courts on “ridgetop bushland” in Ku-ringgai Council area.71 Admittedly, this occurred before the emergence of State Environmental Planning
Policy (SEPP) No 1972 and would be unlikely to happen today. A more recent example, in an area
where native vegetation is scarce and SEPP No 19 irrelevant, is the controversial proposal by
Leeton Council, in south-western NSW, to flood 40 ha of wetland at Fivebough Swamp to provide a
recreational lake.73 The site is renowned as a waterbird habitat, including rare migratory species that
nest during the Northern Hemisphere winter.74 The Council, however, believed that construction of
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an artificial waterbody would provide a valuable tourist attraction on Leeton’s doorstep, catering for
motorboats and watersports as well as employment generation. It later abandoned its plans in
response to pressure from the wider community, including international environmental
organisations. The Council withdrew its own development application that it had submitted, under
the EPAA, to itself.75
The above examples reflect a ready tendency to give priority to serving, or indeed creating, active
recreational needs at the expense of conserving biodiversity. In other cases, councils attempt to
‘sell’ biodiversity management to their ratepayers by highlighting associated recreational
opportunity. For instance, Yarrowlumla Shire Council recognises that its ‘Greenways’ network of
roadsides and unused ‘Crown road reserves’ comprise “public land for passive recreational
community use”, including horse riding, as well as “protecting native vegetation”.76 But such
passive recreational facilities could have a severely destructive effect on remnant habitats.
In many situations, human intrusion can cause substantial ecological harm. For example,
installation of landscaping, gravel paths or seating at a cleared lookout may threaten the long-term
integrity of a rare and fragile ecological community. Aldous draws attention to the potential damage
from human tread.77 Compaction of soil can lead to increased erosion, changes in hydrological
conditions and direct damage to plants. Some ecosystems are more sensitive than others to
trampling. In his comprehensive study, Liddle points out that ecosystems with ground flora of low
productivity, such as open eucalypt forests, are especially vulnerable.78 Hookway and Davidson
observe that coastal dune ecosystems are particularly susceptible to damage from human feet.79
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Even the NSW State planning agency accepts that “recreational use can be self-defeating where it
exceeds the carrying capacity of the ecosystem”.80 Unfortunately, some councils may not even be
cognisant of the recreation/conservation conflict. It is arguable that Local Government has never
outgrown this dominant human-centred recreation paradigm that characterised the earliest days of
national parks. A combination of matters such as proximity of municipal parks to local users,
satisfaction of ratepayer expectations and conventional approaches to open space management will
continue to undermine innovative conservation measures. In conclusion, it is easier for a council to
approach nature conservation with a recreational, rather than biodiversity, perspective. Provision of
recreational facilities and biodiversity conservation, however, are not necessarily compatible.
8.4

Location of Open Space81

An emerging land-use planning profession promoted a systematic approach to open space provision
by encouraging standard formulae on the amount of lands required per head of population.
Standards became widely accepted by the 1950s and 1960s.82 Planners pinpointed preferred
locations for open space in advance, primarily by means of assessing development opportunities
and constraints posed by the physical attributes of the land via a methodology derived from
McHarg’s influential Design with Nature.83 This led to sportsfields on flat, often flood-prone lands
whilst passive open space became a convenient land-use shunted to leftover places where
topographical conditions discouraged or prevented development altogether. In the Sydney Basin,
these comprised vegetated pockets on steep and infertile land that had originally been useless for
agriculture.84 The result today is council-managed reserves containing remnant communities are
often found along gullies and escarpments.85 Schoer argues that they comprise passive recreational
80
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facilities “by default”.86 But importantly, as Kirkpatrick observes, “some of the rarest plants are
now confined to bush remnants in cities”.87 But these are the residual infertile/steep lands that now
provide a very restricted range of biodiversity.
Hopkins and Saunders warn that “remnants are [often] too small to be viable without considerable
management”.88 The cost implications are intensified when one considers the shape and
fragmentation of bushland pockets. They tend to be elongated with long boundaries in proportion to
their overall size, leading to greater vulnerability to ‘edge effects’ such as urban runoff, intrusion
from domestic pets, weed infiltration and dumping.89 Typically, they are slivers of ‘bio islands’
isolated from larger reserves such as national parks.90 All this raises significant challenges for
conservation-committed councils.
Schoer observes that in the Sydney region, heavily vegetated local open space usually comprises
“Hawkesbury Sandstone Vegetation Associations on moderate to very steep land bordering creeks,
rivers or bays”.91 Similar to national parks but on a far smaller scale, council reserves therefore fail
to contribute to representative biodiversity conservation. They add little to the CAR
(comprehensive, adequate and representative) reserve system mentioned in ch 2.92
Lack of representativeness occurs not only across council borders but also within municipalities. In
1988, Buchanan noted that that whilst 40% of land in Ku-ring-gai Council area was derived from
Wianamatta shale, only 2.3% of its extensive reserve system represented that rock type.93 Shalebased areas had already been seized for housing development. In terms of conservation imperatives,
which demand a full mosaic of ecosystems, the outlook is not good. As Cunningham states, in the
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flatter shale country of western Sydney, open space tends to be “sparser, often not much more than
grassed paddocks, and frequently dissected by huge drainage channels”.94 In rural shires where
population expansion is sluggish, there will be little or no demand for new open space. And it is
these areas where the biophysical environment is poorly protected in State reserves.
8.5

Examples and Experience of Committed Councils

Management of remnant vegetation on council public lands is, in some cases, several decades old.
Lane Cove Municipal Council (as it was then known), one of the first metropolitan councils to
undertake bushland regeneration on local open space, was active as far back as 1972.95 The then
Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council was another originator.96 The ‘ecological vision’ spurred urban
residents, especially those in relatively wealthy areas, to appreciate the aesthetic benefits of having
bushland nearby and pressing their own councils into taking action. After all, the first ‘green ban’, a
crucial event in the emergence of urban environmentalism, involved a pocket of harbourside
bushland at Hunters Hill.97 The initiators, as described by Jakubowicz, comprised “a group of
women concerned with the quality of recreation in an affluent suburb”.98 The strength of the
‘ratepayer ideology’ is again evident. As Cunningham suggests, “[l]iving close to the bush is one of
the privileges of affluence”.99
The cost of remnant management is especially high when intense regeneration is involved. Almost
15 years ago, a National Trust representative involved in urban bushland conservation estimated
that handweeding “extremely degraded sites” could cost up to $100,000 per hectare.100 Bennett, Kuring-gai’s then bushland officer, endorsed this figure,101 suggesting that on then current resource
levels, it would take his Council an astonishing 170 years to “redress” bushland degradation on its
own lands.102 Admittedly, the Ku-ring-gai example is relatively uncommon due to its unusually
94
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high proportion of established urban bushland.103 Nevertheless, it illustrates the financial problems
that progressive councils can face.
Councils that chose to embark on open space conservation programs under the then LGA 1919 were
able to rely on s 365, which authorised them to “protect, acquire, preserve and maintain places of
historical or scientific interest and natural scenery”. This provision clearly extended the role of
municipal open space beyond conventional active recreational uses. But apart from the possible
exception of keeping something for “scientific interest” purposes, its opportunities still related to
direct human enjoyment. If a council was so committed to preserving a patch of the natural
environment on municipal land that it wished to deny, or at least restrict, public access, judicial
interpretation of the 1919 Act may have raised problems. In Waverley Municipal Council v
Attorney-General (the ‘Bronte Splashers’ case),104 the NSW Court of Appeal scrutinised a proposal
by the Council to erect a two storey building on a Crown public reserve managed by the Council as
trustee. The second storey was to be occupied by a private swimming club. The Court outlawed the
proposal on the grounds that it transgressed a basic requirement that the reserve be accessible to the
public as of right.105 Hope JA explained that:
“the power of the Council to improve the land does not entitle the Council to erect any kind
of improvement upon it which it may desire; it may only erect upon it improvements whose
purpose is to promote or is ancillary to the use and enjoyment of Bronte park as a public park
and for public recreation”.106
This interpretation would have worked against isolating bushland from human intrusion. Yet Hope
JA went on to stress that the principle of public accessibility for “use and enjoyment” did not
automatically mean that all parts of a public reserve had to be available for public entry at all times.
For instance, use of a sporting oval might be restricted to specific teams at certain times. But this is
a very different situation from withdrawing fenced-off bushland from community access altogether.
The notion of preserving a piece of nature for reasons other than direct community usage sits
uncomfortably with Hope JA’s requirement of “use and enjoyment”. A strong argument can thus be
made that the pre-1993 case law reinforced domination of recreational enjoyment of municipal open
space. (Curiously, the Courts have applied and extended the Bronte Splashers principle to support
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upholding community access to, and enjoyment of, national parks.107 As a result, an outmoded
approach that may have been acceptable for local open space management decades ago is now
enshrined for the State’s most extensive system of conservation reserves.)
The principle of ‘public access as of right’ is now of historical interest only as far as ‘community
lands’ are concerned. As seen in ch 5, and expanded upon further below, the LGA 1993 totally
recast Local Government responsibility over its own lands. In Friends of Prior Park Inc v Ryde City
Council (‘Prior Park’), the NSW Court of Appeal held that the Bronte Splashers principle was no
longer relevant.108 The ‘plan of management’, prepared under the LGA 1993 for all community
lands, is now the centrepiece in determining how municipal open space is to be used and
managed.109 There is no longer a statutory list of uses for which open space may be used. Neither is
there any legal problem about denying community access to vegetation remnants, provided this is in
accordance with the plan. However, a longstanding tradition of allowing, if not encouraging, public
access to all parts of all reserves for public interest and enjoyment, as once enshrined in Bronte
Splashers, can still influence the contents of modern plans.
8.6

Bringing Land into Council Ownership Today

There are two principal ways by which Local Government acquires open space.110 First, it may
obtain land upon its own initiative, either by negotiated purchase or compulsory acquisition, in
accordance with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW).111
Alternatively, and far more commonly, it may require developers to transfer land to council
ownership upon approval of major projects, especially large-scale residential subdivision. Each
approach is discussed below.
8.6.1

Land Acquisition

Section 186(1) LGA 1993 confers wide power on councils to “acquire land ... for the purpose of
exercising any of its functions”. As established in ch 5, Local Government’s service powers clearly
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extend to biodiversity conservation.112 As noted in ch 6, a council may alternatively reserve land for
future acquisition for open space and other purposes listed under s 26(1)(c) EPAA under its own
Local Environmental Plan (LEP).113 The typical LEP clause authorises the owner of reserved land
to demand acquisition by the relevant authority, which, in the case of local open space, will be the
council. Significantly, the State Government has warned councils to be wary of the financial
implications of reserving lands that one day they may be called upon to acquire.114 Nowadays, due
to cost factors, it is unlikely that either device - i.e. acquisition via the LGA 1993 or EPAA - will be
exploited to a major extent. An example of the potential fiscal consequences is illustrated by the
plight of Pittwater Council in acquiring a wetland area in 1996, as then reported in the popular press
and highlighted by Kelly and Farrier.115 The Council believed the land to be worth $450,000 whilst
the owner claimed $16 million. The ultimate purchase price was $4.5 million.
Lismore LEP 2000 contains an interesting clause relating to land zoned ‘Recreation Zone 6(a)’
land, which covers properties reserved for local acquisition. One of the objectives of the clause “is
to manage flora and fauna on public open space”.116 After experiencing the high cost of purchasing
a parcel of land comprising a koala habitat linkage using funds collected under s 94 EPAA,117 the
Council chose to insert a partially protective clause in its LEP.118 Upon an acquisition request for
private land zoned 6(a), the council may now review the appropriateness of the zoning of the site.
Should the zone be changed, compulsory acquisition is then avoided. Before endorsing the clause,
the then Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP) demanded a study by the Council to
investigate the zoning appropriateness of all 6(a) lands in terms of not only their
recreational/conservation opportunities but also the Council’s fiscal ability to acquire them.119
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Unfortunately, it appears that this has led to less certainty in ensuring ultimate protection of many
habitat corridors.
Councils with the strongest rate bases are expected to be in the best position to appropriate lands.
These will tend to be urban councils where the natural environment has already been radically
transformed. But these lands will also be expensive to acquire due to competing urban land-uses.
Even rugged lands previously overlooked by developmental interests are now exposed to
development pressure due to modern engineering technology.120 The cost problem becomes more
complex when one considers that remnant communities are spread unevenly between Local
Government areas. Some of the most valuable remnants may occur in the areas of councils with
least financial muscle. Whilst property values in these locations may be relatively low, the purchase
price may still be beyond Local Government’s reach. These issues highlight the desirability of both
external funding and regional frameworks.
8.6.2

Section 94 EPAA

High acquisition costs have pushed councils to rely on the second, more universal, way to acquire
lands: waiting for proposals to arise and requiring developers to transfer land to council ownership
upon issue of development consent. Under former s 333(1A)(c) LGA 1919, which remained in
operation until mid-1998 when subdivision control was fully integrated into the EPAA, a council
was obliged to take into account, when determining an application for subdivision approval, “the
amount of land to be provided as a public reserve out of the land to be subdivided”.121 Today, apart
from minor exceptions, subdivision invariably requires development consent under the EPAA.122
Councils now rely upon s 94 EPAA to impose conditions requiring either dedication of land or a
monetary contribution towards future acquisition, guided by advisory ‘contribution plans’.123 The
problem here is that opportunity depends entirely on when and whether development applications
come forward. This works against a strategic approach. As Murphy notes, councils have tended to
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display an “opportunistic approach” to open space acquisition”.124 In terms of biodiversity
conservation, the most important lands may not be acquired. The situation is comparable to
reservation of national parks, derided by Adam as ad hoc.125
The s 94 EPAA mechanism is only available when a proposed development “will or is likely to
require the provision of or increase the demand for public amenities and services within the area”.126
This formula embodies the ‘nexus principle’, the nub of s 94, which stipulates that it is the
development itself that must create or increase the need for the facility.127 As Brockhoff warns, this
requirement limits opportunity for acquiring property for conservation purposes.128 Although the
provision of land for conservation purposes would undoubtedly comprise a public service,
establishing a causal link between a development proposal and such a service is problematic. The
key argument is that the biodiversity conservation value of a parcel of land is unconnected to any
proposal to develop it, notwithstanding that its importance may not be appreciated until it is under
threat. Its benefits to humankind arise from its ecological makeup alone. Once it is accepted that
biodiversity is a national or global resource, it is impossible to contend that the need to conserve a
valuable remnant is generated by a single development, or even a number of proposals, within the
one Local Government area. The need for conservation exists already. Although a proposed
development might threaten a particular remnant, any demand to retain it for conservation purposes
arises from a far wider community than mere neighbourhood interests. Biodiversity conservation
gains are generally too intangible, uncertain and diffuse to support effective utilisation of s 94
EPAA. This helps to explain the reference in the Biodiversity Guide for Local Government to
“conceptual and legal hurdles” that confront the use of s 94 for conserving biodiversity.129
The counter argument may be raised that if a development is to decimate the last habitat of an
endangered species or sub-species, there is a demand to conserve it either on or off-site on
biodiversity conservation principles. It is still the development that gives rise to the necessary
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action. The question then arises as to whether the reference to “within the area” under s 94(1)
EPAA quoted above restricts the ‘service’ to local needs only. Should this be the case, the
advantage received by the local community may be miniscule. It is the far wider community,
including future generations, which benefit from conservation for biodiversity needs. This issue
reflects the fuzziness of the nexus principle and a need for statutory change to make it clear that s
94 extends beyond neighbourhood wants.
The situation is entirely different in relation to facilities such as sporting venues or bushy
playgrounds where the nexus between the proposed development - such as a proposed residential
subdivision - and such amenities is easy to establish.130 Such services are the bread-and-butter of s
94 EPAA contributions. A 1994 survey of ‘s 94 EPAA contribution plans’ by Toon et al indicated
that “open space [wa]s levied for more than any other type of amenity or service”.131 It seems,
therefore, as the law stands, that if land is to be acquired for biodiversity conservation under s 94,
the land must also be capable of serving another purpose for which the service/development nexus
can be demonstrated more readily. The obvious solution is local facilities for passive recreation by
means of vegetated open space. But as presented already, biodiversity and passive recreation do not
necessarily coincide.
The likelihood of individual councils receiving swathes of land of sufficient size to maintain
habitats of a wide range of indigenous species is, in any event, negligible. Numerous commentators
stress the importance of reserve size to maintain viable ecological communities.132 Yet as implied
earlier, many bushland reserves are mere fragments. A major reason is the conventional approach of
council planners in assessing the desired amount of open space by reference to population
projections rather than conservation imperatives. The longstanding open space formula is 2.83
hectares per 1000 people.133 In 1992, the then NSW Department of Planning (DEP) urged councils
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to reduce reliance on this “poorly conceived” standard and move toward a “needs-based approach”
in planning for open space.134
There is also the issue that s 94 EPAA funds may not be used for the upkeep or ongoing
management of facilities once they have been established, subject to the inexplicable exception of
road maintenance.135 As a result, the mechanism cannot be utilised to fund the continuing and costly
regeneration of open space remnants referred to earlier.
There are other difficulties applying especially to smaller authorities. In a review of the use of s 94
EPAA by councils in 1993, Barnes and Dollery found that the average per captita contribution of
funds for open space purposes collected by councils with populations lower than 7000 persons was
much less than half of the equivalent figure for councils with populations exceeding 40,000.136 In
other words, bigger populations mean greater opportunities. The study also revealed that “the
smaller the council, the more arbitrarily developers were levied”.137 About 25% of councils, being
mostly rural authorities, did not utilise s 94 EPAA at all.138 In other cases, contribution levels were
extremely low due to slow or moribund growth rates. The mechanism is triggered by development
rather than factors that already exist. Accordingly, the system works best for councils with
expanding populations. Its benefits, therefore, are unevenly spread. This again raises the desirability
of external funding and regional coordination. At present, because s 94 EPAA funding cannot
operate across council boundaries – a council may only levy funds or demand dedication of lands
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for services within its own area139 – regional action is impossible to achieve. Section 94 EPAA
provides a good example of a planning mechanism designed to manage urban expansion that is
incongruous with modern biodiversity conservation imperatives.
All the above factors illustrate the substantial difficulties faced by any council keen to bring land
with remnant vegetation into public ownership. Without fundamental change, the ongoing scenario
is acquisition of shards of land that will invariably be prone to recreational pressure. Unfortunately,
a review of s 94 EPAA released in 2000 by the then DUAP makes no reference to nature
conservation.140 Whilst the report is very brief, it makes interesting recommendations. It raises the
idea of enabling more than one council to levy contributions together on a cross-boundary basis. It
also proposes councils entering negotiated ‘development agreements’ with developers to ensure
provision of public benefits before projects are approved. Both cases may extend to recurrent
conservation works.141 But scant detail is provided. This is a sound topic for future research.
8.7

Management of Existing Open Space under Statutory Frameworks

8.7.1

Management of Community Lands under the LGA 1993

The ‘plan of management’ is now the lynchpin for managing most municipal lands. Local open
space falls readily into the ‘community land’ classification, which, as noted in ch 5, must be
administered in accordance with its relevant ‘plan of management’.142 Chapter 5 also drew attention
to the requirement that ‘plans of management’ tag all community lands according to one of five
‘categories’, including ‘natural areas’,143 which must be further divided by five subcategories.144
Since major amendments in 1998,145 the LGA 1993 has prescribed “core objectives” for each
category and subcategory.146 For example, the objectives for ‘natural areas’, quoted below, are
tightly drawn and make explicit reference to ‘biodiversity’:
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“(a) to conserve biodiversity and maintain ecosystem function in respect of the land, or the
feature or habitat in respect of which the land is categorised as a natural area, and
(b) to maintain the land, or that feature or habitat, in its natural state and setting, and
(c) to provide for the restoration and regeneration of the land, and
(d) to provide for community use of and access to the land in such a manner as will minimise
and mitigate any disturbance caused by human intrusion, and
(e) to assist in and facilitate the implementation of any provisions restricting the use and
management of the land that are set out in a recovery plan or threat abatement plan prepared
under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 or the Fisheries Management Act
1994”.147
Objective (d), which enjoys equal weighting with the others, recognises that recreational usage will
occur but attempts to limit it to activities that “will minimise and mitigate any disturbance”. These
terms are undefined and their interpretation will depend on individual council attitudes. The
reference to ‘minimise’ reflects an assumption that a ‘plan of management’ may encourage human
access that will interfere with restoration of a sensitive ecosystem.
Some of the core subcategory objectives again refer to ‘biodiversity’.148 In some cases, the
provisions are more accommodating to recreational use.149 One of the objectives for ‘bushland’, for
instance, reads:
“to promote the management of the land in a manner that protects and enhances the values
and quality of the land and facilitates public enjoyment of the land, and to implement
measures directed to minimising or mitigating any disturbance caused by human
intrusion”.150
This provision serves to explicitly promote the recreational values of bushland. The preceding
objective makes this clear by referring to protection of, inter alia, the “recreational … values” of the
land,151 which is consistent with the later reference to “public enjoyment”. There is no express
limitation on how to facilitate recreational use. Instead, the reference to “measures” to
“minimis[ing] disturbance” sits alongside the remainder of the clause rather than attempting to
qualify it.
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An objective for ‘escarpment’ is even more obvious in terms of advancing community enjoyment of
the ‘natural area’. It seeks to “facilitate safe community use and enjoyment of the escarpment”.152
There is no reference to ecological protection at all. Accordingly, whilst the symbolism might be
attractive, close reading of the provisions reveals that public recreation may dominate. In view of
municipal tradition, this is likely to occur. Perspectives derived from earlier times will filter
opportunities to conserve biodiversity.
Even if the ‘core objectives’ do carry some ecological force, there appears to be a major weakness
as far as the legislation is concerned. Objectives are relevant only to leases and other interests
granted by Local Government. Subject to several exceptions, a council may not grant a lease,
licence or other estate for use of community land other than for a purpose that is “prescribed by” the
relevant core objectives.153 Accordingly, the objectives do not extend to activities carried out by
directly by Local Government, such as constructing shelter sheds or clearing bushland for picnic
areas on community land, even if the open space is categorised as ‘natural area’. Of course, such
projects would still need to be carried out in accordance with the relevant plan of management.154
Significantly, the Local Government (General) Regulation 1999 demands that any plan of
management must “comply” with the applicable core objective/s.155 But in practice, the plans may
be poorly devised, with any reference to biodiversity conservation providing aspirations rather than
obligations.
Several exceptions to application of the prescribed objectives exist when the activity is subject to a
lease or other interest. These relate to, inter alia, public utilities, caretakers’ residences and
underground pipes serving adjoining premises, which may still cause damage to delicate
ecosystems.156 But what is of greater concern is a far wider ‘exception’ - or, perhaps more
accurately, an alternative - to implementing the objectives. Section 46(1)(b)(i) LGA 1993 states that
a lease or other interest may be granted “for a purpose prescribed by subsection (4) or for a
purposes prescribed by any … core objective”.157 Accordingly, if a purpose under s 46(4) LGA
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1993 can be identified, there is no need to test it against any of the objectives. The provision refers
to:
“the provision of goods, services and facilities, and the carrying out of activities,
appropriate to the current and future needs within the local community and of the wider
public in relation to any of the following:
(i) public recreation,
(ii) the physical, cultural, social and intellectual welfare or development of persons”.158
Here the primacy of recreational usage of municipal open space over any other purpose, including
conservation, is crystal clear. The provision sets aside any need to even consult the prescribed
objectives, notwithstanding their references to biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. It totally
undermines the DLG’s original support, in reviewing the pre-1998 regime, for provisions requiring
consistency with articulated objectives and ensuring, for example, that on land within the
‘bushland’ subcategory, “no use should be permitted which conflicts with the continuance of the
land as bushland”.159 It also weakens former Minister Page’s prediction that the objective provisions
would “enable environmental values … of community land to be better … protected”.160 If
anything, s 46(4) LGA 1993 provides a strong reminder that the dubious assumption of consistency
between biodiversity conservation and passive recreation still carries considerable weight. Because
the provision does not refer to any particular type of recreation, it may support a wide range of
pursuits that are more damaging than passive pastimes. The scope for councils to sideline
conservation here is disturbing.
There is little chance that the post-1998 ‘core objective’ provisions will prevent situations such as
the Prior Park scenario where the Court of Appeal decided that the lease of a building as a preschool on community land categorised as ‘natural area’, and subcategorised as ‘bushland’ and
‘watercourse’, was lawful.161 In Prior Park, the Court emphasised that categorisations were not the
same as prohibitive zoning provisions. Yet oddly, it conceded that a childcare centre within the
‘sportsground’ category would be manifestly inconsistent with the intention of that category and,
therefore, unlawful.162 This seemed to reflect a willingness to protect active open space but not
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‘natural areas’. Even though the post-1998 statutory objectives articulate Parliament’s intentions for
every category and subcategory, thereby implying that educational facilities are no longer
acceptable in ‘natural areas’, s 46(4) LGA 1993 remains a major problem. It appears to legitimise
activities for the “social and intellectual welfare or development of persons”,163 which would appear
to encompass pre-schools, as well as “public recreation”.164 So whilst the ‘core objectives’ inserted
in 1998165 were, according to Ratcliffe, designed to prevent problems such as Prior Park,166 s 46(4)
will not stop them from occurring again. Strong legislative change is needed.
Putting aside all the above difficulties including the potential problems of ‘generic’ plans of
management raised in ch 5,167 there is a valuable feature of the system that may help drive effective
conservation measures into plans of management. The LGA 1993 requires community consultation
in the preparation of draft plans of management.168 In the case of categorisation or recategorisation,
demands a public hearing.169 Accordingly, in similar fashion to the process for formulating
management plans and ‘state of environment reports’ (SoERs), the community may influence the
contents of the instrument. This may well occur in the case of an attractive pocket of bushland or
forested backdrop. Elsewhere, local communities may prefer sportsfields and swimming centres.
Where bushland is retained, pressure is still likely for the site to be available for public enjoyment.
As a result, the plan of management can be a double-edged sword. Whilst it might set down
mandatory strategies such as bushland regeneration, it may alternatively allow remnant vegetation
to be modified or removed.
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8.7.2

Management under Environmental Planning Instruments made under the EPAA

(i)

SEPP No 19 - Bushland in Urban Areas

Turning to the EPAA and its EPIs, reference should be made to one especially relevant SEPP
adverted to in ch 6: i.e. SEPP No 19 - Bushland in Urban Areas, introduced in 1986 to facilitate
management of remnant bushland on municipal open space in metropolitan Sydney (and now also
Gosford and Lake Macquarie council areas).170 SEPP No 19 has played a major role in encouraging
urban councils to take bushland management more seriously.171 It is a good example of the State
Government pushing the conservation agenda onto Local Government during the second wave of
modern environmentalism. The SEPP defines ‘bushland’ in ecological terms as:
“land on which there is vegetation which is either a remainder of the natural vegetation of the
natural vegetation of the land or, if altered, is still representative of the structure and floristics
of the natural vegetation”.172
The force of the SEPP relies on regulation, requiring development consent for any proposal, subject
to exceptions but including activities carried out by councils themselves, to “disturb bushland” on
land zoned or otherwise identified by an EPI as open space.173 The SEPP also reaches beyond the
reserve boundary by directing public authorities, including councils, to address conservation matters
when carrying out activities themselves, or considering applications to carry out development, on
adjoining land.174 For instance, the authority must take into account:
“the effect of the proposed development on bushland zoned or reserved for public open space
purposes and, in particular, on the erosion of soils, the siltation of streams and waterways and
exotic plants within the bushland …”175
Couston, Ku-ring-gai Council’s former bushland conservation manager, asserts that SEPP No 19
recognises bushland as a “legitimate land use”.176 He also alleges that it “remove[s] the competition
between the land uses of developed open space (sports fields, golf courses etc) and bushland”.177
170
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Couston’s observation arises from the structured discretion conferred upon councils when
evaluating development applications to disturb bushland. Clause 6(4) of the SEPP, a good example
of a ‘condition precedent’ provision referred to in ch 6,178 compels a council to:
(i) make an “assessment of the need to protect and preserve the bushland” with regard to the
SEPP’s articulated objectives;
(ii) be convinced that any proposed disturbance is “essential for a purpose in the public
interest and no reasonable alternative is available …”; and
(iii) satisfy itself that the extent of any bushland to be disturbed is “as little as possible” and,
where the disturbance is for construction work, “the bushland will be reinstated upon
completion of that work as far as possible”.
It is noteworthy that, in addition to citing ecological conservation imperatives, the express
objectives of SEPP No 19 make specific reference to, inter alia, the “value” of bushland as a
“recreational … resource” and “protect[ing] the recreational potential of bushland”.179 On their
own, the three obligations set out above provide no direction as to whether preference should be
given to conservation or promoting potentially damaging recreational uses. Obligation (iii) means,
however, that the most destructive facilities, such as sportsfields, cannot be built. Reinstatement of
cleared bushland would be impossible. Yet the clause allows for partial reinstatement of bushland,
as implied by its reference to reinstatement “as far as is possible”. The reality is that councils will
accommodate passive recreational pursuits where the public may enjoy the bushland, even if this
involves modification. Whilst cl 6(4) establishes a presumption in favour of retaining bushland, the
window is not closed to cases where the council is satisfied that disturbance is justified.180
Moreover, as noted by Nearn, the concepts of “public interest” and “no reasonable alternative”
contained in the second obligation are vague.181 Local Government’s entrenched interest in
providing leisure services is likely to lead to a biased view in discerning what the ‘public interest’
entails. SEPP 19, with its express reference to recreation, embodies the widely held but dubious
notion that conservation and passive recreation can easily co-exist.
SEPP No 19 does not rely solely on a command-and-control approach. It also provides for optional
preparation of pro-active plans of management,182 which must “specify measures” to be undertaken
in, inter alia, “restor[ing] and regenerat[ing] degraded areas of bushland”.183 But the same clause
178
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also refers to “enabl[ing] recreational use of the bushland”.184 A plan may, therefore, accord priority
to recreational usage. While the mechanism nevertheless offers scope for implementing
conservation measures, its role appears to have been superseded by the compulsory ‘community
lands’ plans of management under the LGA 1993.
(ii)

Local Environmental Plans

Several years after the onset of SEPP No 19, the then DoP released its policy on ‘Development in
Open Space Zones’ in 1989.185 It recommended councils to follow a reconfiguration of open space
zonings in preparing draft LEPs, including suggestions on which uses should fall into the
permissibility basket. The focus was clearly on recreation rather than conservation. All the
suggested zones are named Open Space ‘Recreation’, with no recommended zoning for cases where
conservation comprises the primary aim. Presumably, the separate ‘environmental protection’
zonings are the appropriate mechanism.186
The policy appears to have had slight impact. Of the 57 1995/2000 comprehensive LEPs reviewed
by the author, only six (10.5%) combine the terms ‘open space’ and ‘recreation’ into the names of
their zones. Sixteen LEPs (28.1%) contain ‘Open Space’ zones, thirteen (21.8%) include
‘Recreation’ zones whilst nineteen (33.3%), all in non-coastal rural areas, have no such zones at all.
References to conservation within the provisions are rare and, curiously, stronger within
‘Recreation’ rather than ‘Open Space’ zones, perhaps suggesting that the latter is expected to be
predominantly open rather than vegetated. Notable examples of zonal objective clauses that relate to
conservation matters include the following:
•

“to identify, protect and conserve the Botany wetlands system” (zone 6(a) Open Space and
Recreation, Botany LEP 1995)187

•

“to enable the use of public land for public recreational purposes and to retain existing open
space, including bushland” (zone 6(a) Open Space ‘A’ Existing Recreation, Willoughby LEP
1995);188

•

“to ensure that development … does not adversely affect the natural environment” (zone 6(a)
Existing Recreation, Mudgee LEP 1998);189

184

State Environmental Planning Policy No 19 - Bushland in Urban Areas, cl 8(4)(c)(ii), op cit n 170.
Department of Planning (NSW), Circular No C6: Development in Open Space Zones, 17 March 1989.
186
See chs 6 & 11.
187
Botany LEP 1995, cl 10, item (d) of secondary objectives, gazetted 30 June 1995.
188
Willoughby LEP 1995, cl 53A(1), gazetted 17 Nov 1995, emphasis added.
185

333

•

“to ensure that open space is managed on a sustainable basis including the maintenance of
ecological processes, genetic diversity and geodiversity” (zone 6(a) Public Recreation, Mosman
LEP 1998);190

•

“to manage flora and fauna” (zone 6(a) Recreation, Lismore LEP 2000).191

Clauses such as the above are rare.
The vast majority of public open space and recreation zonal clauses, however, contain no reference
to bushland or associated conservation matters at all. Even where zonal objectives specifically relate
to conservation concerns, the problem remains, as raised in ch 6, that such clauses are relatively
weak.192 The lesson for plan-makers, perhaps, is to formulate a new special sub-zone where the
primary aim is to maintain and restore the indigenous landscape with limited public access. Rigid,
consistent objectives supported by strong prohibitions and/or conditions precedent could support
such clauses. The author’s analysis exposed no such provisions other than the unique Warringah
LEP 2000, which relies on ‘place-based’ provisions rather than traditional land-use zones. It
contains a clause stating that if “public open space … contains bushland” (which is defined in
robust ecological terms), “development on that land is not to threaten the protection or preservation
of the bushland”.193 The provision is exceptional.
The weakness of LEPs in guaranteeing biodiversity conservation on local open space might mean
more reliance on plans of management prepared under the LGA 1993. This places expectations on
open space and recreation managers, rather than land-use planners, in working towards conservation
priorities. It requires substantial expertise and backing from local politicians and managers, as well
as sufficient resources to improve conservation activity. Managerial gloss is not the answer.
8.6

Conclusion

There is no doubt that recreation and biodiversity conservation do not necessarily blend well. The
challenge for the council officer committed to biodiversity conservation is to convince the decisionmakers to withstand conflicting recreational pressure and give priority to ecological management on
local lands. For example, the overall management plan could set habitat restoration schemes as
principal activities, supported by fierce, realistic objectives and clear, achievable performance
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targets, that are able to be cemented into individual enforceable plans of management. The reality,
however, is that councils will almost always attempt to accommodate both conservation and
recreational demands.
The problem is compounded by the paucity and fragmented nature of vegetated open space.
Examples are isolated, and generally the preserve of urban councils on leftover lands. Whilst the
LGA 1993 provides latitude for enthusiastic, well-resourced councils, it does not demand
conservation on public lands. The 1998 amendments to the LGA 1993 identified in this chapter are
relatively weak. All this does not mean that we should give up on the valuable contribution pockets
of natural areas may make. But to talk in terms of conservation for recreational purposes can be
misleading. The potential conflict must be confronted and reflected in plans with clear priorities and
implementation measures. As Bridgman et al advise:
“[m]anaging native vegetation must begin with a resource inventory, a clear statement of the
objectives and possible competing or multiple-use options for the land, before a set of
economically and politically achievable management strategies can be devised”.194
The crux is, however, that most councils are likely to continue their traditional service-provider
role. This suggests that effective conservation on council open space across the entire State is
fanciful. Consideration may need to be given to the extent to which, if any, Local Government’s
hand might be forced. For example, special ‘natural area plans of management’ may be compulsory
for community lands categorised as ‘natural area’. Clearer circumstances may be written for when
such categorisation is mandatory. The DLG could provide supportive guidelines and examples. In
addition,

the

State

planning

agency

could

produce

zoning

templates

for

new

recreational/conservation sub-zones.
Increased funding should be made available according to conservation needs. A strategic approach
that transcends the artificiality of municipal boundaries may be required. A system that rises above
municipal parochialism may help to outstrip outdated fixations. But even at a State or regional
level, conservation primacy cannot be guaranteed. The national park network, with its perennial
recreation/conservation dilemma, readily demonstrates this. It also illustrates the sheer complexity
of the issues involved. If anything, it reminds us that biodiversity conservation cannot be achieved
on public lands alone. Should Local Government be serious about biodiversity, it must look beyond
its own estate.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONSERVING THE PLEASANT AND PICTURESQUE:
THE NOTION OF AMENITY
9.1

Prelude

This chapter concerns the concept of ‘amenity’. In the Local Government context, the term enjoys
two meanings.1 First, it may refer to a specific facility, such as a sportsfield or ablutions block.
Alternatively, it may relate to the perceived quality of a place in terms of convenience or, more
often, its attractiveness. The first type can adversely affect the second, as illustrated by Green’s
description of council engineering works as:
“a field in which many dreadful things happen to the landscape. … Typical examples are the
bitumenised parking areas along beach fronts; urban subdivision in sensitive coastal sanddunes; marinas; comfort stations on cliff tops; and box-like community halls on the edges of
public parks”.2
This chapter concerns the second type of amenity: i.e. the aesthetics of a place. Whilst the concept
is elusive, and often ambiguous,3 it is of longstanding familiarity to councils,4 as will be
demonstrated. It is the second common attitude to nature conservation examined in this study.
Elements of the biophysical environment are crucial to amenity. Key strategic documents recognise
the potential linkages between securing amenity and achieving biodiversity conservation. The
Biodiversity Convention states that signatory nations are “conscious of the ... aesthetic … values of
biological diversity and its components”.5 The National Biodiversity Strategy notes that “[t]he
aesthetic values of our natural ecosystems and landscapes contribute to the emotional and spiritual
wellbeing of a highly urbanised population”6 The NSW Biodiversity Strategy declares that “many
Australians” value biodiversity “highly” for “aesthetic … reasons”.7 The National Local
1
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Government Biodiversity Strategy places “scenic and amenity values” at the very top of its list of
biodiversity’s “direct benefits”.8 These references are very similar to those relating to recreational
opportunity noted in the previous chapter.9 They all attempt to promote biodiversity conservation by
way of enhancing a popular aspect of human enjoyment. The statement in the National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy concerning amenity is especially telling. In asserting that
‘amenity values’ lead to “[h]igh economic returns through tourism and increased land value”,10 it
seems to be peddling biodiversity as a tool to boost local economic development and strengthen the
‘ratepayer ideology’.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to consider the twin notions of amenity and local biodiversity
conservation working together. Because some sub-issues relate to council parklands, there is
potential for discussion to overlap with the previous chapter. The intention is to avoid this as far as
practicable. The chapter commences with the notion of amenity, with considerable attention to its
historical basis. It then moves on to the issue of preferred landscapes, which extends discussion to
the rural context. This is followed by consideration of (i) positive amenity protection services, and
(ii) opportunities and experience under planning regulation. Embedded throughout the chapter is the
basic argument that despite the hyperbole, amenity protection and biodiversity conservation do not
sit together comfortably.
9.2

The Notion of Amenity and its Enhancement/Preservation

In a 1951 report by the UK Minister of Local Government and Planning, amenity was described
succinctly as “that element in the appearance and layout of town and country which makes for a
comfortable and pleasant life rather than a mere existence”.11 It is the aesthetic makeup of a place incorporating noise, smells and the visual environment - that constitutes amenity. As Smith
suggests, it encompasses “environmental health, pleasantness and civic beauty”.12 It is an old,
central concept in town planning practice,13 having played a strong role in attempts by early English
planning reformers to address the squalor and unsightliness of post-industrial urban development.14
Creation of amenity was a fundamental element of the instrumental garden city phenomenon, which
8
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championed “the beauty and delight of the country”.15 “Securing … amenity” was an express object
of Britain’s first land-use legislation.16 It became embedded in subsequent planning schemes,
remaining a central plank in UK town and country planning for decades.17
The garden city movement’s emphasis on importing the benefits of the countryside into the town
illustrates the close connection between amenity and aspects of the biophysical environment.
Because elements of nature, either pristine or modified by humankind, provide a common source of
aesthetic delight, they play a major role in determining the level of attractiveness of a particular
place. Bringing natural elements into the urban environment, such as street trees, can vastly
improve local amenity.18 In similar fashion, Duek-Cohn notes that “[t]he major element of beauty in
cities is vegetation - trees, shrubs, lawns etc”.19 Such statements echo the UK Ministry of
Transport’s pronouncement in 1958 that “hardly a street could not be improved, if someone could
give thought to planting the right trees in the right places”.20 In Australia, Taylor describes
“picturesque suburbia” as a national icon.21 But amenity is not only about changing the urban
context. The concept can also apply to the rural environment, as discussed later.
Enhancement of suburban amenity by manipulating the biophysical environment is an archetypal
Local Government activity. Common improvement programs include projects on open space, such
as maintaining bushland, as discussed in the previous chapter. The connection between developing
open space public land and improving amenity has been appreciated for some time. In 1968, the
then NSW State Planning Authority (SPA) stated that “[c]losely related to the question of the
provision of Open Space, is that of maintaining and improving the natural amenity of the urban
environment, through good design, landscaping and detailed planning”.22 Bonyhady suggests that
concerns about amenity can be traced at least to the establishment of the first urban parks when
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concepts of “aesthetics, public health and public morality” were inseparable.23 These issues were,
and still are, crucial to Local Government.
Amenity enhancement can also be carried out on other council land, such as civic plazas and road
reserves. Such action may be appreciated not only by visitors and passers-by but also occupants of
nearby premises. The creation and upkeep of aesthetically pleasant neighbourhoods may be a
service welcomed, if not demanded, by ratepayers keen to see property values escalate. Projects
such as restoring bushland backdrops or planting majestic street trees fit snugly into the ‘ratepayer
ideology’. They may form part of broader strategies to boost the image of a place to attract
development, elevate prestige and increase rate revenue. In other words, Local Government may
view amenity projects as good for business.
Amenity is not only something that councils promote through positive programs. It is highly
influenced by activity on private lands. For instance, removal of vegetation by landholders on a
prominent ridgeline or the painting of a building in garish colours can adversely affect local
amenity. For these reasons, councils utilise their regulatory powers under the planning system to
protect or maintain amenity. An objective of early land-use control, therefore, still continues to be
applied. In a similar manner to carrying out actual projects for amenity purposes, it also serves to
satisfy the ratepayer.
The amenity of a place is dictated mostly by its visual environment. This is because humankind is
more reliant on sight than any other sense. As Tuan notes, “[a] larger world is open to [humans],
and far more information that is detailed and specific spatially teaches [them] through the eyes”.24
An appraisal of a landscape’s worthiness of protection may nevertheless entail factors not directly
visible, such as the cultural history of a site or special meaning to local inhabitants.25 But if the
exercise is limited to assessing the level of amenity, the focus is placed almost entirely on what can
be seen. The problem for environmental managers is that the question of whether a particular
landscape is visually significant, or indeed beautiful, is often subjective.26 This was exemplified in

23

T Bonyhady, The Colonial Earth (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 223; see also P
Proudfoot, “Arcadia and the Idea of Amenity” (1986/87) 72 Journal of the Royal Australian Historical
Society 3 at 13-14.
24
Y Tuan, Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values (Eaglewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974), 6.
25
D Upton, “Seen, Unseen and Scene”; R Riley, “The Visible, the Visual and the Vicarious: Questions about
Vision, Landscape and Experience”, both in P Groth & T Bressi (eds), Understanding Ordinary Landscapes
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), passim.
26
R Breckwoldt, Scenic Landscapes: Guidelines for their Protection (Sydney: National Trust of Australia
(NSW), 1978), 12.

339

Kent v Johnson,27 in which the Federal Court refused to recognise the concept of visual nuisance. A
group of Canberra residents, outraged by the Commonwealth Government’s plans to construct a
conspicuous telecommunications tower on prominent Black Mountain, had sought judicial
intervention to halt the proposal. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the size and bulk of the
structure would disfigure a skyline that comprised an essential component of Canberra’s visual
amenity, thereby constituting a public nuisance. Despite encouraging judicial commentary at the
interlocutory proceedings,28 the argument failed. Whilst the proposed tower offended some, it
pleased others. Confronted with such conflicting opinion, Smithers J ruled that the common law did
not extend as far as visual matters, stating that:
“I do not find in the common law any recognition of a right in anyone to control what another
may build upon his land by reference to its interference with his line of sight or the beauty or
lack of it in what is built, or its incompatibility with the historical quality or character of the
neighbourhood”.29
Interestingly, the Black Mountain tower is now a popular and cherished emblem for the national
capital.
The vacuum left by the common law’s failure to deal with scenic amenity has been filled by the
statutory planning system under which protection of scenic landscapes from adverse visual impact
has become an entrenched objective. Whilst concern about amenity protection was confined
originally to the built environment, the gradual movement of planning regulation from the town to
the non-urban context encouraged planners to evaluate the importance of landscapes, including
those still in their natural state, in terms of their contribution to amenity or scenic quality. As noted
in ch 6, the ‘New Zoning Policy for Land Outside Urban Areas’ of 1977, prepared by the then
Planning and Environment Commission (PEC), recommended that councils consider developing
7(d) Rural Environmental Protection (Scenic) zones.30 In his overview of scenic landscape
protection in 1978, Breckwoldt recommended that the ‘scenic’ zone should not only be applied over
“large areas” and beyond “certain landscape elements” but overlaid across smaller ‘environmental
protection’ zones, such as the limited ‘wetlands’ and ‘foreshore protection’ zones.31
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The PEC’s predecessor, the SPA, had already promoted interest in landscape protection,
particularly along the coastline. Ashton, a former SPA chairperson, has pinpointed the Coastal
Lands Protection Scheme (CLPS), referred to briefly in ch 6, as the SPA’s most important
accomplishment.32 The program identified key sites to be later acquired or placed under
development control. The major concern was scenic amenity. The SPA’s Annual Report of 1973/74
stressed that “[t]he coast’s most valuable attribute is its natural scenery”, noting that the proposed
restrictions were designed “to protect the visual character of the landscape”.33 At that time, like all
rural shires, few non-metropolitan, including coastal councils, had exercised any land-use control
powers at all.34 But development pressures were beginning to emerge along picturesque parts of the
coastline, warranting intervention. As a result, the SPA introduced 40 ha minimum subdivision
restrictions and imposed obligations on councils to consider certain matters, such as siting of
buildings. These provisions were scarcely harsh, described by Breckwoldt as “conservation by
dilution”.35
Coastal management, of course, remains a major planning issue today. Biodiversity conservation
now comprises a significant element in the NSW Government’s 1997 Coastal Policy.36 Whilst there
is still reference to “[p]rotecting and enhancing the aesthetic qualities of the coastal zone”,37 this is
no longer a dominating factor. A specific objective is to “conserve the diversity of native plant and
animal species”.38 The CLPS’s original emphasis on visual amenity probably helped to protect
valuable remnant coastal pockets of natural areas. However, as argued below, conservation of
attractive landscapes will not always guarantee good biodiversity outcomes.
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First, amenity is something that must be enjoyed first hand. As Itami observes, “[a]ffection for
landscapes” must be related to human interaction with them.39 It makes little sense to conserve, for
amenity reasons, an uninhabited, remote or hidden place that receives few or no visitors. It follows
that any attempts to limit or deny community access to natural areas would be antipathetic to
amenity objectives. Only those landscapes that can be readily enjoyed should receive protection
under the amenity banner. Consider, for example, efforts to conserve scenic amenity along a rural
highway. Minimisation of unsightly ribbon development has been a longstanding concern for planmakers. But strategies such as strict zoning controls need apply only to that part of the countryside
within view of passing motorists. The existence of a nearby but hidden patch of remnant and rare
vegetation would be immaterial. In Cooma-Monaro Shire, for example, special Local
Environmental Plan (LEP) provisions apply to proposals on land within 400 metres of nominated
highways in order to maintain ‘major visual corridors’.40 Beyond the boundary, the standard rural
zoning clauses apply. These issues begin to highlight the tenuous link between amenity protection
and biodiversity conservation, despite the promising statements quoted earlier.
Second, amenity is usually restricted to local contexts. In the language of environmental managers,
it is generally attached to a particular neighbourhood.41 Amenity is different to popular scenic icons.
It is almost nonsensical to speak in terms of a place having amenity values for wider regional, let
alone national or global interests. It is only residents and visitors who can experience the amenity of
a particular place through direct enjoyment. The concept is, therefore, most apt for the third sphere
of government to grapple with. It cannot be translated easily to wider geographical scales.
As seen in ch 4, the County of Cumberland Planning Scheme’s emphasis on scenic protection did
not stop the State Government from dismantling the ‘Green Belt’.42 Sandercock argues that Local
Government’s preoccupation with neighbourhood amenity has “persistently undermined the
intentions of metropolitan planning”.43 Meeting ratepayer demands to keep neighbourhood
characters intact can frustrate efforts to serve regional interests, as illustrated in more recent debate
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on urban consolidation. In the same fashion, neighbourhood concerns may conflict with broader
biodiversity conservation objectives. Local amenity protection sits uncomfortably with bioregional
planning imperatives.
Third, and most obviously, attitudes concerning pleasing environments will not necessarily accord
with ecological needs. The notion of ecosystem popularity was raised briefly in the previous
chapter. Directing resources to protecting favourite landscapes will lead to unrepresentative
biodiversity outcomes. As will be discussed further below, there is a clear disjunction between
amenity and biodiversity conservation.
9.3

Preferred Landscapes

Established forests that people love to view and walk amongst, and which may easily be the subject
of hard-fought local conservation battles, might well have crept out of gullies after scrubbier
sideslopes were clearfelled for ill-fated farming enterprises long ago under the ‘colonial’ vision.44
They may carry little ecological value. Without a trained eye, admirers may not even notice the
dominance of opportunistic species or the exotics that have replaced the natives. Introduced plants
might even enhance the landscape experience. In some cases, cultivated paddocks and cleared
pasture may be regarded as far more beautiful than the seemingly dreary original landscapes they
replaced. Some noxious weeds when in flower, such as Paterson’s Curse and Boneseed, are viewed
as visually pleasing.45 In the case of urban bushland, Bridgman et al note that what scientists regard
as ‘natural’ is unlikely to coincide with preferences of local communities, who will most likely
welcome the trappings of human modification.46
At a conference on landscape conservation convened in 1975 by the Australian Conservation
Foundation, Seddon described “[r]olling pastures accented with casual groups of gum trees” as “the
essence of our rural landscape”.47 The sheer power of this image continues to carry strong
emotional force, despite increased public awareness of post-European environmental change and
damage. As Taylor noted about ten years later, “identity with humanised pastoral landscapes
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evoking a sense of picturesque beauty has solid historical foundations”.48 In 1995, Driver suggested
that the “lone eucalypts” in the “stereotypical … calendar landscape ... [are] locked in our
psyche”.49 The tragic irony is that this type of landscape is ecologically unsustainable. This fact was
not lost on Seddon, who stressed that the remaining trees are but sad, non-regenerating survivors of
lost ecosystems.50 Loss of regenerative conditions, together with the eucalypt dieback phenomenon,
ensure that without further research and intensive on-farm conservation measures, this cherished
pastoral scene will eventually disappear. Kirkpatrick warns that some remnants are doomed in any
event, being too small to survive even if fenced from grazing animals.51 The landscape
amenity/biodiversity conservation conflict is clearly difficult to escape.
Evaluation of visual quality of landscapes is now commonplace in rural and peripheral-urban
planning exercises, such as ‘environmental studies’52 and other pre-LEP environmental analyses. It
stands alongside other appraisals such as assessment of bushfire risk and agricultural land viability.
Whilst there are numerous landscape methodologies available,53 Lamb recognises two fundamental
models as (i) the “descriptive inventory approach” and (ii) the “public response format method”.54
The first rests on the “implicit assumption that aesthetic quality of the landscape is inherent either in
its physical attributes or abstract qualities”.55 Visual quality is thus seen to be innate and simply
awaits the interpreter to reveal it. As Kane insists, “it is important to attempt to evaluate scenic
resources in an as objective fashion as we can”.56 A common application is what Lamb calls the
“component model”, wherein:
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“assessment consists of identification and description of physical components of the
landscape which are considered the determinants of aesthetic quality. These are often mapped
and rated or scaled according to the contribution of the groupings to aesthetic quality”.57
This has been a popular approach.58 According to Correy, it emerged during the late 1960s in
response to disillusion with the subjective nature of previous methods, which had relied largely on
the personal preferences of professional evaluators.59 The NSW planning agency recommends a
variant of this model in its Rural Land Evaluation Manual (RLE Manual),60 prepared by the
(former) Department of Planning (DoP) for Local Government planners. It embraces a systematic
and supposedly objective process, involving identification of key ‘visual components’ such as
geographical relief and “significant” vegetation, followed by classification of the terrain into
‘landscape units’. These in turn are analysed and placed in order of ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’
‘scenic quality’. It is not difficult to appreciate why this method is attractive to planners. In the
event of a dispute, the decision-maker can resort to a uniform and apparently scientific method,
without having to adjudicate between competing personal values. But despite the scientific guise,
the values ascribed to the environment are still human-derived. Human preference for certain
landscapes is impossible to escape. The DoP notes, for instance, that across most of NSW, scenic
quality attracts a higher score when, inter alia, the terrain is more rugged, waterforms became
dominant or the degree of naturalness increases.61 The methodology contained in the RLE Manual
is based on these, and other, assumptions concerning community preferences for certain landscapes.
As a result, subjective preference for certain landscapes, especially those containing visual
diversity, is imported into what is presented as an objective methodology. Unfortunately, such
community partiality does not automatically coincide with biodiversity conservation needs.
The conflict between biodiversity conservation and scenic protection becomes even more evident
under Lamb’s second model, in which the community becomes directly involved in the landscape
appraisal process.62 Under this model, the evaluation focus is shifted from the landscape to the
observer - i.e. the community - wherein “the experience of the viewer and the way in which the
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experience is constructed” provide the crux. This approach requires community preferences to be
verified through empirical research rather than gleaned by ‘expert’ opinion.63 Pioneering Australian
research under this model occurred in the Hunter Valley in 1977-78 for the then PEC.64 It involved
gauging responses from a sample of 168 residents to fifteen images of various local landscapes. The
results revealed that water bodies, agricultural lands and vegetation provided the most consistent
ingredients of perceived scenic quality. The “enclosed rural valley” proved to be far more popular
than the swamp.65 A similar but more comprehensive study of attitudes towards forest landscapes
undertaken in north-eastern Victoria in 1982 found the “measure of absence of human alteration in
the landscape” to be the “most powerful predictor” of visual quality. Flat topography, on the other
hand, was highlighted as a common negative factor.66 In a more recent example concerning
woodland systems, Cary found that urban-dwellers preferred the “[o]pen grazed woodland”
setting.67 These comprise only a few examples.68 Whilst they are hardly intended to provide the
final word on landscape preferences, they serve to reinforce the potential inconsistency between
scenic amenity and biodiversity objectives. Inhospitable and undistinguished landscapes are far less
likely to be brought under the amenity umbrella than, say, the prominent peak, the picturesque lake,
the towering eucalypt forest or even a low vegetated ridgeline that provides a pleasant backdrop to
an otherwise drab housing estate. Cary’s ‘open, grazed woodlands,69 where visible cattle nibble at
offshoots of indigenous plants, will rate higher on the amenity than natural scrub.
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Of all the possible reasons to conserve a landscape, retention of scenic quality is, arguably, the most
subjective of all. This makes the idea of community involvement in the appraisal process, as
embodied under Lamb’s second model, all the more important. It also renders the notion of
objective, scientific analysis of the landscape, as advocated under Lamb’s first model, all the more
questionable. There is no need for the expert to tell the community what it already enjoys.
In determining disputes concerning amenity, the courts have emphasised the subjective nature of the
exercise. In Henderson v Sydney City Council, an urban amenity case, the Land and Environment
Court (LEC) stressed that the notion involves “intangible elements” and is to be determined
“according to the standards of ordinary people”.70 This accords with the notion that amenity
protection is a public interest issue rather than the province of a professional elite, such as landscape
assessment experts. It also again raises the problem that community perceptions of preferred
landscapes will not necessarily coincide with biodiversity conservation imperatives.
Calculating community preferences for landscapes is not easy. Determination of visual
attractiveness is an extremely personal exercise. It relies on physiological individuality as well as
memory, personal background and cultural bias.71 Cary argues that there is an intrinsic element of
preference “determined by natural selection” that leads to broad agreement on favoured landscape
types.72 A well-constructed methodology with community input may help highlight what extravisual values are interwoven into landscape preferences. But this approach is likely to be too
cumbersome and expensive for most councils to administer, despite the RLE Manual’s
recommendation that they involve “local conservation and community groups ... to nominate units
considered to be of high scenic value”.73 In any event, it will undermine any serious desire to pursue
biodiversity outcomes. Whilst scenic protection may help to sugarcoat biodiversity conservation
policy, it can also obstruct it.
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A far more scientific approach must be followed if we want to keep a landscape for its biological
resources. Imperatives for biodiversity conservation enshrine a firm place for the objective
professional that will be unconcerned about the majesty of a particular tree species, the popularity
of certain fauna or the grandeur of a landscape. He or she will be interested in matters such as, inter
alia, overlooked hidden subterranean ecosystems. The invisible and microscopic may be crucial.
The functioning of terrestrial ecosystems is highly reliant on a sufficient diversity of
microorganisms.74 Such factors are totally outside the purview of those who concentrate on
conserving local amenity or scenic quality alone.
All this paints a dismal representation of supporting biodiversity conservation through amenity
protection measures. When conflict between the two objectives arises, it is easy for amenity
protection to prevail, particularly at Local Government level. The notion of amenity is easy for
constituents and their politicians to grasp. Because it enjoys a far longer history than modern
concerns about biodiversity, as observed earlier, it is far more deeply embedded in community
thinking. Amenity was also a key concept behind the original institutionalisation of town planning,
as noted already in ch 6. The following parts of this chapter consider, in greater detail, both
traditional and modern-day approaches to enhance and maintain amenity at the local level.
9.4

Local Government Amenity Enhancement Programs

Positive programs designed to enhance neighbourhood amenity stem from Local Government’s
earliest days. As noted in ch 8, the Municipalities Act of 1867 authorised councils to engage in
“planting and preserving trees and shrubs”.75 Whilst the provision was not expressly confined to
council lands, in practice it would not have been used to develop private property. Efforts by Local
Government to conserve or improve amenity on private land has generally been confined to
regulation. Actual projects, such as tree planting, have almost always occurred on public land.
Much of the discussion in the previous chapter on beautifying local open space is relevant here. In
order to avoid duplication, this part of the chapter will focus on another enduring ‘amenity
function’: the planting and maintenance of street trees.
It seems that initial nineteenth century efforts involved embellishing public buildings, especially
town halls, courthouses and the nearby ‘civic trinity’,76 with landmark trees.77 Armstrong and
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Burton suggest that the Municipalities Act of 1867 bolstered street tree planting beyond central
precincts to residential streets.78 Interestingly, despite the force of the ‘colonial’ vision, native
rainforest species, especially the silky oak and Moreton Bay fig, were initially popular.79 Whilst a
variety of other natives were also used, such as turpentines and brush boxes,80 imported pines and
deciduous species became commonplace,81 firstly in elevated areas but later elsewhere. A
resurgence of interest in native species occurred after Federation, reflecting the ‘national’ vision,
with kurrajongs, tallowwoods and silky oaks becoming prevalent.82 But these competed against
perennially popular exotics such as the pepper tree and Canary Island Palm, together with newfound
interest in imported flowering trees, especially the South American jacaranda, from the mid-1920s
onwards.83 Such municipal preoccupation with tree planting is of no surprise. Avenues of trees
would have provided a visible symbol of civic pride, going hand-in-hand with the formal parklands
described in ch 8.84 But with the advent of overhead powerlines and the motor car, local authorities
had to reappraise their planting programs, sometimes even having to remove well-established trees
and install new varieties. It seems that council goals never went far beyond street decoration. There
was negligible, if any, attempt to integrate local ecologies with the townscape.
The Local Government Act 1906 (NSW) entrenched the street tree phenomenon by granting to
councils discretionary power to:
“plant trees in any public road or street in its area, and erect tree-guards or fences to protect
them, and ... set apart and fence portions of public roads or streets as tree reserves”.85
The concept of optional ‘tree reserves’ – i.e. presumably ‘mini-parks’ on roadways - is quaint. It
was replaced by the equally curious notions of ‘grass-plots’ and ‘tree gardens’ when the Local
Government Act 1919 (NSW) authorised councils to:
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“improve … any public road, and in particular … plant trees in the road, make therein
gardens and grass-plots, and erect therein tree-guards and fences for the protection of tree
gardens and grass-plots…”.86
This provision lasted until 1993. Its original enactment was accompanied by a broader discretionary
power, embedded in the subdivisions and road opening provisions, to “control and regulate ... the
improvement and embellishment” of a council’s area.87
Numerous councils, notably metropolitan and town municipalities, exploited their ‘amenity powers’
during the 1920s by undertaking local beautification schemes, including tree planting. This was a
direct result of growing interest in the ‘city beautiful’ concept, which flourished after publication of
John Sulman’s prominent Town Planning in Australia,88 a key contribution to Australia’s own,
emerging town planning movement.89 Sulman, an English social reformer influenced by the garden
city ideal, advocated town beautification measures such as increased open space and street
planting.90 The strong attention to aesthetics in the 1909 Royal Commission for the Improvement of
Sydney and Suburbs report ensured the time was ripe for intense civic interest in local amenity.91
Larcombe cites Randwick Municipal Council’s beautification program of the 1920s as an example
of the lavish projects at that time, describing how:
“[l]oans of £100,000, more than a year’s revenue at the time, were spent almost exclusively
on beautification and improvements. The Municipality’s enhanced appearance, which was
praised in the press, did have a beneficial effect. Property values soared and, because UCV
[uncapitalised land value] increased by over 80 per cent, the council’s revenue more than
doubled”.92
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It is easy to appreciate why such activities were popular. The perceived benefits epitomise the
‘ratepayer ideology’. They can still apply today. Llewellyn suggests that the gentrification of former
working class suburbs in Sydney could conceivably be tracked “by counting the growing number of
gum trees or possibly even plant species”.93
Amenity enhancement projects remain a mainstay of municipal activity. In the urban context, they
go beyond street tree planting to creating ‘green’ spaces through street redesign,94 road closures
(perhaps the modern-day equivalent of ‘tree reserves’) and distributing free or subsidised native
garden plants to ratepayers.95 The wide positive powers enjoyed by councils under the Local
Government Act 1993 (NSW) (LGA 1993) clearly embrace such functions. But there is less
tradition of these programs outside cities and townships where the population density is too sparse
to justify expenditure. Perhaps there is also a view that a high level of amenity is already provided
by the countryside, harking back to the garden city times. It appears that amenity enhancement is
mostly a city/town phenomenon. Outside built-up areas, land-use amenity managers tend to confine
their interest to motoring routes and special beauty spots.
There has never been any fierce mandate for councils to integrate urban amenity enhancement with
biodiversity conservation objectives. The choice of species for beautification programs has reflected
general fashion and local idiosyncratic preferences rather than ecological principles. Importantly,
celebration of specific native species is now routine.96 But this did not emerge until modern
environmentalism. Even at the beginning of the 1970s, commercial availability of native plant
species was scant.97 Mackenzie notes that at the inaugural national conference of the Australian
Institute of Landscape Architects in 1969, those who advocated native specimens represented a
93

J Llewellyn, “Tree Preservation Orders in New South Wales: Some Legal and Economic Aspects” (1984) 1
Environment and Planning Law Journal 178 at 179.
94
See Planning and Environment Commission (NSW), Residential Roadwidths (Sydney: the Commission,
1978), 19.
95
Of 36 metropolitan councils surveyed by Mather in 1990 concerning tree protection policies, 66% reported
programs of free trees to ratepayers: G Mather, Urban Tree Preservation: A Study of Tree Preservation
Orders in Sydney and Adjacent Regions (Sydney: Total Environment Centre, 1990), 40. An analogous survey
of 33 rural councils in northeastern NSW revealed similar programs in 55% of cases: G Mather, Rural Tree
Preservation: A Study of Tree Preservation Orders in North East NSW (Sydney: Total Environment Centre,
1993b), 37. Distribution of trees and shrubs to local residents was then authorised by the insertion of s 482B
in the former Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) in 1983. A modern example of subsidised native tress is
Wollongong City Councils ‘Greenplan Program’, involving the sale of five plants for $13.45 to residents for
‘homeplanting’, associated with horticultural advice. This project was the overall winner of the (former)
LGov’s 2001/02 ‘Environment Awards’ “recognising the outstanding achievements by Local Government in
Managing and Protecting the Environment”: see http://lgov.ozhosting.com/;
www.wollongong.nsw.gov.au/EnvironmentDevelopment (accessed 31 Jan 2003).
96
Armstrong & Burton (1986), op cit n 78 at 72-73.
97
B Mackenzie, “An Australian Landscape Design Ethos” (1996) 18 Landscape Australia 123 at 125.

351

strict and misunderstood minority.98 Bull traces the origins of the belated interest in Australian plant
communities to the creation of certain bushland parks on the foreshores of Sydney Harbour in the
early 1970s, designed by Mackenzie himself who had attempted to recreate the original landscape
whilst accommodating public access, observing that:
“[the spaces] demonstrated that the local ecology had drama and interest, that it could provide
a setting for everyday activities, and that it could be replicated in the fabric of our urban
environments. The examples he created became models for more popular activity in the
landscape and, one could say, fundamentally more sustainable practices than those that
prevailed at the time. His works made indigenous vegetation a viable part of the urban
landscape by being at once recognisable and livable…”.99
The newly discovered interest in bringing Australian species into the townscape echoed fresh
attitudes towards local flora. Relatively low maintenance costs for native plants, in contrast to
exotic varieties, reinforced their popularity.100
As part of the broader environmental movement, Bull notes a trend in landscape architecture that
acknowledges the “ecological underpinnings” of landscape design whilst resisting stylistic
approaches.101 She goes on to advocate an alternative approach that combines both style and
modern demands for ecological sustainability, rejecting outright the popular “gardenesque” style
that “miniaturises natural associations” and “treats nature as a curious plaything”.102 Bull’s entreaty
is attractive. But at the municipal level, there is little likelihood of its achievement whilst amenity
enhancement remains a dominant environmental objective. Integration with biodiversity
conservation objectives is difficult because amenity treats natural associations superficially.
The core problem is that amenity demands a selective approach to species and landscape types, with
choice based on appearance rather than ecology. It encourages the ‘gardenesque’ style derided by
Bull. No council, for instance, would install, in accessible public places such as street shoulders,
clumps of dismal, prickly vegetation. In Victoria’s Yarra Ranges Shire, Powers describes the local
community’s views of indigenous species as “messy” and “not colourful enough”.103 Even where
natives are chosen, they will not necessarily be indigenous to the local area. Some local species may
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be regarded not only as drab but as fire hazards and havens for pests.104 Armstrong and Burton
complain that widespread use of bottlebrush and paperbark as street shrubs in both new and
established urban areas has created “a monotonous order that is not expressive of the character of
the local landscape, people or place”.105 Edwards pushes a similar argument, asking:
“[h]ow often is a collection of Melaleuca armillaris, Lophostemon confertus and hakea
laurina regarded as a satisfactory substitute for the complex of species which makes up or
made up local scrub? There is a confused understanding of what ‘native’ means, and a clear
distinction should be drawn between indigenous species and plants from elsewhere in
Australia. The latter are almost as foreign as oaks and elms and should be termed ‘Australian
exotics’”.106
We can take the argument another hypothetical step. Imagine technology was able to synthetically
recreate landscape so cleverly that we could not detect any difference. If we are fooled by the
polystyrene trees and artificial scents, would not our amenity enjoyment remain unaltered? Such an
idea is obviously repugnant to biodiversity conservation. An even more unsettling scenario arises
should there not only be full knowledge of the artificiality but support for it. Synthetic trees could
be championed not only due to their appearance but also their permanence, lack of watering needs
and inability to drop leaves. Minimal maintenance would please modern municipal managers
obsessed with efficiency and budgets. Such a situation is not fanciful. As long ago as 1974, Tribe
referred to the ‘planting’ of artificial trees and shrubs along a Californian freeway by a local
authority.107
In order for amenity and biodiversity conservation objectives to be consistent, there must be a
fundamental attitudinal shift in community attitudes towards native associations, including deeper
appreciation of indigenous ecosystems regardless of their outward form. This is a tall order. As will
be seen below, it applies to private land as well.
9.5

Regulation of Amenity on Private Land

9.5.1

Amenity in Land-Use Control

Introduction of amenity enhancement projects during the early nineteenth century paralleled the
beginning of crude land-use controls over private land. Protecting neighbourhood amenity by
regulation became a discretionary Local Government function when the LGA 1919 authorised
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proclamation ‘residential districts’.108 The mechanism was borrowed from British land-use control
to segregate housing from uses that threatened residential amenity. In her study on the effect of
‘residential districts’, H Proudfoot notes a “direct line of descent” from the garden city ideal.109 In
presenting the original bill to the NSW Parliament, Minister Fitzgerald had sold the idea by
appealing to the ‘ratepayer ideology’, highlighting examples of pleasant residential areas juxtaposed
against ugliness, such as:
“the well-known case of the Burwood brickworks, which are put right down in the centre of a
beautiful district. That destroys the land values and the amenities of the residents of Burwood
… if we had had a system of planning they would have been places in a suitable locality, with
probably a village near … [s]uch difficulties will be covered by the provisions of the bill”.110
Sandercock observes that “protecting residential amenity of upper-middle-class suburbs” impressed
the legislature.111 Obviously, the ‘ratepayer ideology’ carried rigour. Zoning was born in NSW to
achieve the very narrow objective of promoting property interests. Importantly, this is not just a
matter of historical curiosity. In her study of Ku-ring-gai Council’s planning mechanisms from the
1920s to 1992, H Proudfoot refers to “restrictive local government attitudes” that have remained
“ingrained”, still manifested in preoccupation with residential amenity and land values.112 Whilst
such an attitude still promotes the greening of suburbia, for the same reasons advanced earlier this
will not necessarily coincide with ecological principles.
The 1951 County of Cumberland Planning Scheme (CCPS) entrenched planning regulation for
amenity protection purposes. Clause 27(e) required councils, when determining development
applications, to “take into consideration”, inter alia:
“the existing and likely future amenity of the neighbourhood including the question whether
the proposal is likely to cause injury to such amenity including injury due to the emission of
noise, vibration, smell, fumes, smoke, vapour, steam, soot, ash, dust, grit, oil, waste water,
waste products or otherwise”.
This head of consideration, along with the other matters listed under cl 27, was reproduced in
subsequent PSOs across the State prepared under the former Pt XIIA LGA 1919. When the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA) commenced operation in 1980,
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and matters to be taken into account in determining development applications were set into the
legislation itself, former s 90(1) included “the existing and likely future amenity of the
neighbourhood”.113 The requirement was a direct derivation from the formula in the CCPS. A
related head of consideration was “the effect of [a proposed] development on the landscape or
scenic quality of the locality”.114 Whilst there is no specific reference to amenity under the current
abbreviated s 79C(1) EPAA,115 the guidelines on implementing the provision refer expressly to,
inter alia, “the character and amenity of the locality and streetscape”.116
The original paragraph in the CCPS plan was far more specific in regard to the types of potential
“injury” to neighbourhood amenity that could be taken into account. Its focus was on
neighbourhood pollution, particularly from industrial uses. But in 1955, when considering the
provision in Tooth & Co v Parramatta City Council, the High Court made it clear that ‘injury’ to
amenity was not restricted to those causes expressly listed.117 In other cases, including recent ones,
the courts have emphasised that adverse impact on visual amenity clearly fell within the realm of cl
27(e).118 For instance, in Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Ashfield Municipal Council,119 Sugerman J
regarded the concept as crucial in terms of the visual effect of a service station on a residential
neighbourhood, stating that:
“to break up a line of residences with their lawns and gardens by the interposition of a
service station building with its paved yard, equipment of petrol pumps and other accessories,
and daily congestion of parked vehicles is to detract from the pleasurable appearance of a
neighbourhood in the eyes both of residents and passers-by”.120
Amenity remains a significant issue in determining development applications today. Impact on
visual amenity is frequently the subject of merits appeals,121 with numerous judgments turning on
the issue.122 Such cases do not solely arise from the urban context. Proposals for extractive industry
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in rural areas, for example, frequently attract strong opposition on the grounds of disruption to
scenic amenity.123 Major disputes over other developments, such as small acreage subdivision or
erection of dwelling-houses on hilltops, are less common. This is because most permissible uses,
unlike large-scale industries such as quarries, are not classified as ‘designated development’ and,
therefore, provide no opportunity for merits appeals by disgruntled neighbours.124 Furthermore,
many rural uses, especially non-intensive agriculture, are often permissible without consent in rural
zones. In the case of land clearance, as seen in ch 6,125 the responsibilities now lie largely outside
rural Local Government due to the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) (NVCA).126
Impact on amenity is, of course, only one of many factors to be ‘balanced’ against each other by the
decision-maker in determining an application for development. There is no requirement that it, or
any other legitimate matter, be given overriding weight.127 Yet amenity and scenic value are issues
that local politicians can readily understand without expert opinion, such as information from ‘7/8’
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part tests’ and ‘species impact statements’ as discussed in ch 6. Furthermore, in contrast to
biodiversity, amenity is more closely related to ratepayer concerns.
In many circumstances, the decision-maker may follow the ‘culture of consent’ by attempting to
mitigate adverse impact on amenity by imposing conditions. For example, a council might require
that certain trees be retained on the site or new planting be carried out for screening purposes.128
Whilst these may be successful in terms of minimising visual disruption, there is no guarantee that
they will also be aimed at reducing impact on, and/or restoring, ecosystems. For example, a tree
preservation condition may ignore the understorey. Stipulations for planting may fail to specify
indigenous species. Whilst Thorvaldson calls for the visual appraisal process to “describe and assess
the landscape in terms of ecological natural systems as well as a cultural visual analysis”,129 there is
nothing that requires this to be done unless demanded by the individual ‘environmental planning
instrument’ (EPI).
This is not to suggest that amenity protection and biodiversity conservation objectives cannot be
achieved together through well-crafted conditions. In Amatek Ltd v Wingecarribee Shire Council,130
for instance, in approving a quarry, the LEC required an ongoing program of revegetation with
seeds harvested from native vegetation in the local area. Whilst outright refusal of the application
would have been far more sympathetic to amenity protection or biodiversity conservation, the Court
nevertheless displayed an attempt to reconcile the two. But there is nothing to demand such an
approach unless this is made clear in the relevant EPI.
9.5.2

Tree Preservation Orders

For the majority of urban landholders, the most well known instrument for conserving the local
biophysical environment is the tree preservation order (TPO), which demands permission for
removal of, or interference with, all or specified ‘trees’. The power to prepare and make a TPO is
conferred on a council by its own local EPI. Accordingly, it is a purely local mechanism but carries
statutory force. In Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Ryde City Council, Lloyd J observed that
destruction of vegetation, which was prohibited under a TPO without approval, comprised
‘development’ under Pt 4 EPAA.131
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TPOs have traditionally been explicitly related to protection of amenity. When the CCPSO was
introduced in 1951, it authorised the making of TPOs:
“[w]here it appears to the responsible authority that it is expedient for the purpose of securing
amenity or of preserving existing amenities it may for that purpose make an order (hereinafter
referred to as a tree preservation order)…”.132
The wording was borrowed directly from English town planning legislation, which authorised
implementation of TPOs when “expedient in the interests of amenity”.133 The original NSW
formula has changed little over time. Similar, if not identical, versions were later enshrined in pre1980 PSOs and IDOs. The Environmental Planning and Assessment Model Provisions 1980
(‘Model Provisions’), a set of clauses designed by the State Government to achieve a level of
consistency between all LEPs,134 gazetted almost 30 years after the CCPSO and still in operation
today, contain a virtually indistinguishable provision at cl 8(1), stating:
“[w]here it appears to the council that it may be expedient for the purpose of securing amenity
or of preserving existing amenity, it may, for that purpose and by resolution, make an order
(hereinafter referred to as a “tree preservation order”)”.
This provision is still popular. Of the eighteen ‘comprehensive’ current LEPs drafted during
1995/1996, fourteen (i.e. 77.8%) adopt this exact clause from the Model Provisions. For 1999/2000,
eleven of nineteen LEPs (i.e. 57.9%) contain the same provision, suggesting that importation of the
Model Provisions into LEPs is waning. In any event, the vast majority of LEPs that do not adopt the
Model Provisions include their own TPO-making powers.135
There has been no published widespread survey analysis of TPO mechanisms in NSW since work
by Mather over a decade ago. In her 1990 review of TPOs in the Sydney region, Mather noted:
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“the intent of TPO’s [sic] is not simply the protection and preservation of trees, but also the
enhancement or preservation of the quality of the human environment, although these can
lead to conflict”.136
Mather’s analysis is puzzling. The statutory formula in the Model Provisions is unambiguous. It
informs that TPOs are designed solely to secure or preserve amenity by means of protecting
existing trees. It does not incorporate any other environmental objective, conflicting or otherwise.
The narrowness of this enabling clause means that a subsequent TPO that seeks to conserve
biodiversity, rather than amenity, must be invalid. A council that is keen to extend the role of its
TPO should therefore abandon the conventional clause and rely upon the wide plan-making
provisions under Pt 3 EPAA to draft a more creative provision.137
During the late 1980s, the then DoP prepared a draft set of ‘model provisions’, which ultimately
was never adopted. The draft clause in relation to TPOs is noteworthy:
(1) The consent authority may make a tree preservation order...
(2) The consent authority may not grant consent for any action [to ringbark, cut down, top,
lop, remove, injure or destroy a tree] ... unless it has made an assessment of the importance of
the tree or trees in relation to:
(a) soil stability and prevention of land degradation;
(b) scenic or environmental amenity; and
(c) vegetation systems and natural wildlife habitats.138
The provision was cast in sufficiently wide terms to enable a council to introduce a TPO for reasons
well beyond mere amenity, including conservation of “natural wildlife habitats”. This general
approach had already been recognised by the former NSW Department of Environment and
Planning (DEP) in 1982 when, in exhorting councils to review and/or introduce TPOs pursuant to
the ‘Year of the Tree’, it described the value of trees as going beyond traditional amenity issues,
advising that:
“[t]he value of trees should be appreciated - they purify and cool the air, protect from winds,
dust, noise and unsightliness, prevent soil erosion and silting of rivers and provide shade and
shelter for living things. Preservation of native vegetation preserves native fauna”.139
The description represents a sophisticated perspective of the ‘ecological’ vision that preceded
emergence of the concept of biodiversity. But it has not led to revision of the Model Provisions.
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There is minimal evidence of imaginative TPO provisions within the LEPs themselves. The
‘comprehensive’ LEPs prepared in 1995 and 1996 with their own TPO-making clause make no
reference to non-amenity matters. One refers to “maintenance of a demonstrably beneficial amenity
to residents”140 whilst the others fail to contain any objective at all. There are several more recent
and encouraging examples. Randwick LEP 1998 includes an expanded version of the DoP’s draft
clause quoted above.141 Sutherland LEP 2000 enables the Council to prepare a ‘tree and bushland
vegetation preservation order’ for the “preservation of valuable trees and vegetation” to “ensure the
integrity of the natural environment”.142 Tweed LEP 2000 authorises TPO-making for the
“protection of vegetation for reasons of amenity or ecology”,143 thereby leaving the council with the
option to pursue biodiversity or amenity conservation.
These examples illustrate the distance travelled since Ballina Shire Council introduced its
spectacularly misconceived TPO during the mid-1980s, as described by the then NSW Heritage
Council.144 The TPO sought to protect only nominated rainforest and other tree species recognised
as special or rare. It left unprotected those less remarkable species that were part of the ecosystems
of the listed plants. The instrument was based, therefore, on an ecologically fallacious notion of
conserving only the most treasured aspects of the local natural environment. It provides a classic
example of a ‘species’ rather than habitat’ approach to conservation criticised by Bradsen.145
Paradoxically, a strictly enforced blanket approach to tree protection based on amenity-dominated
motives would have been more successful.
Whilst the Ballina case is extreme, it exemplifies how the controls contained in a TPO extend only
to such ‘trees’ as defined under it or the LEP. This potentially paves the way for a very selective
approach to vegetation protection. In her 1990 survey of TPOs throughout Sydney, Mather found
that:
“[o]ne of the biggest shortcomings results from the varied definitions of a tree. Although
there were councils who used a [minimum] height of 3m as the criterion, there were those that
used 5m and 10m. This means, in the latter cases, that the protection will only cover mature
trees or tall-growing species”.146
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A minority of the LEP provisions reviewed by the author indicate a similar tendency, although the
figures on height etc are not as excessive. Of the 52 ‘comprehensive’ 1995-2000 LEPs containing
TPO clauses, ten (i.e. 19.2%) define ‘tree’ by means of height, spread and/or girth. A disappointing
example is Albury LEP 2000, wherein a tree must be at least 4.5 metres in height and have a
minimum ‘branch spread’ of 3 metres before the TPO provision is triggered.147 The clause provides
no protection at all to small and slow-growing trees,148 let alone low shrubs, groundcover and
underground plants. It reinforces the criticism made by Durkin that controls emphasise “tree
retention rather than vegetation retention”.149 This approach is difficult to reconcile with
biodiversity principles, which concentrate on preserving complex assemblages. In 29 LEPs
(57.8%), ‘tree’ is not defined at all. In most of the remainder, the definition of ‘tree’ is wide and
impressive. It can extend to saplings, shrubs and scrub and, in the situation of Narromine LEP 1998,
any “dead standing tree”, thereby providing potential protection to fauna that burrow in such
locations.150
Even where a TPO adopts a broader approach to vegetation removal, there remains the problem of
its lack of effectiveness as a strong regulatory tool. Mather’s surveys of TPOs in both urban and
rural areas indicated high rates of approval of applications for tree removal, with “virtually 100%”
of rural applications attracting consent.151 There is also the suspicion of a lack of commitment to
TPOs in rural shires. Of 33 councils in north eastern NSW that responded to Mather’s survey, as
many as 19 had no TPO at all.152 Those that did exist were generally restricted to township lands.153
Because the TPO clause in a LEP almost always provides an option, rather than an obligation, to
prepare a TPO, there is no reason to assume that strong nature conservation-related TPOs have been
extended across rural lands. Even where rural LEPs might contain wide definitions of ‘tree’, it does
not follow that conservation friendly and well-enforced TPOs have been prepared across the
147
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landscape. The tentative, belated and ill-wanted movement of planning controls into rural areas, as
outlined throughout ch 6, is still noticeable.
9.5.3

Amenity Protection under Local Environmental Plans

This section extends the historical material addressed earlier. In contrast to TPOs, more
sophisticated approaches to amenity protection may be devised by councils through zoning and
relevant provisions in their LEPs. Scenic conservation zones and other specially designated areas
for amenity protection, such as foreshore areas,154 are not uncommon. Of the 1995/2000
‘comprehensive’ LEPs with environmental protection zones, fourteen of 28 (i.e. 50%) contain
‘scenic protection’ or closely related zones. O’Neil traces the first landscape amenity protection
provisions as far back as the ill-fated ‘Green Belt Area’ zone of the CCPS.155 This was a restrictive
zoning which, inter alia, required the consent authority to take into account visual matters
including, inter alia, “any plan of aesthetic, scenic or roadside control” prepared by the Cumberland
County Council (CCC).156 The CCPS essentially conferred discretion on the decision-maker to
approve a range of unspecified uses in the zone.157 Whilst Alexander describes the ‘Green Belt’ as
having derived from “the ecological approach to planning”,158 the provisions make it clear that the
modern approach to biodiversity conservation is very different to yesteryear.
A more ambitious proposal of the CCC was to designate ‘Areas of Special Scenic Significance’,
with provision for “the preservation of existing trees and the planting of woodlots, both on public
land and private land”, failed to reach fruition.159
An early local example was a scenic protection zone over the ‘Central Hill Lands’ adjacent to
Campbelltown township under an Interim Development Order (IDO), a move by the SPA to protect
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“part of the landscape setting for [anticipated] urban development”.160 In 1968, the SPA earmarked
the West Pennant Hills Valley in outer Sydney as a ‘Natural Amenity Preservation Area’ in the
Sydney Region: Outline Plan.161 Its discussion is revealing, in noting that it had:
“given considerable thought to the question of whether further development should be
discouraged in order to preserve the Valley’s character, but there is a shortage of areas which
possess special landscape and other attractions for high quality housing ... there is a case for
carefully designed residential development which does not remove the Valley’s closely
wooded character”.162
The dominance of scenic protection over nature conservation objectives is clearly evident, as is the
relationship between amenity and high land values. The quote also highlights how attractive
landscapes dominated by natural elements can provide a forceful magnet to development pressure.
As the former DoP observed:
“[p]eople are attracted to areas with pleasing views, interesting topography and good
vegetation stands and demand for land for subdivision within areas of high scenic quality can
be high. The high prices paid for land with attractive views demonstrates the value of scenery
as a resource”.163
Ironically, the amenity afforded by aspects of the biophysical environment can be destroyed by the
very development it attracts. For this reason, planning regulations are often directed at minimising
the scale of development and discouraging visually unsympathetic buildings in such areas. Scenic
protection zones are often located near urban settlements where views are considered important,
frequently straddling steep lands and ridgelines. This fits into the first limb of the PEC’s description
of ‘Rural Environmental Protection (Scenic) zones, which recommended:
“…appli[cation] to such areas as [i] hill lands which form a backdrop to a town or [ii] such
other scenic areas of recognised importance that should be retained in broad-acre and strictly
controlled for the common good.”164
Various examples clearly fit within the first limb. Walcha Shire, for instance, has only one
protection zone, namely ‘7(d) Environmental Protection (Scenic)’, whose objectives are:
“to protect and preserve the unique landscape and environmental setting of Walcha,
particularly the forested hill land above the town. A variety of uses is permissible in the zone,
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Campbelltown City Council Interim Development Order No 14, gazetted 20 Sep 1974; see State Planning
Authority (1968), op cit n 22 at 68.
161
State Planning Authority of NSW (1968), op cit n 22 at 83. See also ch 6.
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Ibid at 82.
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Department of Planning (NSW) (1988), op cit n 60 at 14.
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Planning and Environment Commission (NSW), Circular No 13: New Zoning Policy for Land Outside
Urban Areas, 10 Feb 1977, 7.
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but these will be subject to more particular control, for example, in the choice of building
materials, the positioning of a building on its site and the provision of access roads and
landscaping”.165
Another example is Albury LEP 2000,166 under which the single ‘Environmental Protection Zone’
applies only to hilly and floodplain landscapes close to the urban area. The ‘principal objective’ of
the zone is to “protect from inappropriate development and excessive development” land that:
(a) forms part of the scenic backdrop or rural setting, or
(b) located within or adjacent to the River Murray flood plain.167
There is no reference to ecosystem or vegetation conservation. The closest ‘particular objective’
refers to:
“ensur[ing] that development in the Environment Protection zone is carried out in a way that
is sensitive to the land and environmental characteristics”.168
Despite this, agriculture is permissible without consent,169 which renders the provisions almost
nugatory. Apart from two exceptions of “medium density housing with more than three dwellings”
and “recreational vehicle areas”,170 there are no nominated prohibitions in the zone, thereby
conferring a broad discretion on the Council to approve an array of destructive developments. The
conservation role of the zone is, therefore, questionable. It should not be forgotten, however, that
there are other ‘environmental protection’ zones to address this. If biodiversity conservation is to be
the first priority, this must be made clear in both the name and provisions of the zone.
The second limb of the scenic zone recommended by the then PEC is less related to backdrops.
These areas are more likely to be located in more remote regions where development pressure is
limited. In their study of north-eastern NSW, Pressey et al observe that “[m]uch of the area under
Environmental Protection Zoning is steep land listed for scenic protection”.171 Knox and Francis, in
their brief discussion of two scenic protection zones in coastal shires, found that the zones followed
ridgelines, with little attention paid to “retaining vegetation as an ecological system supportive of
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non-human living communities”.172 Whilst the emphasis in on scenic, rather than biodiversity,
conservation, this should not be surprising.
An example of this approach is found in Greater Taree Local Environmental Plan 1995, which
contains separate environmental protection zones for scenic and habitat protection. The objectives
of Zone ‘7(d) Environmental Protection Scenic’ are described as:
“(a) the protection and conservation of features which are of particular scenic interest and
which contribute to the landscape of the locality, especially steep land or land which has
significant vegetation; and
(b) the regulation of development so that it would not destroy or damage the scenic value
or environmental quality of the land”.173
Apart from the confusing reference to “environmental quality” in the PEC’s recommended second
limb,174 the focus of the zone is clearly on scenic protection rather than conservation of ecological
systems. An additional clause directs the Council, in considering proposals in this zone, to take into
account the nature of external surfaces that may be required to “blend visually with the landscape”
and display “low reflective quality.175 The Council must also consider “the trees and shrubs which
are to be retained and the extent of landscaping to be carried out”.176 In such cases, strict control
over development for scenic purposes may help keep ecosystems intact. But this cannot be
guaranteed. Emphasis on hiding buildings (with sufficient fire protection) rather than ensuring their
prominence is recommended.
The existence of the 7(a) Environmental Protection Habitat Zone might even be seen to suggest that
natural systems under the ‘scenic zone, are ecologically inferior and warrant less protection than
elsewhere. Whilst ever amenity and/or scenic protection remain a key land-use planning objective,
there is a real risk that ecological communities may be compromised or destroyed. This is the
crucial factor in regarding scenic zones as a biodiversity conservation tool. Scenic and habitat
protection zones must be located in the right places, each with their own clear, prioritised
objectives. Although a different paradigm about the value of native ecosystems may improve this
situation, the extent of biodiversity loss in Australia is perhaps already too severe to afford the
luxury of waiting for attitudinal change.
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9.6

Conclusion

It is possible for biodiversity conservation to occur under the amenity umbrella at the Local
Government level. But it happens by default. As seen above, amenity protection can be disastrous
for ecological communities. It is important, therefore, that biodiversity conservation objectives be
given clear, firm priority over amenity protection as far as possible, in both political and practical
terms. If the two can be met together, well and good. Otherwise, councils need to be prepared to set
the amenity-based aspect of the ‘ratepayer ideology’ aside. But it is unlikely that Local Government
will take a strong lead here. Protection of local amenity is, after all, embedded in municipal culture.
It is a popular ‘wastebin’, albeit cherished, function.
Action could be taken via key instruments such as LEPs and TPOs, as well as council management
plans and plans of management prompted by ‘state of the environment’ reports under the LGA
1993. Management plans could lead to indigenous street tree planting, weed eradication and
community environmental education, all under the basket of ‘environmental protection activities’.177
Other spheres of government must be prepared to provide leadership to Local Government in terms
of both policy direction and financial assistance. This would assist biodiversity conservation needs
serving the broader public interest to override more parochial local concerns such as conserving
local amenity. Should more resources be made available, preferably on a conditional basis grounded
in conservation imperatives, Local Government is most likely to respond if it has some ‘ownership’
of the issue. This means close collaboration with other relevant bodies. Regional action between
councils is highly relevant. But individual councils will seek to retain control of matters or local
interest only. Securing amenity, unlike conserving biodiversity conservation, falls readily into this
realm.
It must not be overlooked that much of the above discussion must be viewed in terms of the
implications of the NVCA. As outlined in ch 6,178 the NVCA has ousted rural Local Government’s
power in regulating land clearance subject to various exemptions and exclusions. It is within these
gaps where well-drafted clauses may be able to play a key role going beyond amenity to
biodiversity conservation.
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CHAPTER TEN
GOOD PRACTICE:
OPPORTUNITY AND EXAMPLES
10.1

Prelude

Most of the narrative in previous chapters paints a grim picture for Local Government in achieving
an important, if not pivotal, role in biodiversity conservation. But such a conclusion ignores some
impressive models and attempts on the part of individual councils. A handful of commendable
projects carried out under the wide, positive service provisions of the Local Government Act 1993
(NSW) (LGA 1993) have already been listed.1 This chapter is more interested in strategic rather
than one-off projects. It also concerns a very different approach to those considered in the last two
chapters – i.e. that nature should be conserved for its value in terms of biodiversity. As will be seen,
however, good intentions can be frustrated, if not overridden, by a complexity of issues.
Initially, the chapter briefly revisits management of council-managed public lands. It then moves on
to conservation opportunity on private land under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (NSW) (EPAA), extending the critical overview in ch 6. Rather than focusing on relatively
lacklustre REPs, discussion addresses relevant State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) that
force the notion of biodiversity conservation on the municipal agenda. Attention is then paid to
council-prepared Local Environmental Plans (LEPs). The chapter also considers the notion of
umbrella local conservation ‘strategies’, with emphasis on an interesting case study at
Coonabarabran Shire.
10.2

Public Lands

Well-resourced conservation programmes for community lands are the exception rather than the
2
rule. Good examples exist amongst, inter alia, Bankstown, Hornsby, Sutherland and Wollongong

Councils.3 All are urban authorities. For rural councils, management costs will be more acute in
places where pockets of remnants are scattered and located far from council headquarters.4

1

See chs 5 & 11.
G Spies, “Community in the Bush: Community Involvement - Is it Working?” in B Diekman (ed), Bushland
in our Cities and Suburbs Part 2: Making Bush Regeneration Work (Sydney: Nature Conservation Council of
NSW, 1995), 148 & 164.
3
Author’s own observations aided by attendance/participation at various municipal seminars: see n 128, infra.
4
See K Wallace & S Moore, “Management of Remnant Bushland for Nature Conservation in Agricultural
Areas of South-Western Australia - Operational and Planning Perspectives” in D Saunders et al (eds), Nature
Conservation: The Role of Remnants of Native Vegetation (Sydney: Surrey Beatty & Sons, 1987), 259-268,
2
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Furthermore, Campbell observes that as one travels further inland, there is a “cultural devaluing of
native bush”.5 The consequence is uneven conservation efforts, not only across Local Government
but also between wider regions. This reflects cultural, socio-economic and political factors rather
than ecological needs.
Specialist conservation officers provide the bulk of costly bushland management work, via
rehabilitation planning and volunteer supervision. Through closer liaison with land-use planners,
improved integration between council reserve management and planning for surrounding private
lands is feasible.6 But environmental managers are not found in all councils, especially those with
limited funding and old-fashioned outlooks. The National Local Government Biodiversity Survey of
2000 found that over 90% of “remote rural councils … do not currently have a dedicated
environmental officer”.7 This raises the idea of sharing specialist staff by two or more councils,8
perhaps via the Regional Organisation of Council (ROC) network, if available, or by individual
contract. Both methods exist.
Unlike land-use planners, conservation officers have no legislation of their own to ensure a clear
place in the municipal network. Whilst the provisions on ‘state of environment reports’ (SoERs)
and community lands categorised as ‘natural areas’ under the LGA 1993 might provide the best
entry into Local Government, these may be handled instead by traditional open space managers or
even works engineers to whom biodiversity conservation is a non-issue. Even if in-house
conservation officers exist, they may be located on the bureaucratic periphery.9 Conservation
commitment by senior executives and/or the elected council is, therefore, crucial. The powerbrokers may then be sympathetic to matters such as utilising the ‘management plan’ for
who stress the operational difficulties of managing far-flung remnants in the wheat belt of south-eastern
Western Australia.
5
Andrew Campbell, “Contrasting Perspectives: Young Countries in Old Landscapes and Old Countries in
Young Landscapes” in A Hamblin (ed), Visions of Future Landscapes. Proceedings of 1999 Australian
Academy of Science Fenner Conference on the Environment, 2-5 May 1999 (Canberra: Bureau of Rural
Sciences, 1999), 26.
6
S Briggs, “Linking Ecological Scales and Institutional Frameworks for Landscape Rehabilitation” (2001)
2(1) Ecological Management & Restoration 28 at 33.
7
Australian Local Government Association, National Local Government Biodiversity Survey; National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy Implementation Project Stage 1 (Canberra: the Association, 2000), 45. The
document also alludes to the problem of “recruiting suitably qualified candidates” in rural areas: at 56.
8
M Saxon, “The Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 – Is the Development Approval Process
Working” in H Webb (ed), Proceedings of On the Brink: Your Bush, Their Habitat, Our Act: Is the
Threatened Species Conservation Act Working? Conference (Sydney: Nature Conservation Counci1of NSW,
2 May 1997), 95.
9
A Roughley, “With Head, Heart and Land: Integration of Community Workers and Environmental Planners
in Ecological Sustainable Local Area Planning” (1999) 16 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 339,
passim; see also S Douglas, “Local Government and the Threatened Species Conservation Act – the Greatest
Potential; the Weakest Link” (1999) 6 Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 135 at 141.
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conservation strategies or directing resources to implement sturdy ‘plans of management’ for
scrubland rehabilitation.
Despite the above, there are numerous examples of individual praiseworthy efforts.10 But as seen
throughout this thesis, good endeavours do not always transcend municipal boundaries and are nonexistent where the ‘national’ vision still carries significant weight.
10.3

Conservation on Private Lands by Ecological Driven Planning Regulation

10.3.1 SEPPs
A handful of SEPPs, described briefly in ch 6,11 demand that councils confront detailed aspects of
biodiversity conservation in evaluating permissible proposals on specified lands. In some cases,
they prohibit environmentally damaging uses altogether. But apart from SEPP No 44 – Koala
Habitat Protection, they apply to only relatively small areas. Moreover, they do not necessarily
cover all relevant locations. In the case of SEPP No 14 – Coastal Wetlands, for example, Pressey et
al allege that “[m]any wetland areas and some wetland types” are ignored.12 In 1993, Fook referred
to the extent of protected wetlands as having been reduced since the plan’s inception.13
The nature-based SEPPs assume traditional regulatory approaches with stringent approval
processes.14 Whilst SEPP Nos 14, 19 and 26 require development consent for a wide range of
activities - including the mere disturbance of certain ‘bushland’ under SEPP No 1915 - they still
place substantial discretion in the hands of the decision-maker to decide whether or not to grant
consent. As noted by the author elsewhere, “[t]he emphasis is on informed decision-making rather

10

See articles throughout A Ray (ed), Bushcare: Proceedings of NSW Local Government Workshops
(Sydney: NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, 2000); K Woolfe (ed), Myths, Models & Milestones:
Sustainability & Local Environments Conference Papers, 28-29 Nov 1996 (Sydney: Environs Australia,
1996); Municipal Conservation Association (Vic), Proceedings of the Local Government Responds to Rio
Conference, 21-22 Oct 1994 (Melbourne: the Association, 1994b); Office of the Environment (Vic),
Proceedings of the An Important Role to Play: Environmental Initiatives at the Local Government Level
Conference, 2-5 Oct 1991 (Melbourne: the Office, 1992).
11
See ch 6.
12
R Pressey et al, “How Well are the Forests of North-Eastern New South Wales? - Analyses of Forest
Environments in Relation to Formal Protection Measures, Land Tenure, and Vulnerability to Clearing” (1996)
85 Forest Ecology and Management 310 at 323.
13
K Fook, “Protected Wetlands! The Disastrous Tale of SEPP 14” (1993) 37(4) National Parks Journal 11 at
12. For the limited extent of mangroves and seagrass/saltmarsh in NSW, see D Mossop, “Coastal Wetland
Protection Law in NSW” (1992) 9 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 331 at 332.
14
See ch 6.
15
SEPP No 19 - Bushland in Urban Areas, gazetted 24 Oct 1996, cll 4(1), 6(1)-(2).
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than stopping undesirable development.16 A different approach arises from ‘plans of management’
prepared under SEPP No 44,17 which offer active positive management for koala protection rather
than mere negative control. For example, a plan could specify that certain remnants be fenced and
managed on an ongoing basis. Whilst SEPP No 19 also provides for plans of management,
preparation is optional.18 They have largely been overtaken by the mandatory ‘plans of
management’ for community lands under the LGA 1993.
In view of their nature, the said specialist SEPPs can be instrumental in restricting council
environmental agendas to specific sites and/or issues. Lunney and Matthews describe how Coffs
Harbour City Council, for instance, despite having supported a high profile koala conservation
project in 1990, confined its environmental priorities to mapped wetlands and littoral rainforest in
direct response to obligations imposed by SEPP Nos 14 and 26.19 Its interest in koala conservation
was not re-activated until SEPP No 44 forced the issue. Lunney and Matthews conclude that
without such intervention, it is improbable that sufficient koala habitat would have been
conserved.20
SEPP No 44 is open to criticism on the grounds of its focus on a charismatic species of strong
“emotive appeal”.21 Other threatened species, such as the broad headed snake, would never attract
such attention. But protecting the koala’s habitat will also help conserve local ecosystems.22 Even
though conservation policies designed to protect ecosystems are preferable,23 concentration on
particular species can indirectly safeguard broader ecosystems. In the Coffs Harbour situation,
Hamilton, Lunney and Matthews observe how the koala species occupies eucalyptus trees on fertile

16

A Kelly, “Biodiversity, the Planning System and Local Government: A Happy Trio?” in D Lunney, T
Dawson & C Dickman (eds), Is the Biodiversity Tail Wagging the Zoological Dog? (Sydney: Royal
Zoological Society of NSW, 1998a), 39.
17
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19
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Outside Nature Reserves: A Case Study of Koalas in New South Wales” in P Hale & D Lamb (eds),
Conservation Outside Nature Reserves (Brisbane: Centre for Conservation Biology, UoQ, 1997), 102.
20
Ibid.
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E Stratford et al, “Managing the Koala Problem: Interdisciplinary Perspectives” (2000) 14 Conservation
Biology 610 at 612-13.
22
The author is grateful to Mr D Lunney, National Parks & Wildlife Service (NSW), for this point, made
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Gunningham (eds), Environmental Outlook (Sydney: Federation Press, 1994), 201-02.

370

lands that might otherwise attract pressure for agriculture and/or urban expansion and associated
land clearance.24
A handful of councils have made use of opportunities under SEPP No 44 to expand biodiversity
conservation measures by producing shire-wide, rather than site-specific, koala plans of
management.25 Any development consent issued on land recognised as ‘core koala habitat’,
pinpointed via a process of tree identification and species evidence,26 must not be inconsistent with
plans of management.27 The shire-wide plans, however, clearly enable development applications to
be assessed on a more strategic basis. The Coffs Harbour experience is an impressive but atypical
example. The LEP takes the step of importing the Council’s comprehensive Koala Plan of
Management directly into the instrument itself.28 In areas identified as ‘primary koala habitat’,
which include “the most populated and highly developed areas” of the city, the Council must not
grant consent to any proposal that will remove specified trees, such as the koala-popular
tallowwood, unless the proposal “will not destroy, damage or compromise the values of the land as
koala habitat”.29 The terms are powerful. Furthermore, the Council must be satisfied certain criteria
are met, including, inter alia, that:
•

“the proposal will not result in barriers to koala movement”;

•

“boundary fencing does not prevent the free movement of koalas”;

•

“preferred koala trees are used in landscaping where suitable”; and

•

“threats to koalas by dogs have been minimised (i.e. banning of dogs or confining dogs to
koala proof yards)”.30

Whilst these provisions were originally prompted by SEPP No 44, they reflect an ecological
commitment by the Council to ‘green’ its LEP, aided by substantial expert assistance and funding
from the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW) (NPWS). Support from Council individuals,

24

C Hamilton, D Lunney & A Matthews, “An Economic Appraisal of Local Government Approaches to
Koala Conservation” (2000) 7 Australian Journal of Environmental Management 158 at 158.
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Coffs Harbour LEP 2000, gazetted 20 April 2000, cl 12.
29
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and Wildlife Service (NSW) & the Council, authored D Lunney et al) (Coffs Harbour (NSW): the Council,
1999), 8-9, emphasis added.
30
Ibid at 10.

371

including Mayor Cr J Bonfield, former Local Government’s representative on the Biological
Diversity Advisory Council (BDAC),31 would have provided key roles.
It should also not be overlooked that conservation of koala colonies can lead to further local benefits,
such as tourism advantages.32 Hamilton, Lunney and Matthews describe the plan as embodying both
“ecological and economic layers”.33 It must be noted, however, that this approach is unlikely, if not
impossible, across all the 106 council areas covered by SEPP No 44. It will not extend to remote,
inland shires such as Walgett, Warren and Windouran (now amalgamated with Carrathool) where
visitors are relatively rare.
A final aspect of SEPPs worthy of note is that draft SEPPs need only be placed on public exhibition
at the Minster’s discretion.34 From a conservation viewpoint, there can be a definite advantage to
bringing in strict controls without warning.35 The publicly advertised prospect of new restrictions
over vegetation removal will encourage uncaring landholders to clear their lands without penalty
before the new laws kick in. The NSW Government has introduced several ‘overnight’ SEPPs,
including SEPP No 14 and the unpopular former No 46. Councils do not enjoy this benefit when
preparing their own draft LEPs, which can lead to scenarios like the community upheaval in the
Moree Plains c ase study cited in ch 6.36
10.3.2 LEPs and Special Provisions
(i)

Environmental Protection Zones

In considering the potential for councils to promote biodiversity conservation via local instruments,
attention is usually directed at restrictive zoning provisions. This is consistent with the land-use
planning system’s traditional emphasis on regulation. Since the release of the (former) ‘New Zoning

31
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Hamilton, Lunney & Matthews, op cit n 24 at 160 & 163.
33
Ibid at 168.
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Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning (1996) 90 LGERA 1 at 21. See also
Save the Showground for Sydney Inc v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning (1996) 92 LGERA 283 at
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Policy for Land Outside Urban Areas’ in 1977,37 councils have frequently included environmental
protection zones in their LEPs, nudged by subsequent directions issued under s 117(2) EPAA38 and
State planning agency support. Direction No G12 restricts the alteration or removal of these zones
without an ‘environmental study’.39 It reads:
“(i) DLEPs [i.e. draft local environmental plans] shall not alter or remove existing zonings, or
identification of land for scenic areas, environmental protection areas, escarpment
preservation areas, conservation areas, harbour or foreshore protection areas, coastal
protection areas [except that these may be altered or increased where justified by an
Environmental Study].
(ii) Provisions in environmental planning instruments, relating to subdivision and
development controls for land referred to in (i) shall be retained in DLEPs (except that these
may be amended where justified by an Environmental Study).”
Direction No G21 is more pointed, demanding that draft LEPs contain provisions that “facilitate the
conservation” of “place[s] of natural … significance … for the local government area” or “area[s]
which are of ecological significance for the local government area”.40 Unfortunately, ‘natural
significance’ and ‘ecologically significance’ are undefined. The policy assumes that councils will
zone the right areas in the first place. It is more likely, however, that many will fail to recognise
places of high biodiversity value, keeping them within standard zones with minimal or no
protection.41 As the author has stated elsewhere:

37

See ch 6.
See ch 6 at n 105.
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Direction No G12: Environmental Protection Zones, issued under Environmental Planning and Assessment
Act 1979 (NSW), s 117(2). The Act gives minimal indication of the nature of an environmental study. It is
clear, however, that it must be a study “of the land to which the draft local environmental plan is intended to
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40
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“[w]hilst there is always the option to ‘downzone’ lands – i.e. tighten the planning controls to
minimise even outlay development without compensation – this can be politically
unachievable. In any case, why should landholders who have retained native vegetation be
penalised whilst their neighbours, who have previously cleared their lands, reap the benefits
of subdivision potential?”.42
Environmental protection zones can sometimes be popular with the public. O’Connor and Leathley
refer to a survey of Port Stephens Shire residents in which 94% of respondents backed the
introduction of such zones to protect koala habitat.43 Ironically, the Port Stephens LEP 2000
contains no direct reference to koala conservation apart from a single clause applying to a specific
habitat on part of one identified allotment where strict assessment provisions apply.44 Instead, the
LEP includes five separate environmental protection zones, including the more general 7(a)
Environmental Protection zone with well-crafted, consistent zonal objectives that include specific
reference to ‘biological diversity’:
“The objectives of the Environment Protection ‘A’ Zone are to encourage the conservation and
proper management of environmentally sensitive land and to ensure that existing and future land
uses and land management practices do not detract from the environmental values of the land,
and, in particular:
(a)
to protect significant wildlife habitats, water catchment areas and coastal lands, and
(b)
to regulate development to avoid inappropriate uses of land, being uses which would
destroy or damage a habitat ecosystem (particularly that of wetlands), significant
vegetation or wildlife, and
(c)
to promote the regeneration of areas of significant vegetation, and their corridors, for
the protection of native fauna and flora species and to maintain their diversity, and
(d)
to encourage development compatible with, and sympathetic to, the preservation of
the natural environment and based on the principles of ecologically sustainable
development, and
(e)
o regulate development so that it does not adversely affect and is not adversely
affected by coastal processes, in both the short and long term, and
(f)
to maintain the visual character of coastal landscapes, hillscapes and ridgelines and the
availability of land for coastal recreation and access, and
(g)
to ensure the sensitive use of renewable resources to maintain the integrity of the
resource base and provide for its continued use by future generations, and
(h)
to conserve biological diversity and ecological integrity.45
Notably, the LEP demands consent for ‘clearing’ in all environmental protection zones.46
Permission for clearing is also needed in the five 1(c) ‘Rural Small Holding’ zones and the ‘General
Recreation A’ zoning.47 Importantly, ‘clearing’ is defined broadly to mean:
42
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S O’Connor & S Leathley, “The Koala: A Future?” (1996) 33 Australian Planner 20 at 21.
44
Port Stephens LEP 2000, gazetted 29 Dec 2000, cl 54.
45
Port Stephens LEP 2000, gazetted 29 Dec 2000, cl 32.
46
Ibid.
47
Port Stephens Local Environmental Plan 2000, gazetted 29 Dec 2000, cll 11 & 28.
43

374

“any manner of destruction or removal of a tree, shrub or plant (otherwise than as exempted
by the Council’s adopted tree preservation order) up to an area of 2 hectares and includes the
severing or lopping of branches, limbs, stems or trunks of a tree, shrub or plant”.48
The provision is confined to two ha because the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW)
(NVCA), as outlined in ch 6, permits, without control, the “clearing of up to two ha per annum for
any contiguous land holding in the same ownership”: i.e. the ‘minimal clearing’ principle carried
over from SEPP No 46.49 Port Stephens LEP 2000, therefore, fills in the gap to regulate areas of this
size.
A further clause states that before granting consent, the council must be satisfied that, inter alia,
“the carrying out of the proposed development will not harm or compromise ecological habitats”.50
This is a good example of a ‘condition precedent’ provision. Because ‘ecological habitat’ is
undefined, the council may decide to embrace all ecosystems.
Another example of a reasonably stringent environment protection zone is Tweed LEP 2000, with
its four specialist zones including 7(l) Environmental Protection (Habitat) in which the articulated
objectives read:
Primary objectives
• to protect areas or features which have been identified as being of particular habitat
significance.
• to preserve the diversity of habitats for flora and fauna.
• to protect and enhance land that acts as a wildlife corridor.
Secondary objectives
• to protect areas of scenic value.
• to protect the diversity of habitats for flora and fauna.
The relegation of scenic protection to a mere secondary objective is noteworthy. The zoning table
also contains a special category of development, including ‘agriculture’ and ‘forestry’, which is
only permissible after mandatory public consultation.51 Whilst the table contains no reference to
vegetation clearance, this is covered by cl 28 which includes land adjacent to the 7(l) zone and the
compulsory preparation of ‘management plans’:
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(1) Objective
to protect wildlife habitat from the adverse impacts of development.
(2) Unless it is exempt development, a person must not clear vegetation from, drain, excavate or
fill land within Zone 7 (l) except with development consent.
(3) The consent authority must not grant consent to development (other than for the purpose of
agriculture, a dwelling house or a home business) on land within Zone 7 (l) without having
regard to any representations made by NSW Fisheries and the National Parks and Wildlife
Service.
(4) The consent authority must not grant consent to development on or adjacent to land within
Zone 7 (l) unless it has taken into consideration:
(a) the likely effects of the development on the flora and fauna found in the locality, and
(b) the potential for disturbance of native flora and fauna as a result of intrusion by humans and
domestic and feral animals, increased fire risk, rubbish dumping, weed invasion and vegetation
clearing, and
(c) a plan of management showing how any adverse effects arising from the development are
to be mitigated.
Notably, the NVCA overrides the land clearance regulation under sub-clause (2) but again, the LEP
will still regulate land clearance over lands falling within the NVCA’s exemptions and/or
exclusions.52
‘Vegetation clearing’ is defined widely as:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

cutting down, felling, thinning, logging or removing any vegetation, or
killing, destroying, poisoning, ringbarking, uprooting or burning vegetation, or
severing, topping or lopping branches, limbs, stems or trunks of native vegetation, or
substantially damaging or injuring native vegetation in any other way.53

These provisions would be far stronger if ‘vegetation’ was widely defined.
A further interesting zone is 7(b1) Rural Environmental Protection (Wetland Buffer) in Kiama LEP
1996, which is extremely rigid in listing a very narrow range of permissible uses.54 It even casts
land clearance, again defined in broad terms,55 into the basket of prohibited, ‘innominate’ (i.e.
unlisted) uses. One purpose of the zone is to protect vegetation on both public and private lands
adjacent to SEPP No 14 wetlands. However, the area of the zone is relatively small, with only three
patches within the entire municipality.56
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Other noticeable conservation-oriented environmental protection zones can be pinpointed.57 Their
existence makes a stark contrast with the unsuccessful attempt to introduce powerful zoning
controls in Moree Plains Shire during the early 1980s, as described in ch 6,58 where the draft plan
attracted over 850 submissions and about 220 parties attended the public hearing.59 The ultimate
report of the chairperson, which the Council followed, recommended deletion of not only the
environmental protection zones but also the clause relating to land clearance in the general rural
zone.60 From an ecological perspective, the draft LEP was far ahead of its time. The current LEP
gazetted in 1995 contains an ‘Environmental Protection – Habitat’ zone,61 perhaps reflecting more
recent community acceptance of land-use restriction in rural settings. But the new zone is far more
flexible than the stringent controls proposed fifteen years earlier. It contains no prohibited uses; in
contrast, the earlier draft zones sought to outlaw many types of development altogether62
Nevertheless, the current LEP still requires consent for “clearing of trees and vegetation” within the
special zone but unfortunately, the terms are not defined. Whilst the strength of the LEP is therefore
open to question, it should not be overlooked that Moree is located far from the coastline. Benson
recognises the Moree/Walgett region as the most significant ‘hot spot’ for land clearance in NSW.63
Disturbingly, the south of Moree, the planning instrument for Narrabri Shire contains no
environmental protection zone or land clearance provisions at all.64
Perhaps the best approach in improving these types of zones is for a group of creative professionals
to design a range of alternative templates that will supplement the Biodiversity Planning Guide for
Local Government.65
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(ii)

Overriding Provisions with Examples

Some LEPs contain mapped protected area provisions that override the zoning tables.66 These may
list more types of development that require consent, demand further matters be considered in
determining proposals or necessitate certain judgments be reached before approval can be granted.
A ready example is the ‘environmental sensitive land’ (ESL) clause found in numerous rural LEPs.
The zoning provisions in various LEPs, which otherwise permit agriculture and associated land
clearance in general rural zones without consent, are altered to ensure that interference with
67

vegetation in specially marked areas require approval.

Whilst the clauses differ between LEPs, an

example from Rylestone LEP 1996 (i.e. ‘example no. 1’) reads:
(2) A person shall not, except with the consent of the Council, cause the destruction of trees on:
(a) more than one hectare of environmentally sensitive land of an existing holding, or
(b) more than 5 percent of the areas of an existing holding, where that 5 percent comprises
environmentally sensitive land, whichever is less.
(3) The Council shall not grant a consent referred to in subclause (2) unless, in the opinion of the
Council, the destruction of trees on the land will be carried out in a manner which, in respect of
that land and adjacent land, minimises:
(a) the risk of soil erosion or other land degradation, and
(b) the loss of scenic amenity, and
(c) the loss of important vegetation systems and natural wildlife habitats.68
The clause demands consent for the “destruction of trees” over certain areas identified as ESL. The
Council must then reach a certain opinion before consent may be granted. Whilst the provision is
undermined by the regulatory aspects of the NVCA,69 the ‘minimal clearing’ principle referred to
earlier70 gives potential municipal control over sites between one and two hectares in area, further
complicated by the ‘5% of existing holding’ rule under cl 27(2)(b). It is disappointing that the
reference under cl 27(3) to “minimising” risk and loss suggests that some level of damage is
acceptable. The clause also raises the difficulties for the Council in determining when ‘vegetation
systems’ are “important” and ‘wildlife habitats’ are “natural”.
The definition of ESL in Rylestone LEP 1996 reads:
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(a) land being class vii or class viii land as shown on the Soil Conservation Service Capability
map dated June 1982 …
(b) protected land,
(c) land identified for the time being by resolution of the Council as being environmentally
sensitive land, but does not include land determined for the time being by resolution of the
Council not to be environmentally sensitive land.71
Paragraph (a) relates to lands catalogued as having high soil conservation value. Paragraph (b)
refers to the former ‘protected land’ provisions in the Soil Conservation Act 1938 (NSW),72 which
established a regulatory tool for removal of trees and saplings within certain areas, which has since
been superseded by the NVCA.73 This mechanism has never directly involved Local Government.
Paragraph (c) provides more opportunity for local biodiversity conservation. It gives Rylestone
Council opportunity to “identify” land by resolution as ‘environmentally sensitive’. But like many
LEPs, especially in rural areas, the term is not defined. The conservation potential, therefore, relies
on Local Government’s willingness to bestow priority to conserving biodiversity in substantive LEP
provisions.
A far more remarkable model (‘example no. 2’) is located in Dubbo LEP 1997 – Rural Lands, in
which part of the 1(A) Dryland Agricultural zone is mapped as ‘wildlife habitat’, with a special
clause that reads:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

71

The environmental management objective of this plan for wildlife habitat (and the
objective of this clause) is to achieve a network of habitats able to support the flora
and fauna native to land to which this plan applies.
This clause applies to land within Zone 1 (A) and identified on the zoning map as
Environmentally Sensitive and as Habitat on the map entitled “Habitat”, dated January
1997.
A person must not, except with the consent of the Council, carry out any development
on land to which this clause applies which involves the removal or destruction of
native vegetation.
This clause does not require consent for any such development if there is a
requirement made by or under an Act other than the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 for the development to be licensed or approved by a public
authority other than the Council.74
Consent must not be granted for any such development unless the Council has
considered a wildlife habitat impact assessment that demonstrates how the
development is consistent with the objective of this clause. The wildlife impact habitat
assessment must address the following matters:
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(a)
(b)

the potential impact of the proposed development on fauna habitat,
any mitigation measures proposed to be undertaken.75

This is one of the most striking environmental clauses in all the LEPs studied.76 It demands consent
for land clearance on mapped areas within the rural 1(A) zone recognised as contributing to
‘networks of habitats’. Native vegetation is defined broadly as indigenous species, including
understorey plants, which “existed in the State before European settlement”.77 If approval is
required under other State legislation, such as the NVCA, Council consent is unnecessary. But if
consent under the LEP is needed, a significant feature is that the applicant must submit specific
information, namely a ‘wildlife impact habitat assessment’. The thrust of the clause appears to be
placement of the onus firmly on the developer to justify approval by demonstrating the extent of
compliance with the articulated objective.78
The Dubbo case is not the only LEP that demands submission of additional environmental
information.79 Yet it appears to be one of the most sophisticated, boasting further provisions relating
to submission of water quality management plans,80 aquifer impacts assessments,81 soil erosion
assessments82 and dryland impact assessments.83 Importantly, the Council need not always insist
upon these documents.84 Sufficient information may be found instead in applicant-driven ‘property
development plans’ that contain, inter alia, information on vegetation clearance, mitigation
measures and any “irreparable damage”.85 These must be prepared by ‘appropriately qualified
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consultants’ in specific situations when proposals emerge.86 They provide opportunity for planned
ongoing active management.
(iii)

Corridor Provisions

The ‘wildlife habitat’ clause in Dubbo LEP 1997 – Rural Lands is designed to “achieve a network
of habitats and corridors able to support the [native] flora and fauna”.87 It reflects the recommended
‘action’ adopted in the NSW Biodiversity Strategy that environmental planning instruments (EPIs)
serve to “identify and protect significant native vegetation [and] “wildlife corridors”.88 Mention of
corridors is found in 22 (i.e. 38 %) of the 1995/2000 comprehensive LEPs studied. The strength of
these clauses, however, is sometimes very limited. Under Culcairn LEP 1998, for instance,
reference to “protecting … wildlife corridors and important habitat” is restricted to the overall
objectives alone.89 In contrast, Sutherland LEP 2000, at Sydney’s southern edge, demands that
when dealing with residential development, the Council must be convinced that “no adverse affect
on … the protection of wildlife corridors and vegetation links with other nearby vegetation” will
occur.90 Far away from leafy Sutherland Shire is the ESL clause in outback Brewarrina’s LEP 2000,
where before approving an application to damage ‘native vegetation’, including ‘understorey and
native grasslands’,91 the Council must be ‘satisfied’ that:
“effective measures have been incorporated into the proposal to minimise the impact on the
environmentally sensitive land after consideration of …the loss of important vegetation
systems, natural wildlife habitats and corridors including that of threatened species,
populations or ecological communities”.92
Whilst the clause may be criticised for its reference to minimisation, which again implies that some
level of interference is acceptable, the provision stands head and shoulders above countless others
in inland LEPs. But the Dubbo example is a jewel. The LEP for Gilgandra Shire to its north, in
contrast, affords no vegetation protection at all. The closest is a symbolic but meaningless objective
86
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for the entire LEP about conservation of undefined “areas of significance for native vegetation.93 In
contrast, the Dubbo instrument provides ideas for designing suggested ‘template conservation
clauses’, as referred to earlier.94
An instruction on LEP-making issued by the State planning agency under s 117(2) EPAA on
‘Corridors’ is worthy of note. It states that:
“(i)[Draft LEPs] shall not alter or remove existing zonings, or identification, of lands for
special use, open space, communications to other corridor purposes.
(ii)Provisions in an environmental planning instrument, relating to subdivision and
development control of land in corridors shall be retained in draft LEPs.”95
This direction relies upon existing corridor provisions rather than requiring consideration of
introducing new provisions. There is also no specific reference to ‘wildlife’, ‘habitat’ and other
biodiversity corridors, which fall within the “other” category. Consideration could be given to
improving the policy by adding details on introducing, or improving, vegetation corridor provisions
in LEPs.
(iv)

Buffer ‘Zones’

An additional conservation clause involves increased control of ‘buffer areas’ adjacent to State
conservation reserves. The NSW Biodiversity Strategy states that:
“Local Government can play an important complementary role through Local Environmental
Plans and development control processes by ensuring that the use of land adjoining reserves is
compatible with the objectives of reserve management, and through plans of management for
community land”.96
In a similar manner to the ‘edge effect’ issue described in ch 8 in relation to ‘natural area’
community lands, the use of land surrounding a national park or nature reserve can have an
enormous impact on conservation priorities within the park boundary. External adverse effects may
include, for instance, entry by cattle, movement of non-native plant seeds and backdoor entry by
unlawful visitors on horseback. Schonewald-Cox aptly describes the boundary as a “skin, whose
conditions can indicate the health of the entire system”.97
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In terms of attempts by NSW Local Government, only three LEPs have been identified that address
the ‘buffer’ issue. Coolah LEP 2000 demands consultation with the NPWS when a proposed
development applies to land “adjoining” its ‘National Parks and Reserves’ zone or, more loosely,
“has the potential to impact” upon such land.98 Under Tweed LEP 2000, when dealing with a
proposal concerning land “adjacent” to the 8(a) National Parks and Nature Reserves zone, the
authority must consider “likely impacts … on the flora and fauna” and “potential for disturbance by
humans and domestic and feral animals”.99 Snowy River LEP 2000 is the only one that refers to
planning mechanisms for national parks themselves. When dealing with a development application
on land “within the vicinity” of Kosciuszko National Park – in practice within 10 km of the park
boundary100 - the Council must consider not only the “likely impact of the development on the
environment of [the] Park” but also any ‘management plans’ that applies to the Park itself.101 The
Council approaches this regulatory role, following a “long tradition … to prevent a ‘hard edge’ at
the Park boundary and avoid the emergence of inappropriate development, such as signage”.102 The
situation reveals a rare example of Local Government’s attempt to deal with cross-boundary issues.
As both LEPs and NPWS ‘plans of management’ stop at either side of the park boundary, such an
effort is commendable. But there is a long way to go for improvement.
A different model arises from the Warringah LEP 2000 referred to briefly in ch 8, a non-traditional
instrument supported by ‘place-based’ provisions.103 The LEP recognises 71 localities within 8
larger areas, each with its own ‘desired future character statement’ derived from an active
community participation programme. Similar to zonal objectives, the Council must, in receiving an
application for a development falling within ‘category 2 or 3’, “be satisfied” that the proposal is
“consistent” with the relevant statement.104 In the A5 ‘McCarrs Creek Rd’ locality, for instance, the
statement reads, inter alia:
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“[e]mphasis will be given to protecting and where possible enhancing the natural landscape,
including landscapes and vegetation. The increased planting of indigenous canopy trees will
be strongly encouraged”.105
More interestingly, applications within the ‘category 3’ grouping – i.e. proposals that must undergo
more rigorous assessment – must be accompanied by a ‘statement of environmental effects’ that
addresses, inter alia, justification of biophysical impact,106 plus an independent public hearing.107
The list is long, including recreational facilities, industry and retail plant nurseries.108
The Warringah LEP 2000 has become fashionable in planning professional circles. Its basis of
articulating desired futures for neighbourhood localities, rather than following standard zoning
formulae, is fascinating. But the proof of achieving its objectives, such as “establish[ing] limits to
the exercise of discretion with regard to the control of development”,109 relies in the implementation
pudding.
(v)

Problems

Despite the good examples described above, critical examination throughout the entire study
suggests that environmental protection zones and identification of conservation areas in LEPs will
not always achieve biodiversity conservation. Potential problems abound. First, the zones and
special areas tend to be located in coastal shires, on steep lands at the urban periphery or, like the
pattern of national parks, across inland mountainous landscapes. Many are marginalised, being
found mostly in remote and rugged locations where development pressure is limited or virtually
non-existent.110 This view is supported by a study of protection mechanisms within a 7,600,000 sq
km area in north-eastern NSW, in which Pressey et al found that only 3.35% of the area fell under
environmental protection zones, with most comprising “steep land listed for scenic protection”.111
Second, environmental protection zones and conservation areas may be far weaker than their names
suggest. In 1991, the then NSW Department of Planning (DoP) spoke of public criticism that some
councils had introduced environmental protection zones to avoid reserving land for costly
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acquisition.112 It instructed councils to “be reasonable in the range of uses permitted” in these
zones.113 Knox and Francis, in their own survey of conservation zones in four coastal LEPs, found
that the level of environmental protection was generally insufficient and sometimes
“dysfunctional”.114 The zones studied exhibited a wide variation in the range of developments
permitted.115 In all of the three ‘wetland’ zones investigated, agriculture was permissible.116 Such
flexibility was a common approach in the mid-1980s.117 It still remains so.
Third, there is the issue raised in ch 6 concerning disappointing interpretation of zonal objective
provisions.118 The lesson for conservation plan-makers is the need for tight, compatible sub-clauses
that identify those aims to receive utmost priority. Throughout their analysis, Knox and Francis
detected “[i]nconsistencies and wide variation” both within and between the objective provisions.119
In their conclusion, they identified the LEPs as having shown “very little understanding of
ecological principles of systems”.120 It seems, therefore, that the ‘good’ examples reproduced above
may be unique.
Fourth, as demonstrated above, LEPs differ in their definitions – or lack of definitions – of key
terms such as ‘tree’, ‘clearance’ or ‘vegetation’. This issue also applies to Tree Preservation Orders
and ‘plans of management’. It suggests the need for a common approach, perhaps by introducing
the terms as used in the NVCA into the EPAA Model Provisions 1980.
10.4

Local Strategies and Case Study

10.4.1 Council-Wide Strategies
An alternative, or umbrella document, to a LEP is a ‘local biodiversity strategy’ that adopts a
broader approach than regulation alone. The National Biodiversity Strategy refers to promoting
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inclusion of “local government … strategy plans” in biodiversity “goals and principles”.121 The
NSW Biodiversity Strategy states that Local Government is “responding to the challenges of
environmental management and biodiversity conservation through the development of local policies
and strategies”.122 In 2000, however, Hamilton, Lunney and Matthews claimed that no council in
NSW had completed “its own biodiversity strategy to complement the State or Commonwealth
strategies”.123 The observation is baffling, however, in that numerous councils have prepared shirewide conservation plans under a variety of names. The National Local Government Biodiversity
Survey records that in 2000, over ten per cent of NSW councils had prepared “environmental
conservation strategies”.124 But this is far less than the NSW Biodiversity Strategy’s ‘performance
target’ that “[b]iodiversity action plans [be] developed and implemented [by each council] by
2001”.125
Kelly and Farrier note that Lake Macquarie City Council had its own ‘Habitat and Vegetation
Management Biodiversity Scheme’ as far back as 1993, and by 1995 Kiama Council, the first
council to include the term ‘biological diversity’ in its own LEP,126 had adopted a more general
‘Biodiversity Policy’.127 At the time of writing, a handful of councils have their own ‘biodiversity
plans’ whilst others are in the pipeline.128 Examples include Bankstown City129 and Sutherland
Shire.130 The National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy131 and Biodiversity Planning Guide
for Local Government132 have perhaps wielded more influence than the National and State
strategies. But the strongest influence, arguably, appears to come from committed individuals, or
‘champions’, who may be dedicated officers, devoted councillors or determined members of the
local community.
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10.4.2 Coonabarabran Shire Council
A particularly interesting case study involves Coonabarabran Shire, which belongs to the large,
general group of ‘large, inland, rural agricultural’ councils referred to throughout this study. It has
an area of about 7,580 sq km and a small population of less than 7,000 persons.133 In 1999/2000, the
Council was one of three recipients of the ‘Local Government Excellence in the Environment
Awards’ bestowed by the Local Government and Shires Associations’ (LGSAs) under the ‘Natural
Environment’ category for its Vegetation Management Plan (CSCVMP).134 The plan’s initiative
arose from the former Director of Works, J Whitehead, a person committed to conserving the local
natural environment, who served as the council’s ‘champion’ in winning local support.
According to the CSCVMP, about 60% of the Shire still contains native forest, which is a far higher
than in neighbouring shires. The main reason is the extent of the Pilliga scrub, mentioned briefly in
ch 2,135 which is no longer attractive for agricultural pursuits.136 It states further that pressure for
subdivision and development is “low key”.137 Nevertheless, the Council saw fit to prepare the
CSCVMP across the entire Shire. The result is a voluminous and detailed document, containing
three components:
(i)

a ‘Vegetation Planning Manual’, which divides the shire into numerous ‘Conservation
Management Areas’ (CMAreas) based on a variety of information;

(ii)

‘Vegetation Planning Controls’, which are intended to comprise a DCP overlying
Coonabarabran LEP 1990, that will replace the existing TPO; and

(iii)

‘Appendices’, which contain complex background information including, inter alia, an
extraordinary amount of information on local vegetation communities.

The CMAreas are identified by integrating three parallel mapping systems, based on:
(i)
(ii)

133

“remnant vegetation and density”, ranging from classification 1 (‘isolated plants’ with an
approximate density of one tree per ha) to 4 (‘mid-dense to dense’ with over thirty trees per
ha);”138
“vegetation classification”, with five ‘alliances’ divided further into ‘communities’,
resulting in over 30 ‘community classifications’ (eg Black Cypress/BC Yellow Box, found
on lower slopes and plateaux; White Cypress/WC Pilliga Box, found on sandy clay
soils);”139 and
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(iii)

“habitat significance”, evaluated in accordance with principles such as identification of
locations with “sufficient area and spatial configuration” for native species to thrive; reestablishing “corridors between bushland remnants, providing critical habitat refuge areas”
and specifying degraded areas for rehabilitation.”140

The CMAreas themselves are classified and mapped via a series of ‘categories’ and ‘types’. The
categories are divided into ‘priority’, ‘major’ and ‘general’ conservation needs, in addition to ‘State
lands’.141 Each category covering private land is divided into further classifications based on “their
ecological or landscape role or functions”,142 namely ‘habitat’, ‘landscape’, ‘patch’, ‘corridor’,
‘mosaic’, ‘urban’, ‘riverine’ or ‘significance site’.143 The result is 20 different mapped CMAreas
such as, for example, ‘Priority Habitat’, described as:
“large habitat tracts of sufficient size and connectivity for a large proportion of ecological
processes to be self-sustaining, capable of withstanding perturbations and buffering edge
effects, and forming part of the broad pattern of remnant natural vegetation”.144
Each CMArea is related to one of 25 ‘biogeographic’ groupings within the Shire, each divided
again into vegetation community groups. The ‘Priority Habitat’ CMArea contains over 200 subclassifications. Each CMArea, regardless of its subregional location, has its own description and
articulated ‘values’ in the DCP component of the plan. The ‘values’ for ‘Priority Habitat’ are clearly
ecologically based, with reference to the need to keep the areas “relatively undisturbed and well
buffered from the effects of development and population”.145 Whilst brief reference is made to
“valuable resources for tourism, recreation and education”, these aspects do not divert from the
sheer strength of the ecological statements.
The ‘Planning Controls’ provisions for each CMArea are of particular interest. In the case of
‘Priority Habitat’ and six of the seven ‘major’ CMAreas, the plan states that in the event of any
development application arising, council permission is required for associated “destruction of native
vegetation on any land” within the CMArea.146 The provision is clumsy. In order for the DCP to be
activated, a valid and mandatory development application is needed in the first place. If part of a
valid proposal involves vegetation removal, this aspect cannot then be ignored. But in the two rural
140
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zones – i.e. 1(a) Rural Large Holdings and 1(b) Rural General – agriculture and forestry are
permissible without consent.147 This means that unless another special, restrictive clause is relevant
(see below), land may be cleared for agriculture or forestry without having the landholder having to
approach the council at all.
The ‘special clauses’ in the LEP relate to a trio of (i) ESL,148 (ii) ‘nature conservation areas’149 and
(iii) ‘riparian land’ within 60 m of any bank of a river”.150 In the case of the first category – i.e.
ESL, which is either mapped or within 60 m of a river (thereby duplicating with the ‘riparian land’
category) - development consent is required for the “destruction of trees”,151 including ‘saplings,
shrubs or scrub’,152 on:
•

“more than one hectare of ESL of an existing holding”, or

•

“more than 5 per cent of the area of an existing holding, where that 5 percent comprises
environmentally sensitive land”.153

The provision is virtually identical to the earlier example from Rylestone LEP 1996.154 As far as the
DCP provisions are concerned, they will have little impact on assessment of vegetation removal
other than emphasising ecological values. The ESL clause already demands permission for
vegetation removal within the stated areas, subject to the NVCA. For activities affecting native
vegetation on lands of less than one hectare in area (unless the second limb applies), the DCP
provisions will have no relevance at all because development consent is not needed.
As for the second category – i.e. ‘nature conservation areas’ - the clause attempts to prevent a
person from, inter alia, “destroy[ing] a tree, shrub or grass of a species specified in Sch 5” or
“destroy[ing], clear[ing] or remov[ing] a habitat of a protected faunal species” without development
consent.155 If an activity involves interference with a non-Sch 5 species and/or the habitat of a nonprotected faunal species, the said DCP clause will not be triggered because consent is not required.
If consent is needed as a result of the ‘nature conservation area’, the clause in the DCP is shunted
aside as it adds nothing to the LEP. It merely re-echoes the need for development consent. In any
147
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event, the amount of ‘nature conservation areas’ is severely limited, being restricted to only four
sites including some public lands.156
The same situation applies to the third category – i.e. the LEP provision on riparian land - requires
consent for the “destruction of any tree” within “60 metres of any bank of a river”.157 The said
clause is only prompted once consent is needed under the LEP and even then, does not enhance the
assessment process. But again, there is an opportunity to extend vegetation regulation beyond the
NVCA by bringing the ‘minimum clearance’ exemption into the control of the Council.
The planning provisions are very different for all the other six Priority CMAreas. The DCP states
simply that in each CMArea, “[a] person shall not cause the destruction of native vegetation”.
Unlike the above example (i.e. the ‘Priority Habitat’ CMArea), there is no reference to the need for
development consent at all. Instead, the proposed DCP attempts to prohibit interference with native
plants. It endeavours to go much further than the LEP. This raises the issue of the validity of a DCP
that attempts to add more regulation.
In Guideline Drafting & Design v Marrickville Council (‘Guideline Drafting’), the Land &
Environment Court (LEC) found a DCP to be unlawful because it failed to “generally conform”
with the relevant LEP.158 Whilst the EPI permitted ‘refreshment rooms’ in a certain commercial
zone without “spatial or locational limitation”, the DCP attempted to restrict such uses to ground
floors only.159 This approach has since been softened. In North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd,
which involved an application for a ten storey residential flat building refused by the Council on the
grounds of a DCP but overturned by the LEC, the Court of Appeal decided that this “aspect” of
Guideline Drafting relating to conformity of the DCP had been wrongly decided, stating that:
“[there is] no reason why a [DCP], in providing more detailed planning considerations may
not, by imposing criteria by way of restriction or specification of necessary requirements to
be met before the development consent contemplated by a North Sydney [LEP] is granted,
should not be regarded as conforming with the wider North Sydney [LEP]”.160
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It is clear, however, that a DCP cannot prohibit developments unless an EPI expressly incorporates
the provisions of the DCP into its net. In Zhang v Canterbury City Council, Spigelman CJ stressed
that the DCP in question, which set objectives and standards for the development of brothels, could
not usurp a prohibition in a LEP.161 Whilst the DCP comprised a “fundamental element” or “focal
point” in the assessment process, it did not remove the determinative power of the consent
authority.162 This confirms that the prohibitive clauses in the CSCVMP must be invalid. Any new
LEP, or amended LEP, must, therefore, insert the DCP in a similar manner to Coffs Harbour’s
Koala Plan of Management, as mentioned earlier.163
The CCVMP represents an unusual model by a NSW rural council. It contains a massive amount of
scientific information, which is arguably its best asset. The proposed DCP that attempts to strike
land clearance at its heart, however, requires major revision. It is poorly drafted and relates badly to
its associated LEP. Notwithstanding this, the CCVMP reflects a high level of devotion to
conservation on the part of the Council, led by one individual. It is unique and impressive.
10.5

Conclusion

Conservation attitudes between councils vary widely. A council devoted to conservation might be
an island amongst an ocean of shires with minimal or no interest in biodiversity, still influenced by
the ‘national’ vision and restrained by the ‘ratepayer ideology’. Nevertheless, opportunities exist for
inspired and innovative conservation approaches. Some councils have taken advantageous of this,
as illustrated in this chapter. But performance is patchy, depending on the existence of enthusiastic,
influential and dogged ‘champions’.
The efforts of conservation enthusiasts face various problems as discussed throughout the entire
thesis. Overall success depends on many things, including political and managerial support. Even if
excellent intentions and expertise are evident, weakness in other aspects will undermine success.
Coonabarabran provides a ready example. Commitment to native vegetation protection and
excellent scientific and mapping knowledge is undercut by poor plan-making.
The NVCA provides negligible opportunity and encouragement to non-urban councils who want to
expand their conservation role. The operation of the NVCA with its own ‘new magistracies’ - i.e.
the Regional Vegetation Committees (RVCs) that prepare the Regional Vegetation Management
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Plans (RVMPs)164 – provides a threat to any rural council wishing to advance its regulatory
conservation role. For struggling councils, this may be a blessing. For those committed to
biodiversity conservation, the best they might do is to:
•

exploit existing mechanisms, such as drafting creative LEPs that cover what the NVCA leaves
behind in terms of exemptions and exclusions; and

•

seek improved collaboration with neighbours, intensifying their ‘stakeholder’ power on the
RVCs to influence future RVMPs.

The issue that councils must look beyond their borders runs throughout this thesis. The State
Government is already doing this itself through its ‘new magistracies’. Has Local Government been
left behind?

164

See ch 6.

392

CHAPTER ELEVEN
TOWARDS THE FUTURE: OPTIMISM OR GLOOM?
11.1

Prelude

As noted at the beginning of this study, key strategic documents, from the National Biodiversity
Strategy downwards, recognise the vital position of Local Government in conserving biodiversity.
The National Biodiversity Strategy, for example, lists as “priority actions” that:
•
•

“[b]y the year 2000 Australia will have …implemented programs … designed to encourage
local government to play a major role in nature conservation …;
[b]y the year 2005 Australia will have … local governments that have assumed a major role in
the conservation of Australia’s biological diversity”.1

Achieving such aims is extremely ambitious. This does not stop the National Local Government
Biodiversity Strategy from boasting that “natural resource management is best done at a local
level”.2 As seen throughout this thesis, however, there are enormous, if not overwhelming, obstacles
standing in the way of Local Government.
At its core, however, Local Government suffers from an increasingly paradoxical position. On the
one hand, the NSW Government has offloaded costly obligations on councils, many of which many
relate to environmental management, such as preparation of ‘state of environment’ reports (SoERs)
and assessment of development applications under the threatened species legislation.3 On the other
hand, Local Government has been pushed aside by the emergence of regional natural resource ‘new
magistracies’, which appear to regard councils as little more than ‘stakeholders’ who fill in the
neighbourhood details. This puts Local Government in an invidious position if it is to attain the
aspirations cited above. For struggling councils, biodiversity conservation may be viewed as a
luxury or irrelevant.
There is a range of factors that inhibit Local Government’s role in biodiversity conservation. The
purpose of this concluding chapter is to provide a summary of key issues and consider alternatives
for the future. The first part deals with several fundamental and overlapping ‘deep-seated’ problems
that councils face. It then moves on to bring together a variety of ideas to address impediments.
1

Commonwealth of Australia, The National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity
(Canberra: Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (Cth), 1996), 41-42.
2
Australian Local Government Association & Biological Diversity Advisory Council, National Local
Government Biodiversity Strategy (Canberra: the Association, 1999), 6.
3
i.e. in relation to listed threatened species, populations and ecological communities, and their habitats,
pursuant to the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) and Fisheries Management Act 1994
(NSW): see ch 6.
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Attempts are made to suggest solutions, or at least provide matters for consideration, based on
propositions emerging from this study. The final part of this concluding chapter goes further by
raising ideas on major structural change.
11.2

Three Deep-Seated Problems

The first problem is Local Government’s ‘culture and historical baggage’, as embedded in its
longstanding ‘ratepayer ideology’. It is the most common theme throughout this thesis. It flows
from environmental mindsets derived from the ‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions that limit the
outlooks of constituents, their representatives and old-fashioned officers. In 1981, Power,
Wettenhall and Halligan commented that:
“the problems and policy options of today are heavily influenced by the past. The patterns of
thinking and acting that were established in the nineteenth century today provide the basis for,
as well as the constraints on, the local government systems”.4
In 1993, Jones observed that preoccupation with ratepayer concerns has always remained a “strong
underlying philosophy” in Local Government.5 This can be explained by the close, historic
relationship between Local Government and its own property tax, which gives councils their best
asset for local autonomy. More recently, Mamouney described “an entrenched local government
culture” that works against improved environmental management, making specific reference to
“[i]neffective biodiversity management”.6
Nowadays, the ‘ratepayer ideology’ is not as strong as it once was. But the fact that it lingers
reveals that the ‘national’ vision still carries force, especially west of the Great Dividing Range. It is
here where the CAR (i.e. comprehensive, adequate and representative) principle in relation to ‘off
reserve’ conservation is towards its nadir. The recent functional expansion of Local Government
into environmental management appears to have made relatively little impact throughout these vast
expanses of inland NSW. A 2003 Commonwealth report by the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration (the ‘Crossroads’ Report) observes
Local Government’s inability to carry out environmental and other functions “where councils are
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J Power, R Wettenhall & J Halligan, “Overview of Local Government in Australia” in J Power, R
Wettenhall & J Halligan (eds), Local Government Systems of Australia (Canberra: AGPS, 1981), 98; see also
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small and have a very limited revenue base”.7 The result is ongoing biodiversity decline encouraged
by short-sighted cultural traditions that feed ratepayer wants.
In the case of positive services under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (LGA 1993),
reluctance to use ratepayer funds for activities that are expensive and do not serve property interests
lead to minimal or no ecological creativity. The result is that a council is confined to conventional,
rudimentary ‘wastebin’ tasks unless one-off grants and voluntary schemes can be captured. Whilst
biodiversity conservation imperatives may be fashionable on the international and national
podiums, Local Government’s historical origins and limited cultural traditions can keep individual
councils within ideologically limited strangleholds.
In terms of regulatory powers, the ‘culture of consent’ described in ch 6 looms large.8
Developmentalism continues to reign.9 Its roots lie in the rating system, which has traditionally
encouraged the development of land without additional tax payments.10 In the rural context, it
emerged from the ‘colonial’ and ‘national’ visions that pushed for agricultural development and
associated land clearing with minimal, if any, effective regulation. When modern environmentalism
arose, land-use planning focused on urban areas. The big issues then were community involvement
in decision-making and retention of amenity. The system extended its realm under the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA) to detailed environmental
impact assessment of individual proposals, including the more recent threatened species
requirements.11 But the ‘culture of consent’ remained. Amelioration of proposals is far more
common than outright refusal.
Whilst the ratepayer ideology has softened, it has provided the soil for new paradigms to flourish.
There is the general political preference for economic development over biodiversity protection as
well as the demand for quick ‘efficient’ decisions. Gleeson critically describes the “chief purpose”
of land-use planning as “facilitate[ing] development”.12 Developers speak nonsensically of
proposals that they want to see approved as complying with environmental planning instruments
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House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, At the
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395

(EPIs) in spite of the wide discretion that they usually confer on decision-makers.13 The fact that a
proposal is permissible does not guarantee its consent. Neither does compliance with procedural
requirements.
If an LEP is stringent in limiting a decision-maker’s powers, through mechanisms such as
‘conditions precedent’ and ‘prioritised consistent objectives’, conservation-friendly decisions are
more likely to occur. The role of flexibility in land-use planning, which arose during the 1980s and
still exists under other guises, therefore needs to be translated into a suite of mechanisms that go
beyond conventional land-use regulation.14 This involves motivation and inventiveness, which is
usually beyond a single council’s capacity. It calls for cross-boundary action and assistance from
the other spheres of government. The same general comments also apply to plans of management
for community land. Reference to ESD, which generated the second phase of modern
environmentalism,15 will not assist unless significant supportive change is provided.
Although there is evidence of some councils being committed to biodiversity conservation, as seen
in the previous chapter, actions are often isolated. Even then, devotion to managing the biophysical
environment can involve misconstruction of the true concept of biodiversity. Planting of pretty,
popular, non-indigenous species, for example, as noted in ch 9, relates to the longstanding notion of
amenity rather than biodiversity conservation. Even if a council is determined to conserve some
biodiversity, there is the practical problem of finding seed that is indigenous to a local area. A
survey in 1998 overseen by Greening Australia revealed that in some areas, sufficient amounts of
local seed are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.16
If Local Government wants to take a lead conservation role, it must apply its own environmental
destruction brakes immediately. But because of the independence of individual councils, this will
not occur across the board. The best solution, arguably, is to consider Local Government’s reform
and restructure, as discussed further below. This must not only encourage an effective regional
approach to biodiversity conservation. The relationship between councils and the ‘new
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magistracies’ - especially the Regional Vegetation Committees (RVCs) that prepare the statutory
Regional Vegetation Management Plans (RVMPs)17 - must also be addressed. Both before and after
then, the chief focus must be on improved financial resources. Increased financial support, however,
will not create a fresh local environmental ethic by itself.
The second problem is the lack of environmental expertise amongst many councils, given the utter
complexity of the concept of biodiversity itself. As discussed in the first chapter, ‘biodiversity’ was
born from science. But it has now reached broader contexts. Local Government makes this clear by
confusing biodiversity conservation with more traditional activities, such as providing bushy
recreational facilities on open space (ch 8) and protecting scenic landscapes and town amenity (ch
9). These attitudes confuse the true meaning of biodiversity. Another instance is the case of using
biodiversity conservation to ‘keep the soil together’ in agricultural areas. This is a less traditional
municipal function but may nevertheless be attractive to councils that represent farming
communities. But soil management and biodiversity conservation do not necessarily mix well.
Bradsen notes that even weed infestation can promote soil conservation, referring to the fact that
some agencies have recommended retention of “otherwise noxious weeds ... as the only way of
retaining soil in the shorter term”.18
A further and extremely relevant example is the threatened species legislation, as outlined in ch 6,
with its scientific emphases. As far as the science is concerned, the legislation is demanding of
Local Government. It can even be argued that the law is running ahead of the biological sciences.19
In assessing the impact of a proposal on threatened species, populations, ecological communities
and their habitats, a council must sometimes address extremely difficult matters in applying the
‘seven/eight part test’.20 For instance, evaluation of whether a proposal “is likely to have an adverse
effect on the life cycle of the species such that a viable local population of the species is likely to be
placed at risk of extinction”21 might demand a costly, meticulous and potentially lengthy process.
This is beyond the ability of most councils. Even if scientific information is available – say via the
council’s own consultant or an employee - certainty is not something that is readily available.
Environmental scientists will have a very different input into the assessment process than town
17
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planners,22 with their fixation on zoning and permissibility, and the modern managers who seek
quick, efficient decisions. This again suggests that some level of restructure may be in order. Larger
bodies are more likely to be able to afford sufficient environmental expertise, which may not only
be integrated into plan-making and development decisions but infused across all council functions.
The third problem is limited municipal funding, which underlies discussion in both ch 7 and
above. As the Crossroads report emphasises, “[t]he expansion of local government’s role … has not
been matched by a commensurate increase in revenue”.23 The ‘expanded role’ is a result of
community expectations, shifting of tasks from State government and the emergence of costly
statutory obligations. Many of the latter did not exist over ten years ago. The Crossroads report
goes on to note that “significant financial problems may be in prospect”.24 But it provides no
expectation of dramatic improvement in Commonwealth funding. Such cheerlessness is exacerbated
by the report’s criticism, in the following paragraph, of commonplace municipal “poor
management”, with the suggestion that Local Government “is trying to be all things to all people at
a price it cannot pay”.25 Such a criticism is questionable in view of Local Government’s multipurpose nature, which contrasts with specialist agencies at both Commonwealth and State levels.26
Despite the widening of Local Government’s responsibilities, its financial outlays have declined in
proportion to the other spheres of government.27 This puts Local Government in a vulnerable
position. As for biodiversity conservation, a council will not always regard it as a function worthy
of significant expenditure. Constituents might prefer their rate payments to be limited to ‘housekeeping’ tasks. Furthermore, the efficiency-driven modern municipal managers may resent the high
costs of on-site habitat restoration on council land and the assessment of detailed ecological
analyses that accompany development applications.28
The problem of municipal finance goes beyond insufficiency. It encompasses the sources of
revenue. The property tax guarantees continuation of the ‘ratepayer ideology’, thereby helping to
stultify innovation. In contrast, specific purpose grants can be conservation-friendly but are always
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temporary. Furthermore, not all councils will have the individual tenacity, ability and/or awareness
to submit applications and compete against other organisations. An example is ‘Bushcare’ funding
of which Local Government, as noted in ch 7,29 is only a minor recipient. Mercer observes that
“[s]pecific, often-short-term, ‘pilot’ environmental programmes … are quite common”.30
Outside rating, the Federal Assistant Grants (FAGs) comprise the chief source of revenue,
especially for remote councils.31 These are untied due to the ‘effort neutrality’ principle,32 which
means that money can be spent on anything lawful, such as lowering rates or improving a particular
‘housekeeping task’. For instance, FAG payments may be used to clear land for a sportsfield to
assist a popular, local football team.
Increased funding is still necessary if improved biodiversity conservation is to occur. What is
needed is conditional funding for unambiguous conservation purposes. And the source of new
funding must be the Commonwealth Government.33 After all, it is the Commonwealth that endorsed
the Biodiversity Convention and authored the National ESD Strategy and National Biodiversity
Strategy. It is at the national level where the wider benefits of biodiversity can be more readily
appreciated and fed into broader policy frameworks. Biodiversity conservation is far more than a
mere parochial issue. As made clear in ch 1, biodiversity is a global resource to be maintained for
current and future humankind. As stated by the parties to the Biodiversity Convention:
“conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is of critical importance for meeting
the food, health and other needs of the growing world population, for which purpose access to
and sharing of both genetic resources and technologies are essential”.34
For councils, this type of language and expectation is unfamiliar. Unless working within clear,
wider frameworks, Local Government has no role. As demonstrated by chs 8 and 9, provincial
outlooks will otherwise dominate. A council’s major interest in international matters may be
restricted to publicity via ‘sister city programs’ and dubious ‘educational’ jaunts.
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The ‘Local Agenda 21’ (LA21) phenomenon,35 one of the most potent connections between onground Local Government activity and international environmentalism, stirred numerous urban
councils to take biodiversity conservation more seriously. Brown observes that “Australia … agreed
that local authorities will develop an LA21 plan for their own districts by 2006”.36 Whilst the
scheme has led to local policy change in some quarters, it is now waning. Without new specialised
funding, its resurrection will not occur.
All the above does not mean that Local Government is redundant in the biodiversity conservation
context. The subsidiarity principle is still important, if not crucial. It is at the third sphere where,
with the benefit of broader strategies and increased, directed funding, local authorities may fill in
the conservation details via relevant local plans and on-ground action. This means that they may
serve as agents to central government in achieving biodiversity conservation.
Unfortunately, there is no promise of increased funding. In contrast to the early 1970s, it appears
that the Commonwealth Government has lost its strong environmental gleam. There are recent
exceptions, however, of (i) the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999,
and (ii) the 2000 ‘National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality’, endorsed by the COAG
(which includes the Australian Association of Local Government (ALGA)). The latter is primarily a
major funding program, representing the second phase of the ‘Natural Heritage Trust’ (NHT2),
which incorporates the Landcare phenomenon. It is now designed especially to address dryland
salinity and “ensure … land and water management practices will sustain productive and profitable
land and water uses as well as our natural environments”.37 The remarkable feature of the
relationship between Landcare and Local Government, however, is that it hardly exists. In 1994,
Campbell and Siepen described Local Government as “probably the most crucial layer of
government for assisting Landcare groups” yet the “most neglected”.38 They went on to refer to
35
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Local Government Landcare initiatives as “the exception rather than the rule”, noting that “many
Landcare groups despair at the attitudes and behaviour of their local council”.39 (Perhaps it is this
factor that has influenced the focus of NH2 funds away from the project-by-project approach to
prioritised regional catchments administered by the latest form of ‘new magistracies’).40
The lesson is that Local Government will not always universally embrace something that falls
outside its traditional role of ‘wastebin’ tasks, even if Commonwealth funding is available. If
Landcare has fallen outside the focus of rural councils, interest in biodiversity conservation may be
even less promising. Something far stronger than voluntary Commonwealth grants is needed.
One possibility is for the FAG scheme to undergo surgery, involving a third sector in addition to the
existing ‘local roads’ and ‘general purpose’ components. This would go beyond merely inserting a
new requirement that biodiversity conservation be considered by State grants commissions in
allocating ‘general purpose’ funding.41 It would require the State and Territory governments to
distribute grant moneys for particular, or approved, conservation functions. It would also need a
mechanism to check expenditure and implementation. This means a strong move away from the
‘effort neutrality’ principle. A worthwhile approach might be for councils to apply both regulatory
and active functions in accordance with bioregional plans. Councils would have the benefit of
moneys to fill in the details of the regional plans in co-operation with their neighbours.
A second alternative would be the introduction of specific purpose allowances designed solely for
biodiversity conservation, in similar fashion to the grants for children’s and aged care services
noted in passing in ch 7.42 This would be very different to the above as councils would compete
against other organisations. In the case of a council embedded in the ‘ratepayer ideology’, this
scheme would allow more dedicated, non-government organisations (NGOs) to take the lead.
Again, the idea of over-arching bioregional conservation plans is relevant.
The above suggestions are controversial and contain dramatic change to the existing system. They
are raised to assist debate.
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11.3

Various Options for Improvement

Many further obstacles have been acknowledged throughout this thesis, which can be more easily
addressed than the fundamental issues raised above. The key relevant statutes (or parts thereof)
discussed throughout this study, namely the LGA 1993 and the EPAA, together with relevant
subsidiary legislation, already provide significant opportunity for biodiversity conservation at the
local level. But they do not guarantee it. Throughout this study, various suggestions have been made
to enhance and clarify Local Government’s role in nature conservation, as listed below.
•

Improvement of references to ESD in the objectives provisions of key statutes so that ESD is no
longer one of several aims but represents the overriding goal;43

•

Establishment of a closer and more unified legal connection between ‘management plans’ and
SoERs within the LGA 1993, which would strengthen biodiversity conservation as a strategic
service function.44

•

Institution of training opportunities for councillors and relevant council staff on management
plans and SoERs. The management plan process should be designed to drive biodiversity
conservation across all or many relevant functions of an individual council. SoERs must
generate and monitor good conservation programs rather than merely describe the local
environment

•

Amendment of the LGA 1993 to ensure councils instil consideration of ESD principles (which
includes biodiversity conservation) into all their ‘principal activities’ listed in their management
plans rather than ‘environmental protection activities’ alone.45

•

Ensuring the Local Government (General) Regulation 1999 (LGGR) is consistent with the LGA
1993.

•

Insertion of definitions of various phrases and terms in the LGGR to avoid confusion and
inconsistent approaches between councils. For example, references to “counsult[ing]” and
“involv[ing]” … “the community (including environmental groups)” in relation to the
preparation of draft management plans and SoERs requires attention.46

•

Altering the EPAA to enable a council, when proposing to carry out an activity itself, to request
the relevant Minister to waive the application of Pt 5 EPAA if he or she is convinced that “a

43
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satisfactory environmental appraisal has already been undertaken under the management
plan/SoER ‘cycle’.47
•

Insertion of direct reference to ‘recovery plans’ (RPs) and ‘threat abatement plans (TAPs)
(made under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) (TSCA) or Fisheries
Management Act 1994 (NSW) (FMA)) in the list of SoER sectors under s 428(2)(c) LGA 1993
to ensure that the requirements to address these plans, currently locked away in the TSCA (see s
70(2)) and FMA (see s 220ZT(2)), are not overlooked.48 The same suggestion applies also to
Threat Abatement Plans (TAPs).

•

Strengthening integration between EPIs, especially regional environmental plans (REPs), and
RPs. This should be done on a regional or subregional basis to avoid inconsistent approaches.49

•

Insertion of a provision into the LGA 1993 to expressly allow two or more councils to jointly
prepare their SoERs, or chosen sectors of SoERs, preferably on a bioregional basis.50

•

Clarification of provisions on preparation of plans of management for community lands under
the LGA 1993 and the Crown lands Act 1989 (NSW).51

•

Improvement of the narrow ‘trio’ of provisions that dictate when a council must categorise
community land as ‘natural area’, with the objective of improving and expanding biodiversity
conservation on council lands.52

•

Improvement of the statutory articulated objectives of community lands and relevant
subcategories to give clearer priority to biodiversity conservation.53

•

Amendment of the LGA 1993 to require preparation of non-generic, specialised ‘natural plans
of management’ for all community lands categorised as ‘natural area’,54 preferably with the
assistance of guidelines prepared jointly by the DLG and the National Parks and Wildlife
Service (NPWS).

•

Amendment of ss 46(1)(b)(i) and 46(4) LGA 1993 to prevent developments for recreational and
educational purposes on community lands categorised as ‘natural areas’.55
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•

Amendment of the EPAA to authorise groups of councils to prepare draft Regional
Environmental Plans (REPs), subject to Ministerial approval.56

•

Preparation of guidelines for integrating biodiversity conservation into LEPs and Development
Control Plans (DCPs), adding detail to the existing Biodiversity Planning Guide for Local
Government,57 supported by associated seminars (perhaps conducted by the Local Government
Association and Shires Association (LGA&SA). The guidelines should pay particular attention
to, inter alia:
o

the drafting of tight, consistent and prioritised zonal objectives;

o

the design of strong ‘condition precedent’ clauses that allow a council to grant
development consent only if well-articulated conservation requirements are met;

o

the introduction of provisions that go beyond the traditional regulatory approaches,
encompassing a deliberate move away from tools originally designed to address urban
problems; and

o

examples of well-drafted environmental protection zones and clauses relating to
wildlife networks/habitat corridors and buffer areas around conservation reserves.58

•

Preparation of LEP-drafting guidelines, with special attention to framing zonal objectives, to
add further detail to the existing Biodiversity Planning Guide for Local Government,59 together
with associated training seminars (preferably conducted by the Local Government Association
and Shires Association.

•

Review of Direction No G21: Conservation of Environmental Heritage and Ecologically
Significant Items and Areas,60 issued under s 117(2) EPAA, to more concisely embrace
biodiversity conservation.

•

Re-examination of the s 71 EPAA determination issued originally on 17 Jan 1983 relating to the
restricted role of development standards in LEPs.

•

Update and expansion of definitions and provisions in the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Model Provisions 1980, especially in relation to tree preservation orders and of
‘tree’, ‘native vegetation’, ‘environmentally sensitive area’, ‘environmentally sensitive land’
and other relevant terms.

•
56
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o

Allow it to operate on a cross-boundary, or even regional basis; and

o

clarify that s 94 funds may be used for biodiversity conservation purposes, overcoming
any legal concern stemming from the ‘nexus’ principle.61

•

Investigation of the conservation disadvantages relating to existing use privileges,62 preferably
carried out by an independent person or committee.

•

Introduction of a new optional recreational/conservation sub-zone, with guidelines and a
voluntary template prepared by the State planning agency.

•

Overhaul of Direction No G13: Corridors,63 issued under s 117(2) EPAA, to ensure that draft
LEPs sufficiently confront protection and management of wildlife corridors and habitat
networks.

•

Introduction of a well-defined fifth rating category for lands that are primarily used for
biodiversity conservation management, involving significant statutory amendments to the LGA
1993. These lands would receive the lowest rating level of all categories.64 The system would
also recognise the partial use of rural properties for conservation management. The change
would prevent categorisation of ‘bush blocks’ as ‘farmland’ or, in a more bizarre situation, as
‘business’.65 It should also clarify the term ‘vacant’ in the case of the new category of ‘nature
conservation land’. Councils should be equipped with DLG guidelines to assess categorisation.
A lower rating for ‘bush blocks’ would provide a conservation incentive for landholders to
manage their lands for conservation purposes or, if the savings are minimal, at least enhance the
symbolism notion of biodiversity.66

•

Amendment of the LGA 1993 to enable a different valuation basis for ‘nature conservation
lands’, moving the valuation away from the overriding statutory concept of ‘land value’ (an
adjusted version of ‘unimproved capital value’67) to a specialised and lower form of value, in
similar fashion to “heritage valuations” under the Heritage Act 1977 (NSW).68

•

Alignment, as far as practicable, of the proposed ‘nature conservation lands’ under the rating
provisions of the LGA 1993 with ‘environmental protection zones’ under the EPAA.
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•

Reimbursement from the State Government of foregone rate moneys for lands under
conservation agreements between owners and the NPWS that fall within the range of statutory
rating exemptions under s 555(1)(b1) LGA 1993.

•

Consideration of statutory change to the LGA 1993 and National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974
(NSW) to permit individual councils to enter conservation agreements with landholders.69 This
would best be achieved on a bioregional basis with the assistance of regional bodies, such as
voluntary ‘regional organisations of councils’ (ROCs), together with the NPWS who may play
an advisory or concurrence role.

The above list provides a variety of recommendations, ranging from policy modification to solid
legislative change. Their attraction is that each one is at least feasible. They are designed to address
numerous hurdles to biodiversity conservation raised through this study. But they do not tackle the
centrepiece of this thesis. By themselves, they would not fix the ‘deep-seated’ problems discussed
earlier. Powerful structural change is recommended.
11.4

Regional Restructure

Throughout this thesis, numerous suggestions have been made about Local Government moving
towards a more regional approach to biodiversity conservation. The problems summarised earlier
all lead to this conclusion. So do many of the recommendations outlined above. If Local
Government wants to ensure it will not be left out in the cold by the recent environmental ‘new
magistracies’, it must strengthen its ability to play an enhanced regional role.
Local Government sees itself as the “principal means by which local and regional communities
express their identity, enhance their wellbeing [and] care for their environments”.70 A good example
of municipal regional activism is Local Government’s attempts to dominate the voluntary Regional
Development Organisations (RDOs) under the Keating government, as described in ch 4.71
Biodiversity conservation provides a more difficult context. Not only is the issue itself highly
complex, as indicated earlier; so are the relevant institutional arrangements, fragmented
environmental laws and potential for political conflict. Despite all this, a regional basis to
biodiversity conservation that leaves parochialism is essential.

69

Ibid.
Australian Local Government Association, National Agenda for Australian Local Government 2002, item 1
under ‘Preamble’, www.alga.asn.au.page.cfm?site_page_id+386 (accessed 16 Nov 2002). For a brief
description of the role and sources of the ‘LG National Agenda’, see ch 1.
71
See ch 4 .
70

406

Three options to advance regional environmental management by Local Government are outlined
below. Each one, or a combination, may not only fortify Local Government’s conservation capacity
but loosen its role as the State Government’s appendage carrying out ‘wastebin’ tasks.
The first option is the formal county council movement, discussed in ch 4.72 As concluded then,
county councils appear to be a dissipated force.73 But the time may now be ripe for reconsidering
the benefits of re-establishing county councils.
In a recent consultancy brief seeking a report on municipal natural resource management for the
LGA&SA, reference is made to a resolution of the Shires Association that recommends:
“explor[ing] a range of models as to how local government can be involved in the planning,
management, and monitoring of the natural resource environment. This may canvass models
such as local government, natural resource, county councils.74
The reference to ‘county councils’ is intriguing. One aim of the proposed report was to revisit a
similar document completed in 1998 for the then Local Government and Shires Associations
(LGSAs).75 The 1998 document highlighted the uncertainty facing Local Government in view of
not only the complexity of environmental responsibilities but also the moves of State Government
towards regional, appointed committees and their new, potentially prevailing plans.76 But it made
no reference to county councils. Perhaps the more recent acknowledgment raises the idea of ‘lower
tier’ councils ‘delegating upwards’ broad, environmental functions that extend beyond the usual
compartmentalised duties. For example, a county council could prepare a regional SoER. Subject to
legislative reform,77 a ‘higher tier’ council could prepare a cross-boundary LEP or even a REP. The
county councils – or, preferably, the same institutions with a more up-to-date name – could also
deal with ‘new magistracies’ more easily due to their size.
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The recent consultancy brief has already led to a ‘Background Paper’ released in late 2003, which
lists several advantages of county councils, including their ability to “[d]evelop management and
operational plans that focus resources on required outcomes without being restricted by boundary
considerations”.78 It also lists examples of “considerable” actions by county councils, such as “sitespecific management plans, negotiated with the local landholders, to reduce the impact of drainage
systems on wetlands and waterways”.79 This new interest in county councils fails to note their
generally weak role in the current overall structure of Local Government throughout NSW. Yet it
raises interest in their re-ignition.80 Whilst there is no direct reference to biodiversity conservation,
the paper stirs interest in the potential regional conservation role of county councils.
An advantage of county councils is that members appointed to the regional committees would
represent, and be answerable to, all the ‘lower tier’ councils. This means the county councils would
be accountable for less parochial plan-making and determining more controversial development
applications. Decisions would be in accordance with regional policy and statutory frameworks, such
as REPs. In the case where a council area is richer in biodiversity than its neighbours, the regional
plans must reflect this.
Another attraction of ‘higher tier’ councils might be their provision of an alternative to council
amalgamation. County councils could provide an alternative to compulsory, big ‘lower tier only’
councils. They do not involve the abolition of ‘lower tier’ councils that are closer to the grassroots
electorate but can deal with the matters delegated upwards to improve Local Government’s stature
and capacity. In the face of looming political uncertainty, councils may see county councils as a
saviour.
Despite the arguments, county councils may be an option in theory only. As suggested in ch 4, the
County of Cumberland experience illustrates how the State Government is unlikely to create strong
regional bodies under Local Government control.81 Such an argument is strengthened when the
push for major change to Local Government is no longer around the corner, as outlined further
below.
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The second option is voluntary ROCs, again addressed in ch 4.82 These are far more flexible
organisations than county councils. They are attractive to many councils - especially in urban and
coastal areas - in dealing with regional issues, including environmental matters. ROCs received
recent favourable comment in a key ‘Taskforce Report’ commissioned by the Minister responsible
for the EPAA, which states that:
“the current work occurring on various regional planning initiatives will provide the basis for
continuing regional planning in those regions. Hence, the work currently being undertaken by
some Regional Organisations of Councils and other stakeholders should be encouraged to
continue”.83
ROCs (and groups of ROCs) have produced numerous, impressive environmental projects. These
include:
•

sponsorship of Netwaste, a municipal “collaborative waste management project” by the Central
West Regional Organisation of Councils (CENTROC) and the Orana Regional Organisation of
Councils (OROC);84

•

consultative preparation and co-ordinated implementation of the ‘Model DCP and Resource
Folder – Protecting Sydney’s Wetlands’ by the Sydney Coastal Councils Group.85

•

commencement of a project entitled ‘Framework for the Integrated Planning of the Botany Bay
Catchment’, aimed to ensure a co-ordinated approach to “future facility expansion … consistent
with the principles of ESD”, by the Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils
(SSROC) with Commonwealth funding;86

•

the striking and well-known inter-ROC ‘Greenweb’ project,87 which commenced as a largescale vegetation investigation/mapping exercise across Sydney but has led to detailed actions by
various councils, including preparation of individual ‘biodiversity strategies’, and educational
seminars;88and
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This option is especially attractive to councils because the ROC is a purely local mechanism. But its
conservation ability is eroded by various factors. ROCs are fluid, open to membership change and
reliant on unreliable external funding. They are also weak or non-existent in remote areas.
Nevertheless, their contribution must not be underplayed.
The third option involves the most sweeping level of reform: i.e. boundary change and council
amalgamations. In the introductory chapter, it was stated that enforced amalgamation of councils in
NSW is permissible under the LGA 1993.89 Throughout the 1990s, unlike some of its interstate
counterparts, Local Government in NSW escaped a compulsory consolidation process. In 1999,
Marshall, Witherby and Dollery stressed the interest of the Commonwealth’s Office of Local
Government in “encourag[ing] [all] the states to undertake structural reform, particularly
amalgamations”.90 These authors explain that:
“[t]he rationale underlying mergers has been that of improved efficiency. Put simply, larger
municipalities are perceived as offering economies of scale and scope. Administrative
functions in particular are seen as providing the greatest source of potential savings”.91
The NSW Government is now following this principle with gusto. The most significant Local
Government spatial reform since the Barnett Inquiry92 is now occurring. A discussion paper issued
by the NSW Shires Association contains a quote from Premier Carr at a conference in 1993 stating
his desire to return to the following conference “with fewer but stronger councils”.93 Outside the
conference, the Premier apparently added that:
“we could do a lot by co-operation, but if they [i.e. individual councils] fall short then they
will be effectively asking us to crack the whip and we might have to do that”.94
The whip has since arrived, with anxiety spreading across councils throughout rural NSW. During
the 18 months since Jan 2003, the number of councils has reduced from 172 (as noted in ch 195) to
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154, as a result of compulsory amalgamations.96 Before then, the focus was on facilitated voluntary
amalgamation, which commenced in the mid-to-late 1990s.97 Local Government in NSW is now
falling into line with other States where, according to Aulich, “economic efficiency has supplanted
local democracy as a key value”.98
It is worth noting that the very recent report issued by the NSW Legislative Council’s General
Purpose Standing Committee No 5 on Local Government amalgamation does not fully support the
idea of guaranteed economies of scale. It concludes from its evidence that:
“Big councils are not necessarily more efficient. We acknowledge that amalgamations do
have the potential to provide efficiencies and economies of scale, particularly if a small
council is struggling to provide basic services. However, the extent of any efficiencies will
depend on the local circumstances. What is evident is that any amalgamation proposal should
undertake a thorough analysis and substantiate the savings that may occur and the costs that
will be associated with the change. We do not believe there is a demonstrated case that
amalgamations are always cost effective.”99
Notwithstanding such a recommendation, the Carr government is steaming ahead with forced
amalgamations in non-metropolitan areas.
Amalgamations will dilute various aspects that embed Local Government in Australian society,
namely its ‘democratic legitimacy’ and ‘grassroots nature’.100 In a larger council, elected
representatives will be further out of reach. Yet research by Marshall, Witherby and Dollery
suggests that “the bulk of .…[local] constituents do not feel that the democratic fabric of local
government [is] damaged by consolidation”, adding that those interviewed “identified more closely
with their own town or suburb than … with their local authority”.101 There is also the argument that
members of councils, due to their common farming and/or local business backgrounds, are not truly
representative in any event.102 Marshall and Sproats refer to a general movement away from
representative democracy to direct community participation in directing council policies and
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decisions.103 Sproats adopts the term ‘deliberative democracy’, which means “engagement of
citizens in dialogue, policy formulation, public judgement, and decision making”.104
The key tool in NSW for greater community involvement across all council activity is the
‘management plan’, although as outlined in ch 5, community input into the process is scarcely
overwhelming. Other opportunities for active participation include, inter alia, SoERs, ‘plans of
management’, ‘local approvals policies’, LEPs and DCPs. Most community attention is directed
closer to the ground, such as spot-rezonings of single allotments, reclassification of ‘community
land’ to saleable ‘operational land’ and determining controversial development applications.
Community involvement in the latter has existed since the early heady days of the ‘ecological’
vision. Enlargement of councils is unlikely to alter this. More work needs to be done to investigate
better means to connect citizens with plan-making and policy formulation. This should be more
achievable with larger councils where facilitation experts can be employed. Whilst local ratepayers
may continue to be most concerned most about their own patches, the elected members of larger
councils should be able to concentrate on bigger issues. Biodiversity conservation may enter this
realm, with concerned citizens and politicians engrossed in matters beyond corporate efficiency.
The related notion of Local Government’s ‘grassroots nature’, which councils are always keen to
brag about, especially when under threat, may not be a major issue. First, the emerging electronic
age opens the door to quick communication across vast distances. Second, in terms of personal
interaction, local committees or other neighbourhood mechanisms may be established that enable
improved community input into council policy and actions. Daly refers to “[l]ocal community units
… meshed into larger councils”.105 This mechanism was available under the old LGA 1919 with
‘local district’ and ‘urban’ committees.106 Under the LGA 1993, a council has wide powers to

103
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“delegate to the general manager or any other person [other than another employee] or any other
body” its non-regulatory functions, subject to key exceptions.107
The idea of local town, suburb or district committees or teams carrying out delegated tasks is
exciting. Possible scenarios include:
•

initiating ideas for ‘principal activities’ relevant to local areas to be addressed in draft
‘management plans’;

•

providing input into ‘plans of management’ for special pieces of public land;

•

assisting preparation of SoERs, or mini-SoERs in sensitive neighbourhoods; and

•

co-operating in the preparation of LEPs and DCPs from the outset.

Such actions are clearly consistent with the ‘grassroots principle’. The spatial distances of these
bodies from the civic centre should not be problematic if they receive sufficient support.
As mentioned earlier, larger councils should lead to increased ability to employ more sophisticated
expertise.108 For example, each ‘big council’ could appoint a senior ‘conservation manager’,
supported by a technical team armed with sufficient tools for input into LEPs and DCPs. It could
also devise ‘natural area plans of management’ and undertake on-ground works whilst supervising
and training volunteers. The conservation success of such a manager would depend, of course, on
the overall council structure and the conservation commitment on the part of both other officers and
council members themselves.
There is little doubt that bigger councils with ecologically-based boundaries would be a
conservation blessing. But the use of bioregional borders is unlikely without severe boundary
adjustment. It is more probable that many existing borderlines are providing the ‘building blocks for
reform’, with regions based on ‘communities of interest’ rather than biodiversity demands.
Nevertheless, councils of larger size will still be in a far better position to leave neighbourhood
disputes behind. The concern, however, is that the emphases will be on cost-saving and efficiency
improvement rather than tackling more complex, expensive matters.
Is there any preferred option of the above three to enhance biodiversity conservation? A ‘two-tier’
system is tempting but probably politically impractical. Voluntary ROCs rely too much on
107
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flexibility. So despite the various problems raised above, shire amalgamations are, arguably, the
most attractive. Big councils would enjoy sufficient muscle in protecting Local Government’s
interests, such as seeking additional grant moneys and technical assistance from central
government. But a distinction must be made between benefits for Local Government operations and
kudos on the one hand, and increased prospect for improved biodiversity conservation on the other.
A major quandary still lurks behind all the optimism: i.e. Local Government’s ‘historical and
cultural baggage’. This is manifested by the ongoing ‘ratepayer ideology’ as argued throughout this
thesis. Both big and small councils rely on this fiercely guarded tax, which clearly works against
biodiversity conservation. Big councils will not always be immune from the associated paradigm of
developmentalism, which continues to gnaw away at the biophysical environment. They may
simply learn more about what is being destroyed, contributing to a huge museum of information on
ecological damage and loss via documents such as ‘7/8 part test reports’, species impact statements
(SISs) and simple ‘statements of environmental effects’.
One solution is that councils work more closely with the ‘new magistracies’ rather than seeing them
as competitors. The ‘new magistracies’, as their name implies, are recent. They do not suffer from
the pull of the ‘ratepayer ideology’. The best approach is for councils to work together with these
regional bodies, with Local Government demonstrating its seriousness about biodiversity
conservation and contributing to sounds regional environmental policy.
11.5

Final Comment

This thesis has travelled a long journey. But it has never put aside the fundamental fact that Local
Government plays a critical role in biodiversity conservation. At the same time, our local
biodiversity – which belongs not only to us but also the global community, future generations and
other species – is being decimated daily. Local Government is not performing. The thought of how
many habitats and ecosystems have been lost during the preparation of this thesis, as a result of bad
(or no) plans and decisions, is more than disturbing.
It is not intended, however, that this thesis should end with gloom. Pessimism can lead too easily to
defeat. Instead, concentration should be directed towards many of the changes – both large and
small – considered throughout this study. Alternative change could also be explored. Dovers
suggests, for example, that “ESD deserves an equivalent to the role the Productivity Commission
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plays in economic policy”.109 Even without such significant change, there is no doubt that additional
funding is crucial. It may be time to revisit the Whitlam Government’s attempt to alter the
Constitution to enable direct funding from the Commonwealth to Local Government.110 This would
provide one step to assuage the supporters of Local Government in their quest for Constitutional
recognition. Significant parts of such funding, however, must be directed at biodiversity
conservation in line with the principles of the National Biodiversity Strategy.
Creation of conservation opportunities will require substantial political support. For those
committed to biodiversity conservation – i.e. the ‘champions’ - the pressure must continue. The
opportunities Local Government can provide must be seized upon and improved, if not
revolutionised. The ‘sleeping giant’ must be jolted awake.111 Otherwise, our beautiful wide brown
land of “sweeping plains” and “ragged mountain ranges” will continue to become treeless and
bleak.112
-o0O0o-
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POSTSCRIPT
Since 2003,1 enormous change has occurred. The recent enforced amalgamations of Local
Government have already been raised in the concluding chapter. Other major change should be
observed.
Substantial structural change has occurred at the State level. In May 2003, PlanningNSW, the
successor to the then longstanding Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP), was melded
with the Department of Land and Water Conservation. The new mega-agency is the Department of
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR).2 This means that legislation in relation to
environmental planning, native vegetation, catchment and water management is now administered
by the one agency. Whilst this should provide opportunity for integration, the sheer size of the
department, despite ongoing shedding of staff, does not promise this. It also means that when
dealing with the State planning agency, Local Government will be communicating with a
juggernaut. The impression of the author, however, is that the Department intends to delegate away
many of its tasks. The extent to which Local Government will be involved remains to be tested. It
appears that a main victor, however, will be the newly established ‘catchment management
authorities’ (CMAuths).
The CMAuth is the kingpin of ‘new magistracies’. It has arisen from new legislation, the Catchment
Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW) (CMAA), which repealed the Catchment Management
Act 1989 (NSW).3 The CMAuths have therefore replaced the former catchment management
boards. The CMAuth areas are much larger, with only 13 ‘catchment management areas’
established across NSW.4 As a result, the issue of Local Government operating on regional scales
arises again. But this time the regions are huge. Even large amalgamated councils may need to
consider regional mechanisms, such as widespread voluntary regional organisations and macrocounty councils, if they wish to liaise closely with the CMAuths and play a strong role in natural
resource management.

1

It will be recalled that the legal context of this thesis does not go beyond 1 Jan 2003.
Note also the more recent consolidation of the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the National
Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) into the Department of Environment and Conservation.
3
Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW), s 42.
4
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In line with earlier ‘new magistracies’, the members of the CMAuths are appointed. The CMAA
allows for five to seven members,5 who “together have, in the opinion of the Minister, skills and
knowledge” in nine areas.6 At the head the statutory list is “primary production”. Even though the
list contains no prioritisation, this may reflect rumours that rural landholders dominate the
CMAuths.7 The seventh sector is “biodiversity conservation”. The third is “State and local
government administrations”. Notably, a person who has “skills and knowledge” in Local
Government need not be a councillor.8 He or she may not answer to all of the councils within the
region. Skill and knowledge clearly overrides representativeness. Further clarification is required on
the relationship between the CMAuths and Local Government. Notwithstanding a ‘Memorandum of
Understanding’ between the State and Local Governments entitled Natural Resource Management
Partnership Agreement (NRMPA),9 mentioned again below, the author has observed significant
unawareness and confusion amongst elected members concerning the CMAuths.10
Each CMAuth, in a similar manner to the old catchment management boards, is given “the general
function of carrying out or funding catchment management activities”.11 It is expected they will
develop further expertise in seeking external grant moneys, thereby potentially competing with keen
sectors of Local Government. The CMAA goes on to state that a CMAuth “has such other functions
as are conferred or imposed on it by … this or any other Act (including any environmental planning
instrument).12 A note in the statute states that CMAuths “have the capacity to be appointed as the
consent authority for development under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
[EPAA]”. This means there is potential for CMAuths to be regulatory agencies, leaving Local
Government aside in circumstances yet to be seen. A CMAuth may also levy “catchment
contributions” on lands within its area,13 which raises issues similar to those discussed throughout
ch 6.
5

Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW), s 8(3).
Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW), s 8(4).
7
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The CMAA replaces the old ‘blueprint’ plans with statutorily recognised ‘catchment action plans’,14
developed by the CMAuths.15 This new framework is still in its infancy. The extent, if any, to which
the new plans will be aligned with regional environmental plans (REPs) and local environmental
plans (LEPs) will be very interesting. The NRMPA recognises the potential for integration by
stating:
“Local government will wherever possible harness its exiting local and regional mechanisms
to help deliver natural resource management outcomes through the Catchment Action Plan
process and collectively identify opportunities for improving investment in [natural resource
management]. This will include investigating new ways of building and strengthening
regional local cooperation.”16
The reference to regional mechanisms is especially intriguing in view of the level of attention paid
to regional frameworks throughout this thesis. The NRMPA raises the concept of a ‘regional
catchment management authority/local government forum’ for each of the 13 regions, which may
comprise “an existing regional body such as a regional organisation of council [ROC] or a new
arrangement”.17 The reference to ROCs and other potential arrangements may prod councils to
strengthen regional networks to ensure their involvement in catchment planning under the new
regime.
Another element of this latest generation of legislative change is the Native Vegetation Act 1993
(NSW) (NVA), which repeals the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) (NVCA).18 The
NVA continues to demand Ministerial consent for land clearance, with wide definitions19 and a new
emphasis on ‘broadscale’ clearing.20 Such clearing is not to be approved unless it “improve[s] or
maintain[s] environmental outcomes”.21 Specified metropolitan council areas and zones continue to
be excluded from the scheme.22 There are no further specified exemptions – such as the two hectare
‘minimal clearing’ exception under the former NVCA23 – in which the Local Government may fill
in the gap. There is opportunity, however, for regulations to be made to provide further
exclusions.24

14

Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (NSW), ss 19-26.
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The concept of ‘regional vegetation management plans’ (RVMPs) has not continued. The NVA
rescinds all RVMPs made under the NVCA.25 It appears that they have been replaced by (i)
individual ‘property vegetation plans’ and (ii) integration with the ‘catchment action plans’
prepared by the CMAuths under the CMAA.
There is no longer a role for ‘regional vegetation committees’, jettisoning one of the latest ‘new
magistracies’. Instead, it appears that this role is to be fulfilled, at lease partially, by the CMAuths.
In determining an application for land clearance, the Minister must take into account “any relevant
provisions of catchment management plans of catchment management authorities”.26 Furthermore,
the Minister may delegate the approval of a ‘property vegetation plan’ to the relevant CMAuth.27
There is no requirement, however, that a property vegetation plan be consistent with a catchment
management plan.28
The change does not stop at catchment management and clearance control. At the time of writing, a
Water Management Amendment Bill 2004 is before the NSW Legislative Council. In the
explanatory notes, an ‘objective’ of the Bill is “to give [CMAuths] a role in water management and
to provide a link with catchment management plans”.29 Whilst no further discussion on these
changes will be pursued here, it is important to note the increasing complexity of natural resource
management for councils and the special role of the CMAuths.
No major changes have occurred to the EPAA or Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) since Jan
2003. But as noted in ch 4, the former DUAP recommended substantial change to Pt 3 EPAA under
the ‘Planfirst’ reforms.30 In 2003, after several years of putting the proposals together, the ‘Kibble
Taskforce’ - chaired by a former Director of DUAP - dismissed most of Planfirst’s
recommendations

31

The then proposed “regional forums … intended to bring together key

government and community interests” were criticised by the ‘Taskforce’ as inappropriate.32 Instead,
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addition to the potential of environmental planning instruments – notably state environmental
planning policies (SEPPs) and ‘regional environmental plans’ (REPs) - and other plans. It states
that:
“[t]here currently exists a range of catchment management blueprints and other related and
associated natural resource management plans throughout NSW. DIPNR now has the
opportunity to reconcile the critical objectives and provisions of those plans within the
provisions of SEPPs, regional strategies and REPs. In some circumstances (eg: where
regionally significant vegetation exists) it may be appropriate to introduce the provisions of
a particular recovery plan or catchment management plan as a SEPP or REP to provide it
with appropriate statutory weight.”33
The statement reinforces the need for regional approaches to biodiversity conservation. It not only
refers to REPs but also recovery plans under threatened species law and the unclear notion of
‘regional strategies’, which are to be a new instrument altogether different from the catchment
strategy.
What may be of more immediate interest to Local Government is local planning. The Taskforce
recommends that the LEP be replaced by the ‘integrated plan’, which is “to integrate with a broad
range of council plans and strategies and also to integrate with State government planning
objectives”.34 The recommendation is curious as a LEP can already achieve this. Perhaps the
suggested name change is designed to raise enthusiasm. Of greater concern is that some parts of the
‘integrated plan’ are to be subject to a “regulated template”, with “a standard set of zones to be
developed”.35 Exhibition of the ‘template’ for public comment is imminent.
The idea of enforced templates threatens any remaining individuality throughout local government.
The focus should be on workshops, education and provisions of potential drat plans that supplement
the Biodiversity Planning Guide for NSW Local Government.36 On some occasions, the State
Government may need to intervene to stop bad plans and poor decision-making. In general,
however, if local government can demonstrate that it can embrace good approaches to biodiversity
conservation on a regional scale, based on sufficient resources for implementation, interference by
the State Government may be thwarted.
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A further, related proposed major adjustment is the national push for a uniform development
assessment process, which has arisen from the ‘Development Assessment Forum’.37 The most
recent document includes a range of proposals from re-organising categories of development for
varying levels of assessment to refining the role of elected representatives so that they:
“take responsibility for the development of planning policies and that independent bodies
(such as panels, which may include elected politicians) be responsible for assessing
applications against these policies”.38
The above recommendation might be attractive in theory but hard to maintain. As politicians,
councillors are frequently under pressure from developers and concerned citizens in relation to
development proposals. It is most unlikely that they would want to relinquish this power.
On top of all these changes, as stated at the outset of this note, is the upheaval of shire
amalgamations. This adds to the current confusion of government change. In the current tumult,
continuing administrative overhaul may outweigh biodiversity conservation tasks, such as restoring
roadside remnants and preventing ecologically adverse developments.
-o0O0o-
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